On June 28, 2023, an Iraqi refugee burned pages of the holy Quran in Stockholm, setting the emotions of the Islamic world ablaze. The Iraqi government’s reaction to this act – ordering the expulsion of the Swedish ambassador in Bagdad – was a measure deeply surprising to many observers in both its swiftness and harshness. Few expected that the Iraqi government would expel the ambassador and cut diplomatic ties, given the presence of many Iraqi refugees in Sweden.
There is a reason for Iraq’s sharp response, and it has to do with domestic Iraqi politics. The government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani wanted to limit the ability of political leader Muqtada al-Sadr to take advantage of the Quran burning to re-enter the Iraqi political scene.
Sadr’s supporters had staged an attack on the Swedish embassy in Baghdad on July 20 in response to the Quran burning. Sadr’s photo can be clearly seen in the hands of the demonstrators. None of the political parties and other factions supporting the Iraqi government, including the founders of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), who might have been expected to stage protests, issued any call for a rally in front of the Swedish embassy.
“Al-Sudani was in a critical moment, and he was afraid that Muqtada Sadr would dictate his will to him by creating controversy,” Karrar Kamuna, a political analyst and vice-president of the Ishtar Study Center in Iraq, explained in an interview with the authors. “That’s why he saw it as taking the initiative and not letting Sadr take the lead. “
According to Kamuna, the prime minister wanted to pre-empt Sadr and assure that his followers’ actions did not dominate coverage of the situation. “For this reason, after consulting with the political parties of the Shia Coordination Framework, which are considered al-Sudani’s main supporters, he informed the Swedish government a few hours before the act of burning the Quran in Sweden that if this happens, he will cut ties with Stockholm,” Kamuna said. He added that Sudani leaked the news to the media, including the official news agency of Iraq, “so that the attention was directed to the government instead of Muqtada al-Sadr’s behavior.”
Kamuna said that Sadr had been planning to give a speech on the Quran burning after his followers attacked the Swedish embassy, but Sudani got ahead of Sadr by ordering the expulsion of the ambassador from Iraq and the closure of the Swedish embassy. Thus, when Sadr gave a speech that afternoon, he had nothing more to call upon the government to do, as the prime minister had already taken the harshest measures possible.
With this act, Sudani had killed two birds with one stone: He satisfied the international community, which had condemned the attack on the embassy, and he won the approval of an angry public and took attention away from Sadr, Kamuna said.
Yet, Kamuna could be wrong, as the Iraqi government’s move did not have much global outreach.
Mohammed Ridha Mohammed Hassan, a former advisor to the late Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, told the authors that the Sudani government acted to prevent Sadr from causing more chaos. “Perhaps the action of the Iraqi government can be described as harsh behavior, but there was no other solution,” Mohammed Ridha said. “The stability and establishment of the government is the main goal for the Iraqi administration. Al-Sudani’s government is against any incident that created a similar situation in October 2018 against the government of [prime minister] Adel Abdul Mahdi. He is afraid of a similar situation, so he does not allow any risks.”
Mohammed Ridha was referring to small protests against the Iraqi political establishment that broke out in 2018 and mushroomed in a one-year span into a massive demonstration after Sadr took the scene. Sadr was able to take the leadership of the protests and mobilize his supporters, forcing the government to call early elections. Many Iraqi politicians saw that incident as a threat to the Iraqi system of a sectarian division of power that replaced the Ba’athist regime following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
“Now the Swedish government is also interacting with the Iraqi government,” Mohammed Ridha said. “At the same time, the Iraqi government is the frontrunner of the countries that seek to hold the Organization of Islamic Countries’ emergency meeting. If the Iraqi government did not show that strong reaction, it would now have to submit to the atmosphere created in Iraq by someone else, and every action it would take after that would be interpreted as a concession to that person. But now, there is no action left to give such privilege to anyone.”
Mohammed Ridha also emphasized that Sudani made this decision to break ties with Sweden after consultation with the main groups of the Shia Coordination Framework, the political faction that is his main supporter. This contrasts with previous prime ministers, who often acted during crises and only later informed their political supporters.
Sudani has not suffered from international condemnation for these actions and even the Swedish government has expressed understanding and appears to be trying to ameliorate the situation. Sweden has ordered a reconsideration of asylum status for the Iraqi refugee who burned the Quran. In the court of Iraqi public opinion, this action is likely to be considered a victory for the Iraqi government.
The prime minister now appears in a stronger political position than his immediate predecessors, Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Abdul Mahdi. It remains to be seen, however, if Sadr will seek another pretext to try to return to the political spotlight in Iraq.
Ali Mousavi Khalkhali is a Tehran-based political analyst and the editor-in-chief of Iranian Diplomacy, a website that explores diplomatic developments of the Middle East and Iran.
Saeed Azimi is a Tehran-based political journalist.
