Editor’s note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
On March 1, 2024, Iranians are to vote for a 290-seat parliament and an 88-seat Assembly of Experts, the clerical body nominally charged with choosing the next Supreme Leader.
The vote has already been manipulated in favor of ruling conservatives, who in an Iranian context tout the preservation of “Islamic” values to prioritize internal security, rigid enforcement of mandatory veiling, internet filtering and skepticism of rapprochement with the West.
The other two allowed political camps in Iran are the reformists, who call for greater political and social freedoms, improved relations with the West, and economic reforms and the moderates, who seek gradual change and pragmatic policies. Given the disqualification of most of their candidates – including former president Hassan Rouhani – by a hardline vetting body, the real competition is among splinter factions within the conservative camp and the only suspense is over how many Iranians will bother to vote.
Assorted reformist parties have called for a boycott of the elections as have individuals such as jailed Nobel prize laureate Narges Mohammadi. Even some regime insider entities, such as the Islamic Society of Academics and the Society of Qom Seminary Instructors have said they would not take part, while others have called a boycott a “form of civil disobedience” that “can make the regime behave” better in the future.
Across the country, moderates have struggled to come up with a full slate of candidates, succeeding only in the capital, Tehran, and only by including some less rigid conservatives. They have named their slate “the list of protests” to differentiate from regime supporters.
Voter turnout is likely to be anemic, in contrast to past contests when there were some distinctions among candidates.
In 2013, for example, about 73% of registered voters participated to elect Rouhani as president. His victory on a platform of moderation and engagement with the international community was seen as a response to widespread dissatisfaction with his hardline predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was re-elected in 2009 in a fraud-tainted vote.
In 2017, Rouhani won a second term with about 70% turnout. This was seen as an endorsement of his government and optimism about the prospects for change in the aftermath of the conclusion of a landmark nuclear accord in 2015.
In contrast, voter turnout was only 45.8% in 2021, the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic. With all prominent reformists and moderates prevented from running, a distinctive feature of this election was spoiled ballots, around 13% of votes cast, leading to jokes that victor Ebrahim Raisi’s main competitor was “none of the above.” In previous elections, nullified votes did not exceed 5%.
Participation in parliamentary elections has also dwindled and was 42.6% in 2020, another record low. This was attributed to factors including growing public disillusionment with the political system, concerns about the inclusivity of the electoral process, and a bloody crackdown of the November 2019 protests across Iran. Conservatives took control of the parliament and reformists and moderates won only 40 seats, not enough to wield any influence.
Their loss of electoral support has coincided with a dramatic drop in the popularity of the system of velayet-e faquih, or rule by a senior cleric, which was introduced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution.
The late Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei warned two decades ago that “abuse of religious beliefs for political gains will not result in more popular support. The only outcome will be a declining religious belief among people.” Tellingly, a new government-sponsored opinion poll – initially suppressed but recently leaked – found that “73% of the Iranian population support separation of religious and political institutions” compared with 30% eight years ago.
Judging from past elections, conservatives have a well-organized voter base of only 20-25% of eligible voters. Thus, higher turnouts have tended to favor reformists and moderates. The dilemma for the Islamic Republic’s conservative leaders is that while a low turnout guarantees their continued control, it further undermines the legitimacy of the regime.
The most important elected institution in Iran is the Assembly of Experts, a clerical body tasked with choosing the Supreme Leader. The “nezam” (the Iranian political system) might gamble on the presidency or parliament but not on the Assembly of Experts at a time when the incumbent leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is approaching age 85.
Many commentators and political analysts have said that the hardliners will be happy to see a turnout of only 30 percent to guarantee their long-term futures. Former conservative member of parliament Hossein Kanaani-Moghadam predicted a maximum 30% turnout outcome. Current parliamentarian Gholam-Ali Jafar-Zadeh said, “Have no doubt that if the turnout is over 35%, more than 90% of the current MPs will have to leave their seats.”
Former president Rouhani, who was disqualified to run again for a seat in the Assembly of Experts that he has held for the past 24 years, speculated that “the plan is to limit the turnout to a maximum of 30% at the national level and to single-digit levels in Tehran and other big cities” to guarantee a hardline supermajority. Political analyst Mohammad Sadegh Javadi-Hesar wrote that top decision-makers want a “low turnout with guaranteed results. For them, a good Assembly and a good parliament are the ones from which there are no voices or no protests.”
An opinion poll conducted by a government institute in early January predicted turnout of only 28% across Iran, 22% in highly populated provinces and a mere 15% in Tehran.
While seemingly content with a low turnout to achieve its desired outcome, the regime may resort to ballot stuffing to give the illusion of greater legitimacy. Perhaps foreshadowing such efforts, a deputy interior minister falsely claimed that 50% more people showed up on Feb. 11 for annual demonstrations celebrating the anniversary of the revolution than in 2023. Many top clerics and Friday prayer leaders echoed the remarks and said the rally participation indicates a similar rise in election turnout. Other officials predicted turnout of at least 43% while interior minister Ahmad Vahidi talked of 60%.
Dissident Mostafa Tajzadeh issued a statement from his jail cell warning that “the statistics of the outcome of the upcoming elections are planned to resemble that of the 2009 presidential election,” referring to Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election. Pointing to Vahidi’s remarks, Tajzadeh added, “Expect a big lie.” An election whose stated outcome is to preserve the status quo has minimal appeal, while boycotting can be interpreted as an act of civil disobedience, not political apathy. The only suspense about the March 1 elections is the announced turnout and whether the regime resorts to rigging to try to boost its diminished stature.
