Securing the Donbas’ Radiological Materials Amid Escalation

This policy memo was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Territorial disputes and conflict zones create serious security vulnerabilities for radiological materials by placing them out of regulatory control. In her proposal, Kiley McCormick explores how states can mitigate the risk of radiological materials in Donbas being used for nuclear terrorism. The territories of Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine housed over 1200 radiological sources when they declared independence in 2015 and the fate of these high-risk materials is currently unknown. These unsecured sources pose a significant proliferation and terrorism risk. A radiological incident could significantly endanger domestic and international security and efforts to secure these sources merit further consideration.

Issue

How can we mitigate the risk of vulnerable radiological materials in the Donbas being used for nuclear terrorism amid increased tensions in Ukraine’s east? The territories of Luhansk and Donetsk housed over 1200 radiological sources when they declared independence in 2015. The fate of these high-risk materials is currently unknown and poses significant proliferation and terrorism risks. A radiological incident could significantly endanger both regional and international security.¹“Unsecured Radiological Materials in Eastern Ukraine: a Growing Threat.” Royal United Services Institute. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://ukponi.rusi.org/unsecured-radiological-materials-in-eastern-ukraine-a-growing-threat/.

Stakeholders/ Interests

The above crisis involves several state, non-state, and intergovernmental actors. The primary stakeholders and their interests and resources are reviewed below:

1. Russian Federation: Interested in maintaining informal control over the Donbas, preventing the Ukrainian state or non-state actors from consolidating power, safeguarding domestic security, appearing stable and authoritative, and avoiding international embarrassment. Resources include de facto political control over the Donbas, radiological risk mitigation expertise and infrastructure, and access to international institutions such as the U.N.
2. Luhansk People’s Republics (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republics (DPR): Interested in maintaining authority, staving off Ukrainian forces, and pleasing and placating Russia, to whom they are answerable. Resources include a nominal role as governments of the Donbas and local presence.
3. Ukraine: Interested in regaining control of the Donbas, calling attention to Russia’s ‘illegal’ actions, and preventing further security crises. Resources include political capital internationally and role as legal proprietor of the Donbas.
4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Interested in securing radioactive materials. Resources include expertise in radiological management and intergovernmental financial support.²International Atomic Energy Agency, “Security of Radioactive Sources, Implementing Guides,” 2009. https://www.iaea.org/publications/8113/security-of-radioactive-sources
5. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Interested in reducing tensions and fostering stability in the Donbas. Resources include local operational expertise and intergovernmental financial support.
6. France and Germany: Interested in reducing the risk of a security crisis in Europe’s east and stabilizing the European energy market. Resources include financial power, influence over sanctions against Russia, and influence in the EU and NATO. Both are Minsk Protocol Mediators.
7. United States: Interested in limiting Russian influence and maintaining strategic stability in Europe. Resources include financial power, management of sanctions against Russia, and influence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN).

Analysis

The Donbas’ 800,000 citizens are increasingly financially desperate as the conflict continues. Illicit trade and trafficking present an opportunity for additional income in an environment with sparse economic opportunities. Radiological sources in the region’s mines have fallen into disarray since 2015, creating trafficking vulnerabilities.³“Unsecured Radiological Materials in Eastern Ukraine: a Growing Threat.” Royal United Services Institute. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://ukponi.rusi.org/unsecured-radiological-materials-in-eastern-ukraine-a-growing-threat/. A number of these materials are high activity category 1 and 2 sources, which the IAEA classifies as the most potentially injurious sources, and among the most attractive for terrorist organizations.⁴“National Progress Report: Ukraine.” Nuclear Security Summit 2016. Last modified March 31, 2016. Accessed December 6, 2021. https://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-report-ukraine. Adding to the security risk, the more than 1,000 lower activity but still dangerous sources are simple to transport and difficult to detect. Currently, there is no clear state presence in the region, with the LPR and DPR struggling to maintain the waning Ukrainian authority in the region.⁵Chumak, Dmytro. “The Implications of the Ukraine Conflict for National Nuclear Security Policy.” SIPRI. Last modified November 2016. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://www.sipri.org/publications/2016/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/implications-ukraine-conflict-national-nuclear-security-policy These circumstances create a ripe opportunity for non-state actors to acquire or traffic in materials necessary for a dirty bomb, posing a security threat with the potential to harm civilians if deployed in Russia, Ukraine, or further abroad.⁶“Unsecured Radiological Materials in Eastern Ukraine: a Growing Threat.” Royal United Services Institute. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://ukponi.rusi.org/unsecured-radiological-materials-in-eastern-ukraine-a-growing-threat/. The added threat posed by the deployment of Russian troops to Ukraine’s eastern borders has exacerbated these circumstances further, creating an even more dire need to address these unsecured materials.

Criteria

Solutions to this heightened radiological insecurity should be measured by their efficacy in securing the at-risk materials, financial feasibility, domestic political ramifications, and international consequences.

1. Efficacy in securing radiological materials: Remediating unsecured radiological sources will help to prevent nuclear terrorism. Any option should do so efficiently.
2. Financial feasibility: Securing radiological materials is both costly and time-consuming. Due to the vulnerable state of the Russian economy after the imposition of sanctions, the falling value of the ruble, and unstable energy prices, the Russian state could struggle to afford a costly operation.
3. Domestic political ramifications in Russia: The legitimacy of the presidential administration rests on the faith of the Russian people who believe President Putin to be a strong, resolute, and competent figure. This image must be maintained to secure the stability of the administration.
4. International consequences: Russia is seen by powerful Western coalitions to be an adversarial actor after the annexation of Crimea and troop deployments to Ukraine’s border in early February of 2022. Their international reputation has since been precarious, endangering their economy and ability to enact Russian foreign policy goals.

