As the Iranian government contemplates further restrictions on women, a recent altercation between a cleric and an unveiled woman in the Shi’ite seminary city of Qom has reignited the discourse on women’s rights in Iran.
The incident took place on March 6 at a clinic where a young cleric was reported to have used his mobile phone to film a young, unveiled woman holding a baby. Distressed, the woman urged the cleric to delete the images from his device and the quarrel escalated into a physical fight.
The angry reaction of the young woman inspired a significant wave of support, triggering a social media campaign under the hashtags “مادر_Ů‚Ů…ŰŚ” (#Qomi_Mother) and “ما_سلیطه‌ایم” (#We_are_rude).
The Shargh network, citing clinic sources, reported that the woman protesting against the cleric was actually the baby’s aunt.
The incident occurred as social media activists highlighted the increased presence of hijab patrols in the Tehran subway. In a related development, a member of parliament, in a televised interview, said the government was considering taking three million Tomans (about US $50) from the bank accounts of those who do not comply with Iran’s laws obliging all women to cover their hair and dress modestly in public. Â
The incident in Qom has arguably become one of the most significant moments affecting the collective conscience of Iranians since Mahsa Amini died in police custody in September 2022. Her death in the custody of the so-called morality police sparked the “Woman Life, Freedom” Movement and led to a violent government crackdown on protesters in 2022 and 2023.
The protests emerged amid escalating economic pressures on Iranian citizens following Ebrahim Raisi’s assumption of the presidency in 2021. Instead of addressing critical economic issues, Raisi’s hardliner government has focused on cultural matters such as combating non-compliance with the hijab, further inflaming public fury.
The quarrel between the Qomi woman and the cleric occurred just a few days after the lowest-turnout elections in the 45-year history of the Islamic Republic.
The low participation – officially 41 percent but probably lower – as well as the extreme vetting of candidates prior to the election led to victories by hardline figures. Following the elections, some of the newly elected candidates spoke about more strictly enforcing laws against unveiling, along with intensifying efforts to filter and censor the internet.
The last three elections in Iran have each marked record-low participation rates since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a trend that can be linked to recent societal unrest.
Caption: Rate of voter turnout for presidential elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1980 to 2021. Source: Statista
While some interpret the widespread abstention as a sign of public disinterest in politics and governance, a different narrative is plausible: not indifference, but a radicalization of public sentiment. This is also evidenced by phenomena such as a segment of the population that openly celebrates the national football team’s defeats and the severe backlash against individuals seen as embodying religious authority.
Indeed, the election boycott in Iran appears to have been a strategic and intentional step. Despite warnings from a few reformist and moderate politicians that abstaining from voting would push extremists closer to power centers, a more radical faction of reformists aims to set the stage for a decisive showdown. As hardliners increasingly occupy positions of power, the public’s dissatisfaction grows. This dynamic aligns with the objectives of critics in exile who advocate for war or more sanctions against Iran.
Interestingly, the notion of a “final battle” is deeply rooted in Shia theology, underscored by the anticipation of an awaited Mahdi or messiah. This concept has played pivotal roles in Iran at crucial junctures. Notably, the Islamic Revolution drew inspiration from this theological idea, casting the Shah as a demonic figure and portraying the revolutionaries as saviors in a “final battle.”
However, the aftermath of the revolution has exposed the regime’s inefficiencies and internal contradictions, reviving the concept of a final battle, this time against the regime itself.
This sentiment has found expression in repeated popular protests, signaling a crystallization of public dissent. If the regime seeks to impose new rounds of restrictions on internet access and women’s freedoms, it is likely to face a significant backlash. The majority of Iranians, long marginalized by an extremist minority, has demonstrated its willingness to bear the cost of defending its freedoms and social rights. The post-Mahsa era marks a distinct departure from the past, underscoring an irrevocable change in the societal and political landscape.
Despite its failure to overthrow the Islamic regime, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement made substantial achievements in the social sphere. Nowadays, an increasing number of women choose to forgo the hijab, boldly navigating both the streets and cyberspace without it. Attempts by government-affiliated individuals to enforce veiling are met with vehement opposition. Remarkably, even traditional clerics not aligned with the government have voiced their opposition to such repressive policies.
The widespread condemnation of the recent incident in Qom underscored the growing rift between political clerics associated with the regime and their traditional, independent counterparts.
For decades, the Islamic regime has wielded the power of mobilization in critical moments, rallying religious followers against perceived threats to the Islamic faith’s foundation. The efficacy of this tactic has clearly waned. The growing rift between regime and society raises questions about the system’s ability to marshal the same level of support in forthcoming crises or any “final battle” it may face.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021. Twitter/X: @epicoria
Quarrel Over Hijab Triggers New Public Outrage in Iran
By Mohammad Mazhari
Middle East & North Africa
As the Iranian government contemplates further restrictions on women, a recent altercation between a cleric and an unveiled woman in the Shi’ite seminary city of Qom has reignited the discourse on women’s rights in Iran.
