The United States will host a conference today in Doha to plan the deployment of an International Security Force (ISF) in Gaza. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution last month authorizing the ISF to support the US-brokered peace plan in Gaza. This was a significant step by the international community toward providing security for the people of Gaza, who have endured two years of Israeli military operations — many of which have been credibly alleged to violate international humanitarian law, and which have contributed to a devastating humanitarian crisis. But in the weeks since the ISF’s authorization, it became clear that countries were reluctant to provide troops for the mission.
The Washington Post reported that countries that had been considering a deployment, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Italy, and some Arab countries, have developed cold feet. Countries are rightly worried that they would be sending their troops into harm’s way with a poorly defined mandate, expected to execute a dangerous set of tasks including “permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups” — language that many are concerned would involve forcibly disarming Hamas.
Technical support from the UN could be the key to addressing these concerns and securing troops for the ISF. The UN regularly deploys complex peacekeeping missions comprising troops from a wide variety of countries that have never operated together before, and has a wealth of experience sending these missions into volatile conflict zones. UN experts could recommend safeguards that may help allay the fears of countries considering participating in the ISF.
In fact, the Security Council was recently reminded how valuable the UN’s expertise can be when trying to deploy a similar force to Haiti. In 2023, the Security Council authorized a multinational mission to help the Haitian National Police secure the capital from violent gangs. But countries were reluctant to provide forces for the mission, concerned about the risk of violence and uncertainty over funding and logistics. The United States and others involved in planning the Haiti mission ultimately sought advice from the UN on many aspects, which built countries’ confidence. Earlier this year, the Security Council went a step further and enabled the UN to directly provide funding and logistics support for a beefed-up “Gang Suppression Force” in Haiti.
The United States and other countries involved in planning the ISF should reach out to the UN — including the UN Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Operational Support, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) — to engage its expertise in several areas:
Mandate
The Security Council resolution authorizes the ISF to undertake a dizzying range of activities including securing Gaza’s borders, demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, decommissioning weapons from Hamas, protecting civilians including those delivering humanitarian services, training and supporting Palestinian police, and securing humanitarian corridors. The language in the resolution is vague, and some of the objectives outlined are highly risky and would require massive resources. The Security Council could consult with potential troop-contributing countries and then work with the UN to draft a follow-up resolution detailing a clearer and more realistic mandate for the ISF.
Policy
The UN can offer expertise to ensure that the guidance documents that underpin the ISF are similarly clear and realistic. This could include the ISF’s concept of operations, rules of engagement, conduct and discipline standards, and accountability structures, as well as policies on specific mandated tasks such as the protection of civilians and decommissioning of weapons. This policy support would help give countries confidence that their troops would not be exposing themselves to unnecessary legal or operational risks.
Force Generation
The UN has sophisticated processes in place to generate screened and capable forces for its own peacekeeping operations, and can advise on the basic processes required to generate forces for this kind of force. For example, it can share advice on the information that must be provided to countries that are interested in contributing troops and on how to evaluate those troops’ readiness.
Civilian Capacities
To carry out activities like decommissioning weapons, humanitarian coordination, and protecting civilians, the ISF will need more than just troops — it will also need civilians with specialized capabilities, and these can be hard to find. The UN can offer advice on what civilian capacities will be needed for the ISF and how those civilian experts should be integrated into the command structure. It could even potentially share UN rosters of civilian experts to help the ISF source people with the requisite skillsets.
Training
The UN has extensive experience training troops from a wide range of countries, in multiple languages, on how to carry out specialized tasks. For example, if the ISF is expected to protect civilians, then its troops must be trained in how to identify who is a civilian and what actions they are authorized to take in the name of protection. This again could mitigate countries’ concerns about their troops being held to unrealistic expectations or exposed to unnecessary legal and operational risks.
Human Rights
Instituting basic human rights safeguards can help protect civilians in the ISF’s area of deployment — but it can also protect ISF personnel themselves, by ensuring that they have clear information about the standards they are expected to meet. These safeguards could include conduct and discipline standards to ensure that ISF personnel are complying with international human rights law; screening standards to ensure that human rights abusers are not deployed as part of the ISF; and a hotline to ensure that any misconduct is quickly reported and addressed. The UN has supported similar safeguards in the Kenyan-led Haiti mission, and could advise on how they could be implemented in the ISF.
