Iran’s procurement of Russian aircraft and helicopters marks the initial step in rebuilding its conventional military capabilities. As of now, this can be seen primarily as a political success, representing another milestone in the deepening collaboration between Tehran and Moscow.
If media reports are accurate, Iran has placed orders for three types of aircraft: Su-35s, Mi-28s, and Yak-130s. None of these acquisitions should come as a surprise, as rumors of Iran’s interest have circulated for some time. While much attention has been focused on the Su-35 twin-engine air superiority fighter jet, similar speculation has arisen regarding Mi-28 assault helicopters and Yak-130 light combat trainer jets. Unfortunately, no details have been disclosed, including the delivery timeline and the final quantity. There is also a lack of information on whether only framework agreements — which establish the maximum number of aircraft Iran intends to acquire — have been signed or if detailed contractual agreements for a specific number of aircraft have been finalized.
This author has previously discussed the advantages and drawbacks of the Su-35 for Iran. On the plus side, Iranians already know how to handle Russian weaponry and are familiar with Soviet/Russian technology. Second, these are probably the only aircraft that Iran could swiftly acquire. They were built by the Sukhoi company for Egypt, which later refused to accept them. Third, only Russia is desperate enough to exchange such aircraft for relatively primitive drones — no other nation would consider such a transaction. Still, for Iran, acquiring Su-35s and integrating them into operational service will be a significant challenge as Iran has not previously operated such technologically advanced aircraft.
The acquisition of about 18 Mi-28NE NIGHT HUNTER helicopters is in some ways a more intriguing development. This variant is an export version of the Mi-28N configuration. The Mi-28 was originally designed in the 1970s as a replacement for Mi-24s. Despite numerous delays, the N variant made its maiden flight in 2005, while the latest version had its inaugural flight in 2016. Mi-28NE helicopters have already been procured by Uganda, Algeria, and Iraq. Mi-28s are also used by Russia with the NM variant in service since 2020.
For Iran, this is undoubtedly a significant reinforcement, considering that the country currently operates only combat helicopters acquired during the era of the Shah (such as the AH-1J). Although Tehran has showcased “domestic designs” in recent years (such as the TOUFAN or PANHA 2091), these are essentially upgrades of U.S.-made helicopters from the 1970s.
Still, the Mi-28s, which were deployed by the Russians in Syria, are notably inferior to helicopters owned by the Arab monarchies on the Persian Gulf. A much more formidable option would be the Ka-52 used by Russia in Ukraine, operating in tandem with the Mi-28. The Ka-52 is armed with missiles with a longer range than the Mi-28; the 9K121 VIKHR has a range of approximately 10 kilometers, in contrast to the 9M120 ATAKA-V’s 6 km. Nevertheless, the Mi-28NE has recently been integrated with the 9M123VM KRIZANTEMA-VM anti-tank guided missiles, with a declared range of 10 km, although it is uncertain whether Iran will receive these anti-tank guided missiles. Most likely Iran will try to integrate its own missiles with the Mi-28NE, but that will be a time-consuming process. The Ka-52 helicopters are considered too valuable for Russia to offer for export especially while it is fighting in Ukraine.
The subsonic Yak-130 made its debut in the Iranian air fleet in September 2023. These are the first aircraft Iran has received from abroad in over two decades. It is believed that Iran ordered 24 Yak-130s. This seems to be a logical acquisition as Su-35 pilots need training, and the Yak-130 is designed for this purpose. In the Russian Air Force, it has replaced the L-39 Albatros, which was designed and manufactured in Czechoslovakia.
From Iran’s perspective, it is important that the Yak-130 also possesses combat capabilities, albeit limited — up to 3 tons of combat load, while Su-35s can carry up to 8 tons. These aircraft will be able to perform not only air policing duties thanks to R-73 air-to-air missiles but also close support missions. Myanmar, for example, has utilized Yak-130s for such operations, attacking ground targets. Other customers of this aircraft include Algeria, Belarus, Bangladesh, Laos, Syria, and Vietnam.
From a military perspective, it is challenging to unequivocally assess these acquisitions. The procurement of specific military equipment – whether aircraft, helicopter, tank, or combat vehicle – necessitates its integration into service, requiring the establishment of an entire, complex system. This involves adapting ground infrastructure, including maintenance and repairs, preparing personnel, and formulating a doctrine about how to use a particular weapon in relation to other elements of a defense system. In other words, a purchase is the simplest element in the complex process of acquiring military equipment.
