Iran’s recent invitation to join the bloc of largely non-Western economies called BRICS is a new step toward strengthening its “Look to the East” foreign policy that has been espoused by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi.
The invitation follows Iran’s admission to full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is being touted by the Islamic Republic as a “historic development” and “strategic success” at a time when Iran has been isolated from influential members of the international community due to domestic unrest, support to Russia in the Ukraine war, and a deadlock in nuclear negotiations with the United States.
Ayatollah Khamenei believes that the future international order will be centered on Asia and that a supposedly U.S.-led hegemonic order is declining. By joining organizations such as the SCO and BRICS, Iran sends a message that it can confront the isolation imposed by America and Europe and does not need diplomatic engagement with the West over its nuclear program or other issues.
There is no doubt that membership in BRICS and the SCO weakens the position of supporters of a “Look to the West” orientation in the decision-making structure of Iran’s foreign policy. What remains to be seen is what tangible benefits membership in these groups can provide given the continuation of Western economic sanctions.
Although the “Look to the East” approach was also the dominant foreign policy of Iran during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad more than a decade ago, it has expanded considerably since the election of Raisi in 2021. Reasons for this include the government’s perceived need for support from similarly governed countries like China and Russia, the removal of reformists and supporters of relations with the West from Iran’s power structure and the weakening of Iranian civil society as the middle class shrinks due to a chronic economic crisis.
Hardliners opposed to Iranian overtures to the West have labeled efforts by the Mohammad Khatami government in the 1990s and 2000s and by Hassan Rouhani’s administration, which preceded Raisi’s, as “begging diplomacy.”
Although the conservatives themselves were a factor in the failure of reformists and pragmatists to seriously de-escalate tensions with the West, they blame what they regard as their opponents’ misplaced trust in Western promises. Ayatollah Khamenei believes that Iran’s experience with the West has shown that the West’s goal is to destroy the Islamic Revolution, not to learn to live with it. In Khamenei’s view, a Look East policy will better safeguard the current Iranian system.
Supporters of joining the SCO have argued that Iran can increase trade with members of the bloc even though Iran is blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international body that promotes transparency in international financial transactions. According to the Shanghai Charter, members must also not be under Chapter Seven of United Nations Charter and considered a threat to international peace and security, as Iran was before the conclusion of the 2015 nuclear accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The survival of that agreement is now very much in doubt.
Another key issue is whether BRICS will embrace de-dollarization. While Iran seeks an end to the dominance of the dollar in international trade because of the power it gives U.S. economic sanctions, the issue of forming a new BRICS currency was not on the agenda of the meeting in Johannesburg.
The notion that the Western-led order is declining has also been debated within the Iranian political establishment. Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and Ali Akbar Salehi, a former foreign minister and nuclear negotiator, have said that a new order has yet to be established and that Iran should adjust its foreign policy accordingly.
Ruling conservatives act as though the new order already exists and see organizations such as the SCO and BRICS as leverage for Iran in its confrontation with the West. However, influential members of these groups are not seeking such a confrontation. For example, the recent BRICS statement stressed the importance of reviving the JCPOA to support the global non-proliferation regime.
At the same time, Iran’s admission to BRICS, along with Arab rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, can foster further de-escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf region by giving these countries an additional venue for dialogue.
China, which recently brokered a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, raised the idea of expanding BRICS in 2017 and seeks to increase its influence through this organization. Russia sees BRICS as a tool of geopolitical competition and a means to increase its weight in a new Cold War with the West.
However, India, which is aligned to the U.S. through the Quad along with Australia and Japan and trades heavily with the West, does not see BRICS as an anti-Western bloc. Comments by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Johannesburg meeting suggest that India sees the organization as a means to further its development through economic networking.
Considering the economic and political intertwining of BRICS members (except Russia) with the West and the established world order, Iran should not expect major economic benefits from BRICS membership. It is also not realistic to expect this organization to seek an antagonistic confrontation with the liberal order based on Iran’s interpretation of that order.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class.
What Can Iran Achieve from BRICS Membership?
