Editor’s Note: Dr. Kristian Alexander is a Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Institute for Security & Defence Research, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He is an adviser at Gulf States Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He previously worked as a Senior Fellow at Trends Research & Advisory and before that as an Assistant Professor at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Captagon, a potent amphetamine-based stimulant, has morphed from a forgotten pharmaceutical into the defining narcotic of the Middle East’s illicit drug economy.
The drug flourished in particular under the long reign of Bashar al-Assad, when Syria turned to Captagon as a strategic asset. By the early 2020s, Captagon had overtaken all other Syrian exports, with estimates of annual trade revenue ranging from $5 billion to $57 billion.
The ousting of Assad in December 2024 and the rise of transitional leader Ahmad al-Sharaa brought cautious optimism that the trade could be curbed. Sharaa promised to dismantle the Captagon industry, launched public burnings of seized pills, and shut down several high-profile labs. However, the structural remnants of the networks have remained largely intact.
Rather than being eradicated, production has fragmented. Smaller labs have emerged in eastern and southern Syria, run by former regime operatives and local militias. These labs are mobile, harder to detect, and often protected by informal power structures. Border areas like Daraa and Deir ez-Zor continue to operate as trafficking hubs, even as the central state’s control weakens.
Originally introduced in the 1960s as fenethylline, Captagon was banned globally due to its addictive and neurological side effects. Today’s pills bear little resemblance to their original formulation. They are synthetic, cheaply made, and highly profitable. Their compact, lab-based production and explosive regional demand have made Captagon a powerful enabler of state survival, militia financing, and transnational crime in the Middle East and beyond.
Unlike traditional narcotics like cocaine or heroin, Captagon requires no cultivation or seasonal harvesting. It is manufactured using precursor chemicals such as amphetamines and caffeine, which are readily available on global markets. This synthetic nature allows production to flourish in mobile labs across urban and rural areas, free from climate or geography. The pills are small, odorless, easy to conceal, and cheap to make, costing just a few cents per pill, but sold at prices ranging from $5 to $25 depending on location.
Captagon’s pharmacological profile has also fueled its popularity. It enhances alertness, suppresses appetite, and delays fatigue. In the Gulf, it is consumed recreationally and as a performance enhancer by students, laborers, and security personnel. In conflict zones like Syria and Libya, fighters are given Captagon to heighten aggression and endurance, earning it the misleading nickname “the jihadist drug.”
Syrian Narco-State Under Assad
Under Assad, Syria transitioned into a full-fledged narco-state to help compensate for sanctions, economic collapse, and diplomatic isolation. Central to the industry’s operation was the 4th Armored Division, commanded by Assad’s brother, Maher. This elite military unit controlled production facilities, often located near military installations and under state protection. Ports like Latakia and Tartus became major export hubs, with Captagon smuggled in tiles, citrus, and electronics. The drug trade was institutionalized: It supported regime-aligned militias, financed patronage networks, and gave Damascus diplomatic leverage. Assad also used Captagon as a bargaining chip, offering to curb flows in exchange for sanctions relief or normalization with Gulf states.
Despite the post-Assad government’s pledge to end the trade, it faces difficult trade-offs: While committed to reform, parts of Sharaa’s coalition, including former rebels, tribal leaders, and security figures, may view Captagon revenues as essential for short-term stability. This threatens to reproduce Syria’s war economy under new leadership.
Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, and Beyond
Captagon’s production and distribution now extend far beyond Syria. Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley has long been a production zone, with various criminal and political factions, including the militant group Hezbollah, facilitating the trade. Hezbollah’s involvement includes securing transit routes and protecting shipments, often in exchange for political or financial gains.
Jordan serves as a critical transit corridor, especially for Captagon bound for Gulf markets. Jordanian forces have escalated their response, adopting “shoot-to-kill” policies and even launching airstrikes on southern Syrian trafficking hubs. Clashes along the border highlight the militarized nature of the trade and the growing perception of Captagon as a national security threat.
Turkey, Iraq, and Libya also play varying roles, either as trafficking corridors or secondary production zones. Libya, amid its governance vacuum, has emerged as a new node in the supply chain. In all these places, a mix of tribal smugglers, state-linked actors, and organized crime groups perpetuates the trade.
Captagon is no longer confined to the Middle East. European seizures, especially in Italy and Germany, have revealed a growing appetite and sophisticated trafficking infrastructure. In Italy, 14 tons of pills were intercepted recently in industrial shipments. German investigations have uncovered repackaging and partial manufacturing operations linked to Syrian and Lebanese nationals.
Captagon’s European presence extends beyond smuggling. In cities like Aachen and Heidenheim, trials have exposed how criminal networks are embedding the trade within broader illicit economies, including arms smuggling and counterfeit goods. The pills have begun appearing in local markets, especially among marginalized youth and migrant populations.
