Amid the ongoing tensions in the Middle East and Israeli operations in Gaza, concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have once again intensified. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported late last year that Iran has sped up production of 60% enriched uranium, which is very close to the 90% needed for a nuclear bomb.
Iran does not seem to have made the political decision to translate its growing nuclear capability into a weaponization program. But the ongoing conflict in the region, the prolonged U.S. economic war against Iran, Israel’s frequent precision strikes on Iranian interests and assassination of its military commanders have heightened internal debates about abandoning a long-held hedging posture and dashing for the bomb.
Recently, an anchor on Iran’s state television posed a question to the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency, Mohammad Eslami, suggesting that with the certainty of Israel possessing nuclear weapons and repeated Israeli threats against Iran, “is it not the time for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or at least conduct a nuclear test?” While Eslami quickly underscored that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine, the question itself was significant because it reflects the perspective of some Iranian conservatives who increasingly view nuclear weapons as a solution to Iran’s security problems.
The history of Iran’s nuclear posture indicates that Tehran’s activities – whether under the Islamic Republic or the monarchy — have been motivated by regional developments and threat perceptions. Faced with a looming Iraqi threat in the 1970s, for example, the Shah sought to deter Baghdad conventionally, while at the same time laying the foundations for a potential future nuclear weapons program. After the 1979 revolution, Iran lost its conventional superiority and faced Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and use of chemical weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Islamic Republic restarted its nuclear work and is said to have pursued a nuclear weapons program until 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein.
With Saddam gone and Iran’s nuclear efforts exposed, the Iranian leadership opted for a hedging strategy to preserve the option of acquiring a nuclear weapon if the strategic environment changed. With the mastery of enrichment, Iran already enjoys some of the security benefits of a nuclear deterrent force without possessing the weapons themselves. This reality was captured by the late former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who pointed out in 2005 to a U.S. nuclear expert: “As long as we can enrich uranium and master the [nuclear] fuel cycle, we don’t need anything else. Our neighbors will be able to draw the proper conclusions.”
Iran’s current national defense strategy, also known as the “Forward Defense” strategy, is based on three pillars: an advanced nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy forces. Lacking a modern air force capable of projecting power beyond its borders, Iran has increasingly relied on ballistic missiles and drones to flex its muscles in the region. In 2017, Iran responded to an ISIS terrorist attack in Tehran by launching a salvo of ballistic missiles into Syria, targeting the jihadists’ bases. More recently, in January 2024, Tehran launched ballistic missiles against targets in Erbil, Iraq, in retaliation for recent terrorist attacks in Kerman and the Israeli assassination of Iranian generals in Syria. The ballistic missile program has been complemented with an easy-to-produce and cheap fleet of drones that have been proven effective on the battlefield and that Iran has provided to Russia for use in Ukraine.
The third pillar is comprised of non-state actors including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and, to a lesser extent, Hamas. Hezbollah is the most capable and the closest to Tehran, while, as some scholars have argued, the Houthis operate more independently and are less crucial to Tehran’s national defense.
Together, these three pillars form the core of Iran’s deterrence strategy, and any significant weakening in their effectiveness could alter Tehran’s nuclear calculations.
Several developments could persuade Iran to abandon its current nuclear posture and weaponize its nuclear program. First, a major shift in the regional balance of power could convince the Iranian leadership that crossing the nuclear threshold is necessary. This would include the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran’s regional adversaries, notably Saudi Arabia. The former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani, warned in 2019 that since certain regional countries have started “suspicious” nuclear programs that pose a threat to the “entire region and the world,” Iran may “undoubtedly be compelled to recalibrate [its] strategies based on the nature and geography of new threats, and address the requirements of [its] armed forces in response to this threat.”
The ongoing conflict in Gaza also has the potential to change Iran’s nuclear calculus. A direct large-scale conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, which certainly would lead to Hezbollah’s weakening, could change Tehran’s view. However, at the time of this writing, it seems that while skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel continue, neither side is poised to escalate into a larger war.