How Low Can It Go: Turnout is the Only Unknown in Iranian Elections
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
On March 1, 2024, Iranians are to vote for a 290-seat parliament and an 88-seat Assembly of Experts, the clerical body nominally charged with choosing the next Supreme Leader.
The vote has already been manipulated in favor of ruling conservatives, who in an Iranian context tout the preservation of “Islamic” values to prioritize internal security, rigid enforcement of mandatory veiling, internet filtering and skepticism of rapprochement with the West.
The other two allowed political camps in Iran are the reformists, who call for greater political and social freedoms, improved relations with the West, and economic reforms and the moderates, who seek gradual change and pragmatic policies. Given the disqualification of most of their candidates – including former president Hassan Rouhani – by a hardline vetting body, the real competition is among splinter factions within the conservative camp and the only suspense is over how many Iranians will bother to vote.
Assorted reformist parties have called for a boycott of the elections as have individuals such as jailed Nobel prize laureate Narges Mohammadi. Even some regime insider entities, such as the Islamic Society of Academics and the Society of Qom Seminary Instructors have said they would not take part, while others have called a boycott a “form of civil disobedience” that “can make the regime behave” better in the future.
Across the country, moderates have struggled to come up with a full slate of candidates, succeeding only in the capital, Tehran, and only by including some less rigid conservatives. They have named their slate “the list of protests” to differentiate from regime supporters.
Voter turnout is likely to be anemic, in contrast to past contests when there were some distinctions among candidates.
In 2013, for example, about 73% of registered voters participated to elect Rouhani as president. His victory on a platform of moderation and engagement with the international community was seen as a response to widespread dissatisfaction with his hardline predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was re-elected in 2009 in a fraud-tainted vote.
In 2017, Rouhani won a second term with about 70% turnout. This was seen as an endorsement of his government and optimism about the prospects for change in the aftermath of the conclusion of a landmark nuclear accord in 2015.
In contrast, voter turnout was only 45.8% in 2021, the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic. With all prominent reformists and moderates prevented from running, a distinctive feature of this election was spoiled ballots, around 13% of votes cast, leading to jokes that victor Ebrahim Raisi’s main competitor was “none of the above.” In previous elections, nullified votes did not exceed 5%.
Participation in parliamentary elections has also dwindled and was 42.6% in 2020, another record low. This was attributed to factors including growing public disillusionment with the political system, concerns about the inclusivity of the electoral process, and a bloody crackdown of the November 2019 protests across Iran. Conservatives took control of the parliament and reformists and moderates won only 40 seats, not enough to wield any influence.
Their loss of electoral support has coincided with a dramatic drop in the popularity of the system of velayet-e faquih, or rule by a senior cleric, which was introduced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution.
The late Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei warned two decades ago that “abuse of religious beliefs for political gains will not result in more popular support. The only outcome will be a declining religious belief among people.” Tellingly, a new government-sponsored opinion poll – initially suppressed but recently leaked – found that “73% of the Iranian population support separation of religious and political institutions” compared with 30% eight years ago.
Judging from past elections, conservatives have a well-organized voter base of only 20-25% of eligible voters. Thus, higher turnouts have tended to favor reformists and moderates. The dilemma for the Islamic Republic’s conservative leaders is that while a low turnout guarantees their continued control, it further undermines the legitimacy of the regime.
The most important elected institution in Iran is the Assembly of Experts, a clerical body tasked with choosing the Supreme Leader. The “nezam” (the Iranian political system) might gamble on the presidency or parliament but not on the Assembly of Experts at a time when the incumbent leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is approaching age 85.
Many commentators and political analysts have said that the hardliners will be happy to see a turnout of only 30 percent to guarantee their long-term futures. Former conservative member of parliament Hossein Kanaani-Moghadam predicted a maximum 30% turnout outcome. Current parliamentarian Gholam-Ali Jafar-Zadeh said, “Have no doubt that if the turnout is over 35%, more than 90% of the current MPs will have to leave their seats.”
Former president Rouhani, who was disqualified to run again for a seat in the Assembly of Experts that he has held for the past 24 years, speculated that “the plan is to limit the turnout to a maximum of 30% at the national level and to single-digit levels in Tehran and other big cities” to guarantee a hardline supermajority. Political analyst Mohammad Sadegh Javadi-Hesar wrote that top decision-makers want a “low turnout with guaranteed results. For them, a good Assembly and a good parliament are the ones from which there are no voices or no protests.”
An opinion poll conducted by a government institute in early January predicted turnout of only 28% across Iran, 22% in highly populated provinces and a mere 15% in Tehran.
While seemingly content with a low turnout to achieve its desired outcome, the regime may resort to ballot stuffing to give the illusion of greater legitimacy. Perhaps foreshadowing such efforts, a deputy interior minister falsely claimed that 50% more people showed up on Feb. 11 for annual demonstrations celebrating the anniversary of the revolution than in 2023. Many top clerics and Friday prayer leaders echoed the remarks and said the rally participation indicates a similar rise in election turnout. Other officials predicted turnout of at least 43% while interior minister Ahmad Vahidi talked of 60%.
Dissident Mostafa Tajzadeh issued a statement from his jail cell warning that “the statistics of the outcome of the upcoming elections are planned to resemble that of the 2009 presidential election,” referring to Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election. Pointing to Vahidi’s remarks, Tajzadeh added, “Expect a big lie.” An election whose stated outcome is to preserve the status quo has minimal appeal, while boycotting can be interpreted as an act of civil disobedience, not political apathy. The only suspense about the March 1 elections is the announced turnout and whether the regime resorts to rigging to try to boost its diminished stature.
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