Disinformation & CSW67 Outcomes: Why Education Is Only Addressing One Side of the Problem

The CSW 67 outcome document fell short of adequately addressing the supply-side problem of disinformation

By  Jennie Spector

The 67th Convention on the Status of Women included a new topic in its outcome document this year: disinformation, understood as the intentional spread of lies in order to create malicious political outcomes, is listed alongside hate speech as a factor that can “undermine the fulfillment of women’s and girls’ rights.” The inclusion of disinformation in the agreed conclusions of CSW is something to be celebrated. Less celebratory is that the topic was relegated to offering a single pronged solution – that of education and digital literacy for young people. Certainly, education is an important tool in the fight against disinformation. It is not, however, an adequate response given the problem’s characteristics – that it is too easily tolerated by social media companies, that some campaigns are known to be state-sponsored, and that disinformation degrades crucial UN priorities on democratic processes and human rights.

Disinformation is a powerful political weapon, and is accurately acknowledged by CSW for its specific impact on the political lives of women and girls. Studies show women are disproportionately targeted compared to men in online disinformation campaigns. This pattern is so widespread that it has yielded a new research subcategory on “gendered disinformation.” In gendered disinformation, misogynistic tropes and stereotypes are used to degrade the reputation of female politicians, activists, journalists, and other public figures. These campaigns single out women on a number of fronts, using false stories and fake imagery to paint pictures of women as too emotional, unintelligent, or sexualized for public life. Words like “witch,” “sexy,” and “ugly” are popular, as are accusations of “secret transgenderism.” All women holding visible roles are susceptible to these attacks, but women from ethnic minority backgrounds are especially vulnerable. Notable cases in the United States include Vice President Kamala Harris, Governor Gretchen Whitmer, and Congresswomen Ilhan Omar and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. While these women have managed to maintain political careers despite such campaigns, the ambitions of gendered disinformation go beyond the selected individual to discouraging women as a whole from active public political life. 

Tech companies have no clear incentive to combat disinformation. Until tech revenue isn’t reliant on the continuous scrolling of their users, who are often drawn by inflammatory content, we can count on the need for governments to take a primary role in promoting and enforcing an anti-disinformation agenda. Unfortunately, some state actors are exacerbating the problem by successfully coordinating gendered disinformation campaigns around the globe. In 2021, German Green Party chancellor candidate Annalena Baerbock went from front-runner to holding less than 15% of the nation’s vote following a comprehensive smear campaign that can be traced back to Moscow. In India, political parties are believed to operate highly organized troll armies that specifically attack women political opponents. A #ShePersisted report found that from Hungary and Italy to Brazil and Tunisia, state and non-state actors are involved in disinformation campaigns to attack women who threaten their interests within and outside their countries. The violation of women’s human rights acts as an early warning system for the degradation of the rights of all, and increased gendered disinformation is a siren call that the forces seeking a role in the fight for democracy and the promotion of human rights are under attack. This urgent issue calls for a diverse set of solutions. 

From the outcomes at CSW67, it is apparent that the UN understands it has a critical role to play in building norms and mechanisms for combatting disinformation. Our Common Agenda is full of references to the importance of building a trustworthy digital space, and the upcoming Global Digital Compact seems intent on promoting multilateral solutions to the problem. Policy approaches to controlling disinformation are, however, tricky. This is perhaps why CSW stopped short of calling for solutions that address the supply-side of disinformation, sticking to education as a means to potentially address demand. Without a clear solution in sight, the UN could draw on cases like the European Union and Australian E-Safety Commission, which explore the potential of establishing norms on government regulation of digital media companies, as well as incorporate a security-based lens on disinformation into conversations on cyberwarfare. Well-established NGO groups, such as Africa Check, can be a model for incorporating localized solutions.

Halfway to the deadline for the Sustainable Development Goals, the time is now for the UN to seriously consider disinformation’s ability to impede success. The struggle against disinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic correlates to SDG Goal 3 on health and well-being. Disinformation’s ability to disrupt peaceful elections, degrade trust in institutions, and deepen societal divisions directly relates to Goal 16 – peace, justice, and strong institutions. We know that disinformation stands in the way of adequate climate action, Goal 13. And at CSW, a line was sketched to disinformation’s impact on Goal 5, gender equality. As disinformation only stands to grow in complexity, power, and scope, the time is now to ardently call for solutions capable of meeting the challenge at hand.

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