In Asia, while still limited in volume, Captagon has appeared in transit zones in Malaysia and the Philippines. This expansion seems strategic, as traffickers seek to diversify markets in response to increased enforcement in the Gulf and Europe.
Captagon’s persistence and danger stem not only from its economic value but also from its nature as a hybrid threat, cutting across vertical state structures, horizontal societal domains, and transnational borders.
As a vertical threat, Captagon corrupts state institutions. It compromises border enforcement, embeds itself in military and intelligence structures, and undermines judicial systems. In Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere, state actors have often been active participants or protectors of the trade.
As a horizontal threat, Captagon affects public health, labor productivity, and societal cohesion. It fuels addiction, particularly among youth, and is associated with rising violence, especially in border zones. Unlike conventional threats confined to specific demographics, Captagon permeates all levels of society, from elite recreational users in the Gulf to child soldiers in war zones.
As a transnational threat, Captagon spans continents. Its synthetic nature makes it mobile, its supply chain flexible. It moves through ports, airports, and overland routes, often disguised in legitimate trade. It intersects with global criminal syndicates, making enforcement a multi-jurisdictional challenge.
Addressing the Threat: A Multi-Level Strategy
Countering the Captagon trade requires a coordinated, multi-level strategy that targets every link in the supply chain.
First, regulating and tracking precursor chemicals, primarily sourced from countries like China, India, and parts of Eastern Europe, are essential. Financial networks that launder Captagon profits through real estate, front companies, and cryptocurrency must also be disrupted through robust, cross-border anti-money-laundering coordination.
Simultaneously, demand-side responses are vital: Consumer countries, particularly in the Gulf, need to invest in localized prevention initiatives, addiction treatment services, and mental health support to reduce dependency.
On the diplomatic front, transitional governments in Syria, Lebanon, and Libya should be incentivized, through sanctions, trade benefits, and intelligence-sharing agreements, to cooperate with international narcotics-control regimes.
Finally, regional bodies such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League could lead the development of integrated maritime, judicial, and law enforcement frameworks to standardize prosecution and interdiction efforts across jurisdictions.
Captagon is not just a drug. It is a symbol of structural dysfunction, geopolitical opportunism, and criminal innovation. It has propped up regimes, empowered militias, and embedded itself in the fabric of multiple economies. Its rise tells the story of how synthetic narcotics can fuel hybrid warfare, undermine institutions, and destabilize regions. To dismantle the Captagon empire, the response must be equally complex, coordinated, and sustained.
Assad’s Fall and Syria’s Fragmented Captagon Industry
By Kristian Alexander
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Dr. Kristian Alexander is a Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Institute for Security & Defence Research, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He is an adviser at Gulf States Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He previously worked as a Senior Fellow at Trends Research & Advisory and before that as an Assistant Professor at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Captagon, a potent amphetamine-based stimulant, has morphed from a forgotten pharmaceutical into the defining narcotic of the Middle East’s illicit drug economy.
The drug flourished in particular under the long reign of Bashar al-Assad, when Syria turned to Captagon as a strategic asset. By the early 2020s, Captagon had overtaken all other Syrian exports, with estimates of annual trade revenue ranging from $5 billion to $57 billion.
The ousting of Assad in December 2024 and the rise of transitional leader Ahmad al-Sharaa brought cautious optimism that the trade could be curbed. Sharaa promised to dismantle the Captagon industry, launched public burnings of seized pills, and shut down several high-profile labs. However, the structural remnants of the networks have remained largely intact.
Rather than being eradicated, production has fragmented. Smaller labs have emerged in eastern and southern Syria, run by former regime operatives and local militias. These labs are mobile, harder to detect, and often protected by informal power structures. Border areas like Daraa and Deir ez-Zor continue to operate as trafficking hubs, even as the central state’s control weakens.
Originally introduced in the 1960s as fenethylline, Captagon was banned globally due to its addictive and neurological side effects. Today’s pills bear little resemblance to their original formulation. They are synthetic, cheaply made, and highly profitable. Their compact, lab-based production and explosive regional demand have made Captagon a powerful enabler of state survival, militia financing, and transnational crime in the Middle East and beyond.
Unlike traditional narcotics like cocaine or heroin, Captagon requires no cultivation or seasonal harvesting. It is manufactured using precursor chemicals such as amphetamines and caffeine, which are readily available on global markets. This synthetic nature allows production to flourish in mobile labs across urban and rural areas, free from climate or geography. The pills are small, odorless, easy to conceal, and cheap to make, costing just a few cents per pill, but sold at prices ranging from $5 to $25 depending on location.
Captagon’s pharmacological profile has also fueled its popularity. It enhances alertness, suppresses appetite, and delays fatigue. In the Gulf, it is consumed recreationally and as a performance enhancer by students, laborers, and security personnel. In conflict zones like Syria and Libya, fighters are given Captagon to heighten aggression and endurance, earning it the misleading nickname “the jihadist drug.”