Options

Present options for addressing the crisis of unsecured radiological materials include:

1. Russian Extraction: Conduct an operation using Russian operatives to enter the Donbas, locate the materials, and remove or destroy them. Russia could quickly deploy a contingent of operatives to the region, as there are already approximately 130,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s border as of early February 2022.⁷“Russian Troops in Final Stages of Readiness Add to Worries for Ukraine.” New York Times. Accessed Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/world/europe/russian-troops-ukraine-crimean-peninsula.html However, proper training to handle and secure the materials, as well as the challenge of locating the sources, would be both costly and time-consuming. Were the operation to be revealed, Russia would be embarrassed domestically and would likely face additional sanctions for further illegal intervention in the region.
2. Bargaining Chip: Use the radiological materials in current diplomatic negotiations. Russia could use the unsecured radiological materials as a bargaining chip in the current diplomatic negotiations ongoing in Vienna over their amassing of troops. International assistance would provide an opportunity for Russia to profit, as they have from past Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. This would also facilitate a diplomatic offramp from military conflict. An effective operation would be best carried out by a coalition of states with significant experience in securing radiological materials, such as the United States. Calling for international intervention could make the Russian government appear weak domestically.
3. Let It Burn: Allow the materials to remain, be sold, or used, and deny any responsibility for any incidents. Although this would not address the crisis, it would require no financial contribution or political action. However, if a terrorist attack utilizing such materials were to occur, it would devastate Russian public opinion of the administration and bolster international and domestic opposition. Were the incident to occur abroad, denial of responsibility would likely be insufficient to avoid further sanctions or political punishment.

Recommendation

Option 2, Bargaining Chip, presents the most effective and feasible path forward. The Russian administration has built legitimacy on its ability to protect the homeland after nearly 20 years of battling terrorism with the Beslan hostage crisis. Therefore it is a political imperative for the Russian Federation to mitigate the risk of radiological terrorism near its border.⁸Saradzhyan, Simon. “Chechnya Vow Cast a Long Shadow.” The Moscow Times, February 26, 2008. The current escalation of tensions on Ukraine’s border have created an intractable diplomatic scenario for Russia, Ukraine, and the West, but remediating unsecured radiological materials might create one of the few available opportunities for a mutually beneficial settlement. An international coalition would provide the financial backing and expertise to effectively remediate the materials and allow Russia to profit and deescalate.

Risk and Uncertainties

The whereabouts of the radiological sources in the Donbas are currently unknown, making it difficult to approximate the cost, duration, or efficacy of any remediation operation. Russia’s relationships with the West and Ukraine have significantly deteriorated, tying any near-term plans to diplomatic negotiations over the Donbas.

Implementation

Phase 1: The Russian ambassadors to the IAEA and OSCE coordinate with their respective bodies, calling the international community to coalesce and support global peace and security. This will elicit international buy-in and maintain a public image of authority and competence for the Russian state.

Phase 2: Impress the urgency of the issue upon NATO and its partners, including Ukraine, to encourage increased flexibility during diplomatic negotiations.

Phase 3: An international coalition surveys radiological sources to develop an operation plan for remediation with the support of the Nuclear Safety and Security Division of the IAEA and the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE.

Kiley McCormick is a Master of Public Policy student at the Harvard Kennedy School. She currently works as a research assistant at the Belfer Center’s Intelligence Project and Project on Managing the Atom and serves as associate editor of The Ideology and Politics Journal. She previously interned at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CRDF Global, the Wilson Center, U.S. Department of State, and Nuclear Threat Initiative. She holds a Bachelor of Arts Cum Laude in Russian and Political Science from Bryn Mawr College.

Notes

• 1
  “Unsecured Radiological Materials in Eastern Ukraine: a Growing Threat.” Royal United Services Institute. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://ukponi.rusi.org/unsecured-radiological-materials-in-eastern-ukraine-a-growing-threat/.
• 2
  International Atomic Energy Agency, “Security of Radioactive Sources, Implementing Guides,” 2009. https://www.iaea.org/publications/8113/security-of-radioactive-sources
• 3
  “Unsecured Radiological Materials in Eastern Ukraine: a Growing Threat.” Royal United Services Institute. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://ukponi.rusi.org/unsecured-radiological-materials-in-eastern-ukraine-a-growing-threat/
• 4
  “National Progress Report: Ukraine.” Nuclear Security Summit 2016. Last modified March 31, 2016. Accessed December 6, 2021. https://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-report-ukraine.
• 5
  Chumak, Dmytro. “The Implications of the Ukraine Conflict for National Nuclear Security Policy.” SIPRI. Last modified November 2016. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://www.sipri.org/publications/2016/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/implications-ukraine-conflict-national-nuclear-security-policy
• 6
  “Unsecured Radiological Materials in Eastern Ukraine: a Growing Threat.” Royal United Services Institute. Accessed December 6, 2021.  https://ukponi.rusi.org/unsecured-radiological-materials-in-eastern-ukraine-a-growing-threat/.
• 7
  “Russian Troops in Final Stages of Readiness Add to Worries for Ukraine.” New York Times. Accessed Accessed February 4, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/world/europe/russian-troops-ukraine-crimean-peninsula.html
• 8
  Saradzhyan, Simon. “Chechnya Vow Cast a Long Shadow.” The Moscow Times, February 26, 2008.