Issue Brief

We Can’t Buy Our Way Out: It’s Time to Think Differently

America's legacy fleet is vulnerable; Cheap, mass-producible containerized munitions can help close the gap

By T. X. Hammes

Defense Policy & Posture

November 6, 2025

Current U.S. force structure and major platforms are likely to fail in the emerging operational environment. If the Pentagon still believes 2027, or even 2035, is the deadline to be ready for a conflict with China, the U.S. defense industrial base simply cannot produce enough of our current platforms and munitions, even with unlimited funding. We can’t buy our way out. Focusing on the new generation of containerized air, ground, sea, and subsea precision weapons that can be mass produced is the only path to fielding sufficient capability to deter China or succeed in a sustained conflict. While current U.S. weapons systems cannot be produced in large numbers in the next few years, these new systems can quickly strengthen the Joint Force.

Editor’s Note: I have long been a fan of T.X. Hammes’s defense policy work, having commissioned him to write a Cato Institute paper nearly a decade ago. I was thrilled, therefore, when he approached me and Kelly Grieco about writing something for Stimson. This paper explains the potential for relatively inexpensive drones and portable missiles to transform U.S. defense planning. Indeed, many U.S. allies and partners have already adopted such technologies, at a fraction of the cost of piloted aircraft or long-range cruise or ballistic missiles. Whether the United States chooses this path is as much a question of politics as of strategy and will demonstrate the Department of Defense’s capacity for embracing innovative tools and methods that can save taxpayers’ money, while also advancing U.S. security interests.

Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. He is a leading expert on defense policy, the future of conflict, and emerging technology, and the author of three books and over 200 articles, and lectures. He served 30 years in the U.S. Marine Corps, retiring at the rank of Colonel. He holds a PhD in Modern History from Oxford University.

By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program

Rapid changes in the character of warfare have created a tactical environment where pervasive surveillance, AI-assisted command and control, and long-range, autonomous precision mass make current U.S. land, air, and sea forces increasingly vulnerable.¹ This is not a theory or a prediction. The changes are occurring now in a variety of conflicts globally.

Key U.S. weapons systems suffer from range deficiencies, high cost, and logistical complexity. Compounding these weaknesses, the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cannot produce sufficient new systems to even maintain current force levels, much less provide the mass critical to modern warfare. The good news is that by accepting the transition to missile and drone-based warfare and mass producing those systems in commercial containers, the United States can take advantage of the rising dominance of the tactical defense to deter China and Russia.

Changing Operational Environment

Across the globe, states and even some non-state actors are building pervasive surveillance capabilities through land, air, sea, space, electromagnetic, and cyber sensors. Some are achieving precision mass using combined arms with extensive employment of missiles and drones that have ever increasing range. The tactical advantage is shifting strongly in favor of the defense even as it makes fixed facilities, logistics bases, and command facilities increasingly vulnerable to attack.² Compounding the problem, China, Russia, and Iran have stolen a lead on the United States by “containerizing” a variety of missiles, drones, guns, and communication systems. By building these weapons inside standard shipping containers, they are indistinguishable from normal cargo containers until they fire. This neutralizes the U.S. capability to preemptively strike enemy weapons.

In contrast, current U.S. operational concepts rely heavily on very expensive crewed aircraft, powerful but fragile naval platforms, large logistics facilities, massive headquarters, and increasingly vulnerable armor and artillery. Fortunately, emerging weapons that cost a fraction as much can execute the missions of current exquisite platforms that are central to current U.S. operational concepts. If DoD focuses on weapons not platforms, it can develop operational concepts that take advantage of these cheaper systems to provide effective defense at lower cost. Reorganized and equipped U.S. forces can remain forward deployed while minimizing their vulnerability to massed strikes by Chinese forces.

Ukraine and Russia are leading the way in developing and employing these new concepts. Each has developed effective concepts for the use of drones to provide surveillance, attack, electronic warfare, and communications relays. Each nation plans to produce more than four million drones during 2025.³ These range from small quad copters to fixed-wing drones that can fly 3,000 kilometers.

Yet, as famous as the drone units have become, they are only one element of the combat teams on each side. Both are still expending hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds as well as tens of thousands of anti-armor weapons and hundreds of vehicles of all types.⁴ Russia started the war with a successful cyberattack on ViaSat commercial satellite network, the backbone of Ukraine’s communications system. Ukraine responded within days by deploying thousands of Starlink terminals that provided a much more robust nationwide communications system that they call Delta. This gave small tactical units and even individuals the bandwidth previously reserved for major commands.⁵ Anyone with a smartphone can report on enemy activity, including by posting geotagged photos.

Delta provides a comprehensive understanding of the battle space in real time, integrates information about the enemy from various sensors and sources, including—intelligence, on a digital map, does not require additional settings, and can work on any device—laptop, tablet or even on a mobile phone. Roughly speaking, Delta is . . . a modern real-time command map and troop control center.⁶

After viewing the system in operation, Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: “We are witnessing the ways wars will be fought, and won, for years to come.”⁷

These new C2 systems provide commanders with greatly enhanced situational awareness that allows them to rapidly identify targets and assign them to appropriate weapons. Ukraine and Russia have effectively created a 15 kilometer deep “kill zone” where no troops can move without being attacked. New drone production could extend this kill zone to 40 kilometers.⁸ Defense has become so dominant that neither side can conduct effective offensive operations. While Russia continues to be on the offensive, its progress is measured in meters at the cost of roughly 1,000 casualties per day.⁹

Using some of the same technologies but on a much smaller scale, the Houthis have challenged the world’s use of the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb. Between October 7, 2023 and March 2025, the Houthis

targeted U.S. warships more than 170 times and commercial vessels 145 times, according to the Department of Defense. Although the Houthis have yet to hit a U.S. Navy vessel, they have sunk two commercial vessels and killed four mariners. The Department of Defense also revealed recently that the U.S. military has expended upwards of $1 billion dollars as part of its efforts to protect vessels in the Red Sea—an exponentially higher sum than the cost of the Houthis’ offensive kit—laying bare the U.S. military’s vulnerability to asymmetric warfare and stretching an already strained U.S. defense industrial base to produce more air defense missiles.¹⁰

This poorly equipped and small non-state actor challenged a U.S. Navy carrier strike group. Given the United States called off the bombing campaign and the Houthis continue launching missiles and attack boats, one might say the Houthis defeated the United States.

Of much more concern, China is rapidly adapting its forces to effectively employ the concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies that are evolving from these conflicts. By mass producing long-range drones and cruise missiles, China is adapting them for war in the vast expanse of the Pacific.

In today’s battlespace, the exponential increase of ground, air, sea, and space-based sensors means that if you emit a signature, you will be seen. The arrival of long-range, precise mass means that if you are seen you can be hit. The rapid development of command-and-control systems that can make sense of the vast quantity of information, decide what to do, and transmit that information to firing units makes the sensor-shooter combination more lethal than ever. These developments heavily favor the defense since offense requires movement, and movement creates emissions.

Vulnerability of Current U.S. Weapons Systems: A Major Weakness

Current and proposed U.S. weapons systems are based on the 1980s effort to develop precision weapons to defeat the mass of the Soviet Union. The effort was extremely successful and devastatingly demonstrated in Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, and numerous counter-terror strikes globally. Unfortunately, while observing the impact of emerging systems in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Red Sea, the Department of Defense (DoD) has responded by doubling down on the next generation of current exquisite and expensive platforms. None seem to acknowledge how vulnerable even these proposed platforms are to the newer but much cheaper systems that are “good enough.”