Another potential development that could change Tehran’s nuclear calculus is a direct attack against Iranian territory and nuclear infrastructure, either by the U.S. or Israel. Given the ongoing crises around the world, including in Ukraine and Gaza, the U.S. is unlikely to conduct a military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Israel, given its geographical proximity to Iran, and nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, has a strong impetus to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. While Israel in the past has purportedly conducted sabotage attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, they were limited strikes and confined within the boundaries of a long-standing shadow war between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
Preventive attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities by either Israel or the U.S. might yield short-term benefits. However, given Iran’s industrial capacity and technological know-how, Iran could rebuild its facilities, begin enrichment to 90 percent, and weaponize its nuclear program. In fact, military strikes could give Tehran a very strong motivation to quickly rebuild its nuclear program and dash for a bomb. In the past, limited attacks on Iranian nuclear personnel and facilities have only incentivized faster nuclear advances. As former intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi warned in February 2021, “nuclear weapons are against Islamic Sharia, and the Islamic Republic will not pursue them. But if you corner a cat, it might behave differently than a cat roaming free. If they push Iran in that direction, it would not be Iran’s fault but the fault of those who pushed Iran.”
Tehran’s nuclear program has been the product of its strategic environment and its leadership’s threat perceptions. While key decision-makers have not reached a consensus over the added value of nuclear weapons to Iran’s defense strategy, the emergence of an acute security threat could very well change the nuclear calculations of Tehran. As the Islamic Republic marks its 45th anniversary on Feb. 11, it seems that the decision-makers in Tehran continue to believe that nuclear weapons have no additional utility and that Tehran can deter threats through its forward defense posture. This could change, however, if Iran experiences one of the above-mentioned scenarios.
Sina Azodi is a Professional Lecturer of International Affairs at the George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies, and a PhD Candidate at the University of South Florida, where he is writing a doctoral dissertation on Iran’s nuclear program. Follow him on Twitter: @Azodiac83
Will Iran Get the Bomb in 2024?
By Sina Azodi
Middle East & North Africa
Amid the ongoing tensions in the Middle East and Israeli operations in Gaza, concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have once again intensified. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported late last year that Iran has sped up production of 60% enriched uranium, which is very close to the 90% needed for a nuclear bomb.
Iran does not seem to have made the political decision to translate its growing nuclear capability into a weaponization program. But the ongoing conflict in the region, the prolonged U.S. economic war against Iran, Israel’s frequent precision strikes on Iranian interests and assassination of its military commanders have heightened internal debates about abandoning a long-held hedging posture and dashing for the bomb.
Recently, an anchor on Iran’s state television posed a question to the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency, Mohammad Eslami, suggesting that with the certainty of Israel possessing nuclear weapons and repeated Israeli threats against Iran, “is it not the time for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or at least conduct a nuclear test?” While Eslami quickly underscored that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine, the question itself was significant because it reflects the perspective of some Iranian conservatives who increasingly view nuclear weapons as a solution to Iran’s security problems.
The history of Iran’s nuclear posture indicates that Tehran’s activities – whether under the Islamic Republic or the monarchy — have been motivated by regional developments and threat perceptions. Faced with a looming Iraqi threat in the 1970s, for example, the Shah sought to deter Baghdad conventionally, while at the same time laying the foundations for a potential future nuclear weapons program. After the 1979 revolution, Iran lost its conventional superiority and faced Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and use of chemical weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Islamic Republic restarted its nuclear work and is said to have pursued a nuclear weapons program until 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein.
With Saddam gone and Iran’s nuclear efforts exposed, the Iranian leadership opted for a hedging strategy to preserve the option of acquiring a nuclear weapon if the strategic environment changed. With the mastery of enrichment, Iran already enjoys some of the security benefits of a nuclear deterrent force without possessing the weapons themselves. This reality was captured by the late former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who pointed out in 2005 to a U.S. nuclear expert: “As long as we can enrich uranium and master the [nuclear] fuel cycle, we don’t need anything else. Our neighbors will be able to draw the proper conclusions.”
