When Bashar al-Assad fled Syria in December 2024, China’s long-standing bet on the regime’s survival collapsed. For years, Beijing had quietly backed Assad as a bulwark of state stability and counterterrorism. But with the regime’s fall, Chinese officials and civilians fled the country, fearing that they would be at the mercy of Islamist militias.
In the weeks that followed, however, China’s worst-case scenario failed to materialize. Rather than descending into chaos, Syria began to coalesce around a caretaker government led by Ahmed al-Shara’a, the leader of Ha’yat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate. Beijing began cautiously reestablishing diplomatic channels in hopes of securing cooperation on counterterrorism, and its narrative on Syria shifted. On March 25, the Chinese ambassador to the UN acknowledged to the UN Security Council Syrian efforts to gain recognition and support. At the same time, the ambassador said that Beijing expects the new authorities to prevent terrorist groups, particularly those it accuses of harboring Uyghur fighters, from joining government ranks or having any base of operations in Syria. This is similar to the U.S. position against Iranian-linked militias.
Beijing was initially caught off guard by the reversal of Syria’s leadership. Unlike earlier transitions in Sudan, Libya, and Egypt—where Beijing’s low-profile diplomacy and political flexibility allowed it to hedge its bets and preserve its interests—Syria’s transformation has pushed China into more uncertain terrain. Succeeding in a post-Assad Syria will require a level of political agility and strategic risk-taking that Beijing has not yet demonstrated it can muster.
The starting point begins with understanding why Assad was overthrown.
China’s leadership had offered near-unconditional support to Assad after the outbreak of the 2011 civil war. Despite a growing body of evidence presented to the UN Security Council documenting regime atrocities, including chemical attacks, mass torture, and widespread human rights violations, China remained loyal to the Assad regime. In 2012, Beijing invited some opposition factions for dialogue in Beijing, but these yielded no meaningful progress. More consequentially, China used its position as a veto wielder on the UN Security Council to shield Assad from accountability, blocking efforts to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court and opposing sanctions tied to war crimes. In doing so, Beijing not only reinforced Assad’s grip on power but – along with Russia – helped him cultivate the sense of impunity that enabled the regime’s worst abuses.
This legacy now complicates China’s position with Syria’s new leadership. As a de facto guarantor of the Assad regime, China had poured diplomatic, financial, and material support into stabilizing regime-held territories and backed Assad’s reintegration into the Arab and international fold. For the new interim authorities—and for millions of Syrians who lived through the regime’s brutality—China may not be seen as a neutral actor.
Many Syrians endured chemical attacks, siege warfare, mass incarceration, and the erasure of entire communities. For a range of actors, from moderate opposition to the Islamist factions now governing Damascus, the civil war was the means to survive and ultimately liberate Syria from a system that systematically dehumanized its own people.
So far, Chinese officials have not acknowledged the suffering of Syrian civilians at the hands of the Assad regime. Yet the scars of the war are everywhere in Damascus. Chinese officials would have regularly driven past once-vibrant neighborhoods flattened by barrel bombs. The brutality of the war endures in the rubble of destroyed infrastructure and the collective national psyche.
The international community has now seen firsthand the horrors of Sednaya prison, the discovery of mass graves across Damascus and beyond, and the testimonies of survivors previously silenced. China’s failure to acknowledge this history could limit how far Beijing can go in rebuilding credibility with the country’s new leadership and population.
What Beijing Wants From Syria
Chinese officials have been clear about what they want to see in Syria: an inclusive political transition, the improvement of living conditions for Syrians, and cooperation with the international community on counter-terrorism. For Beijing, the third is the most important.
For Chinese officials, the top concern is the presence of ethnic Uyghur fighters affiliated with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uygher Islamist group operating in Syria. Many have fought in Syria since the early years of the civil war in solidarity with co-religionists. Chinese officials have communicated to the new authorities that they expect cooperation with the international community to remove all foreign fighters. But members of the TIP have been hailed as military heroes by the new authorities in the fight to remove Assad and gained promotion in the ranks of the new Syrian military. Criminalizing them now, or handing them over to a foreign government, would risk political backlash.