Today America’s exquisite aircraft, ships, and vehicles suffer from four major weaknesses — vulnerability to modern weapons, range deficiencies, extreme costs, and logistic complexity. Each makes them unsuitable for the emerging operational environment. And of course, the ultimate weakness is the fact the U.S. defense industrial base simply cannot produce them in sufficient quantities for a sustained conflict.

To put it bluntly, many current U.S. exquisite platforms are not survivable in today’s battlespace. While the F-35 is highly capable in the air, it will spend the bulk of its time on the ground at inadequately defended airfields. And in a war with China, many of those airfields will be neutralized by missile attacks. A recent Stimson Center study showed China could, using just some of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s current inventory of ballistic and ground launched cruise missiles, effectively close U.S. and Japanese airbases for up to a month at the beginning of a war.¹¹

The actual situation is much worse. The study did not include the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s long-range drones or tactical aviation, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s highly capable cruise missiles, or the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces’ increasingly capable rocket artillery in the simulated attack on allied air power.

China is also investing heavily in drones. It recently ordered 1,000,000 one-way attack drones.¹² Many are well adapted for the extended ranges anticipated in a Pacific fight. For instance, China is producing Sunflower drones, a dramatically improved version of the Iranian Shahed-136. The Sunflower has a range of 2,000 kilometers, a 40-kilogram warhead, digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC), GPS independent navigation, and vertical launch capability. As the world’s dominant drone manufacturer, we must assume China can at least match the 800-drone attack Russia launched on September 6-7, 2025.¹³ And China will be able to reinforce such an attack with both missiles and long-range rockets. Current U.S. air defenses will be overwhelmed by an attack of this magnitude. Our airpower and associated critical infrastructure can be destroyed on the ground.

The Stimson Center paper did not examine the vulnerability of our B-2s, B-21s, and aerial tankers to attack at their CONUS bases. Yet, China has demonstrated the ability to launch both cruise missiles and long-range drones from containers.¹⁴

Many analysts will state that China would not risk the potential for nuclear escalation by attacking U.S. forces in CONUS. It is true that a Chinese ballistic missile strike could easily be confused for a nuclear strike. However, after cautioning the U.S. that China could not accept U.S. bombers killing Chinese citizens in China, China could launch a less risky cruise missile strike from the sea. Any container ship in the Gulf of Mexico or off the West Coast could launch a devastating attack on the bombers at their bases. As it attacks, China could broadcast over all channels that it was only attacking U.S. bombers on U.S. bases to protect the Chinese civilians being killed by those bombers. For non-stealthy B-52s, B-1s, and tankers, containerized anti-air missiles on merchant ships could also engage them while they are in international airspace.¹⁵ In short, China can severely attrit U.S. airpower early in a fight.

Containerized missiles are effectively a much less expensive stealth weapon. Twenty-foot containers (TEUs) and forty-foot containers (FEU) are ubiquitous. So many move so constantly around the globe that it is impossible to track individual containers without the cooperation of the owner. Russia, China, Iran, Israel, Estonia, and the Netherlands have all fielded containerized missiles that can be employed from a commercial ship or truck. In short, the United States can no longer count on geographic sanctuaries.

Attack drone capabilities are also continually improving. Russia has created a jet-powered Shahed-type drone with a maximum speed of 500 km/hour, a 50-kilogram warhead, and a maximum operating altitude of nearly 30,000 feet.¹⁶ China recently announced it too has a jet-powered vertical takeoff drone.¹⁷ Not surprisingly, Ukraine has steadily improved its drones while increasing their production rate. It is now producing 100 FP-1 drones per day. FP-1s have a range of 1600 kilometers and a payload of up to 120 kilograms. Ukraine’s FP-5 Flamingo drone has a range of 3000 kilometers and a 1000-kilogram warhead.¹⁸ Ukraine is currently producing 50 FP-5s per month with plans to increase to seven per day by the end of the year.¹⁹ The ongoing and rapid diffusion of long-range drone and missile technology means that air bases will be subject to mass combined missile and drone attack in any conflict with even a middle power.

At sea, aircraft carriers are increasingly vulnerable to drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles. Carriers will be targeted both as command and power projection nodes. They have good defenses, excellent damage control, and are hard to sink. However, the USS Oriskany, USS Enterprise, and USS Forrestal flight deckfires have demonstrated that a small explosive delivered against an aircraft on deck can cause a mission kill. In each case, damage control teams minimized the damage, but the carriers were out of action from seven weeks to nine months.²⁰ An attacking force does not need to sink the carrier to achieve its mission but simply put the carrier out of action during the engagement. A hit from a single Sunflower drone or cruise missile could accomplish this. The high value of these platforms combined with their vulnerability to mission kill means they will be priority targets attracting hundreds of missiles and drones.

Nor will other surface ships fare better. Since the Falklands War, cruise missile hits on surface combatants have all resulted in mission kills or destruction of those platforms. A Naval Postgraduate School study noted that between 1967 and 1994, an average of 1.2 hits from cruise missiles put the targeted ship out of action.²¹ While modern fleets employ layers of active and passive defense that will defeat many threats, the enemy only needs a single weapon to penetrate to severely degrade, disable, or sink current surface combatants. As industry continues to mass produce Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and long-range attack drones, sheer numbers will overwhelm shipboard defenses.

Ground force vulnerability to the pervasive surveillance, mass strike regime has been a defining characteristic of the Russo-Ukraine War. Tens of thousands of vehicles have been destroyed and hundreds of thousands of soldiers killed or wounded. In this increasingly transparent and deadly battlespace, there are two ways for ground forces to survive. One is to find or build overhead cover. This requires concealing all emissions as well as evidence of entrance and exits to the covered position. The second way is to blend into the physical and electromagnetic environment. Many nations are adopting this approach by building modern weapons systems into commercial trucks, vans, or shipping containers. Both approaches will be used in accordance with the tactical situation.

A major war with China will be on a scale that is hard to imagine. China owns over 9,000 large merchant vessels – each can be converted to a warship with containerized command, ISR, and missiles. Air and land warfare will involve tens of thousands of drones and missiles. While our current system could deal with missiles and long-range drones in the tens or hundreds, it cannot deal with the numbers China can build and deploy.

In sum, the current U.S. force structure is poorly suited to survive and win in the emerging operational environment. Its ground vehicles, aircraft, ships, headquarters, bases, and logistics systems create distinct and easily identified signatures across the spectrum and are poorly defended against precision mass attacks. Compounding the problem, the U.S. DIB cannot mass produce current platforms or weapons – certainly not in the numbers being expended in Ukraine.²²

Range Deficiencies

Historically, range obsolescence has resulted in a previously dominant weapons system being defeated by newer, often cheaper, systems that could kill at greater ranges. From the crossbow and pike defeating armored knights to carrier aviation dethroning the battleship at sea, superior range allowed newer, cheaper systems to defeat mature, exquisite systems.

Today, the United States faces a similar situation. Newer, cheaper systems have gained major range advantages over most current U.S. platforms to include the United States’ most expensive weapons program – the F-35. Given the F-35 is the basic power projection system for the air force, navy, and Marine Corps, this places U.S. forces at a major disadvantage. The 16 other nations that have contracted for or are flying F-35s face the same issue. Of course, carriers suffer from the same range deficiencies against ground-based cruise and ballistic missile systems. As noted earlier, even the U.S. bomber and tanker bases are potentially within range of Chinese tactical weapons.

While surface combatants carry a limited number of long-range systems, they cannot begin to match the Chinese for sheer numbers of missiles and drones that reach over 1,000 miles. China is developing the ISR, command-and-control, and autonomy that will enable massive volleys launched from extended ranges.²³

Tanks and other armored vehicles also suffer from serious range disadvantages. Anti-armor missiles can reach out 160 kilometers, but tanks can range only 3 kilometers. Some western artillery systems outrange potential enemies, but almost all are outranged by evolving, increasingly autonomous rocket artillery, drones, and missiles.