Humanitarian Coordination
Strong coordination mechanisms will be essential to ensure that ISF operations do not endanger humanitarian actors operating in Gaza, as well as to conduct mandated tasks such as securing humanitarian corridors — all while ensuring that humanitarian principles such as impartiality and independence are consistently respected. Consultations with OCHA and UN agencies can help ensure that the ISF establishes effective mechanisms for coordinating with humanitarians and resolving disputes.
Political Process
Lastly, and most importantly, the ISF is a military tool intended to support a political objective: the peace plan endorsed by the Security Council. The ISF will need to synchronize its operations with the political activities of the peace agreement signatories, neighboring states, UN political envoys including the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, and influential countries such as the United States. Here, too, the UN can advise on equipping the ISF with the right mechanisms and personnel to liaise with political actors.
Following today’s conference in Doha, the United States and other countries involved in planning the ISF should show potential troop contributors that they will look to the UN for support and resources. The more countries see that the ISF will benefit from UN guidance and safeguards, the more likely they will be to offer their troops. And the UN’s involvement could also help strengthen the legitimacy of the ISF, mitigating concerns that the force would serve the political interests of specific countries.
The road ahead for the ISF will not be easy — nor will it be quick. Although the United States reportedly wants the ISF to deploy in early 2026, missions of this type typically take closer to a year to get on the ground. Borrowing existing resources from the UN, rather than creating them from scratch, could help speed things up. After two years of horrific suffering, Gazans deserve every effort by the international community to ensure that the ISF has the capabilities and protections it needs to deploy swiftly and operate effectively to support the peace agreement.
Header image: Forced Displacement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip devastated by Israeli bombing, January 29, 2025. Photo by Jaber Jehad Badwan
To Move Forward on Gaza Force, Engage the UN
By Aditi Gorur
Peacekeeping
The United Nations Security Council has authorized an International Stabilization Force to support the new peace agreement in Gaza. But countries are reluctant to provide troops, worried about exposing their personnel to violence, unrealistic expectations, and legal risks. Seeking out expertise and resources from the UN could make the force more effective and persuade countries to send their troops. Without UN support, the Gaza force could be stalled and the peace process could lose momentum.
The United States will host a conference today in Doha to plan the deployment of an International Security Force (ISF) in Gaza. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution last month authorizing the ISF to support the US-brokered peace plan in Gaza. This was a significant step by the international community toward providing security for the people of Gaza, who have endured two years of Israeli military operations — many of which have been credibly alleged to violate international humanitarian law, and which have contributed to a devastating humanitarian crisis. But in the weeks since the ISF’s authorization, it became clear that countries were reluctant to provide troops for the mission.
The Washington Post reported that countries that had been considering a deployment, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Italy, and some Arab countries, have developed cold feet. Countries are rightly worried that they would be sending their troops into harm’s way with a poorly defined mandate, expected to execute a dangerous set of tasks including “permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups” — language that many are concerned would involve forcibly disarming Hamas.
Technical support from the UN could be the key to addressing these concerns and securing troops for the ISF. The UN regularly deploys complex peacekeeping missions comprising troops from a wide variety of countries that have never operated together before, and has a wealth of experience sending these missions into volatile conflict zones. UN experts could recommend safeguards that may help allay the fears of countries considering participating in the ISF.
In fact, the Security Council was recently reminded how valuable the UN’s expertise can be when trying to deploy a similar force to Haiti. In 2023, the Security Council authorized a multinational mission to help the Haitian National Police secure the capital from violent gangs. But countries were reluctant to provide forces for the mission, concerned about the risk of violence and uncertainty over funding and logistics. The United States and others involved in planning the Haiti mission ultimately sought advice from the UN on many aspects, which built countries’ confidence. Earlier this year, the Security Council went a step further and enabled the UN to directly provide funding and logistics support for a beefed-up “Gang Suppression Force” in Haiti.
