Federico Petroni: NATO may perhaps experience a final blow in these days. You can withdraw tens of thousands of troops. You can close some bases. You can even say publicly that the U.S. will not abide to Article 5. You can de facto announce the death of NATO even without withdrawing the U.S. from the institution.
Peter Slezkine: I’m Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of The Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
My guest today is Federico Petroni, U.S. editor at Limes, an Italian journal on geopolitics. We discuss Europe’s anger of the U.S. attack on Iran, NATO’s fraught future, and Italy’s regional rivalries with France and Turkey, among other subjects. Although we recorded this episode before the announcement of an apparent two weeks ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran, none of Petroni’s points as of yet are out of date. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Welcome to the podcast.
Federico Petroni: Thank you for having me.
Peter Slezkine: You work at a place called Limes. What is it?
Federico Petroni: Correct. It’s the longstanding Italian geopolitical journal founded in 1993. Our mission is to relaunch national interest discourse in Italy. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been our mission, and now it also seems to be relaunching discourse on national interest in the Mediterranean because it seems that this is the area in which Italy can play a role.
Peter Slezkine: Where does it fit politically in Italy?
Federico Petroni: Oh, it’s a non-partisan, completely independent journal, so not linked to any political party. And we’re also committed to a mission of hearing anybody’s voice. We collect every position on the political spectrum and also every party in the conflict we analyze. So, we have hosted in our review both Ukrainian and Russian voices, and both Iranian and Israeli voices. And in America, we have hosted people from the progressive side, but also on the conservative.
Peter Slezkine: Very good. Well, so your publication is ecumenical. You, as an individual, are probably partisan, whether privately or publicly. How would you position yourself in the Italian debate?
Federico Petroni: Well, actually, people on the train from New York City to Washington, D.C., the other day just asked me that question, and my answer was, I’m agnostic. Maybe I came from a liberal education, but over the last few years, I became mostly disillusioned with the liberal establishment idea. That doesn’t mean I have become a nationalist or a conservative, but I do think that conservative and nationalist voices have something to say about the crisis we’re living in the West, and that is my personal opinion.
Peter Slezkine: Well, let’s consider the crisis in its many forms, beginning with Iran. How has the United States and Israel’s attack on Iran affected Italy?
Federico Petroni: Well, first and foremost, on our economy — that’s our biggest problem right now — because even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens today, we’re still living in a world in which energy prices are going way up because of the destruction already caused by Iran’s attacks on oil and gas fields in the Gulf.
So, of course, Asian countries will suffer and are suffering already a lot from that. But European countries are also extremely dependent on oil and gas coming from that region, especially after we have reduced the imports from Russia. So, that is the most consequential thing. We’re also understanding that now Iran supposedly has missiles that can reach our countries.
And after this war, it has been evident that if you have an American base on your soil, you can become a target. And this has created a lot of unease in European countries, Italy as well. We would like to become more insulated from the consequences of this war that we did not launch. It’s a war outside the NATO area. It’s a war of choice, and so it’s in our national interest to distance ourselves from this war. And this, of course, is causing a great crisis in the transatlantic relations.
Peter Slezkine: You said that now there is a sense that the presence of American assets and troops brings with it risk, perhaps more than security. Is the concern about an Iranian missile hitting a base in Sicily, or just, kind of, a general understanding that Americans are trouble and that their presence in Italy should be reconsidered? Is there any serious debate that has started many attempts to actually revise the relationship to the United States to have fewer American troops in Italy?
Federico Petroni: No, it’s not…
Peter Slezkine: Because the prospect of an Iranian missile actually hitting Italy seems very low, or is it actually a concern?
Federico Petroni: It can also become a question of terrorism, so maybe it’s not a missile, but it can be an attack on our soil. I don’t think we are reconsidering the overall relation with the U.S. I would even say that the crisis that NATO is experiencing forces us to have an even stronger relation with the U.S. And I’m also an advocate for deepening the relation with America on new terms. Of course, it has become a reality in NATO that it is the bilateral relation among the countries that is most significant.
