Iran’s reported decision to send ballistic missiles to Russia highlights a growing and unprecedented level of cooperation between the two countries since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
According to Reuters, citing information from several anonymous sources, Iran recently provided Russia with about 400 powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. A significant portion of the arms were said to be short-range tactical ballistic missiles from the Fateh-110 family, such as the Zolfaghar, with a range of 300-700 km. Iran has so far denied the report, which has not been confirmed by Washington. However, the news followed a Jan. 24, 2024 announcement by Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and his Iranian counterpart, Rear Admiral Ali-Akbar Ahmadian of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, about a new type of bilateral military relationship.
The missile shipments, if true, would mark a qualitatively different level of cooperation as well as changing dynamics in the Middle East, which might have served as a driving force behind Tehran’s decision.
Iran has traditionally been hesitant to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia fearing blowback not only from the U.S. but also European countries. Until October 2023, when a U.N. arms embargo on missile transfers to Iran ended, Iran worried that the European members of the U.N. Security Council would instigate the snapback mechanism in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Now, however, Iran is legally able to supply the missiles and sanctioning such arms transfers is voluntary. European countries decided to retain sanctions on missile exports but could not re-invoke universal U.N. penalties.
The war in Gaza has also had a significant impact on Iran’s thinking. Prior to Oct. 7, 2023, the U.S. and Iran had concluded an agreement under which Iran slowed its accumulation of highly enriched uranium and released five U.S. dual nationals in return for access to $6 billion in frozen oil revenues and less stringent U.S. enforcement of oil sanctions. Since the Hamas attacks and Israeli retaliation, tensions have risen between U.S. and Iran-backed forces, from Gaza to Syria, Iraq, and the Red Sea. That has diminished the chances for further U.S.-Iran agreements.
There is also the question of quid pro quos. Now that Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered a third year, Moscow is in need of missiles and might be more forthcoming in response to Iran’s requests for high-tech Russian weaponry.
Indeed, other aspects of widening Iran-Russia military cooperation are noteworthy. Iran has supplied Russia with munitions, artillery shells, and drones (Shahed-131/136 series and the more advanced Mohajer-6), which involves establishing an entire factory for producing Iranian-style drones on Russian soil. In November 2023 Tehran announced that it would be getting Russian Su-35 fighter jets as well as Mi-28 attack helicopters. The deal was reported as finalized but apparently has not yet occurred. Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia, if confirmed, suggest that the fighter jets, helicopters, and perhaps even the S-400 missile defense system will be sent to Tehran soon. In February 2024, Russia also sent an Iranian satellite into orbit marking burgeoning ties in the space industry.
Iranian media has reported that Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft have already arrived and are ready for operational use. Russia may also begin to use the new Iranian kamikaze drone Shahed-101 (and its modified version Shaheed-107) which have been used by Iran-backed militias to lethal effect against U.S. forces in the Middle East.
Iran-Russia military ties fit into a broader level of cooperation. For instance, in December 2023 Tehran reached a long-expected free trade agreement with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. That same month the two also announced that they are close to signing a major bilateral agreement. This would most likely replace a 10-year deal signed in 2001 which has been extended several times. The new pact is to have a 20-year duration and be more ambitious in terms of military, economic, and political cooperation. On February 28, 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and Iran’s Oil Minister Javad Owj signed 15 memoranda of understanding during a meeting of the Iran-Russia Joint Economic Commission in Tehran. Despite such agreements, however, bilateral trade fell in 2023 by 17 percent to $5 billion.
It is unlikely that Iran and Russia will conclude an official alliance. The present partnership is more agile and gives the two parties room for maneuver in the international arena. Historically, formal alliances have not been to Iran’s and Russia’s liking. Both have criticized them as an inherently Cold War-era product still embraced and promoted by the collective West. Instead, the two countries are likely to issue a roadmap for bilateral relations that will contain references to mutual respect for sovereignty, the need to promote a just multipolar world order, and the irresponsibility and toxic behavior of the West.
This could be similar to the 25-year pact Iran signed with China in March 2021. This fell short of a full-scale alliance and so far, has yet to yield major increases in trade or Chinese investment in Iran. The Iran-Russia deal might witness similar roadblocks given the even higher degree of sanctions on the Iranian economy. Moreover, Moscow is unwilling to side with Iran on all major issues. The two have differing views in Syria, the South Caucasus, and even the Red Sea where ships carrying Russian oil recently have come under fire from the Iran-backed Houthis rebels.
For Russia, closer ties with Iran are critical to increase pressure on the U.S. in the Middle East. Washington also worries that Moscow has shifted its position on the nuclear issue and no longer opposes Iran developing full-scale nuclear capabilities. Given the use of Iranian drones in Ukraine, Tehran and Moscow are closer to creating a de-facto united front against the U.S. from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf. For Moscow, Ukraine is seen as a proxy state used by Washington to inflict pain on Russia. This pushes Russia to regard Iran as an instrument to retaliate against the U.S.
Yet Iran has its own game to play. Tehran understands that Russia needs it, and the Islamic Republic is unlikely to allow itself to be dragged into a Middle Eastern quagmire for Russia’s benefit. Direct war with the U.S. or Israel is not in Iran’s plans, placing limits on Moscow’s hopes of using Tehran as a major distraction for the West.
