Two political leaders could not be more different than EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and former U.S. President Donald Trump. The two have publicly clashed, and von der Leyen often finds herself at odds with Trump’s closest European supporters — Hungarian President Viktor Orban and Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni. Nonetheless, the two have much in common when it comes to the transatlantic security relationship. Both agree: Europeans need to be able to defend themselves. They just disagree on how to get there.
Donald Trump has famously threatened to pull out of NATO. Most recently, during his September 2024 debate with Vice President Kamala Harris, Trump reaffirmed his commitment to this move, crediting his hard-line negotiation tactics as the main driver of European defense spending: “I got them to pay up by saying… if you don’t pay we’re not going to protect you.” But during his first term, Trump not only demanded increased European defense spending, his administration also heavily lobbied foreign governments to “buy American.”
Von der Leyen, on the other hand, has advocated a more European future, pushing the EU to become a leader in defense research, development, and procurement. In July 2024, she expanded on this vision in remarks to the European Parliament: “I believe now is … the time to build a true European Defense Union.… we all know very well that our spending on defense is too low and ineffective. Our foreign spending is too great. We must therefore create a single market for defense.”
Many of the disagreements between American and European leaders center on what form European defense should take and how to get there. For example, long-standing budget concerns will affect the outcome of any future efforts on defense spending. Europeans’ reliance on the United States allowed the EU to become an economic and sociopolitical powerhouse without spending much on defense. For the EU to become a serious defense actor, European leaders might need to roll back social welfare policies to free up funding for defense, encourage consolidation of defense companies, and build trust in the EU and among its member states. None of these trade-offs is easy or popular.
Moreover, European leaders disagree over what Europe’s security architecture might look like if it were more “European.” Some leaders advocate for a long-term goal of European strategic autonomy — the idea that European countries should be able defend their interests without foreign intervention. But even those European leaders who fully support strategic autonomy do not agree on what it should look like. There are significant differences within the EU on what the largest threats are, how military force might help mitigate those threats, and how to most effectively build militaries that can address those threats. Furthermore, some leaders from more at-risk states, such as Poland or the Baltics, oppose strategic autonomy, fearing that the pursuit of this goal will drive the United States out of Europe entirely and that an autonomous Europe will fail to adequately provide security should Russia target them next.
A more Europe-centric defense has historically faced three significant barriers: first, inadequate funding; second, concerns over national sovereignty; and third, fear of a potential negative U.S. response. The first two of these roadblocks are shrinking as the Russian threat looms and U.S. security guarantees wane. This means that even with immense uncertainty surrounding European and U.S. politics as well as an ongoing war, Europeans might not only strengthen their defense — but do so collaboratively, which could determine whether Europe succeeds in becoming more self-reliant.
During the last two years, Europeans have already made significant strides toward strategic autonomy, even if some hurdles still exist. For example, after years of lackadaisical defense spending, many European leaders are now championing increased defense budgets and a greater focus on the continent’s defense industry. Moreover, the European Commission has become a much bigger player in this process, from creating innovative funding schemes to creating a new position, Commissioner for Defense. Thus, even though Europe has an uncertain political future, with both the internal challenges of consensus-building — made even more difficult with the rise of Euro-skeptic populism in recent years — and external pressure of a potential U.S. withdrawal, the EU could make progress toward achieving strategic autonomy in the next decade, or-so. Although the roadblocks of funding, national sovereignty, and U.S. response still exist, they are surmountable now more so than before.
Funding
The European Commission, as well as individual member states, has started to address funding shortages. Although funding for defense is still far from sufficient, the recent initiatives are focused on what the EU regulates the best: the common market.1The European common market is also known as the European single market. The EU-led funding initiatives are innovative and might provide a new roadmap to European defense cooperation. Through these initiatives, the Commission asks EU member states to engage in joint procurement, development, and research. In theory, by incentivizing joint procurement among European nations, one of these funding initiatives will help bolster the defense industry and make weapons cheaper in the long term. The United States benefits from its arms sales to European states: When a purchase is made for weapons through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales regulation, unit costs for the U.S. military are lowered, allowing the United States to essentially “buy in bulk.” Through regulations that incentivize joint procurement, the Europeans seek to bring those same benefits to the other side of the Atlantic.
To spark investment on the demand side, the Commission set up the European Defense Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), a fund of around €310 million meant to incentivize multiple member states to buy weapons together by covering the added costs of joint procurement. As EDIRPA expires, it will be replaced with the European Defense Industrial Program, which functions similarly and is funded at €1.5 billion. On the supply side, the EU passed the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), with €500 million of funding. ASAP was part of a three-step initiative to ratchet up ammunition production. The first step was getting EU member states to agree to send ammunition to Ukraine; the second step was securing their agreement on jointly procuring ammunition to restock. Finally, ASAP allocates funding to ramp up production.
Europe has also made progress on joint research and development in defense. For example, the Commission recently created the European Defense Fund, which, with an annual budget of around €1.1 billion, promotes joint innovation. The Commission also released a European defense industrial strategy in March 2024, which lays out a longer-term vision for the EU’s role in bolstering the European defense industry. It encourages European member states to buy together and “buy European,” asking member states to procure 50% of their defense from EU firms by 2030 and 60% by 2035. The EU has a long way to go in terms of funding these mechanisms and initiatives, but the Commission’s innovative involvement in strengthening Europe’s defense is a major step in and of itself.
