Among the areas of foreign policy continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations has been support for the Abraham Accords, which expanded Israel’s diplomatic ties to Arab states.
Under the accords, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan joined Egypt and Jordan in formalizing relations with Israel. Motives for this shift varied, but in general, these countries sought to strengthen ties with Washington. The UAE and Bahrain in particular hoped to acquire more advanced US weapons, as well as collaborate with Israel to defend against perceived threats from Iran. The UAE, for example, wants to buy American F-35 fighter jets; the prerequisite is the tacit approval of Israel.
Qatar and Oman also have strong ties with Tel Aviv, but relations have not yet been formalized. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is waiting for a good opportunity to announce the normalization of relations. The country claims to be the leader of the Islamic world and to support Palestinian rights. Yet in a recent interview, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman described Israel as a “potential ally” rather than an “enemy,” and there are reports of recent meetings intended to strengthen intelligence and military ties.
The Accords have also had a serious impact on Iranian strategic thinking. Although they preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they were a factor in Iran’s decision to boost its military relationship with Moscow. Iran seeks to overcome the balance deficit caused by the emerging Arab-Israel-US order by acquiring new weapons such as hypersonic missiles and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Iran is also trying to increase its “strategic depth” by expanding influence in regions closer to the US, such as Latin America.
The Negev Summits & a ‘New Regional Architecture’
The Arab states’ entry into deeper relations with Israel, to the point of holding summits in the so-called Negev process, reflects a lack of internal political constraints and a perceived threat from Iran and its regional proxies. While none of the Arab states see Israel as a replacement for the United States, they view Tel Aviv as an actor that can strengthen their position in the lobbies of power in the US as well as help formulate a new security order in the Persian Gulf. Then-Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid noted at the first Negev summit in March 2022 that he had laid the foundations for a ‘‘new regional architecture’’ whose main focus was to deter Iran and its allied forces. A second summit is due in March 2023, although a date has not yet been set.
The purpose of this new architecture is to provide deterrence against air and sea threats from Iran and its partners. Air coordination is a strategic asset that was not previously available to Arabs and Israelis. Israel’s new allies are geographically closer to Iran and Iraq—where many Iranian-backed militias operate—making it easier for the Israeli Air Force to identify and react to imminent threats. This coordination promises to improve the Israeli Air Force defense system’s ability to counter Iranian cruise missiles and drones.
The US has been trying to create an alliance of this kind for several years, in part to facilitate a drawdown of US forces from the Middle East. Such a coalition is in line with President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy and the recent integration of Israel into US Central Command.
Iran’s reaction to the first Negev summit—which came amidst an outburst of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE—focused on the United States and Israel rather than Arab countries. Tehran condemned the summit, calling it “a stab in back of the oppressed Palestinian people” and “a gift to the Israeli child-killing regime in continuing to kill people and occupy the land.” At the same time, Iran expressed readiness “to cooperate and expand bilateral relations with countries in the region and confront the Zionist-American conspiracy to create discord and expansion instability in the West Asia.”
Iran considers Israel’s presence on its borders a security threat and is sensitive to the cooperation of neighboring countries with Israel. This was evidenced by attacks by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on alleged Israeli intelligence outposts in Erbil, Iraq. Iran is unlikely to carry out similar attacks on members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Indeed, Tehran’s direct response to Israel’s presence in the Persian Gulf has been limited to verbal condemnations.
Iran has sought to create a kind of deterrence by destabilizing the borders adjacent to Israel as well as inside occupied Israeli territory. Iran has increased support for anti-Israel militants in the West Bank, with the leader of Iran suggesting that this region should be armed like the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. The Islamic Jihad Movement and new resistance forces have increased their anti-Israel activities with the support of Iran.
Increasing military cooperation with Russia and economic relations with China are other Iranian responses to the changing global and regional order.
From the perspective of the leader of Iran, a “Look to the East” policy will be Iran’s permanent approach in foreign policy. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that future poles in the international system will be in the East, including China and Russia. In Khamenei’s view, Western countries led by America seek regime change in Iran and their opposition to the Islamic Republic is existential.