Still, longer-term prospects for Iran-Russia cooperation seem promising. Hit by sanctions after invading Ukraine, Russia has increasingly turned to the Middle East and Asia. Similarly, Iran also looks toward East. With hardliners at the helm in both Moscow and Tehran and a high probability of continuing confrontation with the West, both countries see a need for intensified bilateral ties.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
Iran and Russia Enter A New Level of Military Cooperation
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
Iran’s reported decision to send ballistic missiles to Russia highlights a growing and unprecedented level of cooperation between the two countries since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
According to Reuters, citing information from several anonymous sources, Iran recently provided Russia with about 400 powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. A significant portion of the arms were said to be short-range tactical ballistic missiles from the Fateh-110 family, such as the Zolfaghar, with a range of 300-700 km. Iran has so far denied the report, which has not been confirmed by Washington. However, the news followed a Jan. 24, 2024 announcement by Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and his Iranian counterpart, Rear Admiral Ali-Akbar Ahmadian of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, about a new type of bilateral military relationship.
The missile shipments, if true, would mark a qualitatively different level of cooperation as well as changing dynamics in the Middle East, which might have served as a driving force behind Tehran’s decision.
Iran has traditionally been hesitant to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia fearing blowback not only from the U.S. but also European countries. Until October 2023, when a U.N. arms embargo on missile transfers to Iran ended, Iran worried that the European members of the U.N. Security Council would instigate the snapback mechanism in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Now, however, Iran is legally able to supply the missiles and sanctioning such arms transfers is voluntary. European countries decided to retain sanctions on missile exports but could not re-invoke universal U.N. penalties.
The war in Gaza has also had a significant impact on Iran’s thinking. Prior to Oct. 7, 2023, the U.S. and Iran had concluded an agreement under which Iran slowed its accumulation of highly enriched uranium and released five U.S. dual nationals in return for access to $6 billion in frozen oil revenues and less stringent U.S. enforcement of oil sanctions. Since the Hamas attacks and Israeli retaliation, tensions have risen between U.S. and Iran-backed forces, from Gaza to Syria, Iraq, and the Red Sea. That has diminished the chances for further U.S.-Iran agreements.
There is also the question of quid pro quos. Now that Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered a third year, Moscow is in need of missiles and might be more forthcoming in response to Iran’s requests for high-tech Russian weaponry.
Indeed, other aspects of widening Iran-Russia military cooperation are noteworthy. Iran has supplied Russia with munitions, artillery shells, and drones (Shahed-131/136 series and the more advanced Mohajer-6), which involves establishing an entire factory for producing Iranian-style drones on Russian soil. In November 2023 Tehran announced that it would be getting Russian Su-35 fighter jets as well as Mi-28 attack helicopters. The deal was reported as finalized but apparently has not yet occurred. Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia, if confirmed, suggest that the fighter jets, helicopters, and perhaps even the S-400 missile defense system will be sent to Tehran soon. In February 2024, Russia also sent an Iranian satellite into orbit marking burgeoning ties in the space industry.
Iranian media has reported that Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft have already arrived and are ready for operational use. Russia may also begin to use the new Iranian kamikaze drone Shahed-101 (and its modified version Shaheed-107) which have been used by Iran-backed militias to lethal effect against U.S. forces in the Middle East.
Iran-Russia military ties fit into a broader level of cooperation. For instance, in December 2023 Tehran reached a long-expected free trade agreement with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. That same month the two also announced that they are close to signing a major bilateral agreement. This would most likely replace a 10-year deal signed in 2001 which has been extended several times. The new pact is to have a 20-year duration and be more ambitious in terms of military, economic, and political cooperation. On February 28, 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and Iran’s Oil Minister Javad Owj signed 15 memoranda of understanding during a meeting of the Iran-Russia Joint Economic Commission in Tehran. Despite such agreements, however, bilateral trade fell in 2023 by 17 percent to $5 billion.
It is unlikely that Iran and Russia will conclude an official alliance. The present partnership is more agile and gives the two parties room for maneuver in the international arena. Historically, formal alliances have not been to Iran’s and Russia’s liking. Both have criticized them as an inherently Cold War-era product still embraced and promoted by the collective West. Instead, the two countries are likely to issue a roadmap for bilateral relations that will contain references to mutual respect for sovereignty, the need to promote a just multipolar world order, and the irresponsibility and toxic behavior of the West.
This could be similar to the 25-year pact Iran signed with China in March 2021. This fell short of a full-scale alliance and so far, has yet to yield major increases in trade or Chinese investment in Iran. The Iran-Russia deal might witness similar roadblocks given the even higher degree of sanctions on the Iranian economy. Moreover, Moscow is unwilling to side with Iran on all major issues. The two have differing views in Syria, the South Caucasus, and even the Red Sea where ships carrying Russian oil recently have come under fire from the Iran-backed Houthis rebels.
For Russia, closer ties with Iran are critical to increase pressure on the U.S. in the Middle East. Washington also worries that Moscow has shifted its position on the nuclear issue and no longer opposes Iran developing full-scale nuclear capabilities. Given the use of Iranian drones in Ukraine, Tehran and Moscow are closer to creating a de-facto united front against the U.S. from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf. For Moscow, Ukraine is seen as a proxy state used by Washington to inflict pain on Russia. This pushes Russia to regard Iran as an instrument to retaliate against the U.S.
Yet Iran has its own game to play. Tehran understands that Russia needs it, and the Islamic Republic is unlikely to allow itself to be dragged into a Middle Eastern quagmire for Russia’s benefit. Direct war with the U.S. or Israel is not in Iran’s plans, placing limits on Moscow’s hopes of using Tehran as a major distraction for the West.
Still, longer-term prospects for Iran-Russia cooperation seem promising. Hit by sanctions after invading Ukraine, Russia has increasingly turned to the Middle East and Asia. Similarly, Iran also looks toward East. With hardliners at the helm in both Moscow and Tehran and a high probability of continuing confrontation with the West, both countries see a need for intensified bilateral ties.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
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