It has now been more than four months since Iran and Saudi Arabia issued a joint statement in China pledging to restart diplomatic relations. The deal came after two years of intense talks behind closed doors between Iranian and Saudi officials in Baghdad and were finalized in a week of consultations in Beijing. The two sides have exchanged ambassadors, but questions remain about how durable and comprehensive their reconciliation is.
There is still no word about when Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Saudi Arabia, though months have passed since King Salman extended an official invitation to him. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani told the press on July 3, 2023 that there is no fixed date for Raisi’s trip, an indication of flagging momentum for improving ties between Tehran and Riyadh.
Over the last 60 years, Iran and Saudi Arabia have cut diplomatic relations three times: in 1942, during World War II, when Iran said it was unsafe for Iranians to go to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, and twice after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The first two breaks lasted between two and three years and ended without the mediation of a third country. The latest rupture lasted more than seven years and coincided with rising tensions over Yemen and attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.
In resolving their differences, the two Persian Gulf powers resurrected previous bilateral pacts reached in 1998 and 2001. The latter pledged to combat drug trafficking, crime, terrorism, and money laundering. The earlier agreement concentrated on cooperation in the economic, commercial, scientific, communications, environmental, and sports sectors.
Regional and global reactions to Iran-Saudi rapprochement have been largely positive but the long-term effects of the deal remain unclear. There is still a lack of confidence between Riyadh and Tehran about adherence to the Beijing agreement. And although China succeeded in finalizing the agreement, its supervision mechanisms, if any, have not been revealed.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have often been on different sides of regional disputes.
Iran has staunchly supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while Saudi Arabia financed Syrian opposition groups. Saudi Arabia sees Iran’s growing influence in Syria since the 2011 Arab Spring as a threat. The vast influence and steady presence of Iran in Syria and Assad’s closeness to Iranian leaders can be problematic for Saudi Arabia, although the Saudis recently restored relations with Syria and greenlighted its readmission to the Arab League.
In Yemen, Iran is backing the Houthis and Saudi Arabia failed to dislodge the group despite heavy military involvement after 2015. Saudi Arabia remains vulnerable to rocket attacks by the Houthis if the current cease-fire breaks down.
Iran and Saudi Arabia also differed over Qatar, which Saudi Arabia sought to blockade in 2017. Tehran backed Doha and again, Riyadh was obliged to change course.
As two powerful neighbors in West Asia, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been locked in a decades-old rivalry because of ideological differences. Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leading Sunni Muslim power, basing its legitimacy on its majority Sunni population and its venue as the site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This status was contested in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution in Iran which created a new kind of state with the ambition of exporting its model beyond its borders. Prior to the revolution, the two countries had been allied under the Nixon Doctrine of “twin pillars” and seen as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, espoused a policy of “neither East nor West.” He also opposed monarchies, having overthrown one in Iran, while the Saudis have retained their kings.
The two countries broke relations in 1987 after Iranian Shi’ite pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca and clashed with Saudi security forces, which resulted in the death of more than 400 people. At the time, Ayatollah Khomeini reportedly said “I might be able to forgive [Iraqi dictator] Saddam Hussein one day, but I won’t forgive Saudi Arabia,” according to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the late former Iranian president who quoted Ayatollah Khomeini in his memoirs. Ayatollah Khomeini later softened his position and asked Iranian officials to “resolve issues” with the Saudis so that Iranians could resume performing the Hajj pilgrimage.
Another point of friction is non-proliferation. Riyadh has long feared that Iran would acquire a nuclear weapon. According to a leaked audio of Iranian ex-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Saudi Arabia interfered in the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and sought to subvert the deal. After the agreement was struck, Riyadh remained concerned that it would upset the regional balance of power. Saudi leaders were convinced that Iran’s increased access to financial resources would be used to fund its proxies around the region, further destabilizing the Middle East.
Another issue that Iran cannot overlook is the possibility that Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel. Despite its alleged concern for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, Riyadh has already opened its airspace to Israeli flights. Saudi Arabia has reportedly asked the U.S. for approval of a civilian nuclear program as well as security guarantees in return for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.
A major question about the durability of Iran-Saudi relations involves the conduct of the mediator, China.
Over the past thirty years, Sino-Saudi linkage has increased in a variety of areas. Saudi Arabia has become China’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa, and China’s leading international supplier of crude oil. Saudi Arabia has also been the largest regional recipient of Chinese contracting and investment, which totaled nearly $43.5 billion between 2005 and 2021, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database. China’s exports to Saudi Arabia reached $37.99 billion during 2022 while Beijing’s exports to Tehran were $9.44 billion in 2022.
Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation deal with China during former President Hassan Rouhani’s second term, which allows China to purchase cheap energy in exchange for an obligation to make substantial investments in Iran’s economy. However, it is clear that the relationship with China has been more profitable for the Saudis than the Iranians.
China’s partiality in choosing sides between Iran and Saudi Arabia was evident when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh last December and signed on to statements by the Gulf Cooperation Council that were hostile to Iran. This brought severe criticism from Tehran, but Iran’s objections did not appear to bear tangible fruit.
For now, reconciliation with Saudi Arabia seems beneficial for Iran as it eases isolation on a country that has been under severe sanctions for five years. For Saudi Arabia, the benefit is to stave off new attacks by the Houthis and be able to focus on ambitious economic development plans. Nevertheless, the deal between Tehran and Riyadh is likely to have significant ups and downs in the future.
Mohammad Amin Nouri is an M.A fellow in Regional Studies at the University of Tehran. He is the Director General of The Regional Studies scientific association of University of Tehran.
Saeed Azimi is a political journalist based in Tehran.
