The re-emergence of Türkiye as a decisive external actor in Libya represents a calculated escalation in a strategy to project influence across the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. Building on its military intervention of 2019–2020, which prevented the fall of Tripoli to eastern-based forces, Ankara has transitioned from providing emergency support to pursuing long-term institutional penetration. The July 2025 defense agreement between Türkiye and Libya’s Government of National Unity aims to rebuild the Libyan armed forces through training, technical support, and expertise exchange. This move is not merely defensive; it is a strategic investment in preserving a loyal government in Tripoli and securing Türkiye’s energy and maritime interests.
Libya’s internal political economy is defined by fragmentation and militarized governance. The Tripoli-based administration faces collapsing public services, an acute electricity shortage, and escalating militia violence. Since May 2025, armed clashes between factions nominally aligned with the GNU and the Presidential Council have further exposed the fiction of unified governance. In the east, the illegitimate coalition led by Khalifa Haftar — a warlord whose forces remain implicated in war crimes and systematic corruption — continues to exploit regional rivalries to consolidate power. His alignment with Sudanese Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo reflects a broader pattern of transactional alliances that prioritize personal gain over national stability.
Haftar’s recent outreach to Türkiye marks a cynical reversal. Having once denounced Ankara as an occupier, he now seeks Turkish military training, weapons, and political backing. This shift is driven by waning support from traditional patrons such as Russia and the UAE, alongside his failure to capture Tripoli. In return, Haftar offers Ankara a tantalizing prize: ratification of the 2019 maritime memorandum by the eastern-based parliament. This agreement, which expands Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone claims at Greece’s expense, would solidify Ankara’s legal standing in the Mediterranean and strengthen its hand in offshore energy exploration.
Türkiye’s dual-track engagement with both Tripoli and Benghazi reflects a cold-eyed pragmatism. Beyond military cooperation, economic incentives are central to this strategy. Turkish corporations are positioned to benefit from reconstruction contracts, renewable energy projects, and potential oil and gas exploration. A recent memorandum between Libya’s National Oil Corporation and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to conduct geological surveys in four maritime zones has already heightened tensions with Greece and the EU. This economic penetration is complemented by soft power efforts, including the restoration of Turkish Airlines flights to Benghazi and plans for a tri-national shipping route linking Türkiye, Libya, and Italy.
The geopolitical implications are profound. Türkiye’s deepening presence in Libya challenges the interests of Egypt, France, the UAE, and Greece. Athens finds itself isolated, with diminishing influence over either Libyan faction. Since the beginning of 2025, more than 7,300 migrants have arrived in Greece via the eastern Libyan route — a sharp increase from fewer than 5,000 in all of 2024. This surge is likely a coordinated pressure tactic by Haftar to extract concessions from the EU, mirroring his use of migration as a weaponized tool.
Regionally, Türkiye’s actions are part of a wider pattern of assertive foreign policy. Its military base in Somalia, drone deployments in Northern Cyprus, and hypersonic missile development all signal an ambition to dominate strategic theaters from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The potential sale of 40 Eurofighter Typhoons to Türkiye — though not yet finalized — would significantly enhance its power projection capabilities, alarming neighbors and NATO allies alike.
Türkiye’s gamble in Libya is high-risk. By empowering both rival administrations, Ankara may inadvertently deepen Libya’s division rather than foster unity. The militarization of the Mediterranean, the weaponization of migration, and the disregard for international law all increase the likelihood of confrontation. For Libya, Türkiye’s involvement offers short-term security assistance but threatens to perpetuate the very conditions that have prevented stabilization and democratization. For the region, it marks the emergence of a revisionist power willing to exploit chaos to redraw the map in its favor.
