Editor’s Note: Dr. Yahia H. Zoubir is a retired professor of international relations and management, and a former Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (2020–2026). He is also a Fudan University Scholar.
He has held visiting faculty positions across Europe, the United States, Asia, and Africa, and has published extensively in leading academic journals and major reference works. His research focuses on the political economy and geopolitics of the Maghreb and Sahel, particularly the roles of the United States, China, and Russia. He edited The Routledge Handbook on China and the Middle East & North Africa (2023) and serves as a consultant to governments and corporation.
Abdelkader Abderrahmane is a researcher and consultant in the geopolitics of North-West Africa and the Sahel region.
By Hafed Al-Ghwell, Senior Fellow and Director, North Africa Program
Since the military coups of 2020 and 2021, Mali has undergone a profound political and strategic transformation under the leadership of Assimi Goïta. Framed by a sovereigntist discourse, the regime has distanced itself from traditional Western partners while cultivating new security and economic ties, particularly with Russia. Yet this realignment has not produced stability. Armed groups continue to expand, governance remains weak, and economic conditions have shown little improvement.
Since Assimi Goïta’s rise to power through successive coups in 2020 and 2021, Mali’s political trajectory has become increasingly uncertain and unstable. Goïta’s leadership has been characterized by a pronounced sovereigntist discourse emphasizing national independence, state authority, and resistance to external interference. This posture has resonated with segments of the population frustrated by years of insecurity, governance failures, and perceived foreign dominance, particularly by France.
While presenting himself as a staunch defender of Mali’s sovereignty, Goïta has simultaneously undertaken a significant realignment of the country’s external partnerships. This shift has involved distancing Mali from traditional Western allies and reconfiguring its security and diplomatic relationships, most notably through deepening ties with Russia and expelling key international actors such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). These developments reflect both a rejection of previous security arrangements and an effort to reassert national control over strategic decision-making.
Mali’s evolving external partnerships reflect what can be described as a form of transactional sovereigntist post-alignment, whereby the regime asserts formal autonomy from traditional partners while simultaneously diversifying its external engagements in a pragmatic and highly selective manner. Rather than adhering to a fixed alliance structure, Bamako leverages competing external actors — state and non-state alike — to maximize regime security, extract material benefits, and reinforce its domestic legitimacy in a context of institutional fragility and contested authority.
To bolster internal support, Goïta promised to combat corruption and overhaul Mali’s institutions. His populist rhetoric resonated with many Malians exhausted by elite impunity and governance failures. While these promises initially rallied disillusioned citizens, tangible improvements in security and economic development remain elusive. Since February 2022, the transitional government has repeatedly postponed elections, citing “technical reasons,” and proposed extending the presidential term until 2030. These delays have heightened fears of democratic backsliding. On May 13, 2025, Goïta’s government further consolidated power by dissolving all political parties, banning their meetings, and citing “public order” as justification.
Economic Underdevelopment
Despite persistent political rhetoric, Mali’s regime has yet to deliver on basic services — security, justice, and infrastructure — particularly in rural and border regions. Living conditions remain difficult for most Malians, as economic growth continues to be concentrated in urban areas. This urban-centric pattern has contributed to the neglect of rural regions, where access to basic services, infrastructure, and economic opportunities remains limited, exacerbating socioeconomic disparities.
The urban-rural income disparity in Mali stands at approximately 5.5%, compared to 2.7% in India. Mali ranks 188th out of 193 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index and remains classified within the Low Human Development category, underscoring persistent challenges in health, education, and income.
Corruption continues to undermine progress. Although the post-coup authorities pledged reform and acknowledged widespread corruption, tangible improvements remain limited. At the same time, signs of elite enrichment have become increasingly visible, reinforcing perceptions of inequality and governance failure.
Yet these political and diplomatic shifts have not translated into meaningful improvements in Mali’s socioeconomic conditions.
Insecurity, Terrorism, and External Forces
Mali’s deteriorating security environment continues to fuel political instability and enable the expansion of armed and terrorist groups. Persistent economic hardship and widespread dissatisfaction are likely to push more youths toward militant organizations across the Sahel. Groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS-Sahel remain adept at exploiting local grievances.
Despite repeated pledges to eradicate terrorism, operational security remains fragile. Attacks, ambushes, and violent clashes persist across the country. Armed groups have also demonstrated increasing adaptability, including the use of new communication technologies, which enhance coordination and recruitment.