So, there’s an American-British dimension inside NATO, of course there’s an American-German dimension inside NATO. There’s also an American-Italian dimension. The world we’re living in, even before the Iran war, means that we have to strengthen the bilateral relation with the U.S. NATO is becoming less and less relevant for U.S. strategy.
The U.S. outlook is changing. I mean, the national security strategy formalizes a reality that was already there. It’s no more a question of alliances, fixed permanent alliances. The U.S. will work with countries if the bilateral and mutual interests align. So, from alliances to alignments. I think that Italy is the country whose interests are most aligned with the ones of the U.S. in the Mediterranean. There’s no such country so close to the U.S. as Italy, not in terms of affinity or friendship, but in terms of crude interests.
Take, for example, Turkey. Turkey, of course, is a rising power, but of course it will have its own differences with the U.S. We have no need to discuss about France. France has a long tradition of believing itself in a different relation with the U.S., aligned but not aligned, and all this stuff. So, I think that our countries both see the necessity of a stable Mediterranean.
In fact, we at Limes call this area not really Mediterranean but Middle Ocean, because for us the most important feature of the sea is its link between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific areas… oceans. So, this is why this sea is a link, is in the middle between the oceans, not as much between territories, land, the African landmass, and the European landmass. That is our main concern. Of course, the U.S. will have continuing interest in preserving those sea lanes open, and Italy basically dies if the seas are closed — the Strait of Gibraltar, of Suez, and Bab al-Mandab. So, this can be a base on which to build a future relation with the U.S. even when NATO will become less and less relevant.
Peter Slezkine: So, the Mediterranean is a sea linking the Atlantic and Indian oceans, and thus necessary for navigation, for economic connectivity important to the United States in any future scenario. And Italy plays a crucial role because it is at the center of this central sea, but obviously can’t be the only partner because you mentioned Gibraltar. I mean, you’d need Spain on board and possibly Britain if it maintains interest in these areas, Turkey for sure, as you said, and any number of other countries.
So, for Italy, I understand the focus on the Mediterranean that goes back many, many centuries. For the United States, it’s one of many interests. Is that a substantial enough American interest to create an enduring bilateral relationship between the United States and Italy? So, let’s say you seem to be already dismissing NATO as a structure. Do you think it has a future? Is this Iran spat what kills it? How would you compare that to the Greenland scandal a few months earlier? Or do none of these moments matter because this is a long-term structural shift that’s already been hollowed out?
Federico Petroni: NATO may perhaps experience a final blow in these days. There has been President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that they feel betrayed, that NATO is a one-way street useful only to the European countries, and that perhaps will lead the U.S. to withdraw from NATO.
Of course, there are legal and congressional factors, I know that, but there are a whole bunch of issues in which President Trump or the White House in general can bring NATO to a de facto death. For example, you can withdraw tens of thousands of troops. You can close some bases. You can even say publicly that the U.S. will not abide by Article 5, or…
Peter Slezkine: Read it more literally, that we do not commit to sending troops automatically in case of attack.
Federico Petroni: You can de facto announce the death of NATO even without withdrawing the U.S. from the institution.
Peter Slezkine: But do you think that’s where we’re headed? Because on one hand, Trump and Rubio are complaining about the unfairness of the NATO relationship in division of labor. On the other hand, they are getting NATO to spend more and taking credit for NATO’s increased military capacity, at least on paper. So, materially things seem to be going in one direction, rhetorically perhaps in another.
Federico Petroni: The Iran war changed the whole calculation, in my opinion. As long as this war continues, if it continues for weeks, months, the U.S. will have a crisis with the European countries, because our countries, in our continent, are trying to shield themselves from this war. They are denying the airspace, in some occasions even some bases, like my country did in Sigonella in Sicily. These airspaces are crucial for the U.S. to continue this war because they have been forced out of the Persian Gulf. They keep fighting from the sea, but you can only do limited things from ships. You need to have those bases. Ramstein, the bases in England, they’re crucial.
So, I think that European countries decided to open this crisis precisely because they sense an escalation is coming in the Iran war. There are deployments that are going on, another buildup for a different type of operations. It might be a bluff, it might be just a show of force, but it can also be a significant escalation.
