In Washington, there are two broad frameworks for understanding the aims of U.S. foreign policy. The first is the long-established orthodoxy of liberal internationalism, which envisions the universal reign of democracy and human rights as history’s natural end-state. In anticipation of this outcome, the United States must defend a liberal order against alien elements, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
The second is an increasingly influential position of restraint proposed by an eclectic coalition of academic neorealists, progressive anti-imperialists, and Republican isolationists. Whereas proponents of the liberal order start with the globe and work backwards by subtracting regimes they consider irredeemably illiberal, proponents of restraint begin at the U.S. border and proceed outwards by adding areas they deem strategically vital to the national interest.
Both groups miss the mark. The goal of achieving liberal universalism is as unrealistic as the expectation that the United States might cut the myriad ties that bind it to the network of allies and partners it has built beyond its borders. U.S. officials should align foreign-policy objectives with the capabilities and interests of the actually existing Pax Americana, which is much smaller than the globe and much larger than the nation. The first step in formulating such a policy is to define the full extent of the United States’ extraterritorial empire—or, to put it more politely, the greater West.
The Case for the Greater West
By Peter Slezkine
Russia
Originally published in Foreign Policy
In Washington, there are two broad frameworks for understanding the aims of U.S. foreign policy. The first is the long-established orthodoxy of liberal internationalism, which envisions the universal reign of democracy and human rights as history’s natural end-state. In anticipation of this outcome, the United States must defend a liberal order against alien elements, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
The second is an increasingly influential position of restraint proposed by an eclectic coalition of academic neorealists, progressive anti-imperialists, and Republican isolationists. Whereas proponents of the liberal order start with the globe and work backwards by subtracting regimes they consider irredeemably illiberal, proponents of restraint begin at the U.S. border and proceed outwards by adding areas they deem strategically vital to the national interest.
Both groups miss the mark. The goal of achieving liberal universalism is as unrealistic as the expectation that the United States might cut the myriad ties that bind it to the network of allies and partners it has built beyond its borders. U.S. officials should align foreign-policy objectives with the capabilities and interests of the actually existing Pax Americana, which is much smaller than the globe and much larger than the nation. The first step in formulating such a policy is to define the full extent of the United States’ extraterritorial empire—or, to put it more politely, the greater West.
Read the full article on Foreign Policy.
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