High Cost of Current Systems

Cost is another, if not the, major problem. As Frank Hoffman noted, strategy should serve as an appetite suppressant for strategists and force planners.²⁴ It definitively limits the strategies and force structures DoD can employ. If a strategy does not propose affordable forces, it is not a strategy but a fantasy. The United States finds itself it that situation today. We simply cannot afford the force we fantasize about.

The F-35’s $2.1 trillion lifetime (1994-2088) program cost for 2,456 aircraft comes out to an average of $855 million per aircraft.²⁵ Given the F-35A fleet’s current full mission capable (FMC) rate is only 38%, the Air Force must field five F-35s to have two operational FMC aircraft at any given time.²⁶ That means expending $2.1 billion dollars to ensure it has one full mission capable F-35A. The FMC rates for F-35Bs and Cs are much worse. For B and C model aircraft that are four or more years old, the rates are below 20%.²⁷ Keep in mind that these costs do not include the costs of training pilots and maintenance crews, the $400,000 personalized helmet each pilot requires, airbase operations, or the family of support aircraft essential to modern strike operations.

Nor will the next generation fighters provide any relief. The proposed F-47 is projected to cost three times as much as the F-35 per aircraft. The estimate does not even include the cost of the engine.²⁸ The Navy has not yet put a price tag on its proposed next generation fighter, but it is likely to be in the same range as the F-47.

Ship costs have also grown uncontrollably. The second Ford-class carrier will cost $12.936 billion in then-year dollars.²⁹ And of course, this does not include the aircraft central to the ship’s purpose, or the escorts required to protect it. While the future air wing structure is still not finalized, the currently proposed 16 F-35Cs, 28 F/A-18s, 6 EA-18Gs, and supporting aircraft all represent very expensive platforms necessary to deliver today’s ordnance.³⁰ These systems add billions to the purchase price of each new carrier and tens of billions to the long-term operating costs — all for a weapons system that is badly outranged by both missiles and autonomous drones that, as consumable munitions, do not have any operating costs.

Current U.S. missiles are also extremely expensive — particularly the long-range systems needed in a fight with China. Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) cost $3.4 million each. The Joint Air Surface Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) costs $3.3 million, and the PAC-3 Missile Interceptors are $3.4 million.³¹ Each is designed to be launched from an exquisite, expensive platform. Thus, the cost per missile delivered should factor in the costs of the platforms and organization necessary to get the missile to its launch point. This puts the United States far on the wrong side of the cost curve.

Even the exceptional costs noted in official documents do not begin to cover the actual cost of these systems. When DoD compares weapons, it looks at the cost and upkeep of the weapon but does not include the expenses critical to their successful operation. For instance, when comparing aircraft to alternatives, DoD does not include the cost to build, maintain, and defend airfields. It does not include the cost of training flight crew, maintainers, or other personnel essential to aircraft observations. When pricing sea and ground systems, DoD also fails to take these costs into account. Only by including them can DoD gain a true understanding of the cost tradeoffs between current and potential future systems.

Logistics Challenges

Further compounding the challenge of fighting our current force are its very high logistics requirements. The complexity of the systems, insufficient maintenance budgets, and high operations tempo drive the current low readiness rates and slow maintenance cycles. This is despite the fact that our forces are operating from large, well-established bases — many in the United States.

If the United States goes to war with China, our current inadequate logistics preparation will face four intractable issues — extensive distances, the maritime nature of the theater, time disadvantage, and the massive scale required to fight China.³² China recognized these weaknesses and developed its counter-intervention concept (known as anti-access/aerial denial (A2/AD) in the United States) to exploit them.³³ U.S. logistics forces are simply not organized to fight through China’s A2/AD bubble.

The issue is not limited to the Pacific. Most potential conflicts lie thousands of miles from the United States. Even where we have established overseas bases, those bases lie within range of a variety of enemy precision weapons. Clearly, readiness rates will be even lower when operating at the end of a long logistics pipeline that is under attack.

Even with major budget increases, DoD cannot buy sufficient numbers of our current platforms and long-range weapons. This brings us to another serious weakness — the deficiencies of our Defense Industrial Base (DIB).

Insufficient Industrial Capacity

Even if given the funds, the current DIB cannot begin to provide sufficient platforms to replace combat losses. To date, the maximum F-35 production rate has been 13 per month with Lockheed promising an increase to 20 per month.³⁴ Unfortunately, this production must be shared among the 17 air forces, two navies, and one Marine Corps that fly the aircraft. This production rate is clearly insufficient to sustain an air campaign and its anticipated level of attrition. Nor do future airframes appear to offer relief. Despite massive investment, the Air Force currently projects a production rate of only seven B-21s per year.³⁵ It will take 14 years to reach the 100 bombers currently planned. While DoD has not projected the production rate for F-47s, production problems with the current generation of aircraft indicate very low production rates stretched over decades.

The shipbuilding situation is even worse. The United States is currently building a single carrier every five years. And the Navy just announced the USS John F. Kennedy, the second Ford-class delivery date has slipped from 2024 to 2027.³⁶ Subsequent Ford-class carrier deliveries will also slip. The United States currently builds only two Arleigh Burke DDGs per year. While the Navy plans to build 81 Constellation-class frigates, the initial ship is not scheduled for delivery until 2029, three years behind schedule, at a cost of over $1B each.³⁷

Production of ground systems is also woefully inadequate. The United States can refurbish only 12 M1 tanks per month.³⁸ Despite years of effort and investments designed to increase productivity, 155mm artillery ammunition production will not reach 100,000 rounds per month until 2026. Another limitation on artillery usage is barrel wear. This year, the U.S. Army is trying to accelerate production of barrels for M777 howitzers but has only reached a rate of 30 per month.³⁹ In addition, almost all munitions production is inadequate. Current wargames indicate U.S. forces will run out of munitions in as little as eight days in a conflict with China.⁴⁰

The fact is the United States cannot produce enough major air or naval platforms to even slow the aging of the current fleets much less provide the mass needed in modern combat. The DIB cannot even produce sufficient munitions to sustain the forces we do have. Currently proposed budgets will not provide sufficient funds to overcome these deficiencies if we continue to focus on exquisite platforms. In fact, the focus on these complex, pricey systems has put U.S. readiness and capacity into a death spiral. The spiral has been accelerated by an operations tempo that does not provide sufficient time for maintenance and upgrades of existing platforms.⁴¹

In short, vulnerability, high cost, range deficiency, logistical complexity, and insufficient industrial capacity ensure our current force structure of exquisite platforms is increasingly vulnerable to emerging technologies. Even with a massive budget increase, the United States can neither afford nor produce enough current platforms and weapons to prevail in a protracted conflict with China.

The Good News

Since the United States cannot maintain current platforms nor build sufficient new platforms to replace wartime losses, it will require a different approach to win in this new operational environment. Fortunately, current and emerging technologies provide viable and affordable options in space, air, sea, land, and electronic domains. U.S. industry is producing new smart weapons specifically designed for mass production. From space to sea floor, new, relatively inexpensive systems are being produced that can augment and, for some missions, substitute for current expensive platforms. Many of these new weapons can be mass produced, are much less vulnerable, cost less, have sufficient range for today’s battlespace, and have reduced logistical demands.

