Editor’s Note: Giorgio Cafiero is an expert on the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and closely follows their relations with each other and external powers. A frequent contributor to Stimson, he travels frequently to member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Earlier this month, Switzerland hosted a two-day “peace summit” on Ukraine at the Bürgenstock resort on Lake Lucerne. Russia was absent, but roughly 100 delegations representing countries and organizations from across the world, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), attended.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky used the event to try to increase support from the Global South for Kyiv’s struggle against Moscow. Zelensky put forth an ambitious vision for a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all land within Ukraine’s UN-recognized borders, including Crimea.
Attendees discussed multiple related issues such as prisoners of war, food security, and nuclear safety. The summit produced a communique signed by 80 countries and four European institutions: the Council of Europe, the European Commission, European Parliament, and the European Council.
But BRICS members were not on board. Despite receiving an invitation from Ukraine in January, China snubbed the conference. Brazil came only as an “observer.”
Major non-aligned states that participated but refused to sign the final document included India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and the UAE.
This lack of support from the Global South underscored how most non-Western governments want to maintain relative neutrality and believe that engaging Russia diplomatically is necessary for achieving peace.
As Ukraine struggles to counter Russia’s military advances, Kyiv’s failed diplomatic efforts to convince Arab statesmen to back Ukraine against Russia have been noteworthy. Beginning at an early stage of the conflict, Zelensky sought to bring major players in the Arab-Islamic world to Kyiv’s side. When addressing the Doha Forum in March 2022 and an Arab League summit in May 2023, Zelensky spoke of his country’s struggle against Moscow while highlighting the plight of the Crimean Tatars, who make up Ukraine’s largest Muslim minority group, to appeal to Islamic sensitivities.
But while Arab states have for the most part been willing to vote in favor of UN resolutions that condemn Russia’s invasion, occupation, and annexation of Ukrainian land, Kyiv has failed to persuade them to take concrete actions against Moscow such as implementing Western sanctions, downgrading or severing diplomatic relations with Russia, or arming Ukraine. Arab states generally decided against taking strong stances on the Ukraine war from the beginning.
Among ruling elites in the Arab world, there has been a general view that the Ukraine war is a European conflict that does not require heavy involvement on the part of Arab governments. Western officials and their Arab counterparts have not been on the same page about what is at stake in Ukraine, with many of the former believing that Russia’s rogue conduct threatens the future of the international order while the latter is far more focused on conflicts in Gaza, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen. Among Arab policymakers and ordinary citizens, the notion of Western “hypocrisy” concerning the “rules-based order” is a constant theme against the backdrop of U.S. support for Israel’s behavior in Gaza and the West Bank and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Arab officials generally see the Ukraine war as just one of many global conflicts, as opposed to a defining event in the 21st century.
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Arab governments were also busy diversifying their global alliances and partnerships, concerned that the U.S. was pivoting toward Asia. They have taken major steps to deepen ties with Russia and China while at the same time seeking to convince Washington to retain and increase its security commitment to the Middle East. This also helps explain why Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states responded to the Ukraine war without taking sides; they seek to strengthen relationships with multiple global powers, including those that are adversaries of each other, to achieve more foreign policy independence. Officials in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi see their partnerships with Moscow, which are about many domains such as energy, trade, investment, logistics, counterterrorism, space exploration, etc., as too important to risk jeopardizing over the conflict in Ukraine.
Interestingly, at the Ukraine summit in Switzerland, Qatar was the only Arab country to sign the communique. This was the latest indicator of how the gas-rich emirate aligns more closely with the foreign and security policies of Western governments than other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although Qatar and Russia maintain a partnership that extends across a host of domains from investment to tourism, Doha remains firmly in the West’s security fold. The Emirati- and Saudi-led 2017-21 blockade of Qatar reminded Doha of the importance of the U.S. as its most important security guarantor.
Other GCC/Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do far more to accommodate Russia and China’s national interests regarding sensitive issues on the international stage. Compared to Qatar, the media landscape in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is much more accepting of Russian narratives about the Ukraine war. For example, Saudi and Emirati officials and state-affiliated media have refused to call Russia’s “special military operation” an “invasion.”
The fact that Russia was not invited to the Swiss conference was a major reason why Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not endorse the final communique. The view among policymakers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is that direct diplomatic engagement between Russian and Ukrainian officials is the only realistic path to lasting peace in Ukraine. As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan put it, credible peace talks on Ukraine necessitate Moscow’s participation and “difficult compromise” on the part of both Russia and Ukraine.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent representatives to this Swiss Alpine resort to discuss Ukraine but did not sign the communique, which bodes well for their relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government. These historically Western-backed Persian Gulf monarchies refuse to bow to American and European pressure to take concrete steps against a fellow OPEC+ member, which is important to the Kremlin’s quest to accelerate the world’s transition toward multipolarity. This highlights Moscow’s success in making inroads in the Middle East and enhancing Russia’s leverage in the wider Arab-Islamic world and Global South.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
The Arabs and the Ukraine War: Kyiv’s Vision for Peace Fails to Gain Much Traction
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Giorgio Cafiero is an expert on the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and closely follows their relations with each other and external powers. A frequent contributor to Stimson, he travels frequently to member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Earlier this month, Switzerland hosted a two-day “peace summit” on Ukraine at the Bürgenstock resort on Lake Lucerne. Russia was absent, but roughly 100 delegations representing countries and organizations from across the world, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), attended.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky used the event to try to increase support from the Global South for Kyiv’s struggle against Moscow. Zelensky put forth an ambitious vision for a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all land within Ukraine’s UN-recognized borders, including Crimea.