So, if this is what the administration has in mind, then the European countries want to distance themselves from this mess, to say it undiplomatically. And so, the U.S. will react in a very resentful way, perhaps a partial drawdown of forces, because, from what I hear from my sources, the reason why you didn’t have any withdrawal of troops, significant withdrawal troops in Europe over the past year was that the president himself wasn’t on board with this.
It was a plan that came from the Pentagon, from Elbridge Colby’s office, that was pushed back by the European command and was neutralized basically. But this plan of the Pentagon didn’t have the president’s back because President Trump needed Europe to be on board in order to find a negotiated solution to the Ukraine war. But if this war in Iran changes the whole calculation, well, we can be headed to a very significant crisis in the transatlantic relations.
Peter Slezkine: Why do you think European leaders are willing to bring matters to a head over Iran? You say that they want to insulate themselves from the mess that might develop in Iran or has already developed there. That’s fair enough. But why not just be passive? Why provoke a crisis over this when Europe’s prime concern for the last year seems to have been precisely to keep the United States in NATO? Their greatest anxiety is that the U.S. will leave it, and now it seems like Europe is accelerating that outcome.
Federico Petroni: It’s an excellent question. Honestly, I don’t have an answer. Maybe they want to shield from the extreme consequences that will come out of this significant escalation that might be happening.
Peter Slezkine: Is NATO as a larger institution necessary for advancing the Italian national interest? Is it a disaster if the U.S. withdraws forces from Germany, shuts down bases, fundamentally revises the relationship that has existed for the last 80 years?
Federico Petroni: From what I’ve been collecting here in the U.S., there’s a clear sense that this moment can derail a process that was started last year when an agreement was found on the increase of military expenses. The idea was that the U.S. and European countries would enter a managed period of transition in which there would be the shift of the burden of conventional defense on the Europeans for five to ten years, managed, responsible, and — what the European establishment really likes — something that can be governed and organized in a very bureaucratic manner.
Peter Slezkine: And never actually implemented.
Federico Petroni: Of course. Now this crisis, which depends on how the Iran war goes, might derail this process and might lead to an abrupt rupture between the two sides of the ocean.
I don’t think that Italian’s security would be fundamentally worse if the U.S. withdraws even 20,000 troops from Germany. That’s not the point. The point is the consequences on European competition, the competition among European countries. Because this whole process has a very clear American-German dimension. Of course, you guys here in America are trying to give Germany a prominent role in the funding, first and foremost, but also in the equipment of a new security arrangement in Europe. You’re basically trying to find for Germany the role of a deputy in Europe.
And this is also linked, I think, to the Trump administration’s effort to cultivate relations in the German right, especially with Alternative für Deutschland. This, of course, scares neighboring countries, Poland and France first, but also the UK and other countries that fear the consequences of a German rearmament.
So, if there’s an abrupt end of this transition period, which was first and foremost meant to assuage European perceptions, bad outcomes can result. The French are already freaking out about the German decision to go alone on many things. They are trying to use French nuclear power as leverage to gain some influence on other countries, and other countries like Italy have refused their offer.
So, a whole game of realignment, of strengthening bilateral relations, hedging against the increase of one power, is now in the game.
Peter Slezkine: But so your point basically is that NATO was never, perhaps, and certainly is not now, primarily about defense against some outside threat, but about keeping the peace on the continent, that if we take away the American empire, then Europe will return to its—
Federico Petroni: To its own game.
Peter Slezkine: …own jealousies and internal conflicts.
Federico Petroni: Yes. There has never been in history a united continent except the period in which the U.S. was able to federalize the continent under its own umbrella.
Peter Slezkine: Is NATO necessary for that? That is historically how this American presence has been structured, but is there a way that the U.S. could more or less keep control over the European continent, keep it integrated within its larger empire, without bases and troops in a big military alliance?