Why Iran-Saudi Reconciliation May be Shaky
By Mohammad Amin Nouri • Saeed Azimi
Middle East & North Africa
It has now been more than four months since Iran and Saudi Arabia issued a joint statement in China pledging to restart diplomatic relations. The deal came after two years of intense talks behind closed doors between Iranian and Saudi officials in Baghdad and were finalized in a week of consultations in Beijing. The two sides have exchanged ambassadors, but questions remain about how durable and comprehensive their reconciliation is.
There is still no word about when Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Saudi Arabia, though months have passed since King Salman extended an official invitation to him. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani told the press on July 3, 2023 that there is no fixed date for Raisi’s trip, an indication of flagging momentum for improving ties between Tehran and Riyadh.
Over the last 60 years, Iran and Saudi Arabia have cut diplomatic relations three times: in 1942, during World War II, when Iran said it was unsafe for Iranians to go to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, and twice after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The first two breaks lasted between two and three years and ended without the mediation of a third country. The latest rupture lasted more than seven years and coincided with rising tensions over Yemen and attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.
In resolving their differences, the two Persian Gulf powers resurrected previous bilateral pacts reached in 1998 and 2001. The latter pledged to combat drug trafficking, crime, terrorism, and money laundering. The earlier agreement concentrated on cooperation in the economic, commercial, scientific, communications, environmental, and sports sectors.
Regional and global reactions to Iran-Saudi rapprochement have been largely positive but the long-term effects of the deal remain unclear. There is still a lack of confidence between Riyadh and Tehran about adherence to the Beijing agreement. And although China succeeded in finalizing the agreement, its supervision mechanisms, if any, have not been revealed.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have often been on different sides of regional disputes.
Iran has staunchly supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while Saudi Arabia financed Syrian opposition groups. Saudi Arabia sees Iran’s growing influence in Syria since the 2011 Arab Spring as a threat. The vast influence and steady presence of Iran in Syria and Assad’s closeness to Iranian leaders can be problematic for Saudi Arabia, although the Saudis recently restored relations with Syria and greenlighted its readmission to the Arab League.
In Yemen, Iran is backing the Houthis and Saudi Arabia failed to dislodge the group despite heavy military involvement after 2015. Saudi Arabia remains vulnerable to rocket attacks by the Houthis if the current cease-fire breaks down.
Iran and Saudi Arabia also differed over Qatar, which Saudi Arabia sought to blockade in 2017. Tehran backed Doha and again, Riyadh was obliged to change course.
As two powerful neighbors in West Asia, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been locked in a decades-old rivalry because of ideological differences. Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leading Sunni Muslim power, basing its legitimacy on its majority Sunni population and its venue as the site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This status was contested in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution in Iran which created a new kind of state with the ambition of exporting its model beyond its borders. Prior to the revolution, the two countries had been allied under the Nixon Doctrine of “twin pillars” and seen as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, espoused a policy of “neither East nor West.” He also opposed monarchies, having overthrown one in Iran, while the Saudis have retained their kings.
The two countries broke relations in 1987 after Iranian Shi’ite pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca and clashed with Saudi security forces, which resulted in the death of more than 400 people. At the time, Ayatollah Khomeini reportedly said “I might be able to forgive [Iraqi dictator] Saddam Hussein one day, but I won’t forgive Saudi Arabia,” according to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the late former Iranian president who quoted Ayatollah Khomeini in his memoirs. Ayatollah Khomeini later softened his position and asked Iranian officials to “resolve issues” with the Saudis so that Iranians could resume performing the Hajj pilgrimage.
Another point of friction is non-proliferation. Riyadh has long feared that Iran would acquire a nuclear weapon. According to a leaked audio of Iranian ex-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Saudi Arabia interfered in the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and sought to subvert the deal. After the agreement was struck, Riyadh remained concerned that it would upset the regional balance of power. Saudi leaders were convinced that Iran’s increased access to financial resources would be used to fund its proxies around the region, further destabilizing the Middle East.
Another issue that Iran cannot overlook is the possibility that Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel. Despite its alleged concern for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, Riyadh has already opened its airspace to Israeli flights. Saudi Arabia has reportedly asked the U.S. for approval of a civilian nuclear program as well as security guarantees in return for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.
A major question about the durability of Iran-Saudi relations involves the conduct of the mediator, China.
Over the past thirty years, Sino-Saudi linkage has increased in a variety of areas. Saudi Arabia has become China’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa, and China’s leading international supplier of crude oil. Saudi Arabia has also been the largest regional recipient of Chinese contracting and investment, which totaled nearly $43.5 billion between 2005 and 2021, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database. China’s exports to Saudi Arabia reached $37.99 billion during 2022 while Beijing’s exports to Tehran were $9.44 billion in 2022.
Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation deal with China during former President Hassan Rouhani’s second term, which allows China to purchase cheap energy in exchange for an obligation to make substantial investments in Iran’s economy. However, it is clear that the relationship with China has been more profitable for the Saudis than the Iranians.
China’s partiality in choosing sides between Iran and Saudi Arabia was evident when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh last December and signed on to statements by the Gulf Cooperation Council that were hostile to Iran. This brought severe criticism from Tehran, but Iran’s objections did not appear to bear tangible fruit.
For now, reconciliation with Saudi Arabia seems beneficial for Iran as it eases isolation on a country that has been under severe sanctions for five years. For Saudi Arabia, the benefit is to stave off new attacks by the Houthis and be able to focus on ambitious economic development plans. Nevertheless, the deal between Tehran and Riyadh is likely to have significant ups and downs in the future.
Mohammad Amin Nouri is an M.A fellow in Regional Studies at the University of Tehran. He is the Director General of The Regional Studies scientific association of University of Tehran.
Saeed Azimi is a political journalist based in Tehran.
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