The Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah’s top military commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran threaten major escalation with far-reaching consequences for a Middle East already on edge since the outbreak of the Gaza war last year.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been hit and humiliated in the heart of Tehran in an unprecedented manner. To save face and restore some sense of deterrence, both Iran and Hezbollah will respond, although the timing and manner remain unclear. Due to its strategic location and the presence of U.S. troops, Iraq runs the risk of being caught in the eye of the hurricane if the conflict results in a wider regional war.
Already on Monday, Aug. 5, several U.S. servicemen were injured by a rocket attack on the Ain al-Asad base by Iran-backed militants.
Given the influence of pro-Iran militias in Iraq, the inability of a weak central government to establish a monopoly on the use of force and the still chronically fragmented post-Saddam political order, the impact of a regional war on Iraq could be disastrous. Only de-escalation between the archfoes Israel and Iran – beginning with a durable Gaza cease-fire — can limit the damage to Iraq’s relative stability and fragile diplomatic agency.
The government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will have difficulty navigating the current crisis. Al-Sudani and his predecessor Mustafa al-Kadhimi have tried hard to steer Iraq away from being caught in the proxy war between Iran and the U.S, and even carved out a shaky role for Iraq as a mediator in regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Shia-dominated Iraqi government has improved political and economic ties with its Sunni Muslim Arab neighbors and engaged in efforts to improve regional connectivity through the Development Road, a $17 billion project that would link the Persian Gulf region with Turkey. This project has the potential to transform Iraq into a hub for regional trade and improve its economy. However, there are serious doubts about its feasibility due to internal and external challenges, not least Iranian opposition.
Al-Sudani was initially successful in reaching a tentative truce between U.S. troops and the “Islamic Resistance,” a group of Iran-aligned militias, after a spate of attacks and counterattacks earlier this year. However, there are serious doubts about whether this truce will hold. In the Aug. 5 rocket attack, a half dozen American personnel were injured on the Ain al-Asad base. The Iraqi government issued a statement condemning the attack. However, it is unclear how and to what extent such condemnations will shield Iraq should the U.S. retaliate.
Aware of the limited maneuvering space of al-Sudani’s cabinet, Arab Gulf states have shown remarkable willingness to invest in Iraq in hopes of boosting Iraq’s economic recovery, gradually decreasing Iranian economic influence, and securing their own interests. An all-out regional war with the active participation of pro-Iran groups would put these small political and economic gains in jeopardy.
At the same time, the assassination of Haniyeh has shaken the confidence of Iran-aligned Iraqi leaders in Iran’s ability to ensure the safety of visiting foreign dignitaries. In the aftermath of this audacious act, these leaders have been privately questioning whether they can still travel to Iran and hold meetings if their hosts can’t guarantee their security, an Iraq-based analyst told this author on condition of anonymity.
Recalling Iranian criticism of the Iraqi government for failing to protect Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani when he was killed by a U.S. drone strike near Baghdad International Airport in early 2020, Iraqis are now leveling the same criticism towards the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is in charge of the compound where Haniyeh was killed. One militia commander even called on the social media platform X for an urgent meeting of Islamic resistance groups. It appears that pro-Iran groups in Iraq are divided between those who want to join the retaliation for the Israeli assassinations and those who want to stay away from confrontation rather than risk their own political and economic interests.
However, it would be a mistake to interpret these misgivings as the end of the “Axis of Resistance” in Iraq. Despite the shock of Haniyeh’s assassination, Iran’s Iraq strategy remains unchanged. Tehran favors a stable but not strong Iraq that guarantees Iran’s security and economic interests and acts as a corridor for the transfer of arms and money to Hezbollah via Syria. Iran’s political influence and vested economic interests in Iraq are formidable, and its ideological influence on the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) remains potent. Chaos in Iraq due to an all-out regional war is not in Iran’s interest. Too much is at stake to be squandered in a conflict with an extremely unclear outcome. Having said that, multiple red lines that were once considered untouchable have already been crossed.
Iraqi groups that participate in the retaliation may choose to do so from Syria or Lebanon to try to minimize the blowback against Iraq. However, this is by no means guaranteed. There are also no guarantees that Israel will not target the leaders of these groups and the military, and intelligence infrastructure of the PMF. A more immediate concern is that some PMF groups will attack U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria and the U.S. will retaliate, further destabilizing Iraq.
The recent assassinations show the superiority of Israeli intelligence over Iran’s proxy warfare. Yet, it is unlikely that this will change Iran’s strategic calculations.
As the region braces for the seemingly inevitable Iranian response and inevitable Israeli counterattack, Iraqis and other ordinary Middle Easterners await powerlessly. Only de-escalation between Iran and Israel facilitated by the U.S. and other powers — and crucially a Gaza ceasefire — can limit the damage to Iraq’s hard-won relative stability.
Kawa Hassan is a Nonresident Fellow with Stimson’s Middle East program, a consultant on Middle East affairs, Iraq expert with NATO Communications and Information Agency. He previously served as Executive Director Stimson Europe, Director MENA Program & Senior Fellow, Vice President MENA Program, Director EU Office, EastWest Institute (EWI) where he led Track 2 diplomacy, policy research and advocacy initiatives on mediation and conflict resolution.