Attendees discussed multiple related issues such as prisoners of war, food security, and nuclear safety. The summit produced a communique signed by 80 countries and four European institutions: the Council of Europe, the European Commission, European Parliament, and the European Council.
But BRICS members were not on board. Despite receiving an invitation from Ukraine in January, China snubbed the conference. Brazil came only as an “observer.”
Major non-aligned states that participated but refused to sign the final document included India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and the UAE.
This lack of support from the Global South underscored how most non-Western governments want to maintain relative neutrality and believe that engaging Russia diplomatically is necessary for achieving peace.
As Ukraine struggles to counter Russia’s military advances, Kyiv’s failed diplomatic efforts to convince Arab statesmen to back Ukraine against Russia have been noteworthy. Beginning at an early stage of the conflict, Zelensky sought to bring major players in the Arab-Islamic world to Kyiv’s side. When addressing the Doha Forum in March 2022 and an Arab League summit in May 2023, Zelensky spoke of his country’s struggle against Moscow while highlighting the plight of the Crimean Tatars, who make up Ukraine’s largest Muslim minority group, to appeal to Islamic sensitivities.
But while Arab states have for the most part been willing to vote in favor of UN resolutions that condemn Russia’s invasion, occupation, and annexation of Ukrainian land, Kyiv has failed to persuade them to take concrete actions against Moscow such as implementing Western sanctions, downgrading or severing diplomatic relations with Russia, or arming Ukraine. Arab states generally decided against taking strong stances on the Ukraine war from the beginning.
Among ruling elites in the Arab world, there has been a general view that the Ukraine war is a European conflict that does not require heavy involvement on the part of Arab governments. Western officials and their Arab counterparts have not been on the same page about what is at stake in Ukraine, with many of the former believing that Russia’s rogue conduct threatens the future of the international order while the latter is far more focused on conflicts in Gaza, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen. Among Arab policymakers and ordinary citizens, the notion of Western “hypocrisy” concerning the “rules-based order” is a constant theme against the backdrop of U.S. support for Israel’s behavior in Gaza and the West Bank and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Arab officials generally see the Ukraine war as just one of many global conflicts, as opposed to a defining event in the 21st century.
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Arab governments were also busy diversifying their global alliances and partnerships, concerned that the U.S. was pivoting toward Asia. They have taken major steps to deepen ties with Russia and China while at the same time seeking to convince Washington to retain and increase its security commitment to the Middle East. This also helps explain why Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states responded to the Ukraine war without taking sides; they seek to strengthen relationships with multiple global powers, including those that are adversaries of each other, to achieve more foreign policy independence. Officials in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi see their partnerships with Moscow, which are about many domains such as energy, trade, investment, logistics, counterterrorism, space exploration, etc., as too important to risk jeopardizing over the conflict in Ukraine.
Interestingly, at the Ukraine summit in Switzerland, Qatar was the only Arab country to sign the communique. This was the latest indicator of how the gas-rich emirate aligns more closely with the foreign and security policies of Western governments than other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although Qatar and Russia maintain a partnership that extends across a host of domains from investment to tourism, Doha remains firmly in the West’s security fold. The Emirati- and Saudi-led 2017-21 blockade of Qatar reminded Doha of the importance of the U.S. as its most important security guarantor.
Other GCC/Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do far more to accommodate Russia and China’s national interests regarding sensitive issues on the international stage. Compared to Qatar, the media landscape in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is much more accepting of Russian narratives about the Ukraine war. For example, Saudi and Emirati officials and state-affiliated media have refused to call Russia’s “special military operation” an “invasion.”
The fact that Russia was not invited to the Swiss conference was a major reason why Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not endorse the final communique. The view among policymakers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is that direct diplomatic engagement between Russian and Ukrainian officials is the only realistic path to lasting peace in Ukraine. As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan put it, credible peace talks on Ukraine necessitate Moscow’s participation and “difficult compromise” on the part of both Russia and Ukraine.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent representatives to this Swiss Alpine resort to discuss Ukraine but did not sign the communique, which bodes well for their relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government. These historically Western-backed Persian Gulf monarchies refuse to bow to American and European pressure to take concrete steps against a fellow OPEC+ member, which is important to the Kremlin’s quest to accelerate the world’s transition toward multipolarity. This highlights Moscow’s success in making inroads in the Middle East and enhancing Russia’s leverage in the wider Arab-Islamic world and Global South.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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