After Iran’s recent drone and missile attack on Israel and Israel’s limited response, Tehran assesses that it has effectively challenged Israel’s nuclear deterrence and the Israel-U.S. military alliance.
This is so even though Israel’s retaliatory attack damaged a defense system near Natanz, a city in central Iran that is critical to the country’s nuclear program and highlighted Israel’s ability to evade Tehran’s air defenses.
Iran faces two adversaries that both have nuclear weapons while Iran has none. If the situation escalates further, however, Iran will likely move toward nuclearization to create a deterrent against future attacks.
On the eve of Israel’s limited strike on April 19 , the head of the Nuclear Protection and Security Corps Gen. Ahmad Haq Talab spoke about the need to review Iran’s nuclear strategy as a result of increasing threats from America and Israel. He said, “If Israel decides to use the threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Tehran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the nuclear doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and deviate from the previous reservations declared by the country.”
At the same time, Sharq newspaper reported that Iran’s U.N. ambassador and former deputy national security advisor Amir Saeid Iravani had continued quiet contact with the U.S. not only on the Gaza crisis but the nuclear issue.
The last round of formal nuclear negotiations ended in September 2022 with a proposal by Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that Iran refused to accept without conditions.
Iran sought an end to disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding safeguards issues, the removal of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a U.S. guarantee that any agreement would last beyond the Biden administration. Such concessions were not forthcoming.
With no formal agreement in place, the U.S. and Iran reached an interim understanding in May 2023 in Oman under which Iran agreed not to enrich uranium beyond 60 percent purity, to release five U.S.-Iran dual nationals, and receive some blocked funds in return. Washington also sent signals that it would not increase the enforcement of oil sanctions against Iran.
The interim understanding between White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk and Iran’s then-top nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani was meant to circumvent the U.S. Congress, which would otherwise have had a chance to scrutinize and perhaps block a formal deal. Israel objected, however, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a phone call on June 8, 2023 that Israel wouldn’t adhere to any agreement between Washington and Tehran.
Iran also faced opposition in European countries as well as the U.S. for its support for Russia in the Ukraine war. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine severely undermined the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), essentially wrecking a process with Iran that began in 2008 and included the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Iran, and Germany.
With an increase in energy prices after the Russian invasion, some of the immediate economic pressures on Iran diminished. Russia and Iran grew closer and the narrative of the decline of the West and the need to “Look East” strengthened in Tehran.
However, closer economic ties with Russia and China did not bring the desired results in terms of Iranian economic growth. Iran was supposed to resume indirect talks with the U.S. in Oman in mid-October 2023. The start of the Gaza war prevented that, although the two sides reportedly met in January 2024 to discuss Houthi attacks on shipping in Yemen.
In the midst of the continuing war in Gaza and growing tensions between the U.S. and Iran-backed groups in the region, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced that Iran had increased production of highly enriched uranium, reversing a reduction from mid-2023. U.S. officials believe that Iran has sufficient fuel if further enriched to make several nuclear weapons and that the time it would take for Iran to “break out” can be measured in days, instead of the 12 months established by the JCPOA.
There are still plans on the table that could revive nuclear negotiations. Tehran has announced that the Omanis have put forward a “less for less” or “step by step’’ mechanism similar to the May 2023 agreement. Another possibility, suggested by Ali Vaez and Vali Nasr, would boost regional cooperation as a way to compensate Iran for curbing its nuclear work.
There have also been reports of a Japanese plan to revive nuclear talks although no details have been released. Japan has no history of nuclear mediation but played an important role as a go-between to achieve a ceasefire in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
If the JCPOA is finally declared dead, the West has three options: deterrence, military action, or new negotiations. The UN Security Council resolution that endorsed the JCPOA in 2015 expires in October 2025. Before then, Britain or France could “snap back” UN sanctions against Iran if Iran were to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Iran has stated that if snap back happens, it will withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (as North Korea did in 2002 and then proceeded to build bombs).
One question is whether the U.S. will seek to tighten oil sanctions enforcement as a result of Iran’s retaliation against Israel April 13 for the killing of seven Iranian officers in Damascus on April 1. The Biden administration did announce new sanctions on Iran’s drone production and steel manufacturing but made no mention of oil sanctions. Given that the only advantage of the current understanding between the two countries is that Iran can sell oil to China, a fragile status quo is likely to continue throughout the 2024 U.S. presidential elections.
Even if Biden wins the elections, however, he will likely proceed with caution regarding easing sanctions on Iran.
Iran may pursue leverage outside the nuclear issue to maintain the JCPOA in theory until the UN resolution expires in 2025 and the Security Council is no longer “seized with” the matter.
The Gaza war has also revealed both the limitations and opportunities of Iran and its proxies to confront Israel and America. Iran’s direct attack on Israel provided Tehran with a more detailed analysis of how Israel and America would react to Iran outside the “gray zone.” By evaluating this information, Iran can obtain leverage for use in future nuclear negotiations.
The best way forward may be for the two sides to continue with single-measure commitments, while respecting red lines to avert an escalation of conflict in both the nuclear and regional arenas. By learning from past experience, a balanced solution to resolve the nuclear issue based on a “step by step” process is still possible.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. His book, Iran and the Security Order in the Persian Gulf, is being published by Routledge. Follow him on X, formerly known as Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
After Iran and Israel’s Attacks, Is There Any Chance Left for the Iran Nuclear Deal?
