Recent reports that Saudi Arabia plans to reopen diplomatic ties with Syria 11 years after Riyadh cut off diplomatic relations with Bashar al-Assad’s regime follow the announcement of the Chinese-brokered deal to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This latest development can be viewed both in the context of “natural disaster diplomacy” as well as increased Saudi hedging away from dependence on the United States.
Even before the devastating February 6 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria, there has been a trend among Arab states to bring Syria back into the region’s diplomatic fold. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which armed the Free Syrian Army and called for Assad’s ouster at early stages of the Syrian crisis, reopened its embassy in Damascus in late 2018. Ever since, Abu Dhabi has been driving Arab efforts to accept the reality of Assad’s survival. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, and Jordan have been essentially on the same page as the UAE, but Saudi Arabia had, until recently, held out against rapprochement with Damascus.
At this point, however, Riyadh recognizes that existing efforts to overthrow Assad have failed. The Syrian state’s weaknesses and the country’s abysmal economic conditions seem to give Saudi Arabia reason to believe it has an opportunity to leverage its resources and at least partly lure Damascus away from a long alliance with Tehran. Whether that goal is realistic is another question.
This is not to say that Saudi officials have any new love for Assad’s regime. No one in the Kingdom forgets that the Syrian president called Saudi Arabia’s late King Abdullah and other regional leaders “half men” for not supporting Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel, nor do they forget the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on the opposition inside Syria since 2011. Rather, Riyadh normalizing relations with Damascus reflects Saudi pragmatism and a desire to safeguard regional stability as Riyadh pursues an ambitious economic agenda to wean itself off reliance on hydrocarbon exports.
Enter Vladimir Putin
When assessing Saudi Arabia’s calculus toward Assad, the Russian factor is also important. Ever since Moscow introduced its air power to prop up Assad in 2015, one of the Kremlin’s goals has been to cajole Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members into coming to terms with the need to deal with the continuing reality of Assad’s regime.
Thus, recent talks to normalize Saudi-Syrian ties have been held in Moscow. They are expected to lead to a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries after the fasting month of Ramadan. Such a deal would mark a significant Russian foreign policy win only weeks after China, building on prior efforts by Iraq and Oman, brokered a similar agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, has made no secret of his desire to make Saudi Arabia more independent from the US. Strengthening ties with Washington’s adversaries, chiefly Russia and China, serves this purpose. On March 29, the Saudi cabinet approved a decision for the Kingdom to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in a move seen as a further nod to Beijing. Saudi rapprochement with Syria, meanwhile, would bring Riyadh closer to the Kremlin. As the two leaders of OPEC+, Saudi Arabia and Russia already work together to manage global oil supplies. The future of this cartel matters significantly to the Kingdom’s continued economic health.
Saudi-Syria rapprochement also underscores the futility of US efforts to convince Washington’s Arab allies and partners not to rehabilitate the Assad regime.
One of President Joe Biden’s goals when he visited Saudi Arabia last year—and controversially fist-bumped Mohammad bin Salman—was to convince the Kingdom to avoid moving closer to Russia and China. A Russian-mediated Saudi-Syria reconciliation following the Chinese-brokered one between the Kingdom and the Islamic Republic underscores the extent to which Moscow and Beijing have already wedged themselves between Washington and Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia’s leadership must consider, however, how rapprochement with Assad could further negatively impact its partnership with Washington. Reopening a diplomatic mission in Damascus and sending a Saudi ambassador back to Syria would not constitute a violation of the crippling US-imposed Caesar sanctions against the war-torn country, but supporting reconstruction in Syria absent a political deal with the Syrian opposition would.
There are several key questions to consider. First, would Saudi Arabia boldly disregard the Caesar sanctions after normalizing diplomatic relations with Damascus? Second, would the Biden administration subject Saudi Arabia to economic penalties if the Saudis disregard Washington’s secondary sanctions on Syria? How much political capital is the White House willing to invest into pressuring Arab states not to help Syrians reconstruct and redevelop their country? Given that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration, officials in Riyadh might assess that the White House will not enforce the Caesar Act by imposing sanctions on US-friendly Arab states that do business in post-conflict Syria.
Riyadh might still proceed cautiously after resuming diplomatic relations with Assad’s government to avoid new problems in Washington. Yet, depending on how Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran develops and whether the cease-fire in Yemen holds, the Kingdom may find itself less in need of US security guarantees than in the past, when tensions between Riyadh and Tehran were sky high.
Another factor to consider is that, notwithstanding strong rhetoric, US officials might see rapprochements between America’s regional partners and Damascus as not entirely negative. Given that Assad’s survival is a reality, Washington might find it useful to have US-friendly Arab states on positive terms with Damascus. They could serve as diplomatic bridges between Washington and Assad and provide a path for backchannel communications with the Syrian regime at a time of continued clashes between Iran- and Syria-backed militias and a small contingent of US forces in northeast Syria.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
Saudi-Syria Rapprochement a New Sign of Saudi Hedging and a Win for Russian Diplomacy
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Recent reports that Saudi Arabia plans to reopen diplomatic ties with Syria 11 years after Riyadh cut off diplomatic relations with Bashar al-Assad’s regime follow the announcement of the Chinese-brokered deal to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This latest development can be viewed both in the context of “natural disaster diplomacy” as well as increased Saudi hedging away from dependence on the United States.