The incident took place on March 6 at a clinic where a young cleric was reported to have used his mobile phone to film a young, unveiled woman holding a baby. Distressed, the woman urged the cleric to delete the images from his device and the quarrel escalated into a physical fight.
The angry reaction of the young woman inspired a significant wave of support, triggering a social media campaign under the hashtags “مادر_Ů‚Ů…ŰŚ” (#Qomi_Mother) and “ما_سلیطه‌ایم” (#We_are_rude).
The Shargh network, citing clinic sources, reported that the woman protesting against the cleric was actually the baby’s aunt.
The incident occurred as social media activists highlighted the increased presence of hijab patrols in the Tehran subway. In a related development, a member of parliament, in a televised interview, said the government was considering taking three million Tomans (about US $50) from the bank accounts of those who do not comply with Iran’s laws obliging all women to cover their hair and dress modestly in public. Â
The incident in Qom has arguably become one of the most significant moments affecting the collective conscience of Iranians since Mahsa Amini died in police custody in September 2022. Her death in the custody of the so-called morality police sparked the “Woman Life, Freedom” Movement and led to a violent government crackdown on protesters in 2022 and 2023.
The protests emerged amid escalating economic pressures on Iranian citizens following Ebrahim Raisi’s assumption of the presidency in 2021. Instead of addressing critical economic issues, Raisi’s hardliner government has focused on cultural matters such as combating non-compliance with the hijab, further inflaming public fury.
The quarrel between the Qomi woman and the cleric occurred just a few days after the lowest-turnout elections in the 45-year history of the Islamic Republic.
Caption: Parliamentary Election Voter Turnout Rate. Source: Stimson
The low participation – officially 41 percent but probably lower – as well as the extreme vetting of candidates prior to the election led to victories by hardline figures. Following the elections, some of the newly elected candidates spoke about more strictly enforcing laws against unveiling, along with intensifying efforts to filter and censor the internet.
The last three elections in Iran have each marked record-low participation rates since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a trend that can be linked to recent societal unrest.
Caption: Rate of voter turnout for presidential elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1980 to 2021. Source: Statista
While some interpret the widespread abstention as a sign of public disinterest in politics and governance, a different narrative is plausible: not indifference, but a radicalization of public sentiment. This is also evidenced by phenomena such as a segment of the population that openly celebrates the national football team’s defeats and the severe backlash against individuals seen as embodying religious authority.
Indeed, the election boycott in Iran appears to have been a strategic and intentional step. Despite warnings from a few reformist and moderate politicians that abstaining from voting would push extremists closer to power centers, a more radical faction of reformists aims to set the stage for a decisive showdown. As hardliners increasingly occupy positions of power, the public’s dissatisfaction grows. This dynamic aligns with the objectives of critics in exile who advocate for war or more sanctions against Iran.
Interestingly, the notion of a “final battle” is deeply rooted in Shia theology, underscored by the anticipation of an awaited Mahdi or messiah. This concept has played pivotal roles in Iran at crucial junctures. Notably, the Islamic Revolution drew inspiration from this theological idea, casting the Shah as a demonic figure and portraying the revolutionaries as saviors in a “final battle.”
However, the aftermath of the revolution has exposed the regime’s inefficiencies and internal contradictions, reviving the concept of a final battle, this time against the regime itself.
This sentiment has found expression in repeated popular protests, signaling a crystallization of public dissent. If the regime seeks to impose new rounds of restrictions on internet access and women’s freedoms, it is likely to face a significant backlash. The majority of Iranians, long marginalized by an extremist minority, has demonstrated its willingness to bear the cost of defending its freedoms and social rights. The post-Mahsa era marks a distinct departure from the past, underscoring an irrevocable change in the societal and political landscape.
Despite its failure to overthrow the Islamic regime, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement made substantial achievements in the social sphere. Nowadays, an increasing number of women choose to forgo the hijab, boldly navigating both the streets and cyberspace without it. Attempts by government-affiliated individuals to enforce veiling are met with vehement opposition. Remarkably, even traditional clerics not aligned with the government have voiced their opposition to such repressive policies.
The widespread condemnation of the recent incident in Qom underscored the growing rift between political clerics associated with the regime and their traditional, independent counterparts.
For decades, the Islamic regime has wielded the power of mobilization in critical moments, rallying religious followers against perceived threats to the Islamic faith’s foundation. The efficacy of this tactic has clearly waned. The growing rift between regime and society raises questions about the system’s ability to marshal the same level of support in forthcoming crises or any “final battle” it may face.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021. Twitter/X: @epicoria
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