Mass Producible Weapons, Not Exquisite Platforms

Throughout modern history, ordnance consisted mostly of short-range, dumb munitions. These weapons required platforms that could penetrate enemy defenses and carry the sensors, weapons, and crews necessary to provide terminal targeting. However, in the last decade, we have seen the exponential growth of smart, long-range missiles and drones operating with increasing autonomy. Some of these weapons have ranges that exceed almost all crewed platforms. Just as important, they can be designed and mass produced quickly. The Pentagon has contracted for thousands of Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAMs) and approved the sale of 3,350 to Ukraine. With a range of 150-280 miles, these air-launched munitions should start arriving in Ukraine this year, about two years after the initial public contracting notice.⁴²

Several other companies are developing and testing new cruise missiles that cost a fraction of current weapons and can be launched from air, sea, and land. For instance, Anduril is producing the Barracuda M family of missiles, which the company explains “features advanced autonomous behaviors and other software-defined capabilities, and…is available in configurations offering 500+ nautical miles of range, 100+ pounds of payload capacity, 5Gs of maneuverability, and more than 120 minutes of loitering time.”⁴³

Anduril designed the missiles to require 10 or fewer tools to assemble, use commercially available components across six sub-systems, facilitate rapid hardware integration and testing, and be software-defined to ease upgrades.⁴⁴ In short, it is designed to be produced in the numbers needed for a prolonged conflict.

Anduril is not alone in pursuing affordable systems. Lockheed Martin is testing the Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT) as a low-cost, modular cruise missile. Projected to cost $150,000, the missile will be able to carry a range of sensors and warheads.⁴⁵ Ares Industrial is flight testing a new family of ASCMs with a target price of $300,000 or one tenth that of the current AGM-158C LRASM ASCM.⁴⁶ L3Harris has announced its “Wolf Pack” family of low-cost cruise missiles with ranges out to 200 nautical miles.⁴⁷

Obviously not all these weapons will perform as advertised and will inevitably cost more than currently estimated. But they provide proof of concept that the United States can mass produce much less expensive, long-range, precision weapons specifically designed to not require exquisite, expensive platforms to launch them. Most are being designed to be launched from a standard shipping container.

The good news is not limited to the air domain. Anduril has produced the Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) as well as two versions of Copperhead, a mass-producible torpedo.⁴⁸ Ghost Shark has been specifically designed for mass production and flexibility to create supply chain resilience.⁴⁹ Kongsberg Discovery’s HUGIN autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) successfully completed a multi-week, 1,200 nautical mile surveillance/survey mission.⁵⁰ To date, 12 navies have purchased versions of the HUGIN and are using them operationally. AUVs and UUVs (uncrewed underwater vessels) could be produced in the hundreds to support a variety of naval operations. The Royal Navy assigned the XV-Excalibur, an Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vessel, to patrol the waters of Plymouth, England while controlled from Australia.⁵¹

Ukraine has already proven inexpensive, mass produced, uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) can conduct operations hundreds of miles at sea. Numerous commercial firms are already designing, building, and testing a range of USVs from small coastal craft to vessels capable of oceanic transits. The U.S. Navy is studying how to integrate both USVs and ASVs craft into fleet operations.

Ukraine has also seen incredibly rapid advances in the capabilities of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Both Russia and Ukraine have begun producing them in the millions. In their War on the Rocks article, Martin C. Feldmann and Gene Keselman make a convincing argument that, if incentivized, U.S. industry can also produce millions of these increasingly autonomous smaller drones.⁵²

As noted earlier, the Sunflower autonomous drone, China’s improved version of Iran’s Shahed, provides a cheap but powerful long-range, suicide drone that can be produced in quantities that will overwhelm current U.S. defenses. In response, the United States is developing the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS), which closely resembles the Shahed. Given their relatively simple designs and production methods, U.S. industry should be able to mass produce similar systems.⁵³

Western firms are also developing long-range, stealth configured (but not stealth coated), Autonomous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) to operate both as Collaborative Combat Aircraft and conduct autonomous missions. The intent is to use these AAVs to rapidly increase the number of aircraft in western air forces. The cost tradeoffs and production advantages are obvious. From the Kratos Valkyrie, which are projected to cost between $2M and $5M per airframe to the General Atomics’ YFQ-42 and Anduril’s YFQ-44 (estimated at $25-30M), these aircraft will cost a fraction of the price of an F-35.⁵⁴ As always, there is concern the Pentagon procurement system will dramatically increase the cost and slow the production of these systems.

On the plus side, in their current configurations, they can be produced in large numbers globally. Both General Atomics and Anduril made announcements that they will partner with European firms to build these aircraft in Europe.⁵⁵ The Valkyrie’s low cost, 3,000-mile range, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability, 1,200-pound payload, and Mach .72 cruising speed blur the distinction between drone and cruise missile.⁵⁶ Kratos has developed the Ragnarok mini-cruise missile specifically to fit in the Valkyrie’s internal bomb bay. Costing only $150K, Ragnarok’s 500 nautical mile range combined with Valkyrie’s extended range gives the United States relatively inexpensive long-range, precision weapons.⁵⁷ And Valkyrie’s vertical take-off and landing capability removes the requirement to provide expensive air defense for an airfield.

The U.S. Air Force is also developing the Rapid Dragon system which mounts multiple missiles on a pallet. The pallet is carried aloft in a cargo aircraft and pushed out the ramp. The missiles separate from the pallet, ignite, and proceed autonomously to the target. The concept can be employed with any cargo aircraft with a ramp to include commercial aircraft. Depending on the aircraft and missile pairing, a C-17 could carry over 100 missiles.

Even Better News

The ability to produce large numbers of relatively low-cost autonomous munitions solves the problems of industrial capacity shortfalls, high costs, range deficiency, and logistical complexity that plague our current force structure. That leaves the challenge of increasing survivability. As noted earlier, survival depends on minimizing distinct signatures. Multiple nations and weapons manufacturers have arrived at a simple, cost-effective solution — containerization.

Russia led the way in 2010 when it offered the Club-K containerized missile system for sale internationally. The system mounted four cruise missiles in a standard shipping container.⁵⁸ Since then the United States, China, Israel, Iran, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and numerous other nations have containerized air, land, and maritime missiles, drones, guns, sonars, sensors, C2 nodes, and even long-range Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs). Not surprising, China’s Sea Defense Combat System, revealed in 2022, represents a state-of-the-art containerized system, which

requires only a crew of four. It is internally powered, does not need any external support, and reportedly has no electronic emissions. Targeting data is passively downlinked. The system carries up to four missiles, including the YJ-12E supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, YJ-83 medium range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, YJ-62 long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, PL-16 anti-radiation cruise missile, and the YJ-18E supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.⁵⁹

Clearly, China is developing the ability to arm both shore batteries and almost any oceangoing ship with long-range ASCMs. Given its presence at arms shows, the Sea Dragon Combat System might be for sale. As noted earlier, China had also developed containerized surface-to-air missiles so it can rapidly equip any ship with anti-air capabilities.

Unfortunately, the United States has been slow to adopt this concept. But recently, Rear Admiral Bill Daly, Director of Surface Warfare, identified containerized weapons as a key to increasing the lethality of the U.S. Navy. “Containerized payloads will drive the next evolution of lethality at sea, and many ship types can embark containers,” he explained in a recent article with Lawrence Heyworth. “Containerized payloads are modular, mass-producible, low-cost, platform-agnostic and deceptive. They are a basic, brilliant form of lethality.”⁶⁰ Containerized weapons and sensors mean commercial platforms can be converted to weapons at sea, on land, and in the air. Container ships, tankers, bulk carriers, ferries, fishing ships, commercial trucks, pickup trucks, and trains can all be rapidly turned into highly capable weapons platforms.