Russia has played a central role in Mali’s evolving security architecture. Following the withdrawal of French and UN forces, the Wagner Group provided combat support, training, and regime protection. Its involvement contributed to some tactical gains, including the recapture of Kidal in 2023, but was also accompanied by allegations of serious human rights abuses. In June 2025, Wagner formally withdrew and was replaced by the Africa Corps, a Russian Defense Ministry–controlled force composed largely of former Wagner personnel. The group, smaller in numbers, has pursued a more hands-off approach.
The shift from Wagner to Africa Corps signals not a retreat but rather a deepening of Russian influence in Mali, now embedded within formal bilateral defense agreements and expanding economic cooperation. While this realignment consolidates Russian influence, it does not amount to exclusive alignment. As of March 2026, Washington was reportedly nearing an arrangement with Bamako to resume intelligence-gathering flights over Mali, underscoring the regime’s pragmatic flexibility beneath its seeming sovereigntist posture.
Ukraine represents another external actor operating within this increasingly competitive environment. Its indirect involvement — through intelligence support and drone technology — illustrates how Mali has become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries extending beyond the Sahel. In July 2024, Ukrainian-linked support reportedly contributed to a deadly ambush near Tinzaouatene (also spelt Tin Zaouatine), prompting Bamako to sever diplomatic ties with Kyiv. This episode underscores how the Russia–Ukraine war is increasingly spilling into Africa.
Another key actor is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Despite publicly condemning military coups in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, the UAE has quietly supported some of the new regimes, revealing a persistent gap between rhetoric and practice. In Mali and Niger, its involvement reflects broader efforts to expand influence across the Sahel while competing with regional actors such as Algeria and Qatar.
The broader international environment — particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating tensions in the Middle East — may further shape Mali’s trajectory in indirect but consequential ways. The war in Ukraine continues to generate volatility in global energy and commodity markets, contributing to rising fuel and food prices that disproportionately affect import-dependent economies such as Mali. These pressures risk exacerbating socioeconomic grievances, thereby creating additional recruitment opportunities for armed groups and further undermining state legitimacy. At the same time, Russia’s sustained military engagement in Ukraine may constrain the depth and durability of its commitments in the Sahel, potentially affecting the scope of its security assistance to Bamako over time.
Developments in the Middle East also carry implications. The UAE, while actively projecting influence in the Sahel, faces growing strategic and economic pressures linked to regional instability and its exposure to fluctuating energy markets. Such constraints could affect its capacity or willingness to sustain or expand its engagement in fragile environments such as Mali. More broadly, intensifying global geopolitical competition risks reinforcing Mali’s role as a secondary theater in wider strategic rivalries, where external actors prioritize short-term influence over long-term stabilization. In this context, Mali’s strategy of transactional post-alignment offers flexibility but also increases its vulnerability to external shocks and shifting geopolitical priorities.
Taken together, the involvement of Russia, the United States, Ukraine, and the UAE underscores Mali’s transformation into a space of transactional engagement, where external partnerships are calibrated to serve immediate regime interests within a broader framework of asserted sovereignty.
A Bleak Future?
The core challenges facing Mali — economic underdevelopment, persistent insecurity, and the expansion of armed groups — remain deeply entrenched. Neither the Malian Armed Forces nor the regime’s evolving external partnerships have succeeded in delivering sustainable security or meaningful improvements in living conditions.
Mali’s trajectory reflects not a straightforward realignment toward a single external partner, but rather the consolidation of a post-alignment strategy grounded in transactional sovereignty. While this approach may provide short-term regime resilience, it carries risks, including deepening dependency, fragmenting already fragile security governance structures, and entrenching Mali’s role as a theater of competing external interventions.
Absent meaningful reforms, Mali’s crisis is likely to persist and intensify, with instability increasingly spilling into neighboring states, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea. Durable stability will depend on a comprehensive political, social, and economic transformation that rebuilds trust between the state and its citizens while also mitigating the country’s growing exposure to external geopolitical and economic shocks.
Mali’s Post-Alignment Strategy: Sovereignty, Partnerships, and the Limits of Stabilization
By Yahia H. Zoubir • Abdelkader Abderrahmane
Middle East & North Africa
Mali’s post-coup leadership has repositioned the country as a sovereign actor navigating a shifting geopolitical landscape, distancing itself from Western partners while engaging new ones like Russia and the UAE. This strategy, framed as a reclaiming of national autonomy, has instead exposed the limits of transactional partnerships in fragile states. Despite tactical gains and diversified alliances, insecurity persists, economic conditions remain stagnant, and governance continues to weaken. Meanwhile, Mali is increasingly entangled in broader global rivalries, from Ukraine to the Middle East, amplifying external pressures without delivering stability. The result is a precarious balancing act that sustains the regime in the short term but deepens long-term risks.