Türkiye’s New Gamble in Libya
By Hafed Al Ghwell
Middle East & North Africa
Türkiye’s expanding role in Libya marks a bold effort to reshape the political and security order of the Mediterranean and North Africa. What began as a military intervention to protect Tripoli has evolved into a deeper campaign to rebuild Libya’s institutions, secure energy interests, and assert regional dominance. The July 2025 defense pact between Ankara and Libya’s Government of National Unity reveals how Türkiye blends military power, economic investment, and diplomacy to extend its reach. Yet this strategy is fraught with risk: By engaging both rival factions, Türkiye could entrench Libya’s divisions and fuel wider instability. Understanding this phase of Turkish foreign policy is key to grasping how regional power struggles, migration flows, and energy politics are converging across the Mediterranean.
The re-emergence of Türkiye as a decisive external actor in Libya represents a calculated escalation in a strategy to project influence across the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. Building on its military intervention of 2019–2020, which prevented the fall of Tripoli to eastern-based forces, Ankara has transitioned from providing emergency support to pursuing long-term institutional penetration. The July 2025 defense agreement between Türkiye and Libya’s Government of National Unity aims to rebuild the Libyan armed forces through training, technical support, and expertise exchange. This move is not merely defensive; it is a strategic investment in preserving a loyal government in Tripoli and securing Türkiye’s energy and maritime interests.
Libya’s internal political economy is defined by fragmentation and militarized governance. The Tripoli-based administration faces collapsing public services, an acute electricity shortage, and escalating militia violence. Since May 2025, armed clashes between factions nominally aligned with the GNU and the Presidential Council have further exposed the fiction of unified governance. In the east, the illegitimate coalition led by Khalifa Haftar — a warlord whose forces remain implicated in war crimes and systematic corruption — continues to exploit regional rivalries to consolidate power. His alignment with Sudanese Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo reflects a broader pattern of transactional alliances that prioritize personal gain over national stability.
Haftar’s recent outreach to Türkiye marks a cynical reversal. Having once denounced Ankara as an occupier, he now seeks Turkish military training, weapons, and political backing. This shift is driven by waning support from traditional patrons such as Russia and the UAE, alongside his failure to capture Tripoli. In return, Haftar offers Ankara a tantalizing prize: ratification of the 2019 maritime memorandum by the eastern-based parliament. This agreement, which expands Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone claims at Greece’s expense, would solidify Ankara’s legal standing in the Mediterranean and strengthen its hand in offshore energy exploration.
Türkiye’s dual-track engagement with both Tripoli and Benghazi reflects a cold-eyed pragmatism. Beyond military cooperation, economic incentives are central to this strategy. Turkish corporations are positioned to benefit from reconstruction contracts, renewable energy projects, and potential oil and gas exploration. A recent memorandum between Libya’s National Oil Corporation and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to conduct geological surveys in four maritime zones has already heightened tensions with Greece and the EU. This economic penetration is complemented by soft power efforts, including the restoration of Turkish Airlines flights to Benghazi and plans for a tri-national shipping route linking Türkiye, Libya, and Italy.
The geopolitical implications are profound. Türkiye’s deepening presence in Libya challenges the interests of Egypt, France, the UAE, and Greece. Athens finds itself isolated, with diminishing influence over either Libyan faction. Since the beginning of 2025, more than 7,300 migrants have arrived in Greece via the eastern Libyan route — a sharp increase from fewer than 5,000 in all of 2024. This surge is likely a coordinated pressure tactic by Haftar to extract concessions from the EU, mirroring his use of migration as a weaponized tool.
Regionally, Türkiye’s actions are part of a wider pattern of assertive foreign policy. Its military base in Somalia, drone deployments in Northern Cyprus, and hypersonic missile development all signal an ambition to dominate strategic theaters from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The potential sale of 40 Eurofighter Typhoons to Türkiye — though not yet finalized — would significantly enhance its power projection capabilities, alarming neighbors and NATO allies alike.
Türkiye’s gamble in Libya is high-risk. By empowering both rival administrations, Ankara may inadvertently deepen Libya’s division rather than foster unity. The militarization of the Mediterranean, the weaponization of migration, and the disregard for international law all increase the likelihood of confrontation. For Libya, Türkiye’s involvement offers short-term security assistance but threatens to perpetuate the very conditions that have prevented stabilization and democratization. For the region, it marks the emergence of a revisionist power willing to exploit chaos to redraw the map in its favor.
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