Until January 2024, it had been almost two years since bombs rained down on Yemen. Then on Jan. 12, the U.S. and U.K., with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and The Netherlands, began a campaign of airstrikes on 60 Houthi targets in an effort to deter Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
The targets were radar, missile, and drone capabilities in Abs, Bani Basrah, Dhamar, Hodeidah, Sa‘dah, Sana‘a, and Taizz. But the bombings have so far failed to stop the Houthis from continuing missile and drone strikes against merchant and commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea.
In November 2023, the Houthis began the attacks in response to Israel’s war on Gaza—itself a retaliation for the Hamas-led incursion into southern Israel on Oct. 7, which resulted in roughly 1,200 deaths. The Houthis claim that they are targeting vessels that are, at least partly, owned by Israelis or bound for Israeli ports. But, in practice, ships that have no connection with Israel have also been hit. On Feb. 12, Houthi rockets even caused minor damage to a Greek cargo ship bound for Iran, a supposed Houthi ally.
The Biden administration regards the Houthi conduct as a major threat to the global economy. About 12 percent of international trade and almost one-third of global container shipping transit the Bab al-Mandab (“Gate of Tears”), a narrow strait separating the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.
To try to deter the Houthis, the U.S. formed Operation Prosperity Guardian—a maritime protection force including Washington’s major NATO allies, as well as Australia, Bahrain, and the Seychelles—in late 2023. Then four days after the U.S.-led bombing campaign began, the Biden administration placed the Houthis back on a list of “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” a stigma that had been removed when Biden first came into office.
The Biden administration’s punitive approach to dealing with the Houthis and the Gaza war’s spillover effects into the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea has so far failed to achieve its stated goal as shone by the continuation of Houthi missile and drone attacks. The reasons are rather straightforward.
Fighting a Saudi-led military coalition for more than seven years made the Houthis extremely battle-hardened and capable of withstanding pressure. It’s not an overstatement to say that war is, by now, a way of life for the Houthis. If years of intense Saudi bombing of Houthi-ruled land in Yemen did not deter the group from lobbing rockets into Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to imagine that far fewer military strikes by Washington and London could alter Houthi decisions.
The struggle against Saudi Arabia also taught the rebel movement many lessons about strategies for fighting. The Houthis learned to keep their infrastructure dispersed, which limits the degree to which airstrikes can degrade their large weapons arsenal.
In political and psychological terms, the U.S.-U.K. strikes not only are unlikely to deter the Houthis but will probably only embolden them. This is particularly so in the war of narratives over Gaza. In Yemen, support for the Palestinian cause is high. For all of Yemen’s deep political, ideological, and social divisions, rejection of Israel is a common denominator. The Houthis, who have antagonized many Yemenis with their harsh and arbitrary rule, have been able to shift focus to the Israel-Palestine issue and mobilize more Yemenis behind them, including former opponents.
Of course, there are contradictions and elements of hypocrisy in the Houthi stance. As some commentators have pointed out, while the group takes a stand against Israel’s bombardment and siege of Gaza, the Houthis themselves have been blockading Taizz since 2015 and citizens there are desperate for water. “Without lifting their own blockade of the civilian population on Taizz, Houthis’ claims of demonstrating their moral stance against Israel’s blockade of Gaza—which has put Palestinian civilians at grave risk and is a war crime—is a hollow one while they unlawfully besiege Yemen’s third largest city,” wrote Human Rights Watch’s Niku Jafarnia recently.
Nonetheless, most Yemenis appear to see the Houthi campaign as legitimate. There is also a view among some Yemenis that the U.S.-led bombing of Yemen has parallels to Israel’s war on Gaza, which plays to the Houthi narrative about being a resistance group that stands up to Israel and the West.
The Red Sea crisis has also boosted the Houthi image in the region as a critical part of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” along with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraq- and Syria-based militias.
Throughout the Arab world, including among segments of populations that previously opposed the Houthis or did not pay much attention to them, there is now a widespread view that Houthi operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea make the Yemeni rebels “champions of the Palestinian cause.”
Ultimately, the Houthis are highly unlikely to be deterred by air strikes. Indeed, their attacks will probably continue until and unless there is a ceasefire in Gaza. The longer Israel’s war on that starved enclave rages, the greater the risk of escalation against shipping on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab. These conflicts could take on a life of their own, meaning that they might not abruptly end once the current Gaza war is finally over.
As Yemen’s nearly decade-old civil war remains unresolved, it will be important to observe how the Red Sea crisis impacts the unsettled conflicts between the Houthis and other actors in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. A valid concern is that the Houthi missile and drone attacks, as well as the U.S.-led bombing campaign, will overshadow progress achieved in negotiations under Omani auspices which gained momentum last year. Riyadh appears determined to move ahead with peace talks without allowing the Gaza war’s spillover into Yemen to derail diplomacy. Yet, it remains to be seen how non-Houthi Yemeni groups such as the Southern Transitional Council emerge from the Gaza war’s expansion into Yemen and nearby waters. Unfortunately, these developments risk pushing Yemen back into civil warfare and further away from peace.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
One Month In, What Has the US-UK Bombing Campaign in Yemen Accomplished?