The United States has modified the standard Mk 41 Launcher to create the Mk 70 Mod 1 Expeditionary Launcher. It is a containerized system in all but name. The launcher has four vertical launch cells.⁶¹ It has been successfully test fired from a Littoral Combat Ship and as part of the Army’s Typhon Missile System. The Mk 70 is designed to be self-contained so that it can be deck mounted on a wide variety of ships as well as fired from ashore. DoD already has contracts and production facilities for the launcher and a variety of missiles that it can employ. While it can be fired from warships, it is also well suited for deck launch from commercial vessels that can carry TEUs. Taiwan has developed a TEU with 16 missiles and Anduril is building versions with from 66 short-range missiles to 20 long-range missiles.

Since the U.S. is already producing Mk 70 launcher, missiles, containerized C2 and radars, the only element missing is the commercial ship. War between the United States and China will dramatically reduce maritime trade in the Pacific, if not globally, which, as in previous major economic downturns, will make hundreds of oceangoing commercial ships available for purchase at a fraction of the cost of building a naval platform. In 2023, a five-year-old Panamax averaged about $40 million. Unlike their thin-skinned military counterparts, modern container ships are double hulled and often double bottomed. Adding $10 million for modifications and $80 million for missiles brings a rough estimate of $130 million for the ship and 40 Tomahawk or 80 Barracuda 500s or 400 Barracuda 200 missiles. This is one-eighth the projected cost of a Constellation-class frigate, which is not scheduled for delivery until 2029. Of particular importance in a sustained conflict, assembling the already existing components of a missile merchant will take a fraction of the time and resources of building a modern warship.⁶²

The largest ship the United States should repurpose is a PANAMAX since these ships can transit the Panama Canal to quickly shift between theaters. PANAMAX ships can carry 5,000 containers, but only a hundred or so will be needed to convert one to a warship. Therefore, some of the other containers can be filled with foam or even dirt to provide yards of effective armor for key areas of the ship. This is in sharp contrast to the relatively thin hulls of our current combatants. Other containers can be used to support logistics operations in the theater.

For their part, land forces are putting drones, missiles of all types, long-range rockets, anti-air systems, sensors, C2, and various logistic functions into a variety of containers. The rapidly increasing ranges of inexpensive drones and cruise missiles mean ground commanders can reach 3,000 kilometers into the enemy’s rear area or out to sea. Several armies have already trained to launch long-range strike, anti-air, and ASCM missiles from standard shipping containers.

In addition, dozens of shorter-range anti-armor and anti-material missiles currently carried on distinctly military vehicles could be loaded into containers or box trucks to provide the massed fires required to break up mechanized attacks as well as disrupt enemy logistics systems. Current small missiles can reach 160 kilometers.⁶³ These missiles allow unarmored box trucks to engage from outside the range of most artillery and long before a current armored vehicle can engage with organic weapons.⁶⁴ Further, a wide variety of these weapons are, or are on the verge of being, fully autonomous after launch.

The rapid evolution of capable but relatively inexpensive weapons means allied and friendly nations can design, purchase, and deploy capabilities that can effectively reinforce U.S. efforts. While many nations are buying F-35s, they can only buy them in small numbers. In contrast, they could buy large numbers of long-range, autonomous munitions. For the lifetime cost of an F-35A, a nation could buy 170 Valkyries that would prove much more challenging for an opponent to locate and preempt. As noted, the new companies developing affordable, capable weapons are already starting to set up joint production with selected allied nations. Exploiting these opportunities, smaller nations can take advantage of the increasing dominance of the tactical defense.⁶⁵

Why Containerize?

Containerized weapons provide major advantages in today’s operational environment.

Standard twenty- (TEU) and forty-foot (FEU) containers blend in almost anywhere in the world. Containers with weapons are very difficult if not impossible to differentiate from commercial containers until they prepare to fire. All missiles or drones can be launched within 15 minutes of the container opening. Thus, they are nearly impossible to destroy with preparatory fires.
Weapons in TEUs and FEUs are inherently multi-modal. Using commercial material handling equipment present at the vast majority of commercial ports and airfields, the containers can be shifted between land, air, and sea modes. Tens of millions of commercial trucks, trains, inland barges, and ships are all designed to transport them. Because containers are ubiquitous, so is commercial container handling equipment.
Containerized weapons will introduce greater uncertainty for Chinese planners. While China can track where our current platforms and aircraft are, it will be much more challenging to track the vastly higher number of containers moving via different transportation modes. These weapons can be concealed in tens of thousands of garages, container lots, warehouses, and other buildings throughout the first and second island chains. The ubiquity of containers means the concept works over most of the globe.
Smaller weapons can be loaded into smaller commercial trucks like delivery vans. The Russians, Iranians, Taiwanese, and Estonians have already done so.⁶⁶ They did so specifically because the trucks blend into society and are much easier to purchase and maintain than military prime movers. These trucks are small enough to be moved on C-130s.
C-17s can transport TEUs. Smaller weapons can be containerized in standard aircraft containers so they can be moved by a wide variety of commercial aircraft.
By exploiting commercial transportation, the force can purchase petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), maintenance, and parts from commercial sources, which greatly reduces the strain on the military logistics chain. For instance, a U.S. unit in the first island chain could purchase commercial trucks and small coastal ships to transport its weapons containers. By using commercial trucks or ships, they can use the networks that provide fuel, maintenance, food, water, and other supplies for the local trucking and shipping companies.

Legal Aspects of Containerized Weapons

Concerns about the legality of containerized weapons on merchant ships is one of the reasons for the U.S. Navy’s slow adoption of containerized missiles. However, international law states that any state can convert a merchant ship to a warship. According to Raul “Pete” Pedroso, a professor of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College:

A “warship” is defined as a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.⁶⁷

If flying the U.S. flag, under command of a U.S. commissioned officer, and subject to military discipline, a merchant ship armed with containerized weapons legally becomes a warship. By focusing on building large numbers of containerized weapons systems, the United States will gain the capacity to quickly expand its fleet. The Navy could purchase and arm eight missile merchants for the cost of one Constellation-class frigate. With the frigate delivery delayed until 2029, the Navy could have numerous “missile merchants” at sea before that date.

Transition

This study does not propose immediately eliminating the current exquisite platforms in the U.S. arsenal. Rather, the United States must adapt the employment of these systems to today’s battlespace. This includes integrating them into teams with the evolving weapons systems. As part of adapting, DoD must significantly reduce its investment in those systems to dramatically increase its investments in the new, smart, relatively inexpensive, and more survivable weapons. If the Navy ceased production of Ford-class carriers at four hulls, it would still have 10 carriers through 2038 and four through 2072. And the action will free up tens of billions for munitions. Given the explosive improvements in missile and drone technology, the risk to carriers is likely to be an order of magnitude higher by 2038 — much less 2072 — than today. Continued investment in these highly vulnerable, short-range naval aviation assets will reduce readiness and capability for a major conflict.

The Biden administration’s Replicator Program was an important step forward, but it has not resulted in a major shift to DoD investment. While spending tens of billion on current platforms, the Pentagon is spending only about $500M on drones — or 0.05% of its budget.⁶⁸ This is woefully inadequate. In its report A Blueprint for Breakthroughs in Defense Innovation, a commission led by General David H. Berger, USMC (ret.), recommended the Pentagon “divest as much as 15% of the current budget from legacy systems and redirect resources to emerging technologies.”⁶⁹ This level of shift is needed to reflect the urgency and scale required to close existing gaps. The Pentagon has demonstrated the feasibility of rapid procurement of large numbers of weapons with the ERAM contract.

