Editor’s Note: Burak Can Çelik is a geopolitical analyst and researcher specializing in international relations, Middle Eastern politics, and global strategic affairs. His work focuses on U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, Turkish regional strategy, and the evolving balance of power in the Middle East. A graduate in International Relations from Karabük University, he has published in both Turkish- and English-language media, including The New Arab and Al-Monitor.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Since the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, Turkey has aimed to project principled opposition to the war and a readiness to mediate peace, while preserving alliance security cooperation with NATO and maintaining working channels with Iran.
Official messaging has been consistent: Condemn actions that violate international law and endanger civilians, call for an immediate halt to attacks, and keep diplomatic options open.
Mediation has been mostly indirect, consisting of passing messages, leader-to-leader calls, and a multi-layered set of contacts spanning Washington, Tehran, Muscat, and other Gulf capitals. The Reuters news agency on March 25 reported that Ankara had been a go-between for messages between Iran and the United States, probing U.S. positions while warning Tehran against widening the war.
Turkey’s credibility as a mediator is strengthened by access and geography but limited by several factors, including Israeli hostility and distrust, vulnerability to Iranian missiles, and domestic political incentives for anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric. Success is more likely to be measured by de-escalation and deconfliction than a comprehensive settlement.
Strategic Interests and Constraints
Turkey’s strategic incentives to mediate are significant. NATO’s secretary general publicly confirmed three interceptions of missiles “heading to Turkey,” underscoring the risk of the war’s spillover to a NATO member even if Ankara professes neutrality. A fourth missile was also fired in Turkey’s direction on March 30 and shot down by NATO forces. Pointedly, however, Ankara has not invoked Article 5 in an effort to avoid escalation while still signaling deterrence.
Turkey is also motivated by energy and macroeconomic exposure. Turkey’s energy minister has said that the country’s dependence on Middle East oil is “manageable” at around 10%, but that every $1 rise in the price of a barrel of oil adds roughly $400 million to Turkey’s annual energy bill. Potential disruptions of Iranian natural gas — Turkey consumes roughly 150–170 million cubic meters of natural gas per day, of which Iranian supplies account for approximately 15–25 million cubic meters — also pose a risk, making a prolonged conflict strategically costly. S&P Global’s updated inflation outlook highlights how higher energy costs can quickly translate into domestic economic strain for Turkey.
Ankara seeks to project regional influence by presenting itself as an active diplomatic actor capable of talking to multiple sides. Turkish analysts recall a 2010 fuel swap agreement with Iran negotiated by Turkey and Brazil — an effort that ultimately did not replace the broader international negotiating track, but demonstrated Ankara’s long-standing ambition to broker difficult Iran-related files.
In this delicate environment, Turkey has rejected social media claims that it has supported attacks on Iran, stating that Turkey does not allow its airspace, land, or sea to be used operationally “in any conflict or war” involving third parties.
After more than a decade of absorbing the fallout of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has little appetite for another large-scale displacement crisis. Still hosting over 3 million Syrians, Ankara is acutely aware that even a moderate influx from Iran — if the conflict resumes and escalates or state structures weaken —could trigger disproportionate political and economic consequences. For Turkish policymakers, the refugee dimension is no longer a humanitarian issue alone, but a core national security variable.
Europe continues to cooperate with Turkey to mitigate the risk of a potential new refugee crisis. This partnership, originally shaped by a 2016 deal with the European Union, has been further expanded in recent years through additional funding packages and enhanced technical cooperation mechanisms. Since 2016, the EU has allocated more than €10 billion to support refugees and host communities in Turkey, with additional resources mobilized for 2020–2027. Cooperation extends beyond financial assistance to include institutional collaboration in asylum systems, border management, and migration governance. This underscores Turkey’s position not merely as a transit country, but as a critical strategic partner in Europe’s broader migration management architecture.
In trying to mediate an end to the Iran war, Turkey is hampered by long-running disputes with the U.S. over defense procurement, Syria policy, and Gaza. Ties with Israel are even more strained, and Israel does not appear willing to rely on Turkish brokerage to end the conflict.
The Trump administration appears sympathetic to Turkey’s concerns. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan that attacks on Turkey’s sovereign territory were “unacceptable” and pledged U.S. support. Iran’s foreign ministry, by contrast, denied firing projectiles toward Turkey and suggested that Israel was responsible, while accepting the creation of a joint expert-group mechanism to avoid misunderstandings.
