The United States military carried out a meticulously planned and, by all reports, expertly executed mission in Venezuela on January 3, 2026. Everyone involved in the operation deserves to feel proud of the part they played.
Yet, the civilian leaders who ordered the strike must remember that the raid to capture Maduro could very easily have gone very badly. Jimmy Carter learned that lesson the hard way in 1980 when he ordered a mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran. Operation Eagle Claw went terribly wrong when a helicopter crashed into an aircraft on the ground during the early phases of the operation, killing eight servicemembers. The entire mission was abandoned, and the hostages remained captives until their release in early 1981.
It is very important that policymakers do not get cocky in the wake of the Venezuela raid. They mustn’t believe that because the capture of Maduro was successful, a similar mission elsewhere would unfold in the same way.
The reality is that events in war rarely transpire as originally planned. Helmuth von Moltke, the 19th-century Chief of the Prussian General Staff and noted military thinker, once wrote, “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.” Moltke’s words from 1880 have come down to us in a more familiar form: “No plan survives first contact with the enemy.”
American military planners are taught to anticipate potential contingencies like a downed aircraft or a missing person when crafting operational plans. The architects of Operation Absolute Resolve undoubtedly thought through potential problems like mechanical failure or a casualty and drafted appropriate plans that would have been put into action if needed.
Arguably more importantly, though, civilian leaders need to think about potential contingencies and how they would respond. In a case like the Venezuela raid, they should have decided ahead of time what they would do if the mission had failed. Would they have tried again with similar means later? Would they have admitted defeat? Or would they have escalated the situation to redeem a measure of lost political capital?
The last option deserves the most consideration from the very inception of a crisis. Policymakers need to make sure the political goals they seek to achieve justify all the potential costs of military action.
In the case of the Venezuela raid, the political goal was to capture Nicolas Maduro so he could face justice in the United States. President Trump gambled political capital in ordering the mission. In this case, the operation involved 150 aircraft to suppress the enemy’s defenses while a special forces team flew in on helicopters to capture the Venezuelan president and his wife in their residence.
Suppose for a moment that the Maduros were not where the intelligence said they were, or helicopters were shot down, and the mission had to be aborted. The president would have then faced a dilemma: He could have owned up to the failure in the same way President Kennedy did after the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and back off, or he could have chosen to escalate the situation, which could have reasonably included a full ground invasion to achieve the desired political goal.
The very real possibility of such a mission going awry and the potential for escalation must be weighed before the president gives the order for any military action. The general rule of thumb should be that if the president would not be willing to order a full ground invasion to achieve the desired political goal, then no military action whatsoever should be taken because of the high escalation probability.
This should be known as the “Normandy Threshold.” The Allied invasion of northern France on June 6, 1944, symbolized a full commitment to achieving total victory over Germany during World War II. It followed years of lesser efforts, like the strategic bombing campaign, that failed to bring about victory. Roosevelt and Churchill ordered the costly cross-channel invasion when it became clear to them that only a full commitment of ground troops would compel the Germans to surrender, which was their ultimate political goal.
Ideally, all military operations would be carried out like the Venezuela raid. Policymakers will set out clear, achievable goals, and then Pentagon planners will craft a quick and decisive operation. If everything goes as planned, the mission will be accomplished with a minimum of violence, and all Americans come home alive.
But success of that kind is the exception rather than the rule. Policymakers should consider their strategic contingency plan as the rule. They will enjoy their infrequent tactical victories that much more.
The Normandy Threshold
By Christopher Preble • Dan Grazier
Grand Strategy
The U.S. military captured the Venezuelan president in an aerial and heliborne raid lasting less than three hours. But would the president have ordered military action to accomplish the same goal if it had required large numbers of ground troops and the risk of significant casualties? The very real possibility of such a mission going awry and the potential for escalation must be weighed before the president gives the order for any military action. The general rule of thumb should be that if the president would not be willing to order a full ground invasion to achieve the desired political goal, then no military action whatsoever should be taken because of the high escalation probability. This should be known as the “Normandy Threshold.”
The United States military carried out a meticulously planned and, by all reports, expertly executed mission in Venezuela on January 3, 2026. Everyone involved in the operation deserves to feel proud of the part they played.
Yet, the civilian leaders who ordered the strike must remember that the raid to capture Maduro could very easily have gone very badly. Jimmy Carter learned that lesson the hard way in 1980 when he ordered a mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran. Operation Eagle Claw went terribly wrong when a helicopter crashed into an aircraft on the ground during the early phases of the operation, killing eight servicemembers. The entire mission was abandoned, and the hostages remained captives until their release in early 1981.
It is very important that policymakers do not get cocky in the wake of the Venezuela raid. They mustn’t believe that because the capture of Maduro was successful, a similar mission elsewhere would unfold in the same way.
The reality is that events in war rarely transpire as originally planned. Helmuth von Moltke, the 19th-century Chief of the Prussian General Staff and noted military thinker, once wrote, “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.” Moltke’s words from 1880 have come down to us in a more familiar form: “No plan survives first contact with the enemy.”
American military planners are taught to anticipate potential contingencies like a downed aircraft or a missing person when crafting operational plans. The architects of Operation Absolute Resolve undoubtedly thought through potential problems like mechanical failure or a casualty and drafted appropriate plans that would have been put into action if needed.
Arguably more importantly, though, civilian leaders need to think about potential contingencies and how they would respond. In a case like the Venezuela raid, they should have decided ahead of time what they would do if the mission had failed. Would they have tried again with similar means later? Would they have admitted defeat? Or would they have escalated the situation to redeem a measure of lost political capital?
The last option deserves the most consideration from the very inception of a crisis. Policymakers need to make sure the political goals they seek to achieve justify all the potential costs of military action.
In the case of the Venezuela raid, the political goal was to capture Nicolas Maduro so he could face justice in the United States. President Trump gambled political capital in ordering the mission. In this case, the operation involved 150 aircraft to suppress the enemy’s defenses while a special forces team flew in on helicopters to capture the Venezuelan president and his wife in their residence.
Suppose for a moment that the Maduros were not where the intelligence said they were, or helicopters were shot down, and the mission had to be aborted. The president would have then faced a dilemma: He could have owned up to the failure in the same way President Kennedy did after the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and back off, or he could have chosen to escalate the situation, which could have reasonably included a full ground invasion to achieve the desired political goal.
The very real possibility of such a mission going awry and the potential for escalation must be weighed before the president gives the order for any military action. The general rule of thumb should be that if the president would not be willing to order a full ground invasion to achieve the desired political goal, then no military action whatsoever should be taken because of the high escalation probability.
This should be known as the “Normandy Threshold.” The Allied invasion of northern France on June 6, 1944, symbolized a full commitment to achieving total victory over Germany during World War II. It followed years of lesser efforts, like the strategic bombing campaign, that failed to bring about victory. Roosevelt and Churchill ordered the costly cross-channel invasion when it became clear to them that only a full commitment of ground troops would compel the Germans to surrender, which was their ultimate political goal.
Ideally, all military operations would be carried out like the Venezuela raid. Policymakers will set out clear, achievable goals, and then Pentagon planners will craft a quick and decisive operation. If everything goes as planned, the mission will be accomplished with a minimum of violence, and all Americans come home alive.
But success of that kind is the exception rather than the rule. Policymakers should consider their strategic contingency plan as the rule. They will enjoy their infrequent tactical victories that much more.
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