Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise about the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, Syria’s geopolitical position in the Middle East and on the international stage has significantly changed. Until last year, Iran was Damascus’s main regional ally, but now Tehran has virtually no influence over Syria’s new government. At the same time, the Gulf Arab monarchies and NATO members that, to varying degrees, backed Syrian rebels during a prolonged civil war now wield the most clout. The past several weeks of chaotic developments in the Middle East have shed more light on the extent to which the “New Syria” is increasingly oriented toward the West, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his top aides have prioritized efforts to deepen ties with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, aware of their financial clout and hydrocarbon wealth, as well as their close relationships with Washington and key European capitals. Sharaa’s administration views Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular, as valuable partners. For Syria’s Islamist rebels-turned-rulers, this strategy seems to have paid off with Saudi Arabia and Qatar now supporting the “New Syria” in a variety of ways that improve prospects for the war-ravaged country to achieve domestic stability and the Sharaa government to obtain greater international legitimacy.
Speaking at a press conference in Damascus on May 31 with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shibani, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud announced that Saudi Arabia and Qatar would extend assistance to pay the salaries of Syrian state employees. This followed Syrian Finance Minister Mohammed Yosr Bernieh’s statement that Qatar—with the Trump administration’s endorsement—would contribute $29 million a month for three months to fund civilian public sector wages. Shortly after that announcement, President Donald Trump declared in a May 13 speech in Riyadh that Washington would lift its debilitating sanctions on Syria—a transformative shift in U.S. foreign policy. Trump also met with Sharaa in Riyadh on May 14 in the first meeting between a U.S. and Syrian president in a quarter century. On July 7, the Trump administration announced that it was revoking the terrorist designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist group that Sharaa had led, a significant development in Washington’s approach to post-Assad Syria and the West’s legitimization of Sharaa’s government.
Also in May, Saudi Arabia and Qatar jointly settled Syria’s outstanding $15.5 million debt to the World Bank, offering much-needed financial relief to a nation still reeling from civil war. Then, on May 29, Washington’s ambassador to Turkey and Trump’s envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, met Sharaa at the presidential palace in Damascus, where they inked a $7 billion energy deal between Syria and a Qatari-U.S.-Turkish consortium — comprised of UCC Concession Investments, Kalyon GES Enerji Yatirimlari, Cengiz Enerji, and Power International USA — which will generate 5,000 megawatts. According to Syrian-Qatari businessman and UCC chief executive Ramez al-Khayyat, this deal will create more than 50,000 direct jobs, and 250,000 indirect ones.
Along with Turkey, which strongly backed the Islamist rebels who overthrew Assad last year, Saudi Arabia and Qatar played pivotal roles in persuading the Trump administration to lift most U.S. sanctions on Syria. Trump publicly admitted that his decision followed discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Riyadh, Doha, and Ankara are proving to be key players in Syria’s fragile transition and efforts to stabilize its governance structures while also preparing the ground for Syria’s gradual reintegration into the global economy.
Gulf Arab statecraft has been instrumental in enabling the Sunni Islamist leadership in Damascus to reorient itself toward the GCC, Turkey, and the West, improving Syria’s image in Western capitals while advancing its regional reintegration. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have positioned themselves as both financial patrons of post-Ba’ath Syria and diplomatic intermediaries between Damascus and the broader international arena. The Saudis also see Sharaa’s government as a key partner in ending narcotics trafficking and fighting terrorism. In June, Syrian authorities, acting on Saudi intelligence, seized a large amount of amphetamine tablets from Idlib and Aleppo that otherwise might have been smuggled into surrounding Arab states.
Explaining the Trump administration’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized the risks that Syria is facing. Rubio underscored concerns that the country could slip back into a “full-scale civil war of epic proportions,” a scenario he claimed was “maybe weeks, not many months” away if the U.S. had not acted.
From the Trump administration’s perspective, Syria’s geopolitical reorientation toward the West—and away from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and BRICS Plus—has much potential to pay off in ways that serve American and Israeli interests. Not only did Syria not condemn Israel’s war on Iran in mid-June, but Damascus allowed the Israelis to use Syrian airspace for “Operation Rising Lion.” Now Sharaa’s administration is reportedly in discussions with Israel about joining the Abraham Accords, which would normalize relations between the long-time enemies in return for Israel ending strikes on targets in Syria. However, Israel is insisting on retaining the Golan Heights which it captured from Syria in 1967. U.S. ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack, who recently met Sharaa, said the Syrian leader also needed to move slowly to avoid antagonizing domestic opinion.
Syria’s foreign policy in the post-Assad era poses a significant threat to Iranian geopolitical interests. Within this context, Iran might consider playing its remaining cards to undermine the Sharaa government, if not engineer a coup. Tehran’s ties with various anti-regime elements in Syria, including factions loyal to the Assads such as the so-called “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria,” along with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ capacity to retaliate against Israeli or American interests and assets by waging counterstrikes in Syria, provide potential avenues for Iran to exact a cost on Damascus for its westward pivot. Additionally, Iran could leverage the Syrian public’s widespread opposition to normalization with Israel—a move many Syrians view as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a departure from long-espoused stances supporting Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism. These were ideological pillars of every previous Syrian administration going back to independence from France in 1946, none of which appeared interested in or capable of aligning Damascus with the Transatlantic Alliance.