At a practical level, the Syrian authorities may seek to “devocalize” these groups—quiet their public presence, cut off foreign communications, discourage open expressions of militancy, and disarm them. There is little incentive for Damascus to fully comply with Beijing’s demands when doing so could alienate elements of its own support base. And, where the Syrian government faced pressure from the U.S. to remove foreign fighters from Syria, the Trump administration has, at least tacitly, accepted their permanent reintegration into the new Syrian military.
At least for now, Beijing will likely have to look for other entry points. Using its expertise in business, investment, trade, infrastructure, and reconstruction, Beijing can potentially play a pivotal role in Syria’s recovery. President Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the U.S. will lift sanctions on Syria – beginning with suspending the bulk of Syria sanctions under General License 25 and issuing a 180-day Caesar Act waiver – open the door to foreign investment.
One week after Trump’s remarks, Syria’s caretaker authorities signed a landmark deal with a Chinese company to develop industrial zones in Homs and Damascus—China’s first agreement of its kind since Assad’s fall. More opportunities may follow. Given China’s close ties with Gulf states, Chinese firms may quietly enter the Syrian market by piggybacking on Gulf reconstruction projects through joint ventures, sovereign wealth funds, subcontracting arrangements and indirect financial flows. Given the estimated $200-$400 billion reconstruction price tag, there will certainly be space for China to play a role in Syria’s reconstruction.
But for China to move from a passive presence to an active stakeholder, capital alone is likely not enough. Beijing will also need to acknowledge the political and moral realities it largely ignored for more than a decade.
Jesse Marks is a non-resident fellow with the Stimson Center’s China team. He is also the CEO of Rihla Research & Advisory, a DC-based firm focused on the China, Middle East, and greater Asia. He previously served in the U.S. government, and in various think tanks, NGO, and international organization roles focused on the Middle East.
China Struggles to Adjust to a Post-Assad Syria
By Jesse Marks
Middle East & North Africa
When Bashar al-Assad fled Syria in December 2024, China’s long-standing bet on the regime’s survival collapsed. For years, Beijing had quietly backed Assad as a bulwark of state stability and counterterrorism. But with the regime’s fall, Chinese officials and civilians fled the country, fearing that they would be at the mercy of Islamist militias.
In the weeks that followed, however, China’s worst-case scenario failed to materialize. Rather than descending into chaos, Syria began to coalesce around a caretaker government led by Ahmed al-Shara’a, the leader of Ha’yat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate. Beijing began cautiously reestablishing diplomatic channels in hopes of securing cooperation on counterterrorism, and its narrative on Syria shifted. On March 25, the Chinese ambassador to the UN acknowledged to the UN Security Council Syrian efforts to gain recognition and support. At the same time, the ambassador said that Beijing expects the new authorities to prevent terrorist groups, particularly those it accuses of harboring Uyghur fighters, from joining government ranks or having any base of operations in Syria. This is similar to the U.S. position against Iranian-linked militias.
Beijing was initially caught off guard by the reversal of Syria’s leadership. Unlike earlier transitions in Sudan, Libya, and Egypt—where Beijing’s low-profile diplomacy and political flexibility allowed it to hedge its bets and preserve its interests—Syria’s transformation has pushed China into more uncertain terrain. Succeeding in a post-Assad Syria will require a level of political agility and strategic risk-taking that Beijing has not yet demonstrated it can muster.
The starting point begins with understanding why Assad was overthrown.
China’s leadership had offered near-unconditional support to Assad after the outbreak of the 2011 civil war. Despite a growing body of evidence presented to the UN Security Council documenting regime atrocities, including chemical attacks, mass torture, and widespread human rights violations, China remained loyal to the Assad regime. In 2012, Beijing invited some opposition factions for dialogue in Beijing, but these yielded no meaningful progress. More consequentially, China used its position as a veto wielder on the UN Security Council to shield Assad from accountability, blocking efforts to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court and opposing sanctions tied to war crimes. In doing so, Beijing not only reinforced Assad’s grip on power but – along with Russia – helped him cultivate the sense of impunity that enabled the regime’s worst abuses.
