The U.S. has carried out repeated strikes against targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution that condemned Houthi attacks against shipping but stopped short of approving the use of force.
The UN resolution passed with four abstentions, among them China and Russia. While the Chinese and Russian positions were not surprising, the anti-Houthi strikes have not been met with universal support even among Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf and NATO.
Oman, which has been involved in painstaking negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to end their nearly decade-long conflict in Yemen, declared that “it is impossible not to denounce that an allied country resorted to this military action.” Saudi Arabia was more circumspect, but still called for “avoiding escalation.” If one country knows the folly of attempting to decimate the Houthis via military means, that is the Saudi kingdom.
Among some European NATO partners, unease with Washington’s approach preceded the strikes. On Dec. 18, 2023, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the creation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval protection force meant to prevent Houthi attacks on ships traveling off Yemeni coasts. The U.K, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Australia, and Greece joined but Spain, Italy, and France – which were introduced by Austin as participants — denied that they would take part. NATO partner Turkey is also unlikely to join.
Spain’s defense minister insisted that the Spanish government is bound by European Union and NATO decisions and would not act “unilaterally.” His Italian counterpart explained that his government was ready to play a role and would send a naval frigate to the Red Sea. The frigate, however, would not be part of the U.S.-led operation but would meet requests from Italian shipowners. France has also sent ships to the area while making clear that they are under national command and focused on escorting French-linked vessels. Germany did not join the coalition either.
Washington has been lobbying the EU to re-purpose its long-running Operation Atalanta, established in 2008 to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa, for the protection of ships in the southern Red Sea. The pressure has focused on Spain. Operation Atlanta is headquartered in the southern Spanish naval base of Rota, and the commander and only frigate in the operation are Spanish. Although the EU was close to accepting the expansion of Operation Atalanta into the Red Sea, Madrid reportedly vetoed the proposal. The EU’s naval mission in the Horn of Africa has been under particular stress recently, partly as a result of the Houthi attacks. With many ships avoiding the Suez Channel and instead traveling around the Cape of Good Hope, piracy off the Somali coast has seen a rise in recent weeks. The EU is preparing a new mission that would send at least three warships to the Red Sea under EU command. According to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, the new mission would absorb AGENOR, an existing EU mission in the Persian Gulf. The time frame for implementation is not clear and a final decision is not expected until the next meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers on Feb. 19.
EU powerhouse Germany has expressed a preference for a naval mission coordinated by the EU. However, Berlin was willing to sign a White House communiqué on January 3, 2024, that included fourteen countries and warned the Houthis they would “bear the responsibility of the consequences” if they continued attacking ships in the Red Sea. Italy also signed the communiqué, but France and Spain did not. In hindsight, the Jan. 3 statement can be seen as the prologue of a joint statement published on Jan. 11 that justified the initial U.S.-U.K. strikes as complying with “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, consistent with the UN Charter.” Italy did not sign the Jan. 11 communique. Neither did France or Spain.
The Italian government explained that it preferred a “calming” policy in the Red Sea. The French and Spanish governments were among eight EU countries that voted in favor of a ceasefire in the Gaza war, which the Houthis have cited as a rationale for their attacks. Both France and Spain have been advocating a diplomatic response to the conflict and calling for a general de-escalation in the Middle East. France, the former colonial power in Lebanon, has been particularly concerned about preventing a wider war between Hezbollah and Israel. The French government, in cooperation with Qatar, recently mediated a deal for the delivery of medicines to Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Considering their emphasis on diplomacy, France and Spain could hardly subscribe to the U.S.-U.K. strikes.
If France and Spain feared becoming embroiled in a military confrontation, the strikes against the Houthis must have reassured them that they took the right decision. France and Spain are also not comfortable with the U.S.-U.K. framing, which presents the operation as merely focused on protecting freedom of navigation and trade.
The Houthis’ attacks against ships in the southern Red Sea started in mid-November 2023, more than a month after the Hamas attacks on Israel triggered a massive Israeli retaliation that has now killed more than 25,000 people, according to Gaza health authorities. The Houthi leadership has declared that the group’s objective is to force an end to the war in Gaza and secure humanitarian aid deliveries to the Palestinians living there. There is no certainty that the Houthis would stop their attacks in the Red Sea if the war in Gaza came to an end. The Houthis could seek to leverage their disruptive potential in the Red Sea in negotiations with Saudi Arabia, for instance. However, countries such as France, Italy, and Spain would likely be far more predisposed to support strikes against the Houthis if a ceasefire had been reached in Gaza and the Yemeni group nonetheless continued its attacks.
The Houthi ballistic missile attack on Jan. 15, 2024 against an American-owned cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden showed that Houthi capabilities remain strong, and the geographical scope of their threat might even expand. Attacks until now had largely occurred in the Red Sea, not in the Gulf of Aden.
The U.S. and U.K. conducted another round of strikes against Houthi targets on Jan. 22, reportedly hitting eight sites. However, the continuation of this approach will not bring security to the Red Sea. U.S. President Joe Biden has openly acknowledged that the strikes against the Houthis are not stopping them, and yet the Biden administration appears to be planning a sustained campaign. The continuation of the strikes will further alienate Washington’s partners in the Persian Gulf as well as some of its NATO partners. The U.S. is increasingly seen by some of its traditional allies as acting both counter-productively and unilaterally. These partners cannot understand why Washington is not instead compelling Israel to accept a ceasefire in Gaza.
Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. He is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss, and other publications.
