As we rounded the corner into the new year, our media feeds were once again bombarded by that annual tradition: retrospectives on the past year, its lessons learned, and predictions of what’s to come in the year that follows. The latter category is sure to come with cautionary caveats—namely, that “prediction is difficult, especially about the future.” It’s an old saw—variously attributed to Neils Bohr, Yogi Berra, Mark Twain, and others—often trotted out by analysts when asked to opine what the future holds. And as the dramatic events in Ukraine have illustrated over the past two years, it’s especially applicable to forecasts of war.
The future is fundamentally unknowable, so why bother making forecasts about war or any other phenomena?
Forecasting, which is closely related to but distinct from prediction, allows us to unpack our assumptions of how the world works, consider and contrast outcomes driven by alternative assumptions, and reduce or at least highlight uncertainties. Despite the particularly unknowable nature of the international system and the yet-to-be-made decisions of its leading figures, there are some things we can know. Even better, we know why we know them.
To paraphrase another quote that has been misattributed to Mark Twain, it isn’t what we know that creates trouble, but what we know for sure that just ain’t so. In other words, it is important to distinguish between what we know and what is conventionally believed to be true but isn’t. We can use forecasting to do so. While forecasts fall far short of predicting the future to a tee, they can assist with long-term planning and help us better prepare for whatever futures may come.
Read the full article at Modern War Institute.