The United States and other countries involved in planning the ISF should reach out to the UN — including the UN Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Operational Support, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) — to engage its expertise in several areas:
Mandate
The Security Council resolution authorizes the ISF to undertake a dizzying range of activities including securing Gaza’s borders, demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, decommissioning weapons from Hamas, protecting civilians including those delivering humanitarian services, training and supporting Palestinian police, and securing humanitarian corridors. The language in the resolution is vague, and some of the objectives outlined are highly risky and would require massive resources. The Security Council could consult with potential troop-contributing countries and then work with the UN to draft a follow-up resolution detailing a clearer and more realistic mandate for the ISF.
Policy
The UN can offer expertise to ensure that the guidance documents that underpin the ISF are similarly clear and realistic. This could include the ISF’s concept of operations, rules of engagement, conduct and discipline standards, and accountability structures, as well as policies on specific mandated tasks such as the protection of civilians and decommissioning of weapons. This policy support would help give countries confidence that their troops would not be exposing themselves to unnecessary legal or operational risks.
Force Generation
The UN has sophisticated processes in place to generate screened and capable forces for its own peacekeeping operations, and can advise on the basic processes required to generate forces for this kind of force. For example, it can share advice on the information that must be provided to countries that are interested in contributing troops and on how to evaluate those troops’ readiness.
Civilian Capacities
To carry out activities like decommissioning weapons, humanitarian coordination, and protecting civilians, the ISF will need more than just troops — it will also need civilians with specialized capabilities, and these can be hard to find. The UN can offer advice on what civilian capacities will be needed for the ISF and how those civilian experts should be integrated into the command structure. It could even potentially share UN rosters of civilian experts to help the ISF source people with the requisite skillsets.
Training
The UN has extensive experience training troops from a wide range of countries, in multiple languages, on how to carry out specialized tasks. For example, if the ISF is expected to protect civilians, then its troops must be trained in how to identify who is a civilian and what actions they are authorized to take in the name of protection. This again could mitigate countries’ concerns about their troops being held to unrealistic expectations or exposed to unnecessary legal and operational risks.
Human Rights
Instituting basic human rights safeguards can help protect civilians in the ISF’s area of deployment — but it can also protect ISF personnel themselves, by ensuring that they have clear information about the standards they are expected to meet. These safeguards could include conduct and discipline standards to ensure that ISF personnel are complying with international human rights law; screening standards to ensure that human rights abusers are not deployed as part of the ISF; and a hotline to ensure that any misconduct is quickly reported and addressed. The UN has supported similar safeguards in the Kenyan-led Haiti mission, and could advise on how they could be implemented in the ISF.
Humanitarian Coordination
Strong coordination mechanisms will be essential to ensure that ISF operations do not endanger humanitarian actors operating in Gaza, as well as to conduct mandated tasks such as securing humanitarian corridors — all while ensuring that humanitarian principles such as impartiality and independence are consistently respected. Consultations with OCHA and UN agencies can help ensure that the ISF establishes effective mechanisms for coordinating with humanitarians and resolving disputes.
Political Process
Lastly, and most importantly, the ISF is a military tool intended to support a political objective: the peace plan endorsed by the Security Council. The ISF will need to synchronize its operations with the political activities of the peace agreement signatories, neighboring states, UN political envoys including the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, and influential countries such as the United States. Here, too, the UN can advise on equipping the ISF with the right mechanisms and personnel to liaise with political actors.
Following today’s conference in Doha, the United States and other countries involved in planning the ISF should show potential troop contributors that they will look to the UN for support and resources. The more countries see that the ISF will benefit from UN guidance and safeguards, the more likely they will be to offer their troops. And the UN’s involvement could also help strengthen the legitimacy of the ISF, mitigating concerns that the force would serve the political interests of specific countries.
The road ahead for the ISF will not be easy — nor will it be quick. Although the United States reportedly wants the ISF to deploy in early 2026, missions of this type typically take closer to a year to get on the ground. Borrowing existing resources from the UN, rather than creating them from scratch, could help speed things up. After two years of horrific suffering, Gazans deserve every effort by the international community to ensure that the ISF has the capabilities and protections it needs to deploy swiftly and operate effectively to support the peace agreement.
Header image: Forced Displacement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip devastated by Israeli bombing, January 29, 2025. Photo by Jaber Jehad Badwan
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