As the world moved from an American unipolar moment after the end of the Cold War, the idea of a multipolar world order emerged as a popular theme. Yet the war in Ukraine has crystallized divisions in world politics that undermine this concept and appear to have ushered in a new bipolar era.
If before 2022 Russia and the European Union often managed to maintain equidistance between an increasingly hostile U.S. and China, now this fine balancing act seems increasingly implausible. The increasing alignment of Russia with China and the EU with the U.S. means that a truly multipolar world is unlikely to materialize.
The shift toward bipolarity can also be seen in the Middle East as powers that traditionally allied with the West, such as Saudi Arabia, are hedging in favor of Beijing and countries such as Iran that sought to balance between East and West are going all-in on China. Iranian officials, angry at the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposition of sanctions, look to China to lead a new global order that will allow Iran’s creaking autocracy to survive if not thrive.
Russia has also become increasingly dependent on China. Though the trend began after 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea and the West imposed a series of sanctions, the depth of Russian reliance on its eastern neighbor did not reach a critical level until after Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Prior to then, Russia was able to maintain a semblance of relative equidistancefrom China and the West in part by maintaining close economic ties with the EU, which was dependent for its energy needs on Russian natural gas. The Kremlin also avoided sharing sensitive technologies with China and was an obstacle to Chinese expansion in Central Asia.
With the war in Ukraine, however, Russia has become beholden to China. Trade, energy ties, military cooperation and overall political synergy have reached unprecedented highs, not seen since China was the junior partner to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early ‘60s. All present trends indicate that these are major developments of long-term character and that separating the two Eurasian powers is increasingly improbable, at least while Putin and Xi Jinping are in charge.
Ironically, Russia hoped to usher in the age of multipolarity when it invaded Ukraine in an effort to overturn the Kiev government. But Moscow’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory instead diminished Russia’s prestige. From an aspiring player in the multipolar world order, it has become a virtual appendage of China.
The EU, despite efforts by France to seek common understanding with Russia and to maintain independence of action regarding China, is now increasingly reliant on the U.S. Talk of European strategic autonomy has largely faded as the US-led NATO alliance has expanded to confront Russian aggression. The EU has hardened its position toward China. Some tactical concessions could be made to maintain and regulate trade ties, but it is clear that Brussels and Beijing are on diverging paths.
Moscow sees the emerging world as built around civilizations with spheres of influence and regionalism actively applied to immediate neighborhoods. Yet two big loose circles of geopolitical gravity are gradually being created around the U.S. and China.
True multipolarity would require a third power that would be a match for the U.S. and China. Russia could have been such a player had it conquered Ukraine. India and the rest of the Global South are not yet powerful enough. A true multipolar order as it existed in the 19th and early 20th centuries must be comprised of countries of similar, if not equal global influence.
Moreover, those periods of history featured constantly shifting alliances to maintain the balance of power by creating coalitions. The EU might try to find some common ground with China, while India and other middle powers sign lucrative economic and even military deals with China or other Eurasian powers. However, these countries are unlikely to enter definitive military-political alliances similar to those that existed before the first and second world wars.
Within the present bifurcated world order, the power balance is still heavily tilted in Washington’s favor despite all the talk about U.S. declining influence. This is evident in the Middle East where Washington maintains a network of military bases and stations some 40,000 troops, while China has only one base on the periphery of the region in Djibouti. China lacks the tools to maintain freedom of navigation in the region even as it has become the biggest importer of Middle Eastern oil and the largest trading partner for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its recent brokering of a normalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia was less a diplomatic breakthrough than a nimble harvesting of low-hanging fruit seen as tactically advantageous by historic rivals.
The U.S. remains the most consequential power in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, while China is in a strong second place. Together, they dwarf other emerging actors. This new bipolar order, however, has produced a growing number of fence-sitters for whom choosing neither side is a highly pragmatic choice bringing numerous geopolitical benefits. The so-called “Global South” are not so much non-aligned as agnostic, seeking as many options as possible.
Compared with China, the U.S. still enjoys a number of advantages. It benefits from ocean protection, friendly neighbors, and agriculturally rich lands. The dollar remains the world’s favored reserve currency. America can commit immense foreign policy blunders such as in Iraq, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, then withdraw and reconstitute its power. China, in contrast, has long borders and unstable frontiers that constrain its actions. Fears that it might invade Taiwan have led to a tightening of U.S. ties with Australia, Japan, and South Korea and even a historic reconciliation between the latter two Asian states.
The emerging order will certainly be more chaotic, pitting the Western idea of alliance against a looser Eurasian vision of groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Much will depend on China’s continued economic growth, despite an aging population and centralized bureaucracy. But for now, the trend toward bipolarity seems clear.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia and a scholar of silk roads.