Iraq’s Prime Minister Pre-empts a Sadr Comeback After Quran Burnings
By Ali Mousavi Khalkahli • Saeed Azimi
Middle East & North Africa
On June 28, 2023, an Iraqi refugee burned pages of the holy Quran in Stockholm, setting the emotions of the Islamic world ablaze. The Iraqi government’s reaction to this act – ordering the expulsion of the Swedish ambassador in Bagdad – was a measure deeply surprising to many observers in both its swiftness and harshness. Few expected that the Iraqi government would expel the ambassador and cut diplomatic ties, given the presence of many Iraqi refugees in Sweden.
There is a reason for Iraq’s sharp response, and it has to do with domestic Iraqi politics. The government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani wanted to limit the ability of political leader Muqtada al-Sadr to take advantage of the Quran burning to re-enter the Iraqi political scene.
Sadr’s supporters had staged an attack on the Swedish embassy in Baghdad on July 20 in response to the Quran burning. Sadr’s photo can be clearly seen in the hands of the demonstrators. None of the political parties and other factions supporting the Iraqi government, including the founders of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), who might have been expected to stage protests, issued any call for a rally in front of the Swedish embassy.
“Al-Sudani was in a critical moment, and he was afraid that Muqtada Sadr would dictate his will to him by creating controversy,” Karrar Kamuna, a political analyst and vice-president of the Ishtar Study Center in Iraq, explained in an interview with the authors. “That’s why he saw it as taking the initiative and not letting Sadr take the lead. “
According to Kamuna, the prime minister wanted to pre-empt Sadr and assure that his followers’ actions did not dominate coverage of the situation. “For this reason, after consulting with the political parties of the Shia Coordination Framework, which are considered al-Sudani’s main supporters, he informed the Swedish government a few hours before the act of burning the Quran in Sweden that if this happens, he will cut ties with Stockholm,” Kamuna said. He added that Sudani leaked the news to the media, including the official news agency of Iraq, “so that the attention was directed to the government instead of Muqtada al-Sadr’s behavior.”
Kamuna said that Sadr had been planning to give a speech on the Quran burning after his followers attacked the Swedish embassy, but Sudani got ahead of Sadr by ordering the expulsion of the ambassador from Iraq and the closure of the Swedish embassy. Thus, when Sadr gave a speech that afternoon, he had nothing more to call upon the government to do, as the prime minister had already taken the harshest measures possible.
With this act, Sudani had killed two birds with one stone: He satisfied the international community, which had condemned the attack on the embassy, and he won the approval of an angry public and took attention away from Sadr, Kamuna said.
Yet, Kamuna could be wrong, as the Iraqi government’s move did not have much global outreach.
Mohammed Ridha Mohammed Hassan, a former advisor to the late Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, told the authors that the Sudani government acted to prevent Sadr from causing more chaos. “Perhaps the action of the Iraqi government can be described as harsh behavior, but there was no other solution,” Mohammed Ridha said. “The stability and establishment of the government is the main goal for the Iraqi administration. Al-Sudani’s government is against any incident that created a similar situation in October 2018 against the government of [prime minister] Adel Abdul Mahdi. He is afraid of a similar situation, so he does not allow any risks.”
Mohammed Ridha was referring to small protests against the Iraqi political establishment that broke out in 2018 and mushroomed in a one-year span into a massive demonstration after Sadr took the scene. Sadr was able to take the leadership of the protests and mobilize his supporters, forcing the government to call early elections. Many Iraqi politicians saw that incident as a threat to the Iraqi system of a sectarian division of power that replaced the Ba’athist regime following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
“Now the Swedish government is also interacting with the Iraqi government,” Mohammed Ridha said. “At the same time, the Iraqi government is the frontrunner of the countries that seek to hold the Organization of Islamic Countries’ emergency meeting. If the Iraqi government did not show that strong reaction, it would now have to submit to the atmosphere created in Iraq by someone else, and every action it would take after that would be interpreted as a concession to that person. But now, there is no action left to give such privilege to anyone.”
Mohammed Ridha also emphasized that Sudani made this decision to break ties with Sweden after consultation with the main groups of the Shia Coordination Framework, the political faction that is his main supporter. This contrasts with previous prime ministers, who often acted during crises and only later informed their political supporters.
Sudani has not suffered from international condemnation for these actions and even the Swedish government has expressed understanding and appears to be trying to ameliorate the situation. Sweden has ordered a reconsideration of asylum status for the Iraqi refugee who burned the Quran. In the court of Iraqi public opinion, this action is likely to be considered a victory for the Iraqi government.
The prime minister now appears in a stronger political position than his immediate predecessors, Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Abdul Mahdi. It remains to be seen, however, if Sadr will seek another pretext to try to return to the political spotlight in Iraq.
Ali Mousavi Khalkhali is a Tehran-based political analyst and the editor-in-chief of Iranian Diplomacy, a website that explores diplomatic developments of the Middle East and Iran.
Saeed Azimi is a Tehran-based political journalist.
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