Iran decided to support Russia in its war with Ukraine by providing drones and potentially ballistic missiles in order to create a reciprocal commitment from Russia to support Iran. Besides Russia providing Iran with fighter jets and advanced air defense systems, Iran is expecting Russia to limit Israel’s freedom of maneuver in Syria. Iran has also announced that it has acquired a hypersonic missile that is radar-evasive.
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns has expressed concern about these developments. “What’s beginning to emerge is at least the beginnings of a full-fledged defense partnership between Russia and Iran … The Russians are beginning to look at ways in which, technologically or technically, they can support the Iranians, which poses real threats to … many of our friends and partners in Iran’s neighborhood.”
According to analyst Nadav Pollak, Russia could significantly improve Iran’s military hardware capabilities. “Should Iran obtain advanced air-defense systems from Russia, Tehran will be better equipped to thwart any future possible attack on its nuclear infrastructure or other strategic facilities,” Pollak wrote. “Add the possibility of acquiring advanced aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-35, and the challenge of executing an aerial attack against Iran while minimizing losses becomes yet a bigger headache for military planners,” he argued.
Iran is also trying to expand its “strategic depth” into the US backyard in response to the growing anti-Iran coalition in the Persian Gulf.
For the first time, the Venezuelan Army unveiled Iranian combat drones assembled in Venezuela at a military parade on June 5, 2022. The UAVs, initially known by the Iranian name “Mohajer-2,” are called “Antonio José de Sucre” in Venezuela.
Iran, Russia, and China also held a trilateral military exercise in Latin America in August 2022. This maneuver, called “the Sniper Frontier competition,” was hosted by Venezuela. Also for the first time, Iranian ships appeared last year in the Panama Canal.
Venezuela relies more on Russia and China than Iran for strategic support. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro recently announced a political alliance with China and Russia, with no mention of Iran. Maduro’s understanding is that Tehran may be effective tactically but cannot add much value on a strategic level. Still, Iran’s growing presence in Latin America has been noticed in Washington.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Persian Gulf Security Orders. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
Iran Boosts Military Ties with Russia in Part to Counteract Abraham Accords
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
Among the areas of foreign policy continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations has been support for the Abraham Accords, which expanded Israel’s diplomatic ties to Arab states.
Under the accords, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan joined Egypt and Jordan in formalizing relations with Israel. Motives for this shift varied, but in general, these countries sought to strengthen ties with Washington. The UAE and Bahrain in particular hoped to acquire more advanced US weapons, as well as collaborate with Israel to defend against perceived threats from Iran. The UAE, for example, wants to buy American F-35 fighter jets; the prerequisite is the tacit approval of Israel.
Qatar and Oman also have strong ties with Tel Aviv, but relations have not yet been formalized. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is waiting for a good opportunity to announce the normalization of relations. The country claims to be the leader of the Islamic world and to support Palestinian rights. Yet in a recent interview, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman described Israel as a “potential ally” rather than an “enemy,” and there are reports of recent meetings intended to strengthen intelligence and military ties.
The Accords have also had a serious impact on Iranian strategic thinking. Although they preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they were a factor in Iran’s decision to boost its military relationship with Moscow. Iran seeks to overcome the balance deficit caused by the emerging Arab-Israel-US order by acquiring new weapons such as hypersonic missiles and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Iran is also trying to increase its “strategic depth” by expanding influence in regions closer to the US, such as Latin America.
The Negev Summits & a ‘New Regional Architecture’
The Arab states’ entry into deeper relations with Israel, to the point of holding summits in the so-called Negev process, reflects a lack of internal political constraints and a perceived threat from Iran and its regional proxies. While none of the Arab states see Israel as a replacement for the United States, they view Tel Aviv as an actor that can strengthen their position in the lobbies of power in the US as well as help formulate a new security order in the Persian Gulf. Then-Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid noted at the first Negev summit in March 2022 that he had laid the foundations for a ‘‘new regional architecture’’ whose main focus was to deter Iran and its allied forces. A second summit is due in March 2023, although a date has not yet been set.
