The devastating Israeli response to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel has so far not triggered a wider regional conflagration.
Skirmishes on the Israel-Lebanon border have been bloody but within bounds and attacks on U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq by Iran-backed groups have led to calibrated U.S. retaliation. Iran retains a potential trump card, however, in the form of its advancing nuclear program. It might calculate that Israel and the U.S. are too focused on the Gaza crisis to risk an attack on Iran. At the same time, Iran must weigh the cost of a potential breakout against a weak economy that is already struggling to overcome U.S.-led economic sanctions.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani said on October 29 that nuclear negotiations would continue but that the Gaza war could have an impact. The Islamic Republic of Iran “adheres to the agreement [to continue talks], and if the circumstances require, it will follow this path as before,” he said, adding that the Gaza crisis “might speed up or slow down” talks over curbing Iran’s nuclear advances in return for sanctions relief.
Prior to the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, Iran and the U.S. were scheduled to meet at the end of October in Oman. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had given approval for direct talks after indirect negotiations led to the release in September of five Americans from Iranian jails in return for unfreezing $6 billion in Iranian oil revenues and transferring the money from South Korea to Qatari banks. The money, which has not yet been spent, is supposed to be available to Iran only for the purchase of non-sanctioned humanitarian goods.
Two points can be understood from Kanaani’s comments. First, Iran does not tie its nuclear negotiations to the outcome of regional and international developments, even the fate of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – militant groups backed by Iran including Hamas. Second, Tehran may still use regional developments to influence the course of its nuclear progress.
In this interpretation, the strategy of advancing nuclear negotiations has not changed, but regional tensions can be exploited in Iran’s favor. At the same time, Iran does not want tensions to escalate so much that they cause the collapse of talks or an expanded war.
Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told CNBC on October 20 that he saw no “correlation” between the Israel-Hamas war and Iran’s nuclear program. He added that “we should not equate nuclear material with nuclear weapons.”
According to the latest IAEA report, Iran has continued its buildup of uranium enriched to 60 percent – far above the limits set in a 2015 nuclear deal that the U.S. withdrew from in 2018. However, Iran has not accelerated the rate of enrichment to this level. Iran possessed slightly over 128 kilograms of 60 percent uranium as of the end of October, enough, if enriched to 90 percent, to fuel three atomic bombs. Iran also had more than half a ton of 20 percent enriched uranium, according to the IAEA. Iran insists its program is for peaceful purposes but has a history of hiding weapons research from the international community.
Iran’s nuclear program dates to the 1950s and its first reactor was provided by the United States. The program stopped after the 1979 revolution but resumed after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and Iran feared its neighbor would use nuclear weapons against it. Slow progress took place in the 1990s and by 2002, it was revealed that Iran had a facility capable of enriching uranium. This led to years of negotiations backed by sanctions that eventually yielded the 2015 nuclear deal.
In general, nuclear progress is supported by the Iranian people and seen as a long-term goal. The program is a symbol of nationalism and national prestige. Iranians, as citizens of the largest Shi’ite Muslim majority country, want to show the world that their nation is advanced, fully developed, and strong. They are seeking to present themselves as a sophisticated and law-abiding member of the international community, among the 14 countries that possess the capability to enrich uranium.
The Trump administration delivered a major blow to nonproliferation and the Iranian economy when it quit the nuclear deal while Iran was still in full compliance with it. The value of the national currency against the dollar has fallen about 15 times since the start of Trump’s “maximum-pressure” campaign, and inflation reached 55.5 percent in April 2023.
Oil exports dropped from about 2.2 million barrels per day in 2017 to less than 0.4 million barrels per day in 2020. Exports have recovered this year with Iran selling China more than 1 million barrels a day, albeit heavily discounted. The government’s revenues in the first seven months of this Iranian calendar year (starting March 21), were 30 percent lower than the budgeted figure of about 4,000 trillion rials ($7.85 billion).
The nuclear negotiations are seen as a means to reduce the impact of sanctions on Iranians’ livelihoods. In addition, a tense internal political atmosphere in the aftermath of 2022 protests over enforced hijab does not lend itself to a new crisis. The Iranian government wants, above all, to avoid the return of its nuclear file from the IAEA to the UN Security Council. But its cooperation with the IAEA has been less than stellar.
In addition to continuing the accumulation of 60 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium, Iran has reduced the ability of the IAEA to monitor its program. The latest IAEA report noted that Iran had expelled a number of experienced nuclear inspectors and that its stockpile of enriched uranium was 22 times the limit set in 2015. Iran has also refused to turn over footage from surveillance cameras.
While the nuclear issue percolates, pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria have attacked US forces in the region more than 150 times since Oct. 7. There have been serious clashes along the Lebanese border and even the Yemeni Houthis have launched rockets in the direction of Israel.
If the war in Gaza escalates after a four-day temporary ceasefire, Iran could put pressure on the U.S. and Israel by intensifying its nuclear activities and even constructing nuclear weapons. This could spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, where Saudi de facto leader and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has threatened to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does.
So far, Iran has calibrated its nuclear advances to keep its adversaries on alert but not provoke a major response. It is in the interests of all that the Gaza war does not lead to a new nuclear crisis in the Middle East.
Mohammad Salami is a research associate at the International Institute for Global Strategic Analysis, an Islamabad-based think tank. His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security, and counterterrorism in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf. Follow him on Twitter @moh_salami.
Will the Gaza War Affect Iran’s Nuclear Strategy?