Why Some US Allies Aren’t Joining the Anti-Houthi Mission in the Red Sea
By Marc Martorell Junyent
Middle East & North Africa
The U.S. has carried out repeated strikes against targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution that condemned Houthi attacks against shipping but stopped short of approving the use of force.
The UN resolution passed with four abstentions, among them China and Russia. While the Chinese and Russian positions were not surprising, the anti-Houthi strikes have not been met with universal support even among Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf and NATO.
Oman, which has been involved in painstaking negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to end their nearly decade-long conflict in Yemen, declared that “it is impossible not to denounce that an allied country resorted to this military action.” Saudi Arabia was more circumspect, but still called for “avoiding escalation.” If one country knows the folly of attempting to decimate the Houthis via military means, that is the Saudi kingdom.
Among some European NATO partners, unease with Washington’s approach preceded the strikes. On Dec. 18, 2023, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the creation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval protection force meant to prevent Houthi attacks on ships traveling off Yemeni coasts. The U.K, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Australia, and Greece joined but Spain, Italy, and France – which were introduced by Austin as participants — denied that they would take part. NATO partner Turkey is also unlikely to join.
Spain’s defense minister insisted that the Spanish government is bound by European Union and NATO decisions and would not act “unilaterally.” His Italian counterpart explained that his government was ready to play a role and would send a naval frigate to the Red Sea. The frigate, however, would not be part of the U.S.-led operation but would meet requests from Italian shipowners. France has also sent ships to the area while making clear that they are under national command and focused on escorting French-linked vessels. Germany did not join the coalition either.
Washington has been lobbying the EU to re-purpose its long-running Operation Atalanta, established in 2008 to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa, for the protection of ships in the southern Red Sea. The pressure has focused on Spain. Operation Atlanta is headquartered in the southern Spanish naval base of Rota, and the commander and only frigate in the operation are Spanish. Although the EU was close to accepting the expansion of Operation Atalanta into the Red Sea, Madrid reportedly vetoed the proposal. The EU’s naval mission in the Horn of Africa has been under particular stress recently, partly as a result of the Houthi attacks. With many ships avoiding the Suez Channel and instead traveling around the Cape of Good Hope, piracy off the Somali coast has seen a rise in recent weeks. The EU is preparing a new mission that would send at least three warships to the Red Sea under EU command. According to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, the new mission would absorb AGENOR, an existing EU mission in the Persian Gulf. The time frame for implementation is not clear and a final decision is not expected until the next meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers on Feb. 19.
EU powerhouse Germany has expressed a preference for a naval mission coordinated by the EU. However, Berlin was willing to sign a White House communiqué on January 3, 2024, that included fourteen countries and warned the Houthis they would “bear the responsibility of the consequences” if they continued attacking ships in the Red Sea. Italy also signed the communiqué, but France and Spain did not. In hindsight, the Jan. 3 statement can be seen as the prologue of a joint statement published on Jan. 11 that justified the initial U.S.-U.K. strikes as complying with “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, consistent with the UN Charter.” Italy did not sign the Jan. 11 communique. Neither did France or Spain.
The Italian government explained that it preferred a “calming” policy in the Red Sea. The French and Spanish governments were among eight EU countries that voted in favor of a ceasefire in the Gaza war, which the Houthis have cited as a rationale for their attacks. Both France and Spain have been advocating a diplomatic response to the conflict and calling for a general de-escalation in the Middle East. France, the former colonial power in Lebanon, has been particularly concerned about preventing a wider war between Hezbollah and Israel. The French government, in cooperation with Qatar, recently mediated a deal for the delivery of medicines to Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Considering their emphasis on diplomacy, France and Spain could hardly subscribe to the U.S.-U.K. strikes.
If France and Spain feared becoming embroiled in a military confrontation, the strikes against the Houthis must have reassured them that they took the right decision. France and Spain are also not comfortable with the U.S.-U.K. framing, which presents the operation as merely focused on protecting freedom of navigation and trade.
The Houthis’ attacks against ships in the southern Red Sea started in mid-November 2023, more than a month after the Hamas attacks on Israel triggered a massive Israeli retaliation that has now killed more than 25,000 people, according to Gaza health authorities. The Houthi leadership has declared that the group’s objective is to force an end to the war in Gaza and secure humanitarian aid deliveries to the Palestinians living there. There is no certainty that the Houthis would stop their attacks in the Red Sea if the war in Gaza came to an end. The Houthis could seek to leverage their disruptive potential in the Red Sea in negotiations with Saudi Arabia, for instance. However, countries such as France, Italy, and Spain would likely be far more predisposed to support strikes against the Houthis if a ceasefire had been reached in Gaza and the Yemeni group nonetheless continued its attacks.
The Houthi ballistic missile attack on Jan. 15, 2024 against an American-owned cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden showed that Houthi capabilities remain strong, and the geographical scope of their threat might even expand. Attacks until now had largely occurred in the Red Sea, not in the Gulf of Aden.
The U.S. and U.K. conducted another round of strikes against Houthi targets on Jan. 22, reportedly hitting eight sites. However, the continuation of this approach will not bring security to the Red Sea. U.S. President Joe Biden has openly acknowledged that the strikes against the Houthis are not stopping them, and yet the Biden administration appears to be planning a sustained campaign. The continuation of the strikes will further alienate Washington’s partners in the Persian Gulf as well as some of its NATO partners. The U.S. is increasingly seen by some of its traditional allies as acting both counter-productively and unilaterally. These partners cannot understand why Washington is not instead compelling Israel to accept a ceasefire in Gaza.
Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. He is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss, and other publications.
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