Undoubtedly, Iran now has a chance to enhance its military capabilities, which are outmatched by most neighboring countries. Iranian aircraft, including models like the F-4, F-5, F-14, Mirage F-1, and F-7, are not only antiquated but also fatigued. Iran will finally receive relatively modern equipment and will get an opportunity to train its pilots in a modern manner, assuming an effective training system is established. The value of these procurements will be greater if, in the future, Iran decides to order additional aircraft and helicopters from Russia, and if it manages to acquire technologies and build indigenous capabilities such as overhauls and production of spare parts.
On the other hand, the ordered quantity of aircraft and helicopters is insufficient to significantly bolster Iran’s military capabilities in a tangible way, especially in the event of a conventional war, where it falls short of sustaining a prolonged conflict. It remains unclear how much and what type of missiles, bombs, and spare parts (such as additional engines) Iran will acquire. In addition, the Russian defense industry may encounter significant challenges in delivering on time given the Ukraine war. Furthermore, there have been recurring reports about the subpar technical quality of Russian weaponry.
From Russia’s perspective, such deals represent an undeniable success, albeit not necessarily a financial one. Iran is unlikely to pay Russia in cash; instead, it will be a barter transaction. According to unconfirmed reports, Russia has agreed to exchange Su-35s for Iranian Shaheed-131 and Shaheed-136 drones, trading one aircraft for a thousand UAVs. As experts note, “It would be a very good deal for the Iranian side because the cost of a single Shaheed is estimated between $10,000 and $50,000. So, in this situation, the Su-35 would be sold for an equivalent of $10 to $50 million.” In exchange for the Yak-130 and Mi-28, Iran might pay with missile technologies.
Nevertheless, for the Kremlin, the transactions represent a propaganda success at the very least. Russia is grappling with international economic sanctions, and its arms exports have plummeted. Interest in Russian arms is minimal, driven not only by sanctions and other Western pressure but also due to negative publicity surrounding Russian weaponry performance. The Russian success is even greater because at the same time, Kazakhstan rejected French Rafale fighters and ordered ten Su-30SM aircraft.
Robert Czulda is an assistant professor at the University of Lodz, Poland and a former visiting professor at Islamic Azad University in Iran, the University of Maryland, and National Cheng-chi University in Taiwan. He is the author of Iran 1925 – 2014: From Reza Shah to Rouhani (2014) and Iran’s Security Policy: Internal and International Dimensions (2022). Follow him on Twitter: @RobertCzulda.
Iran May Trade Drones for Russian Fighter Jets, Helicopters, and Trainers
By Robert Czulda
Middle East & North Africa
Iran’s procurement of Russian aircraft and helicopters marks the initial step in rebuilding its conventional military capabilities. As of now, this can be seen primarily as a political success, representing another milestone in the deepening collaboration between Tehran and Moscow.
If media reports are accurate, Iran has placed orders for three types of aircraft: Su-35s, Mi-28s, and Yak-130s. None of these acquisitions should come as a surprise, as rumors of Iran’s interest have circulated for some time. While much attention has been focused on the Su-35 twin-engine air superiority fighter jet, similar speculation has arisen regarding Mi-28 assault helicopters and Yak-130 light combat trainer jets. Unfortunately, no details have been disclosed, including the delivery timeline and the final quantity. There is also a lack of information on whether only framework agreements — which establish the maximum number of aircraft Iran intends to acquire — have been signed or if detailed contractual agreements for a specific number of aircraft have been finalized.
This author has previously discussed the advantages and drawbacks of the Su-35 for Iran. On the plus side, Iranians already know how to handle Russian weaponry and are familiar with Soviet/Russian technology. Second, these are probably the only aircraft that Iran could swiftly acquire. They were built by the Sukhoi company for Egypt, which later refused to accept them. Third, only Russia is desperate enough to exchange such aircraft for relatively primitive drones — no other nation would consider such a transaction. Still, for Iran, acquiring Su-35s and integrating them into operational service will be a significant challenge as Iran has not previously operated such technologically advanced aircraft.
The acquisition of about 18 Mi-28NE NIGHT HUNTER helicopters is in some ways a more intriguing development. This variant is an export version of the Mi-28N configuration. The Mi-28 was originally designed in the 1970s as a replacement for Mi-24s. Despite numerous delays, the N variant made its maiden flight in 2005, while the latest version had its inaugural flight in 2016. Mi-28NE helicopters have already been procured by Uganda, Algeria, and Iraq. Mi-28s are also used by Russia with the NM variant in service since 2020.
For Iran, this is undoubtedly a significant reinforcement, considering that the country currently operates only combat helicopters acquired during the era of the Shah (such as the AH-1J). Although Tehran has showcased “domestic designs” in recent years (such as the TOUFAN or PANHA 2091), these are essentially upgrades of U.S.-made helicopters from the 1970s.
