Recent press reports have cast doubt on whether Iran and Russia will go through with a planned deal for Iran to purchase two dozen Su-35 twin engine fighter planes. But it is too early to say that the sale is off, and it may be that the two sides are still negotiating terms while Iran is seeking advantage through selective media leaks.
Reports about a planned sale emerged in early January 2023. At the time, the news was officially confirmed by the Iranians, including Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and Iranian Member of Parliament Shahriyar Heidar. It was then stated that deliveries of the 24 new Su-35 twin-engine air-superiority jet fighters would begin in the middle of 2023. The planes, originally manufactured for sale to Egypt but never delivered, would be enough to equip up to two squadrons but not sufficient to significantly modernize the Iranian tactical fleet, let alone provide Iran with air superiority over its neighbors, particularly the Western-armed Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf.
In reporting that the deal had been cancelled, media outlets quoted Iranian defense minister Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani as saying that Iran would develop and manufacture similar jets on its own. However, no reason was given for such a shift. If Iran and Russia have agreed to the delivery of the jets, cancellation would likely require substantial compensation costs and damage what has been a steadily growing alliance between Iran and Russia since Russia helped salvage the Assad government in Syria in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
In general, implementation of agreements like the Su-35 sale is a multi-stage process. For instance, many months ago, training for Iranian pilots should have commenced in Russia, and Iran should have started preparing appropriate airfield infrastructure domestically.
Meanwhile, Gen. Ashtiani has hinted that Iran could return to the deal “if deemed necessary” while Gen. Vahidi has been quoted as saying that the dispute is over Russian reluctance to transfer technology for production of aircraft parts, as well as to agree to provide technical knowledge to Iran to maintain the planes domestically.
Thus, the most probable explanation for the delay in delivering the jets is difficulties in negotiations, which, in the case of such advanced systems, entail many key elements. These include the scale of Russian investment in Iran’s defense industry as well as agreement on spare parts deliveries, maintenance procedures and ground personnel training. There may also be political aspects, such as whether Iran can use the Su-35s freely in armed conflicts that might contradict Russian national interests, as well as technical details, such as whether Iran has the right to modify or modernize the jets without Russian permission.
Recent Iranian statements may also reflect an effort to show that the delivery delays do not negatively impact Iran’s military might in the region. The Islamic Republic rarely admits setbacks and tends to portray every scenario as favorable to Tehran.
The credibility of reports about Iran cancelling the agreement would be greater if Iran were actually capable of independently designing and building aircraft with technical parameters similar to the Su-35.
A modern jet aircraft like the Su-35 is a system of systems composed of numerous advanced components. Iran would need a capability to design and then serially produce elements such as advanced propulsion systems, or digital avionics. Developing a modern fuselage also represents a significant challenge and requires a well-established scientific and industrial infrastructure. Additionally, communication systems, onboard radar, and weaponry, which also rely on integration of hardware with software, must be designed, tested, and manufactured. Such comprehensive capabilities are possessed by only a small group of countries worldwide, which, unlike Iran, have experience in designing such systems as well as the requisite financial resources, trained engineers, modern production lines, and a network of international partners. In many cases, importing know-how, specific systems, or subsystems (such as engine or airframe components) becomes necessary. Iran, isolated and lacking adequate design and production potential, certainly does not belong in this category.
In conclusion, it seems that the deal has not collapsed, and there will be no breakdown in relations between Iran and Russia. Both countries, despite long-standing and historic mutual mistrust, cannot afford to give up on cooperation at a time when both are heavily sanctioned, and Russia is trying to fight off a Ukrainian offensive.
Iran, meanwhile, lacks alternative sources for importing advanced military systems. It has experienced similar problems, including long delays, when it sought to buy advanced air-defense systems from Russia. Thus, what we are currently witnessing is likely just negotiating discrepancies and an effort to gain leverage and disguise problems. Delivery of the Su-35 is probably just a matter of time.
Robert Czulda is an assistant professor at the University of Lodz, Poland and a former visiting professor at Islamic Azad University in Iran, the University of Maryland, and National Cheng-chi University in Taiwan. He is the author of Iran 1925 – 2014: From Reza Shah to Rouhani (2014) and Iran’s Security Policy: Internal and International Dimensions (2022). Follow him on Twitter: @RobertCzulda.
