The Red cell project
The Red Cell was a small unit created by the CIA after 9/11 to ensure the analytic failure of missing the attacks would never be repeated. It produced short briefs intended to spur out-of-the-box thinking on flawed assumptions and misperceptions about the world, encouraging alternative policy thinking. At another pivotal time of increasing uncertainty, this project is intended as an open-source version, using a similar format to question outmoded mental maps and “strategic empathy” to discern the motives and constraints of other global actors, enhancing the possibility of more effective strategies.
Partial Successes, Total Failures
The recently released edited volume, China’s Use of Armed Coercion: To Win Without Fighting, is largely focused on answering questions about how, when, why, and to what effect China has used its armed forces to coerce its neighbors. The results are not encouraging for China.
In an effort to establish territorial sovereignty over disputed areas in the South China Sea, China has increased the frequency, scale, and intensity of its aerial and naval patrols in the East and South China Seas.
Since 2007, Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) and China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels have conducted hundreds of “special operations” to expel foreign fishermen operating near the Paracel Islands and have regularly conducted rights protection cruises in the South China Sea. Since then, Chinese vessels have consistently harassed foreign fishing vessels operating in waters near contested features in the South China Sea, while using superior forces to control escalation and intimidate other countries’ maritime law-enforcement services from upholding their own sovereign legal rights.
Since 2010, China has provided MLE/CCG escorts for its fishing fleets in the Spratly Islands, often inside the claimed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other countries in violation of international law and custom. Although this practice still leads to occasional clashes, since the CCG established a persistent presence throughout the South China Sea beginning in 2013, harassment or interdiction of Chinese fishing vessels has become increasingly rare.
This kind of policing, patrolling, and protection of Chinese fishing activities in key areas in the Spratly Islands and along the nine-dash line is intended to compel acceptance of Beijing’s unlawful sovereignty claims and excessive jurisdictional claims by “safeguarding maritime rights and interests.” China’s success in establishing a degree of deterrence around its claims to effective control in some formally contested areas is beyond dispute. There is arguably tacit acceptance of China’s economic activities within large, often contested, areas of the South China Sea, partly as a result of its persistent armed presence and its willingness to use maritime law-enforcement tools and tactics to uphold its claims by force.
However, China has not succeeded in compelling formal acceptance or recognition of its claims to exclusive economic or territorial rights in the Spratly Islands, which have in fact been roundly rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. China still contends with frequent violations of its claimed jurisdictional rights by other claimants, indicating that its purported claims to exclusive economic rights are still very much contested. Other claimants have not given up on defending their own positions and have continued to benefit from economic resources within their claimed EEZs despite China’s excessive claims and intimidation tactics.
Rather than cowing its smaller neighbors into abject submission, China’s efforts have arguably led to increased resistance and balancing behavior by other countries in the region. Indonesia has scuttled China’s illegal fishing vessels in recent years; India has deepened its defense cooperation with the U.S. and formed a diplomatic partnership, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with the U.S. and its allies, Japan and Australia; Vietnam has elevated its ties with the U.S. to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership; Australia has joined the U.S. and UK in the new “AUKUS” defense pact; the Philippines has agreed to host more U.S. forces and to conduct more joint naval and air patrols — just to name a few examples. ASEAN has also renewed its efforts to mitigate tensions and address key issues through multilateral diplomacy and joint military exercises, and the number of cooperative security arrangements in the region is growing.
Furthermore, the United States has been explicit about the fact that it does not recognize China’s claims in the South China Sea and will not accede to its demands for prior notification or permission for freedom of navigation operations and surveillance missions near China’s claimed features and territorial waters. Although China consistently intercepts such missions, occasionally using unsafe or unprofessional tactics, the majority of encounters between the U.S. and Chinese militaries are described by U.S. defense officials as “safe, professional and routine.”
The U.S. has also enhanced allied deterrence in the region by making clear that it will defend its allies’ claims to the territories under their effective control, including the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea and Japan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands. Thus, China’s efforts to deter U.S. forces from operating without its permission within areas under its claimed jurisdiction have manifestly failed; its efforts to deter other claimants from fishing or operating in contested waters or near features under their effective control have also failed, as have its efforts to compel other claimants to comply with China’s broad jurisdictional demands (e.g., the Philippines); and its efforts to win recognition for its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have failed across the board.
Deterrence, Defense, and Diplomacy
China’s approach has proven to be largely self-defeating, at least in terms of its political objectives. Beijing’s reliance on coercive tactics in recent decades has already generated significant geopolitical backlash, including through increased regional defense cooperation with the U.S. and multilateral repudiation of China’s behavior. The United States has already begun increasing its efforts to assist allies and partners in the region in resisting China’s excessive claims and can easily provide greater support to international legal and multilateral diplomatic initiatives that could further constrain China’s coercive behavior. As a result of all these factors, one might expect China to conclude that it needs to act with greater self-restraint in order to maintain productive relations with its neighbors and avoid permanently undermining its goal of projecting an image as a “responsible great power” — something that China has consistently indicated it prioritizes.
Thus, the primary challenge for the United States in countering China’s coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific is political, rather than military. U.S. strategy should emphasize diplomacy, public information, and law enforcement — and avoid an overemphasis on military tools and tactics. America’s high-end military capabilities position it well to deter China from international aggression. Its strategic aims in the region should thus focus on deterring conflict while bolstering regional countries in their efforts to check China’s coercive behavior in the gray zone.
The United States should seek to forge greater regional consensus on China’s unacceptable behavior, and to strongly support multilateral agreements, like the ongoing negotiations for a binding code of conduct on the South China Sea. The U.S. should also work to deepen practical security cooperation among regional states, even if such cooperation does not include the U.S. directly, to ensure the free flow of commerce and the unencumbered navigational rights of all nations through international waters and airspace in accordance with international law. Washington should offer friendship and support to countries that might feel threatened and make clear America’s ability and intention to uphold its obligations to defend its treaty allies from attack or coercion. Rather than playing a fruitless game of whack-a-mole by attempting to match China’s tactics or police every instance of low-level coercive behavior in the region, U.S. strategy should focus on preventing escalation to armed conflict and providing advice, assistance, and political-military support to regional partners to galvanize a strong, unified, multilateral response to China’s coercive behavior. In the meantime, China’s actions aren’t delivering the results it wants, and instead risk doing lasting damage to its reputation and relations in the region. To paraphrase Napoleon, don’t interrupt China while it’s making a mistake.
Find the full book page for China’s Use of Armed Coercion: To Win Without Fighting on Stimson.