By not purchasing one F-35A ($110M in 2020), DoD could purchase 110 cruise missiles with ranges over 1,000 miles.⁷⁰ For the purchase cost of 10 F-35s, it could have 1,100 long-range missiles. Further, missiles do not require airfields to operate or expensive flight hours to maintain pilot proficiency. Thus, the hundreds of millions devoted to flight hours can be spent on additional missiles. Using the F-35 Program Office’s lifetime cost of $855M for each F-35, DoD could purchase 8,550 long-range missiles for the lifetime cost of 10 F-35As.

The Navy may have taken the first steps in the process of moving from the few, exquisite, and very slow to deliver platforms to smart, small, and cheap weapons.

The next order for a Constellation-class frigate is zeroed out — no frigates are in the budget request. But the Pentagon has asked Congress to set aside $1.7 billion for on-water autonomous systems, along with $730 million for underwater autonomous capabilities.⁷¹

This may signal the Navy is considering cancelling the Constellation program. However, the budget still includes $600M for advance procurement of the fifth hull in the program.

The Navy has contracted with Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman for “conceptual” CCA designs.⁷² These companies are focused on designing less expensive aircraft that can be mass produced. Unfortunately, the Navy is still maintaining it needs a sixth-generation fighter which will consume enormous resources and deliver only a small fleet of aircraft a decade from now. And, if F-35 production rates are a guide, it will take another decade or more to equip the fleet.

Foreign military sales and joint production agreements can provide another path to rapidly increase the number of these new, smart, and relatively inexpensive systems in the hands of allies and friends. Some companies have already demonstrated their capabilities.

In early August, Anduril delivered its first batch of Altius 700M loitering munitions and supporting systems to Taiwan… Unlike traditional foreign military sales programs, which often take years to move from contract signing to deployment, Anduril built the Altius systems at financial risk, enabling delivery within six months of contract signature.⁷³

Conclusion

Current U.S. force structure and major platforms are likely to fail in the emerging operational environment. If DoD still believes 2027, or even 2035, is the deadline to be ready for a conflict with China, the U.S. DIB simply cannot produce enough of our current platforms and munitions, even with unlimited funding. We can’t buy our way out.

Focusing on the new generation of containerized air, ground, sea, and subsea precision weapons that can be mass produced is the only path to fielding sufficient capability to deter China or succeed in a sustained conflict. While current U.S. weapons systems cannot be produced in large numbers in the next few years, these new systems can quickly strengthen the Joint force.

The Navy can focus on using containerized drones, missiles, ASVs, AUVs, and guns to rapidly upgrade its existing platforms. It has already fired a containerized SM6 from the deck of a Littoral Combat Ship and various missiles from containers ashore.⁷⁴ It needs to do much more.

While the U.S. Navy is exploring uncrewed ships, the Dutch Navy is taking innovation a different way by rapidly fielding additional small ships to reinforce its current fleet. It has contracted for two small ships (550 tons with a crew of 9) to be operational in 2026 and 2027. Each will carry 150 containerized anti-air missiles as a floating magazine for its current frigates.⁷⁵

Creating missile merchants means the Navy will not have to wait on the production of uncrewed ships to dramatically increase the number of missiles at sea. By focusing on rapid production of containerized weapons rather than continuing to pour money into a few exquisite platforms, the Navy can begin fielding missile merchants in large numbers long before it can commission new FFGs.

Ground forces face challenges similar to the period from 1914 to1918 during which new weapons and tactics rendered previous offensive concepts unusable. They have taken steps in the right direction by fielding long-range missile batteries that can provide direct support to any Joint fight in any conflict. In particular, the army and Marine Corps have recognized that ground force must play a significant role in any Indo-Pacific naval campaign. As containerized ASCMs range increases to over 1600 kilometers, they can strongly reinforce defense of land against naval forces. Both services are experimenting with how to adapt their units to exploit the emerging technologies. Failure to do so could lead to their destruction in the modern battlespace.

The aviation communities of all the services face a much greater challenge. They must shift from current exquisite crewed platforms that rely on major bases and vulnerable carrier decks to a more mobile concept for strike and air defense. The spiraling cost and low production rate of current and planned aircraft make the existing aviation plans unaffordable and ineffective. While the services will have to continue to operate their current inventories, they must begin phasing them out as ever-more capable autonomous drones and missiles take over the mission of deep strike, interdiction, and even close air support.

The world is entering the missile and drone age. Unless the services can demonstrate they can quickly and affordably protect their airfields from mass missile and drone attacks, they need to curtail investments in their massively expensive crewed platforms. As very mature platforms, crewed aircraft have little room for further development — and only at a very high cost. In contrast, the emerging concepts for drones and missiles bear a remarkable resemblance to the evolution of air warfare doctrine beginning in 1914. Like the airplanes of 1914, autonomous weapons have enormous potential for growth and mass production. We have seen drones evolve from a reconnaissance force operating singly to combined formations of observation, fighter, bomber, transport, communications, and electronic warfare. Soon, we will see coordinating autonomous swarms of autonomous drones and missiles. U.S. aviation must adapt.

This is the fundamental problem for the Joint Force — how to deal with a dramatically changed battlespace. While the needed changes are doable and potentially affordable, progress has been slow — restrained by our current procurement system and the reluctance to innovate at scale. Fortunately, the necessary changes are achievable within this decade. But it will take a major effort by the services, Department of Defense, Congress, and industry. Failure to act will leave our forces increasingly vulnerable to the array of states and non-state actors who are embracing the changes.

The views expressed here are purely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the National Defense University.

Notes

1
Michael C. Horowitz, “Battles of Precision Mass: Technology is Remaking War – and America Must Adapt,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/battles-precise-mass-technology-war-horowitz.
2
T. X. Hammes, “The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 103, 4th Quarter, 2021, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-103/jfq-103_10-17_Hammes.pdf.
3
David Axe, “4.5 Million Drones Is A Lot Of Drones. It’s Ukraine’s New Production Target For 2025,” Forbes, March 12, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/03/12/45-million-drones-is-a-lot-of-drones-its-ukraines-new-production-target-for-2025/.
4
“Frontline report: Europe moves fast—for once—and floods
Ukraine with shells,” Euromaidan, May 2, 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/05/02/frontline-report-the-eu-promised-ukraine-2-million-shells-by-2026-most-have-already-arrived/. [/mfn} Both sides are also conducting large-scale, long-range strikes. The Russians have targeted power production as well as the civil population using a range of drones, missiles, and aircraft-launched munitions. The Ukrainians seem to prefer precision attacks against Russian air bases, ammunition storage facilities, logistics networks, oil refineries, and weapons production facilities using relatively inexpensive and increasingly autonomous missiles and drones. Neither is achieving rapid success but rather extending attrition deep into enemy territory. Both sides seem to be seeking the economic and physical exhaustion of the other. In fact, economic exhaustion is how wars between healthy major powers have ended since 1750 – examples include the Seven Years War, American Revolution, Anglo-French War, Russo-Turkish War, French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, First World War, and Second World War.

A key observation is that the war of adaptation continues to evolve. The massive increase in the use of precision in both the close-in fight and the long-range fight shows that the combination of pervasive surveillance and precision mass has extended the battlespace to a depth of 3000 kilometers. The era of secure rear areas is gone. All support facilities now need active and passive defenses.