Washington and key European capitals would like to see Syria stabilized under a Western-oriented and Israel-friendly government that keeps the country outside Iran’s orbit. The White House sees the Gulf Arab monarchies playing a critical role in helping Syria to achieve such stability under Sharaa’s leadership. But given the challenges to his legitimacy at home and the conflict dynamics in the Middle East, governing Syria, even with Western, Turkish, and Gulf Arab support, will not be easy.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
Gulf States Steer Syria’s Turbulent Politics Post Assad
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise about the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, Syria’s geopolitical position in the Middle East and on the international stage has significantly changed. Until last year, Iran was Damascus’s main regional ally, but now Tehran has virtually no influence over Syria’s new government. At the same time, the Gulf Arab monarchies and NATO members that, to varying degrees, backed Syrian rebels during a prolonged civil war now wield the most clout. The past several weeks of chaotic developments in the Middle East have shed more light on the extent to which the “New Syria” is increasingly oriented toward the West, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his top aides have prioritized efforts to deepen ties with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, aware of their financial clout and hydrocarbon wealth, as well as their close relationships with Washington and key European capitals. Sharaa’s administration views Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular, as valuable partners. For Syria’s Islamist rebels-turned-rulers, this strategy seems to have paid off with Saudi Arabia and Qatar now supporting the “New Syria” in a variety of ways that improve prospects for the war-ravaged country to achieve domestic stability and the Sharaa government to obtain greater international legitimacy.
Speaking at a press conference in Damascus on May 31 with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shibani, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud announced that Saudi Arabia and Qatar would extend assistance to pay the salaries of Syrian state employees. This followed Syrian Finance Minister Mohammed Yosr Bernieh’s statement that Qatar—with the Trump administration’s endorsement—would contribute $29 million a month for three months to fund civilian public sector wages. Shortly after that announcement, President Donald Trump declared in a May 13 speech in Riyadh that Washington would lift its debilitating sanctions on Syria—a transformative shift in U.S. foreign policy. Trump also met with Sharaa in Riyadh on May 14 in the first meeting between a U.S. and Syrian president in a quarter century. On July 7, the Trump administration announced that it was revoking the terrorist designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist group that Sharaa had led, a significant development in Washington’s approach to post-Assad Syria and the West’s legitimization of Sharaa’s government.
Also in May, Saudi Arabia and Qatar jointly settled Syria’s outstanding $15.5 million debt to the World Bank, offering much-needed financial relief to a nation still reeling from civil war. Then, on May 29, Washington’s ambassador to Turkey and Trump’s envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, met Sharaa at the presidential palace in Damascus, where they inked a $7 billion energy deal between Syria and a Qatari-U.S.-Turkish consortium — comprised of UCC Concession Investments, Kalyon GES Enerji Yatirimlari, Cengiz Enerji, and Power International USA — which will generate 5,000 megawatts. According to Syrian-Qatari businessman and UCC chief executive Ramez al-Khayyat, this deal will create more than 50,000 direct jobs, and 250,000 indirect ones.
Along with Turkey, which strongly backed the Islamist rebels who overthrew Assad last year, Saudi Arabia and Qatar played pivotal roles in persuading the Trump administration to lift most U.S. sanctions on Syria. Trump publicly admitted that his decision followed discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Riyadh, Doha, and Ankara are proving to be key players in Syria’s fragile transition and efforts to stabilize its governance structures while also preparing the ground for Syria’s gradual reintegration into the global economy.
Gulf Arab statecraft has been instrumental in enabling the Sunni Islamist leadership in Damascus to reorient itself toward the GCC, Turkey, and the West, improving Syria’s image in Western capitals while advancing its regional reintegration. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have positioned themselves as both financial patrons of post-Ba’ath Syria and diplomatic intermediaries between Damascus and the broader international arena. The Saudis also see Sharaa’s government as a key partner in ending narcotics trafficking and fighting terrorism. In June, Syrian authorities, acting on Saudi intelligence, seized a large amount of amphetamine tablets from Idlib and Aleppo that otherwise might have been smuggled into surrounding Arab states.
Explaining the Trump administration’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized the risks that Syria is facing. Rubio underscored concerns that the country could slip back into a “full-scale civil war of epic proportions,” a scenario he claimed was “maybe weeks, not many months” away if the U.S. had not acted.
From the Trump administration’s perspective, Syria’s geopolitical reorientation toward the West—and away from the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and BRICS Plus—has much potential to pay off in ways that serve American and Israeli interests. Not only did Syria not condemn Israel’s war on Iran in mid-June, but Damascus allowed the Israelis to use Syrian airspace for “Operation Rising Lion.” Now Sharaa’s administration is reportedly in discussions with Israel about joining the Abraham Accords, which would normalize relations between the long-time enemies in return for Israel ending strikes on targets in Syria. However, Israel is insisting on retaining the Golan Heights which it captured from Syria in 1967. U.S. ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack, who recently met Sharaa, said the Syrian leader also needed to move slowly to avoid antagonizing domestic opinion.
Syria’s foreign policy in the post-Assad era poses a significant threat to Iranian geopolitical interests. Within this context, Iran might consider playing its remaining cards to undermine the Sharaa government, if not engineer a coup. Tehran’s ties with various anti-regime elements in Syria, including factions loyal to the Assads such as the so-called “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria,” along with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ capacity to retaliate against Israeli or American interests and assets by waging counterstrikes in Syria, provide potential avenues for Iran to exact a cost on Damascus for its westward pivot. Additionally, Iran could leverage the Syrian public’s widespread opposition to normalization with Israel—a move many Syrians view as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a departure from long-espoused stances supporting Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism. These were ideological pillars of every previous Syrian administration going back to independence from France in 1946, none of which appeared interested in or capable of aligning Damascus with the Transatlantic Alliance.
Washington and key European capitals would like to see Syria stabilized under a Western-oriented and Israel-friendly government that keeps the country outside Iran’s orbit. The White House sees the Gulf Arab monarchies playing a critical role in helping Syria to achieve such stability under Sharaa’s leadership. But given the challenges to his legitimacy at home and the conflict dynamics in the Middle East, governing Syria, even with Western, Turkish, and Gulf Arab support, will not be easy.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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