Federico Petroni: That was George Kennan’s idea in the ’50s. He was against the creation of NATO because he thought that it would entrench an unnecessary American military empire in Europe. Of course, I think that there’s a case to be made that Europe can sustain itself even without an American military presence over there, if you are able to find some sort of arrangement with Russians. If you reduce the Russian threat, there’s no need to maintain this whole institutionalized military organization.
Of course, there are multiple ways in which you can transition out of this arrangement. If you do that in a stable and predictable and, you know, prolonged way, countries can readjust.
Peter Slezkine: The assumption is that for Europe to remain a cohesive whole, it has to re-arm, but that then could create these internal fractures within Europe.
Federico Petroni: We have to increase our own defenses because we are starting from way below zero. So, it is in our interest to re-arm ourselves.
Peter Slezkine: Against whom? So, Italy is rearming for what purpose?
Federico Petroni: That’s the point. I don’t think it is in Italian national interest to re-arm for a ground war against Russia in the Northern European plain. I think it is possible to imagine many lateral agreements between countries, focusing on more specific threats.
Of course, maybe the cyber threat and the space threat can allow a broader arrangement between all European countries, but Italy has to focus on Mediterranean defense. That can also have a Russian angle. There are Russian submarines. There are Russians present in Libya, of course, but we do not need to substitute U.S.-led NATO against Russia with a European-led NATO against Russia.
It is not even in Germany’s interest and not even in Poland’s interest, because if Poland expects seriously that Spain or Italy or even France in one scenario are going to assist them, or are to be forced to assist them against Russia, they might find themselves in a bad place.
So, as a consequence, I think that it would be more coherent if every country develops its own threat assessment. Of course, the first and foremost threat to Italian security is the closure of the Mid Ocean. If the choke points are closed, Italy chokes off basically. So, this is a scenario around which we have to build an armed force.
So, hard on navy, hard on missiles, of course, cyber defense, and all this stuff, but we cannot spend what NATO now demands us to spend on tanks, for example. It’s unwise.
Peter Slezkine: You’ve written, I think, about the American Empire. You have described it in those terms. How is the American Empire perceived from Italy? What does it mean to be part of the American Empire? What is your place within it?
Federico Petroni: We used to love being part of the American Empire. Of course, it came with consequences, political consequences. I think of many instances in which Americans have had a role, a very influential role in our electoral politics as well. But…
Peter Slezkine: Yeah, from the very beginning.
Federico Petroni: From the very beginning, yes. But overall, I think that Italy profited from being part of this empire. That doesn’t mean that this love — a real love that Italy had with America — is everlasting.
There is now a great deal of dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the U.S., not just because of the Trump administration excesses, but also because of a perception that the U.S. is no longer a culture that we like. There’s no substitute for it. For example, if you interview young people, it’s clear that they recognize the U.S. as a potent cultural factor in their own life, but they do not like it. And perhaps this is a reason for why Gen Z is so nihilistic, also in Italy — perhaps not as much as the American one, but we do have Gen Z nihilism in Italy as well.
At the political level, we recognize that there’s no substitute for a strong relation with the U.S. You are crucial for our financial defense, even more than the military hard security defense. Our debt depends on the stability that the U.S. financial market is able to provide. If there’s speculation on our bonds, as it happened in 2011 with the Berlusconi government, if the U.S. doesn’t step in and provide some security, basically the Italian government becomes insolvent. And that’s what triggered Berlusconi’s downfall in 2011, after a move by the French and the German governments in order to displace a government that was perceived as non-cooperative, to say the least.
Peter Slezkine: So, in that case, the U.S. was not able to provide any kind of backstop to the—
Federico Petroni: Well, it was not willing.
Peter Slezkine: …French and German pressure.
Federico Petroni: It was not willing, not able. Of course, you’re able to do that. But Berlusconi, with the Obama administration, paid a perception the U.S. being that he was unreliable especially vis-à-vis Russia. Things were starting to go south in the relations between the U.S. and Russia. The whole reset game went south.
And so, Berlusconi, who was a real facilitator of a rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia, paid the price of it. Of course, also the Libya affair was instrumental because Italy wanted to stay out of a war that was launched also by the French in order to displace Italian influence in Libya. Of course, we were forced to participate, to open up our bases to this useless and stupid war against the Gaddafi regime that triggered a brutal instability in the Mediterranean and in Africa.