Editor’s Note: Dr. Yahia H. Zoubir is a retired professor of international relations and management, and a former Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (2020–2026). He is also a Fudan University Scholar.
He has held visiting faculty positions across Europe, the United States, Asia, and Africa, and has published extensively in leading academic journals and major reference works. His research focuses on the political economy and geopolitics of the Maghreb and Sahel, particularly the roles of the United States, China, and Russia. He edited The Routledge Handbook on China and the Middle East & North Africa (2023) and serves as a consultant to governments and corporation.
Abdelkader Abderrahmane is a researcher and consultant in the geopolitics of North-West Africa and the Sahel region.
By Hafed Al-Ghwell, Senior Fellow and Director, North Africa Program
Since the military coups of 2020 and 2021, Mali has undergone a profound political and strategic transformation under the leadership of Assimi Goïta. Framed by a sovereigntist discourse, the regime has distanced itself from traditional Western partners while cultivating new security and economic ties, particularly with Russia. Yet this realignment has not produced stability. Armed groups continue to expand, governance remains weak, and economic conditions have shown little improvement.
Since Assimi Goïta’s rise to power through successive coups in 2020 and 2021, Mali’s political trajectory has become increasingly uncertain and unstable. Goïta’s leadership has been characterized by a pronounced sovereigntist discourse emphasizing national independence, state authority, and resistance to external interference. This posture has resonated with segments of the population frustrated by years of insecurity, governance failures, and perceived foreign dominance, particularly by France.
While presenting himself as a staunch defender of Mali’s sovereignty, Goïta has simultaneously undertaken a significant realignment of the country’s external partnerships. This shift has involved distancing Mali from traditional Western allies and reconfiguring its security and diplomatic relationships, most notably through deepening ties with Russia and expelling key international actors such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). These developments reflect both a rejection of previous security arrangements and an effort to reassert national control over strategic decision-making.
Mali’s evolving external partnerships reflect what can be described as a form of transactional sovereigntist post-alignment, whereby the regime asserts formal autonomy from traditional partners while simultaneously diversifying its external engagements in a pragmatic and highly selective manner. Rather than adhering to a fixed alliance structure, Bamako leverages competing external actors — state and non-state alike — to maximize regime security, extract material benefits, and reinforce its domestic legitimacy in a context of institutional fragility and contested authority.
To bolster internal support, Goïta promised to combat corruption and overhaul Mali’s institutions. His populist rhetoric resonated with many Malians exhausted by elite impunity and governance failures. While these promises initially rallied disillusioned citizens, tangible improvements in security and economic development remain elusive. Since February 2022, the transitional government has repeatedly postponed elections, citing “technical reasons,” and proposed extending the presidential term until 2030. These delays have heightened fears of democratic backsliding. On May 13, 2025, Goïta’s government further consolidated power by dissolving all political parties, banning their meetings, and citing “public order” as justification.
Economic Underdevelopment
Despite persistent political rhetoric, Mali’s regime has yet to deliver on basic services — security, justice, and infrastructure — particularly in rural and border regions. Living conditions remain difficult for most Malians, as economic growth continues to be concentrated in urban areas. This urban-centric pattern has contributed to the neglect of rural regions, where access to basic services, infrastructure, and economic opportunities remains limited, exacerbating socioeconomic disparities.
The urban-rural income disparity in Mali stands at approximately 5.5%, compared to 2.7% in India. Mali ranks 188th out of 193 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index and remains classified within the Low Human Development category, underscoring persistent challenges in health, education, and income.
Corruption continues to undermine progress. Although the post-coup authorities pledged reform and acknowledged widespread corruption, tangible improvements remain limited. At the same time, signs of elite enrichment have become increasingly visible, reinforcing perceptions of inequality and governance failure.
Yet these political and diplomatic shifts have not translated into meaningful improvements in Mali’s socioeconomic conditions.