Israeli Assassinations in Iran and Lebanon Put Iraq’s Stability in Further Peril
By Kawa Hassan
Middle East & North Africa
The Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah’s top military commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran threaten major escalation with far-reaching consequences for a Middle East already on edge since the outbreak of the Gaza war last year.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been hit and humiliated in the heart of Tehran in an unprecedented manner. To save face and restore some sense of deterrence, both Iran and Hezbollah will respond, although the timing and manner remain unclear. Due to its strategic location and the presence of U.S. troops, Iraq runs the risk of being caught in the eye of the hurricane if the conflict results in a wider regional war.
Already on Monday, Aug. 5, several U.S. servicemen were injured by a rocket attack on the Ain al-Asad base by Iran-backed militants.
Given the influence of pro-Iran militias in Iraq, the inability of a weak central government to establish a monopoly on the use of force and the still chronically fragmented post-Saddam political order, the impact of a regional war on Iraq could be disastrous. Only de-escalation between the archfoes Israel and Iran – beginning with a durable Gaza cease-fire — can limit the damage to Iraq’s relative stability and fragile diplomatic agency.
The government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will have difficulty navigating the current crisis. Al-Sudani and his predecessor Mustafa al-Kadhimi have tried hard to steer Iraq away from being caught in the proxy war between Iran and the U.S, and even carved out a shaky role for Iraq as a mediator in regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Shia-dominated Iraqi government has improved political and economic ties with its Sunni Muslim Arab neighbors and engaged in efforts to improve regional connectivity through the Development Road, a $17 billion project that would link the Persian Gulf region with Turkey. This project has the potential to transform Iraq into a hub for regional trade and improve its economy. However, there are serious doubts about its feasibility due to internal and external challenges, not least Iranian opposition.
Al-Sudani was initially successful in reaching a tentative truce between U.S. troops and the “Islamic Resistance,” a group of Iran-aligned militias, after a spate of attacks and counterattacks earlier this year. However, there are serious doubts about whether this truce will hold. In the Aug. 5 rocket attack, a half dozen American personnel were injured on the Ain al-Asad base. The Iraqi government issued a statement condemning the attack. However, it is unclear how and to what extent such condemnations will shield Iraq should the U.S. retaliate.
Aware of the limited maneuvering space of al-Sudani’s cabinet, Arab Gulf states have shown remarkable willingness to invest in Iraq in hopes of boosting Iraq’s economic recovery, gradually decreasing Iranian economic influence, and securing their own interests. An all-out regional war with the active participation of pro-Iran groups would put these small political and economic gains in jeopardy.
At the same time, the assassination of Haniyeh has shaken the confidence of Iran-aligned Iraqi leaders in Iran’s ability to ensure the safety of visiting foreign dignitaries. In the aftermath of this audacious act, these leaders have been privately questioning whether they can still travel to Iran and hold meetings if their hosts can’t guarantee their security, an Iraq-based analyst told this author on condition of anonymity.
Recalling Iranian criticism of the Iraqi government for failing to protect Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani when he was killed by a U.S. drone strike near Baghdad International Airport in early 2020, Iraqis are now leveling the same criticism towards the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is in charge of the compound where Haniyeh was killed. One militia commander even called on the social media platform X for an urgent meeting of Islamic resistance groups. It appears that pro-Iran groups in Iraq are divided between those who want to join the retaliation for the Israeli assassinations and those who want to stay away from confrontation rather than risk their own political and economic interests.
However, it would be a mistake to interpret these misgivings as the end of the “Axis of Resistance” in Iraq. Despite the shock of Haniyeh’s assassination, Iran’s Iraq strategy remains unchanged. Tehran favors a stable but not strong Iraq that guarantees Iran’s security and economic interests and acts as a corridor for the transfer of arms and money to Hezbollah via Syria. Iran’s political influence and vested economic interests in Iraq are formidable, and its ideological influence on the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) remains potent. Chaos in Iraq due to an all-out regional war is not in Iran’s interest. Too much is at stake to be squandered in a conflict with an extremely unclear outcome. Having said that, multiple red lines that were once considered untouchable have already been crossed.
Iraqi groups that participate in the retaliation may choose to do so from Syria or Lebanon to try to minimize the blowback against Iraq. However, this is by no means guaranteed. There are also no guarantees that Israel will not target the leaders of these groups and the military, and intelligence infrastructure of the PMF. A more immediate concern is that some PMF groups will attack U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria and the U.S. will retaliate, further destabilizing Iraq.
The recent assassinations show the superiority of Israeli intelligence over Iran’s proxy warfare. Yet, it is unlikely that this will change Iran’s strategic calculations.
As the region braces for the seemingly inevitable Iranian response and inevitable Israeli counterattack, Iraqis and other ordinary Middle Easterners await powerlessly. Only de-escalation between Iran and Israel facilitated by the U.S. and other powers — and crucially a Gaza ceasefire — can limit the damage to Iraq’s hard-won relative stability.
Kawa Hassan is a Nonresident Fellow with Stimson’s Middle East program, a consultant on Middle East affairs, Iraq expert with NATO Communications and Information Agency. He previously served as Executive Director Stimson Europe, Director MENA Program & Senior Fellow, Vice President MENA Program, Director EU Office, EastWest Institute (EWI) where he led Track 2 diplomacy, policy research and advocacy initiatives on mediation and conflict resolution.
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