Iran and Saudi Arabia are moving to improve ties at a time when the regional order is in flux, U.S. hegemony is weakening and the center of gravity of power is moving from the West to the East.
Washington is switching from a constant large military footprint to an ‘’offshore balancing’’ strategy, seeking to reduce excessive security obligations in the Middle East so that it can focus on containing China. Therefore, the Joe Biden administration has expressed support for Saudi-Iran dialogue, describing it as a de-escalation, not a friendship, that could ease regional tensions more broadly and facilitate the U.S. pivot to Asia. In the words of Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the United States “should not be panicking—the mere fact of Saudi-Iranian de-escalation is actually in the U.S. national interest.”
Regional powers lack capacity to become hegemons and so are forming new arrangements as middle powers that seek solutions in areas where the U.S. lacks leverage. At the same time, countries in the region that initially opposed the Iran nuclear deal are seeking dialogue with Tehran on issues that were excluded from the nuclear talks, such as Iran’s growing arsenal of missiles and drones.
Saudi Arabia, for example, is trying to mitigate the immediate threats against its national security. Disappointed by the lack of a strong U.S. response to attacks on its oil infrastructure during the Trump presidency, Riyadh now seeks to secure its interests and not get embroiled in so-called great power competition.
Iran’s “deep state” also believes that an agreement with Saudi Arabia mediated by China can help deepen relations with Beijing and counter U.S. efforts to act as a ‘‘security integrator’’ in the region. U.S. Central Command (Centcom) aims to combine the forces of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members into task forces that will jointly patrol the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. A center is also being established by Washington near Riyadh to develop new weapons to counter drones that have been used by Yemen’s Houthis as well as Iran to attack targets inside Saudi Arabia.
In hindsight, U.S. power in the region probably reached its peak after the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003. The fall of Saddam Hussein changed the balance of power in the region in Iran’s favor. U.S. support for revolutionaries during the 2011 Arab Spring also offended Saudi Arabia, which was upset to see the U.S. abandon traditional allies such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.
The civil war in Syria that broke out in 2011 also led to the direct intervention of Iran which was determined not to lose an important connector in a chain leading to Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea.
Iranian gains led regional states such as Saudi Arabia to adopt an aggressive foreign policy in Yemen. But after several years of war, Saudi Arabia did not achieve its goals in Yemen, while the Houthis gained access to more advanced weapons that threatened the depths of Saudi Arabia.
It should be noted that Yemen is the most important file in the negotiations to improve relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s influence in Yemen is seen as a vital asset in imposing a logistical burden on the Saudis and maintaining deterrence against Riyadh. Tehran views Yemen as a strategic asset that would ensure operational access into Saudi Arabia during a hypothetical conflict.
Saudi Arabia wants an end to the Yemen war and rocket attacks on its homeland. It also does not want to be the arena of competition between the U.S. and China and wants to avoid being targeted by Iran in the event of hostilities between Iran and Israel. The ‘‘Abraham Accords’’ that normalized Israeli relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain and Israel’s recent inclusion in Centcom have led to fears that conflict between Iran and Israel could spread to the Arabs. Based on this, the UAE declared that its relationship with Israel is not a threat to any other country and Abu Dhabi said it would not allow its territory to be used to threaten Iran.
Iran had announced that if it is targeted by Israel from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, it would retaliate against those host countries.
Saudi Arabia, which has not yet joined the Abraham Accords, has tried to portray any warming of relations with Israel as purely bilateral and not a threat to Iran. It seems that Tehran also accepts bilateral relations between the Arabs and Israel. Iran’s concern is more about potential security alliances among the Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel, a concept that is sometimes referred to as an “Arab NATO.”
Accordingly, Iran is worried about the possibility that Centcom could realize its long-held ambition to create an integrated air defense system with Israel and the GCC. This system would weaken the power of Iran and its regional partners in the field of missiles and drones.
Another variable that could determine the level of Iran-Saudi relations is whether the Saudis follow through on promises to increase trade with and investment in Iran.
Iran has announced that it seeks to reach $1 billion in annual bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia in the short term and $2 billion in the medium term — something that may be hard to achieve given U.S. sanctions.
Iran has also sought a reduction in Saudi support for the Iran International satellite television channel, which has showcased Iranian dissidents during the recent protests over enforced hijab. Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, had threatened to attack Saudi Arabia if it continued to back the channel.
From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, Iran’s influence on Saudi Shi’ites, who make up about 10 to 15 percent of the Saudi population and live in the oil-rich eastern province, is another key reason to de-escalate tensions with Iran.
Riyadh is also focused on its Vision 2030, which seeks to modernize and diversify the Saudi economy through reducing dependence on oil, developing alternative sources of income, and increasing the participation of the private sector. Détente with Iran, the Saudis hope, will reduce regional tensions, end the Yemen war, and deter Houthi attacks on the Saudi homeland including new cities like Neom on the coast of the Red Sea.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is also preparing the ground for obtaining the throne and wants to give no ammunition to internal opponents.
In reaching their normalization agreement, both Tehran and Riyadh have had to downplay their historic strategic preferences. For years, Saudi Arabia has insisted that Iran should not have any role in the Arab world.
Iran, however, is not willing to make permanent concessions regarding Yemen. Although both sides have turned to compromise to achieve tactical goals, continuation of the agreement depends on whether the two countries can turn tactics into long-term strategy.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
What are the Limits of Iran-Saudi Détente?