Ukraine also developed artificial intelligence-assisted command and control that has dramatically increased the lethality of its sensors and weapons combination.⁴Mick Ryan, “The New Adaptation War,” Future Doctrina, April 16, 2025, https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-new-adaptation-war.
5
“Starlink’s performance in Ukraine has ignited a new space race,” Economist, January 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/05/starlinks-performance-in-ukraine-has-ignited-a-new-space-race.
6
Oleg Danylov, “The unique Ukrainian situational awareness system Delta was presented at the annual NATO event,” mezha, October 28, 2022, https://mezha.ua/en/2022/10/28/the-unique-ukrainian-situational-awareness-system-delta-was-presented-at-the-annual-nato-event/.
7
David Ignatius, “How the Algorithm Tipped the Balance in Ukraine,” Washington Post, December 20, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/12/19/palantir-algorithm-data-ukraine-war/.
8
Yevheniia Martyniuk, “Defense News: Ukraine plans 15-km unmanned ‘kill zone’ along Russian front as drone production hits 4,000+ daily,” Euromaidan, February 3, 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/03/02/defense-news-ukraine-plans-15-km-unmanned-kill-zone-along-russian-front-as-drone-production-hits-4000-daily/.
9
“Russia’s latest big Ukraine offensive gains next to nothing, again,” Economist, October 17, 2025, https://www.economist.com/interactive/europe/2025/10/17/russia-latest-big-ukraine-offensive-gains-next-to-nothing-again.
10
Michael Froman, “The Siege of the Red Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 21, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/siege-red-sea.
11
Kelly Greico, Hunter Slingbaum, and Jonathan M. Walker, “Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to US Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific,” Stimson Center, December 24, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/cratering-effects-chinese-missile-threats-to-us-air-bases-in-the-indo-pacific/.
12
Dylan Malyasov, “China places massive order for kamikaze drones,” Defence Blog, December 22, 2024, https://defence-blog.com/china-places-massive-order-for-kamikaze-drones/.
13
David Brennan, “Russian drone, missile attacks on Ukraine set new record in September,” ABC News, October 1, 2025, https://abcnews.go.com/International/russian-drone-missile-attacks-ukraine-set-new-record/story?id=126068632.
14
T. X. Hammes and R. Robinson Harris, “Warship Weapons for Merchant Ship Platforms: Turning merchant ships into warships with missiles and drones would expand the combat fleet quickly,” Proceedings, February 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/february/warship-weapons-merchant-ship-platforms.
15
Christopher McFadden, “China’s hidden container missile system could take down US jets in surprise attack,” Interesting Engineering, June 17, 2025, https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/china-container-missile-system.
16
Howard Altman, “Russia’s Jet Powered Shahed Kamikaze Drone Is A Big Problem For Ukraine,” TWZ, July 31, 2025, https://www.twz.com/news-features/russias-jet-powered-shahed-kamikaze-drone-is-a-big-problem-for-ukraine.
17
Stephen Chen, “China unveils first high-speed VTOL jet drone that makes every warship an aircraft carrier,” Science, August 15, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3321677/china-unveils-first-high-speed-vtol-jet-drone-makes-every-warship-aircraft-carrier?share=d19wIMkiyLAD%2F3pCGi%2F64hJCCCyGBqKehoteD5TDJHVnhRq9sjbbS9i2Geuemxig7MV5gyQ2W%2Fod%2F1J%2FYUYaOaYJGgkhbSsIuOGIljGbY4aP0qL1FVmEaqKAmykZXm9tb5%2Fz4271oGjVRvtoBNPvxw%3D%3D&utm_campaign=social_share.
18
Olena Kryzhanivska, “Drone warfare in Ukraine: FP-1 long-range drones and unmanned ground vehicles,” Ukraine Arms Monitor, August 29, 2025, https://ukrainesarmsmonitor.substack.com/p/drone-warfare-in-ukraine-fp-1-long.
19
Валентин Шнайдер, “Fire Point increased the production rate of Flamingo missiles to 50 per month. How did they do it?” dev.ua, September 22, 2025, https://dev.ua/en/news/fire-point-zbilshyly-tempy-vyrobnytstva-raket-flaminho-do-50-na-misiats-iak-im-tse-vdalosia-1758533145.
20
Don Holloway, “Flaming Flattops: Deadly Fires Struck U.S. Aircraft Carriers,” History Net, https://www.historynet.com/flaming-flattops/.
21
John C. Schulte, “An analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, September 1994, https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/9974f637-75a9-450d-947d-ec65441930cb/content.
22
Taylor Hacker, Arsenal of Democracy: Myth or Model? Lessons for 21st-Century Industrial Mobilization Planning, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, May 28, 2025, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/arsenal-of-democracy-myth-or-model-lessons-for-21st-century-industrial-mobilization-planning/publication/1.
23
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, U.S. Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.
24
Frank G. Hoffman, “Strategy as an Appetite Suppressant,” War on the Rocks, March 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/strategy-as-appetite-suppressant/.
25
John A. Tirpak, “F-35 Office Seeks to Clarify $2.1 Trillion Cost Ahead of Budget Release,” Air & Space Forces, April 8, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/f-35-office-2-1-trillion-cost/.
26
“Availability, Use, and Operating and Support Costs of F-35 Fighter Aircraft,” Congressional Budget Office, June 2025, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61482#_idTextAnchor00.
27
Ibid.
28
Caleb Larsen ,” The F-47 Fighter Cost Problem No One Wants to Touch, 1945, March 25, 2025, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-f-47-fighter-cost-problem-no-one-wants-to-touch/.
29
“Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Updated December 13, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf.
30
Thomas Newdick, “Navy’s Aviation Boss Lays Out Big Vision For Drone-Packed Carriers Of The Future,” Warzone, April 1, 2021, https://www.twz.com/40007/navys-aviation-boss-lays-out-big-vision-for-drone-packed-carrier-air-wings-of-the-future.
31
Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System March 2024 United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System March 2024, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf.
32
Maximillian K. Bremer and Kelly Greico, “The Four Tyrannies of Logistical Deterrence,” Stimson Center, November 8, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-four-tyrannies-of-logistical-deterrence/.
33
Jon Lake, “China’s Stealthy Area Denial,” Asian Military Review, March 14, 2023, https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2023/03/chinas-stealthy-area-denial/.
34
John A. Tirpak, “Lockheed Ups Pace of F-35 Deliveries to New High to Start Clearing Backlog,” Air & Space Forces, October 31, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lockheed-f-35-deliveries-pace-predictions/.
35
John A. Tirpak, “Northrup Reveals Another B-21 Contract, in Talks with USAF About Faster Production,” Air & Space Forces, January 30, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/northrop-another-b-21-contract-faster-production/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force%20has%20acknowledged%20there%20are,suggested%20it%20is%20around%20seven%20per%20year.
36
An Analysis of the Navy’s 2025 Shipbuilding Plan, Congressional Budget Office, January 2025, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61155#_idTextAnchor050; Mallory Shelbourne, “Carrier John F. Kennedy Delivery Delayed 2 Years, Fleet Will Drop to 10 Carriers For 1 Year,” USNI News, July 7, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/07/07/carrier-john-f-kennedy-delivery-delayed-2-years-fleet-will-drop-to-10-carriers-for-1-year.
37
Ibid, An Analysis of the Navy’s 2025 Shipbuilding Plan.
38
Lara Seligman, Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson, “U.S. to send Ukraine more advanced Abrams tanks — but no secret armor,” Politico, January 26, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/26/us-sends-ukraine-advanced-abrams-tanks-00079648.
39
