Editor’s Note: Based in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center. He follows regional security and economic trends and is a frequent contributor to Stimson’s Middle East Perspectives project on these topics. The author of “China, Russia and New Eurasian Order,” he is a recognized expert on regional ties with Russia and China and has also written for the Carnegie Endowment and Trends Research and Advisory.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria last year initially seemed to be a huge blow to Russia, stripping it of a long-time ally and undermining the link between Russia and the African continent, where Russian mercenaries have been actively engaged in the economic and security spheres.
Nine months after Islamist rebels overthrew the Assad dynasty, however, Russian relations with Syria are on an apparent road to recovery. By skillfully using differences among regional actors as well as its status as Syria’s chief weapons supplier, Russia has managed to reconstitute parts of its former influence, including retaining access to three military bases.
Moscow’s most important influence during its decades-long alliance with the Assad regime may be even more important to Syria now — serving as a deterrent or at least a break on Israeli military activities.
On October 15, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Moscow for the first time since he took power. In televised remarks, he told Russian President Vladimir Putin that Syria is seeking “to restore and redefine in a new way the nature of these relations so there is independence for Syria, sovereign Syria, and also its territorial unity and integrity and its security stability.” Putin in turn noted decades of “special relations” with Syria and his hopes to expand ties.
In apparent preparation for the Moscow meeting, talks were held in Damascus on October 2 between Syrian defense officials and a Russian military delegation led by Rear Admiral Oleg Viktorovich Kornibenko. The visit suggested that Syria may seek to renew cooperation with Russia through the exchange of military expertise.
The visit followed one in early September by a high-ranking Russian delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. The Russian media reported that Damascus expressed interest in Russian military police patrolling the southern provinces of Syria, one way to deter Israel from continuing attacks on the area. Arab media also reported that Russia had resumed patrols near the northeastern city of al-Qamishli, where Syrian and Kurdish forces have clashed.
In the spring, Russia supplied Syria with oil and wheat and resumed printing Syrian currency banknotes. These steps followed a visit to Moscow by Syrian Foreign Minister Asad al-Shibani and a phone call between Putin and al-Sharaa in February.
Overall, the rapprochement will likely enable Russia to maintain at least a minimal presence at two military bases in Syria — the Hmeimim airbase and Tartous port — as well as at Qamishli airport in the northeast and, consequently, for Russia to maintain influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Syria appears to be turning to Moscow in part to limit military activity by Israel, which has occupied small parts of southern Syria since December 2024 and continues to attack Syria, including bombing the defense ministry in Damascus in July.
Damascus’ calculus is motivated by fear that Israel — which has upended the regional balance of power by crippling Hamas and Hezbollah and attacking Iran over the past two years — wants to see Syria remain weak and unable to regain control over the entirety of its territory. While Israel and Syria have long been at odds, Israel was accustomed to the weak and corrupt Assad dynasty and worries that the new leadership’s Islamist background could make it a more formidable foe in the future. Israel also seeks to protect Syrian Druze, whose sect is an influential minority in Israel that serves in the Israeli armed forces.
These concerns, paradoxically, have also led Israel to express support for Russia retaining a military presence in Syria. Israel sees Russia as a buffer against growing Turkish influence in the country. Turkey backed the Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which led the successful rebellion against Assad, and since early 2025, has deepened its military and security ties with the new Syrian government in hopes of returning Syrian refugees and countering the Kurds. At the same time, Turkey backs Russia’s continued presence in Syria to counterbalance Israel. Ankara hopes Russia will be able to rein in Israel’s seeming ambition to build a corridor to the Kurds living in Syria’s northeast. Turkey also wants to balance the influence of wealthy Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, over the new rulers in Damascus.
Arab countries likewise prefer that Russia retains a certain level of influence in Syria as a counter to Israel, which they see as increasingly menacing since Israel bombed Qatar in September in a failed effort to kill Hamas leaders. In addition to Turkey, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a strong supporter of the new Syrian leadership and the country’s re-integration into the region’s economy and multilateral institutions.
Another actor approving the Russian presence is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition of US-backed forces that contained and eventually defeated the Islamic State group in 2015. Since late 2024, the SDF has experienced growing pressure from Turkey to lay down arms or integrate into the Syrian armed forces, losing much of its de facto autonomy. For the SDF, therefore, Russia could counterbalance Damascus’ and Ankara’s ambitions, particularly if the U.S. withdraws forces from Syria.
With the renewal and even expansion of ties with Russia, the new Syria wants Western and Arab countries to see that it has alternatives in both the military and economic spheres. Russia might not be indispensable, but it has managed to successfully navigate the differences between Turkey, Israel, Damascus, and the SDF. Given the reality that Syria will remain a fractured state for the foreseeable future, Russia’s continued involvement looks inevitable.
At the same time, Russia is unlikely to regain its past power in Syria. Turkey is now Syria’s top ally in both the economic and security fields. Recent reports suggest a potential deployment of Turkish military assets in eastern Aleppo Province. Ankara has also pledged to open other military bases across Syria. Ultimately, the competition over Syria fits into a wider context of rivalry between Ankara and Moscow stretching from Libya to the South Caucasus.
Cash flow from the Gulf region will remain central to Syria’s hopes for reconstruction; Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, is unlikely to effectively compete on that front. Moreover, the authorities in Damascus will have to consider European and American interests when it comes to expanding ties with Moscow.
As Damascus pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, Russia will evolve from the most powerful external player in Syria to one among a constellation of actors sharing a varying degree of influence in a country struggling to recover from more than a decade of civil war.