The purpose of this new architecture is to provide deterrence against air and sea threats from Iran and its partners. Air coordination is a strategic asset that was not previously available to Arabs and Israelis. Israel’s new allies are geographically closer to Iran and Iraq—where many Iranian-backed militias operate—making it easier for the Israeli Air Force to identify and react to imminent threats. This coordination promises to improve the Israeli Air Force defense system’s ability to counter Iranian cruise missiles and drones.
The US has been trying to create an alliance of this kind for several years, in part to facilitate a drawdown of US forces from the Middle East. Such a coalition is in line with President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy and the recent integration of Israel into US Central Command.
Iran’s reaction to the first Negev summit—which came amidst an outburst of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE—focused on the United States and Israel rather than Arab countries. Tehran condemned the summit, calling it “a stab in back of the oppressed Palestinian people” and “a gift to the Israeli child-killing regime in continuing to kill people and occupy the land.” At the same time, Iran expressed readiness “to cooperate and expand bilateral relations with countries in the region and confront the Zionist-American conspiracy to create discord and expansion instability in the West Asia.”
Iran considers Israel’s presence on its borders a security threat and is sensitive to the cooperation of neighboring countries with Israel. This was evidenced by attacks by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on alleged Israeli intelligence outposts in Erbil, Iraq. Iran is unlikely to carry out similar attacks on members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Indeed, Tehran’s direct response to Israel’s presence in the Persian Gulf has been limited to verbal condemnations.
Iran has sought to create a kind of deterrence by destabilizing the borders adjacent to Israel as well as inside occupied Israeli territory. Iran has increased support for anti-Israel militants in the West Bank, with the leader of Iran suggesting that this region should be armed like the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. The Islamic Jihad Movement and new resistance forces have increased their anti-Israel activities with the support of Iran.
Increasing military cooperation with Russia and economic relations with China are other Iranian responses to the changing global and regional order.
From the perspective of the leader of Iran, a “Look to the East” policy will be Iran’s permanent approach in foreign policy. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that future poles in the international system will be in the East, including China and Russia. In Khamenei’s view, Western countries led by America seek regime change in Iran and their opposition to the Islamic Republic is existential.
Iran decided to support Russia in its war with Ukraine by providing drones and potentially ballistic missiles in order to create a reciprocal commitment from Russia to support Iran. Besides Russia providing Iran with fighter jets and advanced air defense systems, Iran is expecting Russia to limit Israel’s freedom of maneuver in Syria. Iran has also announced that it has acquired a hypersonic missile that is radar-evasive.
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns has expressed concern about these developments. “What’s beginning to emerge is at least the beginnings of a full-fledged defense partnership between Russia and Iran … The Russians are beginning to look at ways in which, technologically or technically, they can support the Iranians, which poses real threats to … many of our friends and partners in Iran’s neighborhood.”
According to analyst Nadav Pollak, Russia could significantly improve Iran’s military hardware capabilities. “Should Iran obtain advanced air-defense systems from Russia, Tehran will be better equipped to thwart any future possible attack on its nuclear infrastructure or other strategic facilities,” Pollak wrote. “Add the possibility of acquiring advanced aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-35, and the challenge of executing an aerial attack against Iran while minimizing losses becomes yet a bigger headache for military planners,” he argued.
Iran is also trying to expand its “strategic depth” into the US backyard in response to the growing anti-Iran coalition in the Persian Gulf.
For the first time, the Venezuelan Army unveiled Iranian combat drones assembled in Venezuela at a military parade on June 5, 2022. The UAVs, initially known by the Iranian name “Mohajer-2,” are called “Antonio José de Sucre” in Venezuela.
Iran, Russia, and China also held a trilateral military exercise in Latin America in August 2022. This maneuver, called “the Sniper Frontier competition,” was hosted by Venezuela. Also for the first time, Iranian ships appeared last year in the Panama Canal.
Venezuela relies more on Russia and China than Iran for strategic support. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro recently announced a political alliance with China and Russia, with no mention of Iran. Maduro’s understanding is that Tehran may be effective tactically but cannot add much value on a strategic level. Still, Iran’s growing presence in Latin America has been noticed in Washington.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Persian Gulf Security Orders. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
Recent & Related