Joseph Trevithick, “Ukraine Is Burning Through 155mm M777 Howitzer Barrels So Fast The U.S. Army Can’t Keep Up,” TWZ, January 21, 2025, https://www.twz.com/land/ukraine-is-burning-through-155mm-m777-howitzer-barrels-so-fast-the-u-s-army-cant-keep-up.
40
William Beaver and Jim Fein, ” The U.S. Needs More Munitions To Deter China,” Heritage Foundation, December 29, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-us-needs-more-munitions-deter-china.
41
Robert O. Work, “A Slavish Devotion to Forward Presence Has Nearly Broken the U.S. Navy,” Proceedings, December 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/december/slavish-devotion-forward-presence-has-nearly-broken-us-navy.
42
Thomas Newdick, “Ukraine Will Receive First of Thousands of New U.S. Made Standoff Missiles in the Coming Weeks,” TWZ, August 25, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/ukraine-will-receive-first-of-thousands-of-new-u-s-made-standoff-missiles-in-the-coming-weeks.
43
“Anduril Unveils Barracuda-M Family of Cruise Missiles,” https://www.anduril.com/article/anduril-unveils-barracuda/.
44
Ibid.
45
John A. Tirpak, “Lockheed Offers a New Low-Cost Cruise Missile as Part of ‘High-Low Mix’,” Air & Space Forces, March 6, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lockheed-new-low-cost-cruise-missile/.
46
Joseph Tevithick, “New ‘Cheap’ Cruise Missile Concept Flight Tested By Silicon Valley-Backed Start-Up,” TWZ, August 21, 2024, https://www.twz.com/air/new-cheap-cruise-missile-concept-flight-tested-by-silicon-valley-backed-start-up.
47
Joseph Trevithick, “‘Wolf Pack’ Of Modular Mini Cruise Missiles Unveiled by L3Harris,” TWZ, July 19, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/wolf-pack-of-modular-mini-cruise-missiles-unveiled-by-l3harris.
48
Joseph Trevithick, “Copperhead Torpedo-Like Underwater Kamikaze Drones Rolled Out By Anduril,” TWZ, April 7, 2025, https://www.twz.com/sea/copperhead-torpedo-like-underwater-kamikaze-drones-rolled-out-by-anduril.
49
“Anduril Australia to Build Ghost Shark Factory,” Anduril, August 14, 2024, https://www.anduril.com/article/anduril-australia-to-build-ghost-shark-factory/.
50
Nadja Skopljak, “Norwegian long-range AUV performs multi-week fully autonomous mission.” Innovation, September 5, 2024, https://www.offshore-energy.biz/norwegian-long-range-auv-performs-multi-week-fully-autonomous-mission/.
51
David Szondy, “Royal Navy robotic sub controlled from 10,000 miles away,” New Atlas, August 16, 2025, https://newatlas.com/military/royal-navy-robotic-sub-distance-control/?utm_source=New+Atlas+Subscribers&utm_campaign=1352827210-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2025_08_18_01_57&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_65b67362bd-1352827210-92283385.
52
Martin C. Feldmann and Gene Keselman, “Factories First: Winning the Drone War Before It Starts,” War on the Rocks, July 17, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/factories-first-winning-the-drone-war-before-it-starts/.
53
Dylan Malyasov, “U.S. develops its own version of Iranian kamikaze drone,” Defence Blog, July 16, 2025, https://defence-blog.com/pentagon-showcases-u-s-made-shahed-style-drone/.
54
Mikayla Easley, “Report: Air Force CCA program still faces cost, bureaucratic hurdles despite positive movement,” Defense Scoop, August 6, 2024, https://defensescoop.com/2024/08/06/air-force-cca-cost-bureaucratic-hurdles-csis-report-2024/.
55
Audrey Decker, “General Atomics plans robot wingman production for Europe,” Defense One, July 17, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2025/07/general-atomics-plans-robot-wingman-production-europe/406815/?oref=d1-skybox-hp.
56
Joseph Trevithick, “XQ-58 Valkyrie Drone Family Has Grown To Five Variants,” TWZ, March 21, 2024, https://www.twz.com/air/xq-58-valkyrie-drone-family-has-grown-to-five-variants.
57
Tyler Rogoway, “Ragnarok Mini-Cruise Missile With Big Range Targets $150K Price Tag,” TWZ, October 16, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/ragnarok-mini-cruise-missile-with-big-range-targets-150k-price-tag.
58
“Deadly new Russian weapon hides in shipping container,” Reuters, April 26, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/deadly-new-russian-weapon-hides-in-shipping-container-idUSTRE63P2XB/.
59
James Kraska and Gavin Logan, “Get Ready for the New Rules of War in the Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, June 10, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/get-ready-for-the-new-rules-of-war-in-the-indo-pacific/.
60
Bill Daly and Lawrence Heyworth, “Containerized Payloads: Modular Lethality,” Proceedings, June 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/june/containerized-payloads-modular-lethality.
61
“Mk 70 Mod 1 Payload Delivery System,” Lockheed Martin, 2023, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/Mk70_Product_Card.pdf.
62
Op. cit., Hammes and Harris.
63
“Barracuda-100M Completes Another Successful Flight Test for Army High Speed Maneuverable Missile Program,” Anduril Industries, July 16, 2025, https://www.anduril.com/article/barracuda-100m-completes-successful-flight-test-for-army-high-speed-maneuverable-missile//.
64
“Spike NLOS,” Rafael, https://www.rafael.co.il/system/spike-nlos/.
65
Op. cit., Hammes.
66
Alya Shandra, “Russia now uses Iranian drones instead of precision missiles to attack Ukraine – Air Force,” Euromaidan, May 10, 2022, https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/10/05/russia-now-uses-iranian-drones-instead-of-precision-missiles-to-attack-ukraine-air-force/; Joseph Trevithick, “Hellfire Missile Launcher Disguised As Civilian Truck Breaks Cover in Taiwan,” TWZ, August 14, 2025, https://www.twz.com/news-features/hellfire-missile-launcher-disguised-as-civilian-truck-breaks-cover-in-taiwan; “Estonia’s Long-Range Coastal Defense System: Blue Spear SSM,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRivU6lJbAc.
67
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare,” International Law Studies, Vol 97. 2021, 1165, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2982&context=ils#10=.
68
Michael Hirsh, “How Did The World’s Most Sophisticated Military Fall So Far Behind With Drone Warfare?” Politico, August 27, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/08/27/pentagon-drone-technology-deficiency-00525058?utm_content=politico/magazine/Politics&utm_source=flipboard.
69
David H. Berger, et al, A Blueprint for Breakthroughs in Defense Innovation, January 2025, https://assets.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/56/2025/01/Strategic-Edge_A-Blueprint-for-Breakthroughs-in-Defense-Innovation.pdf.
70
Dan Glazier, “Selective Arithmetic to Hide the F-35’s True Costs,” POGO, October 21, 2020, https://www.pogo.org/analysis/selective-arithmetic-to-hide-the-f-35s-true-costs.
71
“U.S. Navy Budget Request Leaves Out Next Constellation-Class Frigate,” The Maritime Executive, June 30, 2025, https://maritime-executive.com/article/u-s-navy-budget-request-leaves-out-next-constellation-class-frigate.
72
Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Carrier-Based ‘Loyal Wingman’ Drone Development Suddenly Pushes Forward (Updated),” TWZ, September 5, 2025, https://www.twz.com/sea/navy-suddenly-pushes-forward-with-carrier-based-loyal-wingman-drone-development.
73
Jack Overell, “Anduril Industries expands presence in Taiwan with accelerated delivery of Altius loitering munitions,” SAE Group, August 2025, https://www.smgconferences.com/editors-corner/6096-news–anduril-industries-expands-presence-in-taiwan-with-accelerated-delivery-of-altius-loitering-munitions.
74
Zachary Anderson, ” USS Savannah Successfully Completes Live-Fire Demonstration,” America’s Navy, October 24, 2023, https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Media/News/Article/3567796/uss-savannah-successfully-completes-live-fire-demonstration/.
75
Rudy Ruitenberg, ”Dutch Navy to buy armed sidekick ships for its air-defense frigates,” Defense News, September 25, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/09/25/dutch-navy-to-buy-armed-sidekick-ships-for-its-air-defense-frigates/.

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