Still, the Mi-28s, which were deployed by the Russians in Syria, are notably inferior to helicopters owned by the Arab monarchies on the Persian Gulf. A much more formidable option would be the Ka-52 used by Russia in Ukraine, operating in tandem with the Mi-28. The Ka-52 is armed with missiles with a longer range than the Mi-28; the 9K121 VIKHR has a range of approximately 10 kilometers, in contrast to the 9M120 ATAKA-V’s 6 km. Nevertheless, the Mi-28NE has recently been integrated with the 9M123VM KRIZANTEMA-VM anti-tank guided missiles, with a declared range of 10 km, although it is uncertain whether Iran will receive these anti-tank guided missiles. Most likely Iran will try to integrate its own missiles with the Mi-28NE, but that will be a time-consuming process. The Ka-52 helicopters are considered too valuable for Russia to offer for export especially while it is fighting in Ukraine.
The subsonic Yak-130 made its debut in the Iranian air fleet in September 2023. These are the first aircraft Iran has received from abroad in over two decades. It is believed that Iran ordered 24 Yak-130s. This seems to be a logical acquisition as Su-35 pilots need training, and the Yak-130 is designed for this purpose. In the Russian Air Force, it has replaced the L-39 Albatros, which was designed and manufactured in Czechoslovakia.
From Iran’s perspective, it is important that the Yak-130 also possesses combat capabilities, albeit limited — up to 3 tons of combat load, while Su-35s can carry up to 8 tons. These aircraft will be able to perform not only air policing duties thanks to R-73 air-to-air missiles but also close support missions. Myanmar, for example, has utilized Yak-130s for such operations, attacking ground targets. Other customers of this aircraft include Algeria, Belarus, Bangladesh, Laos, Syria, and Vietnam.
From a military perspective, it is challenging to unequivocally assess these acquisitions. The procurement of specific military equipment – whether aircraft, helicopter, tank, or combat vehicle – necessitates its integration into service, requiring the establishment of an entire, complex system. This involves adapting ground infrastructure, including maintenance and repairs, preparing personnel, and formulating a doctrine about how to use a particular weapon in relation to other elements of a defense system. In other words, a purchase is the simplest element in the complex process of acquiring military equipment.
Undoubtedly, Iran now has a chance to enhance its military capabilities, which are outmatched by most neighboring countries. Iranian aircraft, including models like the F-4, F-5, F-14, Mirage F-1, and F-7, are not only antiquated but also fatigued. Iran will finally receive relatively modern equipment and will get an opportunity to train its pilots in a modern manner, assuming an effective training system is established. The value of these procurements will be greater if, in the future, Iran decides to order additional aircraft and helicopters from Russia, and if it manages to acquire technologies and build indigenous capabilities such as overhauls and production of spare parts.
On the other hand, the ordered quantity of aircraft and helicopters is insufficient to significantly bolster Iran’s military capabilities in a tangible way, especially in the event of a conventional war, where it falls short of sustaining a prolonged conflict. It remains unclear how much and what type of missiles, bombs, and spare parts (such as additional engines) Iran will acquire. In addition, the Russian defense industry may encounter significant challenges in delivering on time given the Ukraine war. Furthermore, there have been recurring reports about the subpar technical quality of Russian weaponry.
From Russia’s perspective, such deals represent an undeniable success, albeit not necessarily a financial one. Iran is unlikely to pay Russia in cash; instead, it will be a barter transaction. According to unconfirmed reports, Russia has agreed to exchange Su-35s for Iranian Shaheed-131 and Shaheed-136 drones, trading one aircraft for a thousand UAVs. As experts note, “It would be a very good deal for the Iranian side because the cost of a single Shaheed is estimated between $10,000 and $50,000. So, in this situation, the Su-35 would be sold for an equivalent of $10 to $50 million.” In exchange for the Yak-130 and Mi-28, Iran might pay with missile technologies.
Nevertheless, for the Kremlin, the transactions represent a propaganda success at the very least. Russia is grappling with international economic sanctions, and its arms exports have plummeted. Interest in Russian arms is minimal, driven not only by sanctions and other Western pressure but also due to negative publicity surrounding Russian weaponry performance. The Russian success is even greater because at the same time, Kazakhstan rejected French Rafale fighters and ordered ten Su-30SM aircraft.
Robert Czulda is an assistant professor at the University of Lodz, Poland and a former visiting professor at Islamic Azad University in Iran, the University of Maryland, and National Cheng-chi University in Taiwan. He is the author of Iran 1925 – 2014: From Reza Shah to Rouhani (2014) and Iran’s Security Policy: Internal and International Dimensions (2022). Follow him on Twitter: @RobertCzulda.
Recent & Related