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
Iran’s recent invitation to join the bloc of largely non-Western economies called BRICS is a new step toward strengthening its “Look to the East” foreign policy that has been espoused by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi.
The invitation follows Iran’s admission to full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is being touted by the Islamic Republic as a “historic development” and “strategic success” at a time when Iran has been isolated from influential members of the international community due to domestic unrest, support to Russia in the Ukraine war, and a deadlock in nuclear negotiations with the United States.
Ayatollah Khamenei believes that the future international order will be centered on Asia and that a supposedly U.S.-led hegemonic order is declining. By joining organizations such as the SCO and BRICS, Iran sends a message that it can confront the isolation imposed by America and Europe and does not need diplomatic engagement with the West over its nuclear program or other issues.
There is no doubt that membership in BRICS and the SCO weakens the position of supporters of a “Look to the West” orientation in the decision-making structure of Iran’s foreign policy. What remains to be seen is what tangible benefits membership in these groups can provide given the continuation of Western economic sanctions.
Although the “Look to the East” approach was also the dominant foreign policy of Iran during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad more than a decade ago, it has expanded considerably since the election of Raisi in 2021. Reasons for this include the government’s perceived need for support from similarly governed countries like China and Russia, the removal of reformists and supporters of relations with the West from Iran’s power structure and the weakening of Iranian civil society as the middle class shrinks due to a chronic economic crisis.
Hardliners opposed to Iranian overtures to the West have labeled efforts by the Mohammad Khatami government in the 1990s and 2000s and by Hassan Rouhani’s administration, which preceded Raisi’s, as “begging diplomacy.”
Although the conservatives themselves were a factor in the failure of reformists and pragmatists to seriously de-escalate tensions with the West, they blame what they regard as their opponents’ misplaced trust in Western promises. Ayatollah Khamenei believes that Iran’s experience with the West has shown that the West’s goal is to destroy the Islamic Revolution, not to learn to live with it. In Khamenei’s view, a Look East policy will better safeguard the current Iranian system.
Supporters of joining the SCO have argued that Iran can increase trade with members of the bloc even though Iran is blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international body that promotes transparency in international financial transactions. According to the Shanghai Charter, members must also not be under Chapter Seven of United Nations Charter and considered a threat to international peace and security, as Iran was before the conclusion of the 2015 nuclear accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The survival of that agreement is now very much in doubt.
Another key issue is whether BRICS will embrace de-dollarization. While Iran seeks an end to the dominance of the dollar in international trade because of the power it gives U.S. economic sanctions, the issue of forming a new BRICS currency was not on the agenda of the meeting in Johannesburg.
The notion that the Western-led order is declining has also been debated within the Iranian political establishment. Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and Ali Akbar Salehi, a former foreign minister and nuclear negotiator, have said that a new order has yet to be established and that Iran should adjust its foreign policy accordingly.
Ruling conservatives act as though the new order already exists and see organizations such as the SCO and BRICS as leverage for Iran in its confrontation with the West. However, influential members of these groups are not seeking such a confrontation. For example, the recent BRICS statement stressed the importance of reviving the JCPOA to support the global non-proliferation regime.
At the same time, Iran’s admission to BRICS, along with Arab rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, can foster further de-escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf region by giving these countries an additional venue for dialogue.
China, which recently brokered a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, raised the idea of expanding BRICS in 2017 and seeks to increase its influence through this organization. Russia sees BRICS as a tool of geopolitical competition and a means to increase its weight in a new Cold War with the West.
However, India, which is aligned to the U.S. through the Quad along with Australia and Japan and trades heavily with the West, does not see BRICS as an anti-Western bloc. Comments by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Johannesburg meeting suggest that India sees the organization as a means to further its development through economic networking.
Considering the economic and political intertwining of BRICS members (except Russia) with the West and the established world order, Iran should not expect major economic benefits from BRICS membership. It is also not realistic to expect this organization to seek an antagonistic confrontation with the liberal order based on Iran’s interpretation of that order.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class.
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