Iran Hits Irbil and Pakistan to Retaliate for Terrorist Attacks and the Assassination of a Key General

The strategy of going after non-U.S. targets has cast doubt on the regime's claims, even among its regional militia allies

By  Mohammad Mazhari

In the quiet hours before dawn on January 16, 2024, the Iraqi Kurdish city of Irbil was shaken by the horrible sound of explosions. Ballistic missiles struck several locations and residents fled their homes in panic. The onslaught prompted an immediate closure of both the city’s airspace and its airport, highlighting the gravity of the situation.

In three successive statements, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed responsibility for the strikes, presenting them as retaliation for terrorist attacks on the southern Iranian cities of Kerman and Rask. According to a fourth statement by the IRGC, the missile strikes were aimed at Islamic State terrorists as well as agents of the Israeli spy agency, Mossad, which Iran has blamed for the assassination of Seyed Rezi Mousavi, a high-ranking Quds Force commander in Syria on Christmas Day. Iranian authorities had previously communicated a clear intent to retaliate for Mousavi’s death.

Stung by domestic criticism over its failure to respond adequately to a series of assassinations and terrorist strikes, the Islamic Republic appears to be taking advantage of the rising instability and violence in the region since the Hamas attacks on Israel in 2023 to settle some scores. At the same time that Iran hit Irbil, it also carried out a series of strikes in Pakistan that appeared aimed at retaliating for the terrorist bombings in Kerman that killed nearly 100 people who had gathered in Kerman on Jan. 3, 2024, to commemorate the death in 2020 of Quds Force chief Qasem Soleimani, killed by a U.S. drone strike in Iraq. Pakistan responded with attacks on alleged militants in Iran’s province of Sistan-Baluchistan.

In reporting on the Irbil attacks, Iranian media outlets focused on the death of Peshraw Agha Dizayee, an Iraqi businessman, labeling him an Israeli collaborator and a “Mossad financier” with alleged connections to Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani. While this claim has not been confirmed by Kurdish sources, the IRGC asserted that Dizayee’s residence in Irbil had served as a Mossad safe house. Contrary to what the Iranian state-run news agency IRNA claimed, reports from local media said that the missile strikes had killed innocent civilians.

In the aftermath of the strikes, the Tehran Municipality erected banners bearing the slogan “Severe Response” in various districts of Tehran. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has used the term repeatedly in threatening retaliation against Iran’s enemies, including after the killing of Soleimani.

Tehran’s Streets Echo Supreme Leader’s Vow: Banners Proclaim ‘Severe Response, God Willing’ – A Direct Quote from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Concurrently, social media accounts associated with the Islamic regime, colloquially known as the “Cyber Army,” swiftly circulated the hashtag “Severe Response.” Accompanying this online campaign was an image of the demolished residence of Peshraw Dizayee. The posts boasted that the image was evidence of “the power of a normal Iranian missile.”

In a sarcastic post on his Twitter/X account, a conservative parliamentarian Malek Shariati wrote, “Revenge? Severe response? No, not yet. I guess last night’s fireworks were in commemoration of the Shah’s departure from Iran.”

However, numerous social media commentators have raised concerns about the efficacy of such bombings, which, as seen in Irbil, have targeted innocent civilians or hit forces in Syria purportedly linked to ISIS without clear verification.

The strikes elicited negative reactions from the Iraqi government and Kurdish authorities. Iraqi Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani condemned the attacks as a “crime against the Kurdish people,” while Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani characterized the missile strikes as a “clear aggression” against Iraq.

Even some Shi’ite groups in Iraq, typically allies of Iran, offered mild criticism. In a statement on his Telegram account, Abu Ali al-Askari, the security official for Iraq’s Hezbollah Brigades, a militia backed by Iran, wrote that the group was not informed about the specifics of Iranian military operations. Al-Askari said he did not oppose the strikes, but that Iran’s regional rivals Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could have been better targets.

Given Iran’s influence in Iraq, attacking Kurdistan was likely seen as a step the Islamic Republic could take with relative impunity. The strikes also carried messages for Iran’s regional and international rivals.

The IRGC can now claim to Iranian hardliners that it has responded adequately to a string of Israeli assassinations and sabotage in Iran. Second, the targeting of Dizayee’s residence, located only a few kilometers from U.S. facilities in Irbil, could be seen as a message to the United States that Iran is capable of targeting American interests directly, should it choose to do so.

At the same time, Iran’s military approach has demonstrated a strategy aimed at avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. This approach includes targeting areas near American interests without causing significant U.S. casualties, indicating a deliberate effort to prevent regional tensions from escalating into a major conflagration.

Iran often opts for indirect engagement and symbolic targeting, choosing relatively unimportant sites to avoid a major confrontation. This method serves to express opposition to the U.S. presence in the region and to showcase Iran’s reach without direct military conflict.

Striking civilian targets near U.S. bases also reflects an Iranian intention to try to restrain Iraqi-Kurdish cooperation with the U.S. The attack can be seen as part of Iran’s broader strategy to extend its influence in the Iraqi political and security scene, particularly in areas under the control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Despite boasting about sending powerful signals to the U.S. and its regional allies, however, the Iranian regime still faces a significant challenge in convincing its hardline supporters that it is fulfilling Ayatollah Khamenei’s threat of “severe revenge.”

The strategy of going after non-U.S. targets has cast doubt on the regime’s claims, even among its regional militia allies.

Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021. Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/epicoria

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