Ukraine War Ushers in a New Bipolar World Led by the US and China
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
As the world moved from an American unipolar moment after the end of the Cold War, the idea of a multipolar world order emerged as a popular theme. Yet the war in Ukraine has crystallized divisions in world politics that undermine this concept and appear to have ushered in a new bipolar era.
If before 2022 Russia and the European Union often managed to maintain equidistance between an increasingly hostile U.S. and China, now this fine balancing act seems increasingly implausible. The increasing alignment of Russia with China and the EU with the U.S. means that a truly multipolar world is unlikely to materialize.
The shift toward bipolarity can also be seen in the Middle East as powers that traditionally allied with the West, such as Saudi Arabia, are hedging in favor of Beijing and countries such as Iran that sought to balance between East and West are going all-in on China. Iranian officials, angry at the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposition of sanctions, look to China to lead a new global order that will allow Iran’s creaking autocracy to survive if not thrive.
Russia has also become increasingly dependent on China. Though the trend began after 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea and the West imposed a series of sanctions, the depth of Russian reliance on its eastern neighbor did not reach a critical level until after Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Prior to then, Russia was able to maintain a semblance of relative equidistancefrom China and the West in part by maintaining close economic ties with the EU, which was dependent for its energy needs on Russian natural gas. The Kremlin also avoided sharing sensitive technologies with China and was an obstacle to Chinese expansion in Central Asia.
With the war in Ukraine, however, Russia has become beholden to China. Trade, energy ties, military cooperation and overall political synergy have reached unprecedented highs, not seen since China was the junior partner to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early ‘60s. All present trends indicate that these are major developments of long-term character and that separating the two Eurasian powers is increasingly improbable, at least while Putin and Xi Jinping are in charge.
Ironically, Russia hoped to usher in the age of multipolarity when it invaded Ukraine in an effort to overturn the Kiev government. But Moscow’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory instead diminished Russia’s prestige. From an aspiring player in the multipolar world order, it has become a virtual appendage of China.
The EU, despite efforts by France to seek common understanding with Russia and to maintain independence of action regarding China, is now increasingly reliant on the U.S. Talk of European strategic autonomy has largely faded as the US-led NATO alliance has expanded to confront Russian aggression. The EU has hardened its position toward China. Some tactical concessions could be made to maintain and regulate trade ties, but it is clear that Brussels and Beijing are on diverging paths.
Moscow sees the emerging world as built around civilizations with spheres of influence and regionalism actively applied to immediate neighborhoods. Yet two big loose circles of geopolitical gravity are gradually being created around the U.S. and China.
True multipolarity would require a third power that would be a match for the U.S. and China. Russia could have been such a player had it conquered Ukraine. India and the rest of the Global South are not yet powerful enough. A true multipolar order as it existed in the 19th and early 20th centuries must be comprised of countries of similar, if not equal global influence.
Moreover, those periods of history featured constantly shifting alliances to maintain the balance of power by creating coalitions. The EU might try to find some common ground with China, while India and other middle powers sign lucrative economic and even military deals with China or other Eurasian powers. However, these countries are unlikely to enter definitive military-political alliances similar to those that existed before the first and second world wars.
Within the present bifurcated world order, the power balance is still heavily tilted in Washington’s favor despite all the talk about U.S. declining influence. This is evident in the Middle East where Washington maintains a network of military bases and stations some 40,000 troops, while China has only one base on the periphery of the region in Djibouti. China lacks the tools to maintain freedom of navigation in the region even as it has become the biggest importer of Middle Eastern oil and the largest trading partner for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its recent brokering of a normalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia was less a diplomatic breakthrough than a nimble harvesting of low-hanging fruit seen as tactically advantageous by historic rivals.
The U.S. remains the most consequential power in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, while China is in a strong second place. Together, they dwarf other emerging actors. This new bipolar order, however, has produced a growing number of fence-sitters for whom choosing neither side is a highly pragmatic choice bringing numerous geopolitical benefits. The so-called “Global South” are not so much non-aligned as agnostic, seeking as many options as possible.
Compared with China, the U.S. still enjoys a number of advantages. It benefits from ocean protection, friendly neighbors, and agriculturally rich lands. The dollar remains the world’s favored reserve currency. America can commit immense foreign policy blunders such as in Iraq, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, then withdraw and reconstitute its power. China, in contrast, has long borders and unstable frontiers that constrain its actions. Fears that it might invade Taiwan have led to a tightening of U.S. ties with Australia, Japan, and South Korea and even a historic reconciliation between the latter two Asian states.
The emerging order will certainly be more chaotic, pitting the Western idea of alliance against a looser Eurasian vision of groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Much will depend on China’s continued economic growth, despite an aging population and centralized bureaucracy. But for now, the trend toward bipolarity seems clear.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia and a scholar of silk roads.
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