And so, this is why the events in 2011 led to getting rid of Berlusconi’s government. So, the Meloni government is really, really aware of this risk, and so we need to have a strong relation with the U.S., also because of this factor.
Peter Slezkine: A strong relationship with the United States insulates Italy from financial pressure from European rivals.
Federico Petroni: It helps.
Peter Slezkine: Can you go back to the Libyan invasion you mentioned a while ago? So, explain how that looks from an Italian perspective, because I think in the U.S. it’s remembered for Obama’s line about leading from behind, the original justification that Gaddafi was going to murder a bunch of opposition figures, the fact that he was done away with quite brutally on camera, and then our own Benghazi scandal. But I don’t think the Italian interest is understood in the U.S. much at all.
Federico Petroni: Libya has been a national catastrophe for Italy. Italy was trying to recover some influence in the Northern African shore. Of course, for us, Libya is a treasure in terms of energy, but it was also useful to have ramifications in the African continent. Gaddafi was really influential with many of his neighbors. He was a very influential power center in the African continent.
So, it was instrumental for us to have a good relation with Libya. Destroying this country created a whole regional instability that is still having so much influence in the Sahara region after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime. Weapons were spread all over the Sahara, fueling regional and local insurgencies, like the one that you had in Mali, for example.
So, we’re still dealing with the pieces after the mirror of Libya completely broke 15 years ago. Of course, there were huge migration waves coming out of Libya because it is the door through which the human trafficking goes. Of course, we lost so many energy contracts, and this is playing a role in having instability south of the Mediterranean. Plus, over the course of the years, the Russians and the Turks found a base in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the two regions that composed the northern part of former Libya, or the Libyas.
Peter Slezkine: Why did you blame the French for this?
Federico Petroni: Because they started the war. They wanted to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. They fantasized about having their own strong man in Libya, and they also did that in order to take away from Italy some part of our influence there, in terms of contracts, in terms of political context, and all this stuff.
Libya also reveals some of our national vices, because when the civil war there became dramatic with the siege of Tripoli by a bunch of insurgents against the UN-recognized government there, that government called Italy to send military troops to defend Tripoli. We didn’t answer. The Turks did. Turkey intervened, and from then on, Turkey displayed its own influence on that region and, of course, on that part of the Mediterranean.
I think that the lesson has been learned in Rome, and I strongly advise our government to take a more active role in the future, because it is in our interest to avoid other flashpoints to erupt in our neighborhood — the Balkans and Libya. This requires developing the military capabilities to be able to stage an amphibious landing, to deploy units able to do that kind of war. It requires us also to develop a familiarity with drone warfare, because that will be the war that will be fought close to our neighborhood.
Peter Slezkine: A war with whom? I mean, Turkey is, along with Italy, a member of NATO. To what extent is it a regional rival and the power that Italy looks at most closely?
Federico Petroni: It would be stupid for us to antagonize Turkey. We don’t have the means — perhaps we don’t have even the stamina to do that. Turkey, however, is becoming the crucial power of the Eastern Mediterranean. It has a clear strategy of controlling the choke points that mattered the most for her.
Her Blue Homeland doctrine calls for Ankara to territorialize parts of the sea, especially the Mediterranean Sea. So, they have presence in Albania, in the Balkans, in Tripolitania, as I said. They’re developing strong relations with Egypt, so Suez Canal. They are becoming the crucial actor of the southern part of Bab al-Mandab, in former Somalia. But even in Ethiopia, their influence is growing.
So, there’s a clear risk — and this is the biggest risk Italy is facing geopolitically — that the U.S. guarantee over the choke points, over the security of sea lanes, is going to be gradually substituted with a competitive non-guarantee among crucial powers. Turkey, of course, Israel, the U.S. will still be in the game, France, China, Russia — of course, the Mediterranean and the Mid Ocean will be a huge stake in the competition among powers because it still connects crucial oceans. It still connects crucial continents. The Mediterranean and the Middle Ocean is becoming a gigantic choke point in a way.