By Mohammad Salami
Middle East & North Africa
The devastating Israeli response to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel has so far not triggered a wider regional conflagration.
Skirmishes on the Israel-Lebanon border have been bloody but within bounds and attacks on U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq by Iran-backed groups have led to calibrated U.S. retaliation. Iran retains a potential trump card, however, in the form of its advancing nuclear program. It might calculate that Israel and the U.S. are too focused on the Gaza crisis to risk an attack on Iran. At the same time, Iran must weigh the cost of a potential breakout against a weak economy that is already struggling to overcome U.S.-led economic sanctions.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani said on October 29 that nuclear negotiations would continue but that the Gaza war could have an impact. The Islamic Republic of Iran “adheres to the agreement [to continue talks], and if the circumstances require, it will follow this path as before,” he said, adding that the Gaza crisis “might speed up or slow down” talks over curbing Iran’s nuclear advances in return for sanctions relief.
Prior to the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, Iran and the U.S. were scheduled to meet at the end of October in Oman. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had given approval for direct talks after indirect negotiations led to the release in September of five Americans from Iranian jails in return for unfreezing $6 billion in Iranian oil revenues and transferring the money from South Korea to Qatari banks. The money, which has not yet been spent, is supposed to be available to Iran only for the purchase of non-sanctioned humanitarian goods.
Two points can be understood from Kanaani’s comments. First, Iran does not tie its nuclear negotiations to the outcome of regional and international developments, even the fate of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – militant groups backed by Iran including Hamas. Second, Tehran may still use regional developments to influence the course of its nuclear progress.
In this interpretation, the strategy of advancing nuclear negotiations has not changed, but regional tensions can be exploited in Iran’s favor. At the same time, Iran does not want tensions to escalate so much that they cause the collapse of talks or an expanded war.
Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told CNBC on October 20 that he saw no “correlation” between the Israel-Hamas war and Iran’s nuclear program. He added that “we should not equate nuclear material with nuclear weapons.”
According to the latest IAEA report, Iran has continued its buildup of uranium enriched to 60 percent – far above the limits set in a 2015 nuclear deal that the U.S. withdrew from in 2018. However, Iran has not accelerated the rate of enrichment to this level. Iran possessed slightly over 128 kilograms of 60 percent uranium as of the end of October, enough, if enriched to 90 percent, to fuel three atomic bombs. Iran also had more than half a ton of 20 percent enriched uranium, according to the IAEA. Iran insists its program is for peaceful purposes but has a history of hiding weapons research from the international community.
Iran’s nuclear program dates to the 1950s and its first reactor was provided by the United States. The program stopped after the 1979 revolution but resumed after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and Iran feared its neighbor would use nuclear weapons against it. Slow progress took place in the 1990s and by 2002, it was revealed that Iran had a facility capable of enriching uranium. This led to years of negotiations backed by sanctions that eventually yielded the 2015 nuclear deal.
In general, nuclear progress is supported by the Iranian people and seen as a long-term goal. The program is a symbol of nationalism and national prestige. Iranians, as citizens of the largest Shi’ite Muslim majority country, want to show the world that their nation is advanced, fully developed, and strong. They are seeking to present themselves as a sophisticated and law-abiding member of the international community, among the 14 countries that possess the capability to enrich uranium.
The Trump administration delivered a major blow to nonproliferation and the Iranian economy when it quit the nuclear deal while Iran was still in full compliance with it. The value of the national currency against the dollar has fallen about 15 times since the start of Trump’s “maximum-pressure” campaign, and inflation reached 55.5 percent in April 2023.
Oil exports dropped from about 2.2 million barrels per day in 2017 to less than 0.4 million barrels per day in 2020. Exports have recovered this year with Iran selling China more than 1 million barrels a day, albeit heavily discounted. The government’s revenues in the first seven months of this Iranian calendar year (starting March 21), were 30 percent lower than the budgeted figure of about 4,000 trillion rials ($7.85 billion).
The nuclear negotiations are seen as a means to reduce the impact of sanctions on Iranians’ livelihoods. In addition, a tense internal political atmosphere in the aftermath of 2022 protests over enforced hijab does not lend itself to a new crisis. The Iranian government wants, above all, to avoid the return of its nuclear file from the IAEA to the UN Security Council. But its cooperation with the IAEA has been less than stellar.
In addition to continuing the accumulation of 60 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium, Iran has reduced the ability of the IAEA to monitor its program. The latest IAEA report noted that Iran had expelled a number of experienced nuclear inspectors and that its stockpile of enriched uranium was 22 times the limit set in 2015. Iran has also refused to turn over footage from surveillance cameras.
While the nuclear issue percolates, pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria have attacked US forces in the region more than 150 times since Oct. 7. There have been serious clashes along the Lebanese border and even the Yemeni Houthis have launched rockets in the direction of Israel.
If the war in Gaza escalates after a four-day temporary ceasefire, Iran could put pressure on the U.S. and Israel by intensifying its nuclear activities and even constructing nuclear weapons. This could spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, where Saudi de facto leader and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has threatened to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does.
So far, Iran has calibrated its nuclear advances to keep its adversaries on alert but not provoke a major response. It is in the interests of all that the Gaza war does not lead to a new nuclear crisis in the Middle East.
Mohammad Salami is a research associate at the International Institute for Global Strategic Analysis, an Islamabad-based think tank. His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security, and counterterrorism in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf. Follow him on Twitter @moh_salami.
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