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
After Iran’s recent drone and missile attack on Israel and Israel’s limited response, Tehran assesses that it has effectively challenged Israel’s nuclear deterrence and the Israel-U.S. military alliance.
This is so even though Israel’s retaliatory attack damaged a defense system near Natanz, a city in central Iran that is critical to the country’s nuclear program and highlighted Israel’s ability to evade Tehran’s air defenses.
Iran faces two adversaries that both have nuclear weapons while Iran has none. If the situation escalates further, however, Iran will likely move toward nuclearization to create a deterrent against future attacks.
On the eve of Israel’s limited strike on April 19 , the head of the Nuclear Protection and Security Corps Gen. Ahmad Haq Talab spoke about the need to review Iran’s nuclear strategy as a result of increasing threats from America and Israel. He said, “If Israel decides to use the threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear centers as a tool to put pressure on Tehran, it is possible and conceivable to revise the nuclear doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and deviate from the previous reservations declared by the country.”
At the same time, Sharq newspaper reported that Iran’s U.N. ambassador and former deputy national security advisor Amir Saeid Iravani had continued quiet contact with the U.S. not only on the Gaza crisis but the nuclear issue.
The last round of formal nuclear negotiations ended in September 2022 with a proposal by Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that Iran refused to accept without conditions.
Iran sought an end to disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding safeguards issues, the removal of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a U.S. guarantee that any agreement would last beyond the Biden administration. Such concessions were not forthcoming.
With no formal agreement in place, the U.S. and Iran reached an interim understanding in May 2023 in Oman under which Iran agreed not to enrich uranium beyond 60 percent purity, to release five U.S.-Iran dual nationals, and receive some blocked funds in return. Washington also sent signals that it would not increase the enforcement of oil sanctions against Iran.
The interim understanding between White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk and Iran’s then-top nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani was meant to circumvent the U.S. Congress, which would otherwise have had a chance to scrutinize and perhaps block a formal deal. Israel objected, however, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a phone call on June 8, 2023 that Israel wouldn’t adhere to any agreement between Washington and Tehran.
Iran also faced opposition in European countries as well as the U.S. for its support for Russia in the Ukraine war. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine severely undermined the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), essentially wrecking a process with Iran that began in 2008 and included the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Iran, and Germany.
With an increase in energy prices after the Russian invasion, some of the immediate economic pressures on Iran diminished. Russia and Iran grew closer and the narrative of the decline of the West and the need to “Look East” strengthened in Tehran.
However, closer economic ties with Russia and China did not bring the desired results in terms of Iranian economic growth. Iran was supposed to resume indirect talks with the U.S. in Oman in mid-October 2023. The start of the Gaza war prevented that, although the two sides reportedly met in January 2024 to discuss Houthi attacks on shipping in Yemen.
In the midst of the continuing war in Gaza and growing tensions between the U.S. and Iran-backed groups in the region, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced that Iran had increased production of highly enriched uranium, reversing a reduction from mid-2023. U.S. officials believe that Iran has sufficient fuel if further enriched to make several nuclear weapons and that the time it would take for Iran to “break out” can be measured in days, instead of the 12 months established by the JCPOA.
There are still plans on the table that could revive nuclear negotiations. Tehran has announced that the Omanis have put forward a “less for less” or “step by step’’ mechanism similar to the May 2023 agreement. Another possibility, suggested by Ali Vaez and Vali Nasr, would boost regional cooperation as a way to compensate Iran for curbing its nuclear work.
There have also been reports of a Japanese plan to revive nuclear talks although no details have been released. Japan has no history of nuclear mediation but played an important role as a go-between to achieve a ceasefire in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
If the JCPOA is finally declared dead, the West has three options: deterrence, military action, or new negotiations. The UN Security Council resolution that endorsed the JCPOA in 2015 expires in October 2025. Before then, Britain or France could “snap back” UN sanctions against Iran if Iran were to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Iran has stated that if snap back happens, it will withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (as North Korea did in 2002 and then proceeded to build bombs).
One question is whether the U.S. will seek to tighten oil sanctions enforcement as a result of Iran’s retaliation against Israel April 13 for the killing of seven Iranian officers in Damascus on April 1. The Biden administration did announce new sanctions on Iran’s drone production and steel manufacturing but made no mention of oil sanctions. Given that the only advantage of the current understanding between the two countries is that Iran can sell oil to China, a fragile status quo is likely to continue throughout the 2024 U.S. presidential elections.
Even if Biden wins the elections, however, he will likely proceed with caution regarding easing sanctions on Iran.
Iran may pursue leverage outside the nuclear issue to maintain the JCPOA in theory until the UN resolution expires in 2025 and the Security Council is no longer “seized with” the matter.
The Gaza war has also revealed both the limitations and opportunities of Iran and its proxies to confront Israel and America. Iran’s direct attack on Israel provided Tehran with a more detailed analysis of how Israel and America would react to Iran outside the “gray zone.” By evaluating this information, Iran can obtain leverage for use in future nuclear negotiations.
The best way forward may be for the two sides to continue with single-measure commitments, while respecting red lines to avert an escalation of conflict in both the nuclear and regional arenas. By learning from past experience, a balanced solution to resolve the nuclear issue based on a “step by step” process is still possible.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. His book, Iran and the Security Order in the Persian Gulf, is being published by Routledge. Follow him on X, formerly known as Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
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