For the U.S., of course, it will not be a primary region of interest, but you cannot discount the Middle Ocean, and you will not discount it, first and foremost, because of Israel. Even if Israel develops its own Spartan model, so autarkic model — we’re able to defend ourselves even without U.S. weapons for free — even in that scenario, you will maintain a close connection with Israel, even if it is becoming a hot political issue.
Peter Slezkine: And a great generational divide—
Federico Petroni: Yes.
Peter Slezkine: …on both parties.
Federico Petroni: Yes. But I don’t see a scenario in which a U.S. president stays away and does nothing if Israel gets attacked by another country. Of course, you will not always be on the side of Israel, especially for the generational reasons that you highlighted. But if tiny Israel is the target of a massive war launched by a regional rival, there’s no way you will stay out, I guess.
So, you will need access to the water close to Israel, and this is why you will have an enduring interest in the Mediterranean, on top of energy reasons and also reasons of military supremacy that this administration is clearly embracing and not going away from.
Peter Slezkine: Well, maybe, because there are also signals that the U.S. should not patrol every waterway, that straits that are used more by other countries should be their responsibility. So, we’ll see what happens with the Strait of Hormuz and how the war with Iran ends. But it should not be taken for granted anymore that the United States will everywhere and always patrol every choke point.
Federico Petroni: I agree.
Peter Slezkine: So, you can imagine a future where Tehran takes a toll from the ships that pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which is then reflected in slightly raised prices, but insignificant compared to the crisis we’re dealing with now. Maybe Italy will set up some sort of block point in Sicily, and Turkey will have its own bottleneck, and on and on.
And the U.S., I think, in that scenario, is not in a horrible situation because it has vast oceans to both sides and the Arctic to the north, and this would obviously increase friction across the globe. But the U.S. would still have access to all the oceans and can always go a different route, whereas Italy, as you say, would be truly strangled if some of these choke points were closed off.
Federico Petroni: I completely agree, and this is why I think that we need to change the fundamental dynamic that has governed U.S.-Italy relations for 80 years. That was premised on our Italian interests being defined by you Americans. And there’s a culpability from the Italian side. We have to change our mindset, and Limes, my journal, is very strong in advocating our country to clearly state what we want from the world and what we want from America.
How to change the dynamic: I argue that Italy will need to develop its own maritime and military capabilities in order to be able to secure at least parts of the Mediterranean, with the support of the U.S. providing some form of capabilities that we don’t have, such as intelligence and space assets, and other forms of assistance that are way below what we have expected the U.S. to perform in case of a big security crisis in the Mediterranean.
This is, in and of itself, a huge deal for our country that will absorb every measure in terms of finance, in terms of industry. This is why I have argued in articles in the past that we need a national industrial project to focus on the things that we need to secure maritime interests.
First and foremost, we need technologies that are able to secure undersea critical infrastructure. This can be an occasion to develop AI capabilities strictly focused on the underwater domain. This will also be a tool for influence with other countries. We can provide the security of other countries in the Mediterranean if we’re able to develop such technologies. And our Navy is already working on a cluster of undersea robotic and AI technologies. So, this is a first issue on which we can also develop a relation with the U.S. But there’s also, of course, shipbuilding. We already have a very flourishing shipbuilding industry, and we should increase it.
We can also develop some space capability. Italy already has one of the most important space industrial sectors in Europe. There is no European space industry without our factories and our companies, so we are pretty advanced. Of course, we can’t go to the moon alone, but we can provide some niche capabilities.
I also think — and my journal publishes a lot on this — that European countries should not fantasize about creating strategic autonomy in space. There would be no space industry in Europe alone, but we can be very effective in providing some components of a Western transatlantic space industry.
And there’s a case to be made that if there’s no big crisis between the U.S. and the European countries, we can still find avenues of agreement to develop mutual clusters in space and in other digital industries, because it’s very evident that Europe — even if it becomes a federal state, and it will happen — will not have the capabilities to develop what matters the most for 21st century power: digital industries, space industries.