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
Iran and Saudi Arabia are moving to improve ties at a time when the regional order is in flux, U.S. hegemony is weakening and the center of gravity of power is moving from the West to the East.
Washington is switching from a constant large military footprint to an ‘’offshore balancing’’ strategy, seeking to reduce excessive security obligations in the Middle East so that it can focus on containing China. Therefore, the Joe Biden administration has expressed support for Saudi-Iran dialogue, describing it as a de-escalation, not a friendship, that could ease regional tensions more broadly and facilitate the U.S. pivot to Asia. In the words of Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the United States “should not be panicking—the mere fact of Saudi-Iranian de-escalation is actually in the U.S. national interest.”
Regional powers lack capacity to become hegemons and so are forming new arrangements as middle powers that seek solutions in areas where the U.S. lacks leverage. At the same time, countries in the region that initially opposed the Iran nuclear deal are seeking dialogue with Tehran on issues that were excluded from the nuclear talks, such as Iran’s growing arsenal of missiles and drones.
Saudi Arabia, for example, is trying to mitigate the immediate threats against its national security. Disappointed by the lack of a strong U.S. response to attacks on its oil infrastructure during the Trump presidency, Riyadh now seeks to secure its interests and not get embroiled in so-called great power competition.
Iran’s “deep state” also believes that an agreement with Saudi Arabia mediated by China can help deepen relations with Beijing and counter U.S. efforts to act as a ‘‘security integrator’’ in the region. U.S. Central Command (Centcom) aims to combine the forces of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members into task forces that will jointly patrol the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. A center is also being established by Washington near Riyadh to develop new weapons to counter drones that have been used by Yemen’s Houthis as well as Iran to attack targets inside Saudi Arabia.
In hindsight, U.S. power in the region probably reached its peak after the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003. The fall of Saddam Hussein changed the balance of power in the region in Iran’s favor. U.S. support for revolutionaries during the 2011 Arab Spring also offended Saudi Arabia, which was upset to see the U.S. abandon traditional allies such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.
The civil war in Syria that broke out in 2011 also led to the direct intervention of Iran which was determined not to lose an important connector in a chain leading to Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea.
Iranian gains led regional states such as Saudi Arabia to adopt an aggressive foreign policy in Yemen. But after several years of war, Saudi Arabia did not achieve its goals in Yemen, while the Houthis gained access to more advanced weapons that threatened the depths of Saudi Arabia.
It should be noted that Yemen is the most important file in the negotiations to improve relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s influence in Yemen is seen as a vital asset in imposing a logistical burden on the Saudis and maintaining deterrence against Riyadh. Tehran views Yemen as a strategic asset that would ensure operational access into Saudi Arabia during a hypothetical conflict.
Saudi Arabia wants an end to the Yemen war and rocket attacks on its homeland. It also does not want to be the arena of competition between the U.S. and China and wants to avoid being targeted by Iran in the event of hostilities between Iran and Israel. The ‘‘Abraham Accords’’ that normalized Israeli relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain and Israel’s recent inclusion in Centcom have led to fears that conflict between Iran and Israel could spread to the Arabs. Based on this, the UAE declared that its relationship with Israel is not a threat to any other country and Abu Dhabi said it would not allow its territory to be used to threaten Iran.
Iran had announced that if it is targeted by Israel from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, it would retaliate against those host countries.
Saudi Arabia, which has not yet joined the Abraham Accords, has tried to portray any warming of relations with Israel as purely bilateral and not a threat to Iran. It seems that Tehran also accepts bilateral relations between the Arabs and Israel. Iran’s concern is more about potential security alliances among the Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel, a concept that is sometimes referred to as an “Arab NATO.”
Accordingly, Iran is worried about the possibility that Centcom could realize its long-held ambition to create an integrated air defense system with Israel and the GCC. This system would weaken the power of Iran and its regional partners in the field of missiles and drones.
Another variable that could determine the level of Iran-Saudi relations is whether the Saudis follow through on promises to increase trade with and investment in Iran.
Iran has announced that it seeks to reach $1 billion in annual bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia in the short term and $2 billion in the medium term — something that may be hard to achieve given U.S. sanctions.
Iran has also sought a reduction in Saudi support for the Iran International satellite television channel, which has showcased Iranian dissidents during the recent protests over enforced hijab. Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, had threatened to attack Saudi Arabia if it continued to back the channel.
From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, Iran’s influence on Saudi Shi’ites, who make up about 10 to 15 percent of the Saudi population and live in the oil-rich eastern province, is another key reason to de-escalate tensions with Iran.
Riyadh is also focused on its Vision 2030, which seeks to modernize and diversify the Saudi economy through reducing dependence on oil, developing alternative sources of income, and increasing the participation of the private sector. Détente with Iran, the Saudis hope, will reduce regional tensions, end the Yemen war, and deter Houthi attacks on the Saudi homeland including new cities like Neom on the coast of the Red Sea.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is also preparing the ground for obtaining the throne and wants to give no ammunition to internal opponents.
In reaching their normalization agreement, both Tehran and Riyadh have had to downplay their historic strategic preferences. For years, Saudi Arabia has insisted that Iran should not have any role in the Arab world.
Iran, however, is not willing to make permanent concessions regarding Yemen. Although both sides have turned to compromise to achieve tactical goals, continuation of the agreement depends on whether the two countries can turn tactics into long-term strategy.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
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