Given the failure of direct talks in Pakistan on Saturday, April 11, to resolve the conflict and the U.S. threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the likeliest near-term outcome is intensified indirect diplomacy via multiple intermediaries, including Pakistan, Egypt, and Oman, in addition to Turkey. A second scenario is escalation through further missile spillover into Turkish airspace, which would raise the political cost of mediation and increase NATO consultation pressure even if Article 5 remains off the table.
In the medium term, diplomacy is likely to consolidate around a proposal/counterproposal track focused on nuclear constraints, missile limits, and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. If the situation does not stabilize, Turkey’s role may shift toward containment of the consequences through humanitarian facilitation, incident deconfliction, and alliance defense strengthening.
Going forward, Turkey should keep mediation quiet but structured to avoid public grandstanding that reduces trust, coordinate tightly with NATO on attribution and air/missile defense posture to preserve deterrence without escalation, and use its access to push for a sequencing package to halt third-country strikes and restore freedom of navigation. Turkey should also reduce credibility gaps with Israel by emphasizing civilian protection and deconfliction rather than rhetorically maximalist framing, and accelerate energy-risk mitigation through diversification planning to prevent domestic economic vulnerability from narrowing diplomatic options.
The Gulf’s Strategic Break with Iran and Turkey’s Emerging Window
Iran’s recent missile and drone pressure spilling directly into the Gulf arena has ended a period of detente with the Islamic Republic. In March, the UAE closed its embassy in Tehran, Qatar declared Iranian military and security attachés persona non grata, and Saudi Arabia expelled Iran’s military attaché along with several diplomatic personnel.
The more consequential outcome, however, lies in the evolving perception of the U.S. security umbrella across Gulf capitals: not a rupture with Washington, but a gradual departure from reliance on a single guarantor. In this recalibration, Turkey stands out and could leverage its defense-industrial capacity, NATO membership, and geostrategic depth to expand its strategic and economic engagement with the Gulf. Notably, some Asian and Gulf-based companies are reportedly considering the Istanbul Financial Center as an alternative operational hub to the GCC even as recent assessments by the European Parliament (2026) and the World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index underscore persistent deficiencies in the rule of law, directly impacting investor confidence and Ankara’s ability to construct a credible, rules-based institutional environment.
Header image: NATO Secretary General hosts meeting of senior officials from Finland, Türkiye, and Sweden. By NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Turkey Also Tries to Mediate an End to the US-Israeli War on Iran
By Burak Can Çelik
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Burak Can Çelik is a geopolitical analyst and researcher specializing in international relations, Middle Eastern politics, and global strategic affairs. His work focuses on U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, Turkish regional strategy, and the evolving balance of power in the Middle East. A graduate in International Relations from Karabük University, he has published in both Turkish- and English-language media, including The New Arab and Al-Monitor.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Since the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, Turkey has aimed to project principled opposition to the war and a readiness to mediate peace, while preserving alliance security cooperation with NATO and maintaining working channels with Iran.
Official messaging has been consistent: Condemn actions that violate international law and endanger civilians, call for an immediate halt to attacks, and keep diplomatic options open.
Mediation has been mostly indirect, consisting of passing messages, leader-to-leader calls, and a multi-layered set of contacts spanning Washington, Tehran, Muscat, and other Gulf capitals. The Reuters news agency on March 25 reported that Ankara had been a go-between for messages between Iran and the United States, probing U.S. positions while warning Tehran against widening the war.
Turkey’s credibility as a mediator is strengthened by access and geography but limited by several factors, including Israeli hostility and distrust, vulnerability to Iranian missiles, and domestic political incentives for anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric. Success is more likely to be measured by de-escalation and deconfliction than a comprehensive settlement.
Strategic Interests and Constraints
Turkey’s strategic incentives to mediate are significant. NATO’s secretary general publicly confirmed three interceptions of missiles “heading to Turkey,” underscoring the risk of the war’s spillover to a NATO member even if Ankara professes neutrality. A fourth missile was also fired in Turkey’s direction on March 30 and shot down by NATO forces. Pointedly, however, Ankara has not invoked Article 5 in an effort to avoid escalation while still signaling deterrence.
Turkey is also motivated by energy and macroeconomic exposure. Turkey’s energy minister has said that the country’s dependence on Middle East oil is “manageable” at around 10%, but that every $1 rise in the price of a barrel of oil adds roughly $400 million to Turkey’s annual energy bill. Potential disruptions of Iranian natural gas — Turkey consumes roughly 150–170 million cubic meters of natural gas per day, of which Iranian supplies account for approximately 15–25 million cubic meters — also pose a risk, making a prolonged conflict strategically costly. S&P Global’s updated inflation outlook highlights how higher energy costs can quickly translate into domestic economic strain for Turkey.