Iran-Russia Fighter Deal Likely Still On
By Robert Czulda
Middle East & North Africa
Recent press reports have cast doubt on whether Iran and Russia will go through with a planned deal for Iran to purchase two dozen Su-35 twin engine fighter planes. But it is too early to say that the sale is off, and it may be that the two sides are still negotiating terms while Iran is seeking advantage through selective media leaks.
Reports about a planned sale emerged in early January 2023. At the time, the news was officially confirmed by the Iranians, including Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and Iranian Member of Parliament Shahriyar Heidar. It was then stated that deliveries of the 24 new Su-35 twin-engine air-superiority jet fighters would begin in the middle of 2023. The planes, originally manufactured for sale to Egypt but never delivered, would be enough to equip up to two squadrons but not sufficient to significantly modernize the Iranian tactical fleet, let alone provide Iran with air superiority over its neighbors, particularly the Western-armed Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf.
In reporting that the deal had been cancelled, media outlets quoted Iranian defense minister Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani as saying that Iran would develop and manufacture similar jets on its own. However, no reason was given for such a shift. If Iran and Russia have agreed to the delivery of the jets, cancellation would likely require substantial compensation costs and damage what has been a steadily growing alliance between Iran and Russia since Russia helped salvage the Assad government in Syria in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
In general, implementation of agreements like the Su-35 sale is a multi-stage process. For instance, many months ago, training for Iranian pilots should have commenced in Russia, and Iran should have started preparing appropriate airfield infrastructure domestically.
Meanwhile, Gen. Ashtiani has hinted that Iran could return to the deal “if deemed necessary” while Gen. Vahidi has been quoted as saying that the dispute is over Russian reluctance to transfer technology for production of aircraft parts, as well as to agree to provide technical knowledge to Iran to maintain the planes domestically.
Thus, the most probable explanation for the delay in delivering the jets is difficulties in negotiations, which, in the case of such advanced systems, entail many key elements. These include the scale of Russian investment in Iran’s defense industry as well as agreement on spare parts deliveries, maintenance procedures and ground personnel training. There may also be political aspects, such as whether Iran can use the Su-35s freely in armed conflicts that might contradict Russian national interests, as well as technical details, such as whether Iran has the right to modify or modernize the jets without Russian permission.
Recent Iranian statements may also reflect an effort to show that the delivery delays do not negatively impact Iran’s military might in the region. The Islamic Republic rarely admits setbacks and tends to portray every scenario as favorable to Tehran.
The credibility of reports about Iran cancelling the agreement would be greater if Iran were actually capable of independently designing and building aircraft with technical parameters similar to the Su-35.
A modern jet aircraft like the Su-35 is a system of systems composed of numerous advanced components. Iran would need a capability to design and then serially produce elements such as advanced propulsion systems, or digital avionics. Developing a modern fuselage also represents a significant challenge and requires a well-established scientific and industrial infrastructure. Additionally, communication systems, onboard radar, and weaponry, which also rely on integration of hardware with software, must be designed, tested, and manufactured. Such comprehensive capabilities are possessed by only a small group of countries worldwide, which, unlike Iran, have experience in designing such systems as well as the requisite financial resources, trained engineers, modern production lines, and a network of international partners. In many cases, importing know-how, specific systems, or subsystems (such as engine or airframe components) becomes necessary. Iran, isolated and lacking adequate design and production potential, certainly does not belong in this category.
In conclusion, it seems that the deal has not collapsed, and there will be no breakdown in relations between Iran and Russia. Both countries, despite long-standing and historic mutual mistrust, cannot afford to give up on cooperation at a time when both are heavily sanctioned, and Russia is trying to fight off a Ukrainian offensive.
Iran, meanwhile, lacks alternative sources for importing advanced military systems. It has experienced similar problems, including long delays, when it sought to buy advanced air-defense systems from Russia. Thus, what we are currently witnessing is likely just negotiating discrepancies and an effort to gain leverage and disguise problems. Delivery of the Su-35 is probably just a matter of time.
Robert Czulda is an assistant professor at the University of Lodz, Poland and a former visiting professor at Islamic Azad University in Iran, the University of Maryland, and National Cheng-chi University in Taiwan. He is the author of Iran 1925 – 2014: From Reza Shah to Rouhani (2014) and Iran’s Security Policy: Internal and International Dimensions (2022). Follow him on Twitter: @RobertCzulda.
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