Syrian Narco-State Under Assad
Under Assad, Syria transitioned into a full-fledged narco-state to help compensate for sanctions, economic collapse, and diplomatic isolation. Central to the industry’s operation was the 4th Armored Division, commanded by Assad’s brother, Maher. This elite military unit controlled production facilities, often located near military installations and under state protection. Ports like Latakia and Tartus became major export hubs, with Captagon smuggled in tiles, citrus, and electronics. The drug trade was institutionalized: It supported regime-aligned militias, financed patronage networks, and gave Damascus diplomatic leverage. Assad also used Captagon as a bargaining chip, offering to curb flows in exchange for sanctions relief or normalization with Gulf states.
Despite the post-Assad government’s pledge to end the trade, it faces difficult trade-offs: While committed to reform, parts of Sharaa’s coalition, including former rebels, tribal leaders, and security figures, may view Captagon revenues as essential for short-term stability. This threatens to reproduce Syria’s war economy under new leadership.
Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, and Beyond
Captagon’s production and distribution now extend far beyond Syria. Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley has long been a production zone, with various criminal and political factions, including the militant group Hezbollah, facilitating the trade. Hezbollah’s involvement includes securing transit routes and protecting shipments, often in exchange for political or financial gains.
Jordan serves as a critical transit corridor, especially for Captagon bound for Gulf markets. Jordanian forces have escalated their response, adopting “shoot-to-kill” policies and even launching airstrikes on southern Syrian trafficking hubs. Clashes along the border highlight the militarized nature of the trade and the growing perception of Captagon as a national security threat.
Turkey, Iraq, and Libya also play varying roles, either as trafficking corridors or secondary production zones. Libya, amid its governance vacuum, has emerged as a new node in the supply chain. In all these places, a mix of tribal smugglers, state-linked actors, and organized crime groups perpetuates the trade.
Captagon is no longer confined to the Middle East. European seizures, especially in Italy and Germany, have revealed a growing appetite and sophisticated trafficking infrastructure. In Italy, 14 tons of pills were intercepted recently in industrial shipments. German investigations have uncovered repackaging and partial manufacturing operations linked to Syrian and Lebanese nationals.
Captagon’s European presence extends beyond smuggling. In cities like Aachen and Heidenheim, trials have exposed how criminal networks are embedding the trade within broader illicit economies, including arms smuggling and counterfeit goods. The pills have begun appearing in local markets, especially among marginalized youth and migrant populations.
In Asia, while still limited in volume, Captagon has appeared in transit zones in Malaysia and the Philippines. This expansion seems strategic, as traffickers seek to diversify markets in response to increased enforcement in the Gulf and Europe.
Captagon’s persistence and danger stem not only from its economic value but also from its nature as a hybrid threat, cutting across vertical state structures, horizontal societal domains, and transnational borders.
As a vertical threat, Captagon corrupts state institutions. It compromises border enforcement, embeds itself in military and intelligence structures, and undermines judicial systems. In Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere, state actors have often been active participants or protectors of the trade.
As a horizontal threat, Captagon affects public health, labor productivity, and societal cohesion. It fuels addiction, particularly among youth, and is associated with rising violence, especially in border zones. Unlike conventional threats confined to specific demographics, Captagon permeates all levels of society, from elite recreational users in the Gulf to child soldiers in war zones.
As a transnational threat, Captagon spans continents. Its synthetic nature makes it mobile, its supply chain flexible. It moves through ports, airports, and overland routes, often disguised in legitimate trade. It intersects with global criminal syndicates, making enforcement a multi-jurisdictional challenge.
Addressing the Threat: A Multi-Level Strategy
Countering the Captagon trade requires a coordinated, multi-level strategy that targets every link in the supply chain.
First, regulating and tracking precursor chemicals, primarily sourced from countries like China, India, and parts of Eastern Europe, are essential. Financial networks that launder Captagon profits through real estate, front companies, and cryptocurrency must also be disrupted through robust, cross-border anti-money-laundering coordination.
Simultaneously, demand-side responses are vital: Consumer countries, particularly in the Gulf, need to invest in localized prevention initiatives, addiction treatment services, and mental health support to reduce dependency.
On the diplomatic front, transitional governments in Syria, Lebanon, and Libya should be incentivized, through sanctions, trade benefits, and intelligence-sharing agreements, to cooperate with international narcotics-control regimes.
Finally, regional bodies such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League could lead the development of integrated maritime, judicial, and law enforcement frameworks to standardize prosecution and interdiction efforts across jurisdictions.
Captagon is not just a drug. It is a symbol of structural dysfunction, geopolitical opportunism, and criminal innovation. It has propped up regimes, empowered militias, and embedded itself in the fabric of multiple economies. Its rise tells the story of how synthetic narcotics can fuel hybrid warfare, undermine institutions, and destabilize regions. To dismantle the Captagon empire, the response must be equally complex, coordinated, and sustained.
Recent & Related