This legacy now complicates China’s position with Syria’s new leadership. As a de facto guarantor of the Assad regime, China had poured diplomatic, financial, and material support into stabilizing regime-held territories and backed Assad’s reintegration into the Arab and international fold. For the new interim authorities—and for millions of Syrians who lived through the regime’s brutality—China may not be seen as a neutral actor.
Many Syrians endured chemical attacks, siege warfare, mass incarceration, and the erasure of entire communities. For a range of actors, from moderate opposition to the Islamist factions now governing Damascus, the civil war was the means to survive and ultimately liberate Syria from a system that systematically dehumanized its own people.
So far, Chinese officials have not acknowledged the suffering of Syrian civilians at the hands of the Assad regime. Yet the scars of the war are everywhere in Damascus. Chinese officials would have regularly driven past once-vibrant neighborhoods flattened by barrel bombs. The brutality of the war endures in the rubble of destroyed infrastructure and the collective national psyche.
The international community has now seen firsthand the horrors of Sednaya prison, the discovery of mass graves across Damascus and beyond, and the testimonies of survivors previously silenced. China’s failure to acknowledge this history could limit how far Beijing can go in rebuilding credibility with the country’s new leadership and population.
What Beijing Wants From Syria
Chinese officials have been clear about what they want to see in Syria: an inclusive political transition, the improvement of living conditions for Syrians, and cooperation with the international community on counter-terrorism. For Beijing, the third is the most important.
For Chinese officials, the top concern is the presence of ethnic Uyghur fighters affiliated with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uygher Islamist group operating in Syria. Many have fought in Syria since the early years of the civil war in solidarity with co-religionists. Chinese officials have communicated to the new authorities that they expect cooperation with the international community to remove all foreign fighters. But members of the TIP have been hailed as military heroes by the new authorities in the fight to remove Assad and gained promotion in the ranks of the new Syrian military. Criminalizing them now, or handing them over to a foreign government, would risk political backlash.
At a practical level, the Syrian authorities may seek to “devocalize” these groups—quiet their public presence, cut off foreign communications, discourage open expressions of militancy, and disarm them. There is little incentive for Damascus to fully comply with Beijing’s demands when doing so could alienate elements of its own support base. And, where the Syrian government faced pressure from the U.S. to remove foreign fighters from Syria, the Trump administration has, at least tacitly, accepted their permanent reintegration into the new Syrian military.
At least for now, Beijing will likely have to look for other entry points. Using its expertise in business, investment, trade, infrastructure, and reconstruction, Beijing can potentially play a pivotal role in Syria’s recovery. President Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the U.S. will lift sanctions on Syria – beginning with suspending the bulk of Syria sanctions under General License 25 and issuing a 180-day Caesar Act waiver – open the door to foreign investment.
One week after Trump’s remarks, Syria’s caretaker authorities signed a landmark deal with a Chinese company to develop industrial zones in Homs and Damascus—China’s first agreement of its kind since Assad’s fall. More opportunities may follow. Given China’s close ties with Gulf states, Chinese firms may quietly enter the Syrian market by piggybacking on Gulf reconstruction projects through joint ventures, sovereign wealth funds, subcontracting arrangements and indirect financial flows. Given the estimated $200-$400 billion reconstruction price tag, there will certainly be space for China to play a role in Syria’s reconstruction.
But for China to move from a passive presence to an active stakeholder, capital alone is likely not enough. Beijing will also need to acknowledge the political and moral realities it largely ignored for more than a decade.
Jesse Marks is a non-resident fellow with the Stimson Center’s China team. He is also the CEO of Rihla Research & Advisory, a DC-based firm focused on the China, Middle East, and greater Asia. He previously served in the U.S. government, and in various think tanks, NGO, and international organization roles focused on the Middle East.
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