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Until January 2024, it had been almost two years since bombs rained down on Yemen. Then on Jan. 12, the U.S. and U.K., with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and The Netherlands, began a campaign of airstrikes on 60 Houthi targets in an effort to deter Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
The targets were radar, missile, and drone capabilities in Abs, Bani Basrah, Dhamar, Hodeidah, Sa‘dah, Sana‘a, and Taizz. But the bombings have so far failed to stop the Houthis from continuing missile and drone strikes against merchant and commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea.
In November 2023, the Houthis began the attacks in response to Israel’s war on Gaza—itself a retaliation for the Hamas-led incursion into southern Israel on Oct. 7, which resulted in roughly 1,200 deaths. The Houthis claim that they are targeting vessels that are, at least partly, owned by Israelis or bound for Israeli ports. But, in practice, ships that have no connection with Israel have also been hit. On Feb. 12, Houthi rockets even caused minor damage to a Greek cargo ship bound for Iran, a supposed Houthi ally.
The Biden administration regards the Houthi conduct as a major threat to the global economy. About 12 percent of international trade and almost one-third of global container shipping transit the Bab al-Mandab (“Gate of Tears”), a narrow strait separating the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.
To try to deter the Houthis, the U.S. formed Operation Prosperity Guardian—a maritime protection force including Washington’s major NATO allies, as well as Australia, Bahrain, and the Seychelles—in late 2023. Then four days after the U.S.-led bombing campaign began, the Biden administration placed the Houthis back on a list of “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” a stigma that had been removed when Biden first came into office.
The Biden administration’s punitive approach to dealing with the Houthis and the Gaza war’s spillover effects into the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea has so far failed to achieve its stated goal as shone by the continuation of Houthi missile and drone attacks. The reasons are rather straightforward.
Fighting a Saudi-led military coalition for more than seven years made the Houthis extremely battle-hardened and capable of withstanding pressure. It’s not an overstatement to say that war is, by now, a way of life for the Houthis. If years of intense Saudi bombing of Houthi-ruled land in Yemen did not deter the group from lobbing rockets into Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to imagine that far fewer military strikes by Washington and London could alter Houthi decisions.
The struggle against Saudi Arabia also taught the rebel movement many lessons about strategies for fighting. The Houthis learned to keep their infrastructure dispersed, which limits the degree to which airstrikes can degrade their large weapons arsenal.
In political and psychological terms, the U.S.-U.K. strikes not only are unlikely to deter the Houthis but will probably only embolden them. This is particularly so in the war of narratives over Gaza. In Yemen, support for the Palestinian cause is high. For all of Yemen’s deep political, ideological, and social divisions, rejection of Israel is a common denominator. The Houthis, who have antagonized many Yemenis with their harsh and arbitrary rule, have been able to shift focus to the Israel-Palestine issue and mobilize more Yemenis behind them, including former opponents.
Of course, there are contradictions and elements of hypocrisy in the Houthi stance. As some commentators have pointed out, while the group takes a stand against Israel’s bombardment and siege of Gaza, the Houthis themselves have been blockading Taizz since 2015 and citizens there are desperate for water. “Without lifting their own blockade of the civilian population on Taizz, Houthis’ claims of demonstrating their moral stance against Israel’s blockade of Gaza—which has put Palestinian civilians at grave risk and is a war crime—is a hollow one while they unlawfully besiege Yemen’s third largest city,” wrote Human Rights Watch’s Niku Jafarnia recently.
Nonetheless, most Yemenis appear to see the Houthi campaign as legitimate. There is also a view among some Yemenis that the U.S.-led bombing of Yemen has parallels to Israel’s war on Gaza, which plays to the Houthi narrative about being a resistance group that stands up to Israel and the West.
The Red Sea crisis has also boosted the Houthi image in the region as a critical part of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” along with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraq- and Syria-based militias.
Throughout the Arab world, including among segments of populations that previously opposed the Houthis or did not pay much attention to them, there is now a widespread view that Houthi operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea make the Yemeni rebels “champions of the Palestinian cause.”
Ultimately, the Houthis are highly unlikely to be deterred by air strikes. Indeed, their attacks will probably continue until and unless there is a ceasefire in Gaza. The longer Israel’s war on that starved enclave rages, the greater the risk of escalation against shipping on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab. These conflicts could take on a life of their own, meaning that they might not abruptly end once the current Gaza war is finally over.
As Yemen’s nearly decade-old civil war remains unresolved, it will be important to observe how the Red Sea crisis impacts the unsettled conflicts between the Houthis and other actors in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. A valid concern is that the Houthi missile and drone attacks, as well as the U.S.-led bombing campaign, will overshadow progress achieved in negotiations under Omani auspices which gained momentum last year. Riyadh appears determined to move ahead with peace talks without allowing the Gaza war’s spillover into Yemen to derail diplomacy. Yet, it remains to be seen how non-Houthi Yemeni groups such as the Southern Transitional Council emerge from the Gaza war’s expansion into Yemen and nearby waters. Unfortunately, these developments risk pushing Yemen back into civil warfare and further away from peace.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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