Iran’s current national defense strategy, also known as the “Forward Defense” strategy, is based on three pillars: an advanced nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy forces. Lacking a modern air force capable of projecting power beyond its borders, Iran has increasingly relied on ballistic missiles and drones to flex its muscles in the region. In 2017, Iran responded to an ISIS terrorist attack in Tehran by launching a salvo of ballistic missiles into Syria, targeting the jihadists’ bases. More recently, in January 2024, Tehran launched ballistic missiles against targets in Erbil, Iraq, in retaliation for recent terrorist attacks in Kerman and the Israeli assassination of Iranian generals in Syria. The ballistic missile program has been complemented with an easy-to-produce and cheap fleet of drones that have been proven effective on the battlefield and that Iran has provided to Russia for use in Ukraine.
The third pillar is comprised of non-state actors including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and, to a lesser extent, Hamas. Hezbollah is the most capable and the closest to Tehran, while, as some scholars have argued, the Houthis operate more independently and are less crucial to Tehran’s national defense.
Together, these three pillars form the core of Iran’s deterrence strategy, and any significant weakening in their effectiveness could alter Tehran’s nuclear calculations.
Several developments could persuade Iran to abandon its current nuclear posture and weaponize its nuclear program. First, a major shift in the regional balance of power could convince the Iranian leadership that crossing the nuclear threshold is necessary. This would include the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran’s regional adversaries, notably Saudi Arabia. The former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani, warned in 2019 that since certain regional countries have started “suspicious” nuclear programs that pose a threat to the “entire region and the world,” Iran may “undoubtedly be compelled to recalibrate [its] strategies based on the nature and geography of new threats, and address the requirements of [its] armed forces in response to this threat.”
The ongoing conflict in Gaza also has the potential to change Iran’s nuclear calculus. A direct large-scale conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, which certainly would lead to Hezbollah’s weakening, could change Tehran’s view. However, at the time of this writing, it seems that while skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel continue, neither side is poised to escalate into a larger war.
Another potential development that could change Tehran’s nuclear calculus is a direct attack against Iranian territory and nuclear infrastructure, either by the U.S. or Israel. Given the ongoing crises around the world, including in Ukraine and Gaza, the U.S. is unlikely to conduct a military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Israel, given its geographical proximity to Iran, and nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, has a strong impetus to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. While Israel in the past has purportedly conducted sabotage attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, they were limited strikes and confined within the boundaries of a long-standing shadow war between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
Preventive attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities by either Israel or the U.S. might yield short-term benefits. However, given Iran’s industrial capacity and technological know-how, Iran could rebuild its facilities, begin enrichment to 90 percent, and weaponize its nuclear program. In fact, military strikes could give Tehran a very strong motivation to quickly rebuild its nuclear program and dash for a bomb. In the past, limited attacks on Iranian nuclear personnel and facilities have only incentivized faster nuclear advances. As former intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi warned in February 2021, “nuclear weapons are against Islamic Sharia, and the Islamic Republic will not pursue them. But if you corner a cat, it might behave differently than a cat roaming free. If they push Iran in that direction, it would not be Iran’s fault but the fault of those who pushed Iran.”
Tehran’s nuclear program has been the product of its strategic environment and its leadership’s threat perceptions. While key decision-makers have not reached a consensus over the added value of nuclear weapons to Iran’s defense strategy, the emergence of an acute security threat could very well change the nuclear calculations of Tehran. As the Islamic Republic marks its 45th anniversary on Feb. 11, it seems that the decision-makers in Tehran continue to believe that nuclear weapons have no additional utility and that Tehran can deter threats through its forward defense posture. This could change, however, if Iran experiences one of the above-mentioned scenarios.
Sina Azodi is a Professional Lecturer of International Affairs at the George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies, and a PhD Candidate at the University of South Florida, where he is writing a doctoral dissertation on Iran’s nuclear program. Follow him on Twitter: @Azodiac83
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