Ankara seeks to project regional influence by presenting itself as an active diplomatic actor capable of talking to multiple sides. Turkish analysts recall a 2010 fuel swap agreement with Iran negotiated by Turkey and Brazil — an effort that ultimately did not replace the broader international negotiating track, but demonstrated Ankara’s long-standing ambition to broker difficult Iran-related files.
In this delicate environment, Turkey has rejected social media claims that it has supported attacks on Iran, stating that Turkey does not allow its airspace, land, or sea to be used operationally “in any conflict or war” involving third parties.
After more than a decade of absorbing the fallout of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has little appetite for another large-scale displacement crisis. Still hosting over 3 million Syrians, Ankara is acutely aware that even a moderate influx from Iran — if the conflict resumes and escalates or state structures weaken —could trigger disproportionate political and economic consequences. For Turkish policymakers, the refugee dimension is no longer a humanitarian issue alone, but a core national security variable.
Europe continues to cooperate with Turkey to mitigate the risk of a potential new refugee crisis. This partnership, originally shaped by a 2016 deal with the European Union, has been further expanded in recent years through additional funding packages and enhanced technical cooperation mechanisms. Since 2016, the EU has allocated more than €10 billion to support refugees and host communities in Turkey, with additional resources mobilized for 2020–2027. Cooperation extends beyond financial assistance to include institutional collaboration in asylum systems, border management, and migration governance. This underscores Turkey’s position not merely as a transit country, but as a critical strategic partner in Europe’s broader migration management architecture.
In trying to mediate an end to the Iran war, Turkey is hampered by long-running disputes with the U.S. over defense procurement, Syria policy, and Gaza. Ties with Israel are even more strained, and Israel does not appear willing to rely on Turkish brokerage to end the conflict.
The Trump administration appears sympathetic to Turkey’s concerns. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan that attacks on Turkey’s sovereign territory were “unacceptable” and pledged U.S. support. Iran’s foreign ministry, by contrast, denied firing projectiles toward Turkey and suggested that Israel was responsible, while accepting the creation of a joint expert-group mechanism to avoid misunderstandings.
Given the failure of direct talks in Pakistan on Saturday, April 11, to resolve the conflict and the U.S. threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the likeliest near-term outcome is intensified indirect diplomacy via multiple intermediaries, including Pakistan, Egypt, and Oman, in addition to Turkey. A second scenario is escalation through further missile spillover into Turkish airspace, which would raise the political cost of mediation and increase NATO consultation pressure even if Article 5 remains off the table.
In the medium term, diplomacy is likely to consolidate around a proposal/counterproposal track focused on nuclear constraints, missile limits, and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. If the situation does not stabilize, Turkey’s role may shift toward containment of the consequences through humanitarian facilitation, incident deconfliction, and alliance defense strengthening.
Going forward, Turkey should keep mediation quiet but structured to avoid public grandstanding that reduces trust, coordinate tightly with NATO on attribution and air/missile defense posture to preserve deterrence without escalation, and use its access to push for a sequencing package to halt third-country strikes and restore freedom of navigation. Turkey should also reduce credibility gaps with Israel by emphasizing civilian protection and deconfliction rather than rhetorically maximalist framing, and accelerate energy-risk mitigation through diversification planning to prevent domestic economic vulnerability from narrowing diplomatic options.
The Gulf’s Strategic Break with Iran and Turkey’s Emerging Window
Iran’s recent missile and drone pressure spilling directly into the Gulf arena has ended a period of detente with the Islamic Republic. In March, the UAE closed its embassy in Tehran, Qatar declared Iranian military and security attachés persona non grata, and Saudi Arabia expelled Iran’s military attaché along with several diplomatic personnel.
The more consequential outcome, however, lies in the evolving perception of the U.S. security umbrella across Gulf capitals: not a rupture with Washington, but a gradual departure from reliance on a single guarantor. In this recalibration, Turkey stands out and could leverage its defense-industrial capacity, NATO membership, and geostrategic depth to expand its strategic and economic engagement with the Gulf. Notably, some Asian and Gulf-based companies are reportedly considering the Istanbul Financial Center as an alternative operational hub to the GCC even as recent assessments by the European Parliament (2026) and the World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index underscore persistent deficiencies in the rule of law, directly impacting investor confidence and Ankara’s ability to construct a credible, rules-based institutional environment.
Header image: NATO Secretary General hosts meeting of senior officials from Finland, Türkiye, and Sweden. By NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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