Even before the devastating February 6 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria, there has been a trend among Arab states to bring Syria back into the region’s diplomatic fold. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which armed the Free Syrian Army and called for Assad’s ouster at early stages of the Syrian crisis, reopened its embassy in Damascus in late 2018. Ever since, Abu Dhabi has been driving Arab efforts to accept the reality of Assad’s survival. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, and Jordan have been essentially on the same page as the UAE, but Saudi Arabia had, until recently, held out against rapprochement with Damascus.
At this point, however, Riyadh recognizes that existing efforts to overthrow Assad have failed. The Syrian state’s weaknesses and the country’s abysmal economic conditions seem to give Saudi Arabia reason to believe it has an opportunity to leverage its resources and at least partly lure Damascus away from a long alliance with Tehran. Whether that goal is realistic is another question.
This is not to say that Saudi officials have any new love for Assad’s regime. No one in the Kingdom forgets that the Syrian president called Saudi Arabia’s late King Abdullah and other regional leaders “half men” for not supporting Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel, nor do they forget the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on the opposition inside Syria since 2011. Rather, Riyadh normalizing relations with Damascus reflects Saudi pragmatism and a desire to safeguard regional stability as Riyadh pursues an ambitious economic agenda to wean itself off reliance on hydrocarbon exports.
Enter Vladimir Putin
When assessing Saudi Arabia’s calculus toward Assad, the Russian factor is also important. Ever since Moscow introduced its air power to prop up Assad in 2015, one of the Kremlin’s goals has been to cajole Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members into coming to terms with the need to deal with the continuing reality of Assad’s regime.
Thus, recent talks to normalize Saudi-Syrian ties have been held in Moscow. They are expected to lead to a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries after the fasting month of Ramadan. Such a deal would mark a significant Russian foreign policy win only weeks after China, building on prior efforts by Iraq and Oman, brokered a similar agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, has made no secret of his desire to make Saudi Arabia more independent from the US. Strengthening ties with Washington’s adversaries, chiefly Russia and China, serves this purpose. On March 29, the Saudi cabinet approved a decision for the Kingdom to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in a move seen as a further nod to Beijing. Saudi rapprochement with Syria, meanwhile, would bring Riyadh closer to the Kremlin. As the two leaders of OPEC+, Saudi Arabia and Russia already work together to manage global oil supplies. The future of this cartel matters significantly to the Kingdom’s continued economic health.
Saudi-Syria rapprochement also underscores the futility of US efforts to convince Washington’s Arab allies and partners not to rehabilitate the Assad regime.
One of President Joe Biden’s goals when he visited Saudi Arabia last year—and controversially fist-bumped Mohammad bin Salman—was to convince the Kingdom to avoid moving closer to Russia and China. A Russian-mediated Saudi-Syria reconciliation following the Chinese-brokered one between the Kingdom and the Islamic Republic underscores the extent to which Moscow and Beijing have already wedged themselves between Washington and Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia’s leadership must consider, however, how rapprochement with Assad could further negatively impact its partnership with Washington. Reopening a diplomatic mission in Damascus and sending a Saudi ambassador back to Syria would not constitute a violation of the crippling US-imposed Caesar sanctions against the war-torn country, but supporting reconstruction in Syria absent a political deal with the Syrian opposition would.
There are several key questions to consider. First, would Saudi Arabia boldly disregard the Caesar sanctions after normalizing diplomatic relations with Damascus? Second, would the Biden administration subject Saudi Arabia to economic penalties if the Saudis disregard Washington’s secondary sanctions on Syria? How much political capital is the White House willing to invest into pressuring Arab states not to help Syrians reconstruct and redevelop their country? Given that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration, officials in Riyadh might assess that the White House will not enforce the Caesar Act by imposing sanctions on US-friendly Arab states that do business in post-conflict Syria.
Riyadh might still proceed cautiously after resuming diplomatic relations with Assad’s government to avoid new problems in Washington. Yet, depending on how Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran develops and whether the cease-fire in Yemen holds, the Kingdom may find itself less in need of US security guarantees than in the past, when tensions between Riyadh and Tehran were sky high.
Another factor to consider is that, notwithstanding strong rhetoric, US officials might see rapprochements between America’s regional partners and Damascus as not entirely negative. Given that Assad’s survival is a reality, Washington might find it useful to have US-friendly Arab states on positive terms with Damascus. They could serve as diplomatic bridges between Washington and Assad and provide a path for backchannel communications with the Syrian regime at a time of continued clashes between Iran- and Syria-backed militias and a small contingent of US forces in northeast Syria.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
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