Insecurity, Terrorism, and External Forces
Mali’s deteriorating security environment continues to fuel political instability and enable the expansion of armed and terrorist groups. Persistent economic hardship and widespread dissatisfaction are likely to push more youths toward militant organizations across the Sahel. Groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS-Sahel remain adept at exploiting local grievances.
Despite repeated pledges to eradicate terrorism, operational security remains fragile. Attacks, ambushes, and violent clashes persist across the country. Armed groups have also demonstrated increasing adaptability, including the use of new communication technologies, which enhance coordination and recruitment.
Russia has played a central role in Mali’s evolving security architecture. Following the withdrawal of French and UN forces, the Wagner Group provided combat support, training, and regime protection. Its involvement contributed to some tactical gains, including the recapture of Kidal in 2023, but was also accompanied by allegations of serious human rights abuses. In June 2025, Wagner formally withdrew and was replaced by the Africa Corps, a Russian Defense Ministry–controlled force composed largely of former Wagner personnel. The group, smaller in numbers, has pursued a more hands-off approach.
The shift from Wagner to Africa Corps signals not a retreat but rather a deepening of Russian influence in Mali, now embedded within formal bilateral defense agreements and expanding economic cooperation. While this realignment consolidates Russian influence, it does not amount to exclusive alignment. As of March 2026, Washington was reportedly nearing an arrangement with Bamako to resume intelligence-gathering flights over Mali, underscoring the regime’s pragmatic flexibility beneath its seeming sovereigntist posture.
Ukraine represents another external actor operating within this increasingly competitive environment. Its indirect involvement — through intelligence support and drone technology — illustrates how Mali has become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries extending beyond the Sahel. In July 2024, Ukrainian-linked support reportedly contributed to a deadly ambush near Tinzaouatene (also spelt Tin Zaouatine), prompting Bamako to sever diplomatic ties with Kyiv. This episode underscores how the Russia–Ukraine war is increasingly spilling into Africa.
Another key actor is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Despite publicly condemning military coups in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, the UAE has quietly supported some of the new regimes, revealing a persistent gap between rhetoric and practice. In Mali and Niger, its involvement reflects broader efforts to expand influence across the Sahel while competing with regional actors such as Algeria and Qatar.
The broader international environment — particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating tensions in the Middle East — may further shape Mali’s trajectory in indirect but consequential ways. The war in Ukraine continues to generate volatility in global energy and commodity markets, contributing to rising fuel and food prices that disproportionately affect import-dependent economies such as Mali. These pressures risk exacerbating socioeconomic grievances, thereby creating additional recruitment opportunities for armed groups and further undermining state legitimacy. At the same time, Russia’s sustained military engagement in Ukraine may constrain the depth and durability of its commitments in the Sahel, potentially affecting the scope of its security assistance to Bamako over time.
Developments in the Middle East also carry implications. The UAE, while actively projecting influence in the Sahel, faces growing strategic and economic pressures linked to regional instability and its exposure to fluctuating energy markets. Such constraints could affect its capacity or willingness to sustain or expand its engagement in fragile environments such as Mali. More broadly, intensifying global geopolitical competition risks reinforcing Mali’s role as a secondary theater in wider strategic rivalries, where external actors prioritize short-term influence over long-term stabilization. In this context, Mali’s strategy of transactional post-alignment offers flexibility but also increases its vulnerability to external shocks and shifting geopolitical priorities.
Taken together, the involvement of Russia, the United States, Ukraine, and the UAE underscores Mali’s transformation into a space of transactional engagement, where external partnerships are calibrated to serve immediate regime interests within a broader framework of asserted sovereignty.
A Bleak Future?
The core challenges facing Mali — economic underdevelopment, persistent insecurity, and the expansion of armed groups — remain deeply entrenched. Neither the Malian Armed Forces nor the regime’s evolving external partnerships have succeeded in delivering sustainable security or meaningful improvements in living conditions.
Mali’s trajectory reflects not a straightforward realignment toward a single external partner, but rather the consolidation of a post-alignment strategy grounded in transactional sovereignty. While this approach may provide short-term regime resilience, it carries risks, including deepening dependency, fragmenting already fragile security governance structures, and entrenching Mali’s role as a theater of competing external interventions.
Absent meaningful reforms, Mali’s crisis is likely to persist and intensify, with instability increasingly spilling into neighboring states, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea. Durable stability will depend on a comprehensive political, social, and economic transformation that rebuilds trust between the state and its citizens while also mitigating the country’s growing exposure to external geopolitical and economic shocks.
Recent & Related