We cannot do that alone. There’s only something that we can do together with the U.S. as part of a broader transatlantic, at least industrial, alliance. But let’s see if this dream can stay alive.
Peter Slezkine: Yeah, it would be hard to restructure transatlantic relations to address these new issues, because NATO is so focused historically on Russia. But I agree with you completely that it should, if it is going to have any purpose, be focused on outer space and cyberspace, which is an issue of concern to all and one in which the Europeans can contribute meaningfully to U.S. efforts but cannot survive alone.
But so your plan, in some respect, is for Italy to become the United States’ preferred partner in the Mediterranean by developing undersea and shipbuilding capabilities that make it an interesting ally, and that that would strengthen Italy’s position in the region relative to other NATO members, France and Turkey, which have proven to be real rivals in recent years.
And presumably those countries would also be offering the United States interesting terms to help boost their capacities at the detriment, perhaps, of Italy. Is that the outlook? Is the priority to secure American support to boost Italy’s strength vis-à-vis other NATO members who are, in fact, the greatest potential regional rivals?
Federico Petroni: No, it’s not. I don’t think that our main goal would be to defeat or to enhance our position vis-à-vis other countries. In fact, with Turkey, we need to find a competitive collaboration or a collaborative competition — put it in any way you want. The Turks love that. It’s their preferred way of doing things. Just look at Russia.
Peter Slezkine: Yeah. Russian-Turkish relations have been structured this way for a very long time.
Federico Petroni: Definitely. So, we need to do something similar with Turkey. We need to do things in common together in the Balkans, in Libya. And I would even say that Italy needs to play a fundamental role in avoiding a war over Cyprus. Israel is openly calling Turkey the new Iran, and Erdoğan, a few days ago, even said that if Turkey is forced to be involved in the Iran war, it won’t be against Iran. And the message is very clear. So, I think that this growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry risks to erupt on Cyprus.
Israel is trying to build a sort of sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, taking inside Greece and Cyprus precisely to build a bastion against Turkey. So, if Italy wants to help herself, she needs to find some sort of diffusion in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of course, we can’t be alone. France needs to be taken inside this effort to defuse threats in the Eastern Mediterranean by avoiding a war at all costs. Of course, we need to rearm ourselves, but not to be an Italian Sparta. We will not be a warrior-fighting nation.
We need to develop military means in order to be more credible, of course, and also to back diplomacy with a strong stick, as Theodore Roosevelt would’ve said. So, the outlook is really to avoid any other flashpoint to erupt in the region. So, we need to find a balance between France, Italy, and Turkey in the Mediterranean, not openly competing for positions — that would be idiotic. We will need to find a sort of flexible arrangement for the Mediterranean. I know the answer is very unsatisfying, but that’s the reality we have to live with.
We will live in a permanent negotiation, a never-ending process of managing and clearly understanding what’s going on in the Mediterranean region in order to keep it stable.
Peter Slezkine: One final question. I know I’ve exhausted you completely. You have written that Italy…
Federico Petroni: Or your listeners.
Peter Slezkine: Well, the listeners, I’m sure, are spellbound. You have written that Italy needs to keep China out. Why? The economic situation is not spectacular. The outlook is gloomy, as you described at the start. Why not just open the doors to Chinese investment in industry?
Federico Petroni: Because it will fundamentally alter our relations with the U.S., because the Chinese are interested in influencing the very technologies and the very sectors that we need for our own defense. So, it would be foolish, I think, to accept Chinese money or technology in exchange for Chinese influence on those tools.
Peter Slezkine: But why are you so concerned about Chinese influence and not American influence? You just described how the United States allowed Italy to be screwed by France and Libya — for Berlusconi to be pushed out through French and German financial pressure. So, I mean, the United States does not have a sterling track record if you’re sitting in Rome, per your own narrative.
Federico Petroni: There’s a perception that we know the Americans and we can at least manage them. The Chinese are the big brother that we don’t know.
Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, let’s end on that note of mystery. Thank you so much.
Federico Petroni: Yeah, thank you so much for having me.
Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to The Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episodes. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