These steps have been matched by defense spending increases among member states. Although it is uncertain whether these individual states’ increases can be tied directly to the EU’s initiatives, defense spending across the continent is on an upward trajectory. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that military spending in Central and Western Europe alone reached $407 billion in 2023, up 10% from 2022 and 43% from 2014. Moreover, even though the 2014 NATO Wales Summit required NATO members to commit 2% of their GDP to defense spending, at the time only three of the NATO members hit that goal. In 2024, 23 of the 30 NATO allies are expected to spend 2%.
National Sovereignty
Another significant impediment to European defense cooperation is concern over national sovereignty. Some key policy areas have proven stubbornly resistant to EU integration and centralization. Issues that have recently seen significant progress in overcoming sovereignty concerns include monetary and fiscal policy, public health, and economic recovery. The EU became the central decision-maker on these issues in the aftermath of the Greek financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, defense is still overwhelmingly a national competency.
Yet, as EU founding father Jean Monnet predicted in 1978, the EU has been primarily “forged in crisis.” The Russian war in Ukraine is such a crisis, allowing the Commission to work around national sovereignty concerns in order to address the ongoing war. For example, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects are among the more successful EU-affiliated defense initiatives. Originally established in 2009, PESCO was revitalized in the aftermath of Trump’s 2016 election and Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. So far, multiple member states have begun to work together on a long-range drone, integrated missile defense system, and an infantry fighting vehicle. PESCO projects, although still in their early stages, are explicitly member-state driven, with the EU agencies working as facilitators and coordinators. Thus, PESCO projects provide an opportunity for the EU to bolster the national sovereignty of its member states.
The EU often gains considerable power in times of crisis, as member states look toward the supranational governing power for direction, joining together to act as a stronger force. Whether the war in Ukraine will provide enough of an impetus for states to rally behind the EU with respect to security and defense is uncertain — but given that von der Leyen has made defense a mainstay of the current and upcoming commissions, the EU is well positioned to become a more prominent security actor by helping member states coordinate funding and enhance strategic planning.
Potential US Response
A third issue that could be a barrier to enhanced European cooperation on defense is whether the next U.S. administration will oppose or support the EU’s recent efforts toward strategic autonomy. In the past, the United States has actively undermined European efforts to bolster defense on the EU’s own terms. For example, in 2018, the Trump administration released a memorandum encouraging the Pentagon and U.S. diplomats to play a bigger role in conventional foreign arms sales. Thus, in 2019, when European leaders were ironing out the details of the proposed European Defense Fund and PESCO projects, Ellen Lord, the Trump administration’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and Andrea Thompson, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, wrote to the EU in strong opposition. They described the language in these documents as “poison pills” and threatened that limiting the involvement from non-EU countries could also exclude any company that uses American technology.
For U.S. leaders, this is a tricky trade-off — the United States has vested interests in both growing and restraining European defense initiatives. When U.S. allies buy from American defense manufacturers, production lines stay open, and U.S. weapons production is cheaper. Some U.S. policymakers fear that U.S. influence in Europe will decline if the U.S. no longer maintains the primary role in providing European security, though American influence has always derived as much from economic and political ties as from military power. Nevertheless, some countries that benefit from America’s continued role as the security guarantor have exploited this fear. For example, at an event in Washington, D.C., Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said, “European autonomy sounds fancy, doesn’t it? But it means shifting the center of European gravity toward China and severing the ties with the US.”
At the same time, in the longer term, the United States would benefit from Europeans taking greater defense responsibilities, which would require investment in their own defense industry. Moreover, if European leaders are to advocate for rising defense budgets, they will need to prove that the money spent on defense will directly benefit Europeans.
The role of the United States will also be critical in resolving another core concern: As the EU establishes itself as a defense actor, it will begin to impinge on NATO’s areas of core competencies. But in reality, the largest point of contention between NATO and the EU has been American opposition to the EU as a defense actor. If the United States decides, instead, to embrace the EU in its new defense role, NATO could — and likely would — benefit from a strong European defense industrial base.
What’s Next for Washington?
When it comes to European defense, U.S. leaders have too often allowed their desire for the perfect to become the enemy of the good. American officials have only a limited ability to directly affect European defense choices. But they can choose to stop acting as a barrier. This will not be a simple or easy process. The EU has often done well in times of crisis, but learning how to most effectively integrate defense into the EU structure will take time. However, by starting with its regulation of the common market, the EU is finally taking steps in the right direction on defense. U.S. leaders should encourage these recent developments, rather than airing old grievances or prioritizing the sales of U.S. arms to European states.
With the rise of China and other threats, it has become increasingly clear in Washington and European capitals that America might need to draw down its commitment to the continent in the coming years. Both Europeans and Americans will be less safe if the next U.S. administration does not prepare for this prospect. The Biden administration and European leaders, to their credit, have demonstrated what could be a mutually beneficial path forward. In the closing remarks of the July 2024 NATO Summit held in Washington, D.C., U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins affirmed that the Biden administration, “welcome[d] EU efforts, in coordination with the Alliance to strengthen and expand European defense industrial capacity to enhance defense readiness. It is in the interest of the Alliance and the United States to have strong European partners, to include European industry.”
The United States and its European allies have cooperated on defense for over 75 years, but it is time for a different type of cooperation. After years of inaction, the EU is stepping up to bolster European security and defense. U.S. policymakers must decide whether to impede that process or facilitate further progress.
Notes
- 1The European common market is also known as the European single market.