Russia Keeps a Foothold in Post-Assad Syria
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Based in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center. He follows regional security and economic trends and is a frequent contributor to Stimson’s Middle East Perspectives project on these topics. The author of “China, Russia and New Eurasian Order,” he is a recognized expert on regional ties with Russia and China and has also written for the Carnegie Endowment and Trends Research and Advisory.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria last year initially seemed to be a huge blow to Russia, stripping it of a long-time ally and undermining the link between Russia and the African continent, where Russian mercenaries have been actively engaged in the economic and security spheres.
Nine months after Islamist rebels overthrew the Assad dynasty, however, Russian relations with Syria are on an apparent road to recovery. By skillfully using differences among regional actors as well as its status as Syria’s chief weapons supplier, Russia has managed to reconstitute parts of its former influence, including retaining access to three military bases.
Moscow’s most important influence during its decades-long alliance with the Assad regime may be even more important to Syria now — serving as a deterrent or at least a break on Israeli military activities.
On October 15, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Moscow for the first time since he took power. In televised remarks, he told Russian President Vladimir Putin that Syria is seeking “to restore and redefine in a new way the nature of these relations so there is independence for Syria, sovereign Syria, and also its territorial unity and integrity and its security stability.” Putin in turn noted decades of “special relations” with Syria and his hopes to expand ties.
In apparent preparation for the Moscow meeting, talks were held in Damascus on October 2 between Syrian defense officials and a Russian military delegation led by Rear Admiral Oleg Viktorovich Kornibenko. The visit suggested that Syria may seek to renew cooperation with Russia through the exchange of military expertise.
The visit followed one in early September by a high-ranking Russian delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. The Russian media reported that Damascus expressed interest in Russian military police patrolling the southern provinces of Syria, one way to deter Israel from continuing attacks on the area. Arab media also reported that Russia had resumed patrols near the northeastern city of al-Qamishli, where Syrian and Kurdish forces have clashed.
In the spring, Russia supplied Syria with oil and wheat and resumed printing Syrian currency banknotes. These steps followed a visit to Moscow by Syrian Foreign Minister Asad al-Shibani and a phone call between Putin and al-Sharaa in February.
Overall, the rapprochement will likely enable Russia to maintain at least a minimal presence at two military bases in Syria — the Hmeimim airbase and Tartous port — as well as at Qamishli airport in the northeast and, consequently, for Russia to maintain influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Syria appears to be turning to Moscow in part to limit military activity by Israel, which has occupied small parts of southern Syria since December 2024 and continues to attack Syria, including bombing the defense ministry in Damascus in July.
Damascus’ calculus is motivated by fear that Israel — which has upended the regional balance of power by crippling Hamas and Hezbollah and attacking Iran over the past two years — wants to see Syria remain weak and unable to regain control over the entirety of its territory. While Israel and Syria have long been at odds, Israel was accustomed to the weak and corrupt Assad dynasty and worries that the new leadership’s Islamist background could make it a more formidable foe in the future. Israel also seeks to protect Syrian Druze, whose sect is an influential minority in Israel that serves in the Israeli armed forces.
These concerns, paradoxically, have also led Israel to express support for Russia retaining a military presence in Syria. Israel sees Russia as a buffer against growing Turkish influence in the country. Turkey backed the Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which led the successful rebellion against Assad, and since early 2025, has deepened its military and security ties with the new Syrian government in hopes of returning Syrian refugees and countering the Kurds. At the same time, Turkey backs Russia’s continued presence in Syria to counterbalance Israel. Ankara hopes Russia will be able to rein in Israel’s seeming ambition to build a corridor to the Kurds living in Syria’s northeast. Turkey also wants to balance the influence of wealthy Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, over the new rulers in Damascus.
Arab countries likewise prefer that Russia retains a certain level of influence in Syria as a counter to Israel, which they see as increasingly menacing since Israel bombed Qatar in September in a failed effort to kill Hamas leaders. In addition to Turkey, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a strong supporter of the new Syrian leadership and the country’s re-integration into the region’s economy and multilateral institutions.
Another actor approving the Russian presence is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition of US-backed forces that contained and eventually defeated the Islamic State group in 2015. Since late 2024, the SDF has experienced growing pressure from Turkey to lay down arms or integrate into the Syrian armed forces, losing much of its de facto autonomy. For the SDF, therefore, Russia could counterbalance Damascus’ and Ankara’s ambitions, particularly if the U.S. withdraws forces from Syria.
With the renewal and even expansion of ties with Russia, the new Syria wants Western and Arab countries to see that it has alternatives in both the military and economic spheres. Russia might not be indispensable, but it has managed to successfully navigate the differences between Turkey, Israel, Damascus, and the SDF. Given the reality that Syria will remain a fractured state for the foreseeable future, Russia’s continued involvement looks inevitable.
At the same time, Russia is unlikely to regain its past power in Syria. Turkey is now Syria’s top ally in both the economic and security fields. Recent reports suggest a potential deployment of Turkish military assets in eastern Aleppo Province. Ankara has also pledged to open other military bases across Syria. Ultimately, the competition over Syria fits into a wider context of rivalry between Ankara and Moscow stretching from Libya to the South Caucasus.
Cash flow from the Gulf region will remain central to Syria’s hopes for reconstruction; Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, is unlikely to effectively compete on that front. Moreover, the authorities in Damascus will have to consider European and American interests when it comes to expanding ties with Moscow.
As Damascus pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, Russia will evolve from the most powerful external player in Syria to one among a constellation of actors sharing a varying degree of influence in a country struggling to recover from more than a decade of civil war.
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