The UN Emergency Platform Idea is Not a “Power Grab”—It’s a Force Multiplier

It is necessary to recognize that this initiative emerges out of a cascading array of disasters that spotlight major gaps in global governance.

By  Peter J. Hoffman  •  Richard Ponzio

In his (September 2021) Our Common Agenda report, UN Secretary-General António Guterres calls for a new Emergency Platform to respond to complex global crises, such as future pandemic risks, a major climatic event, or disruption to global flows of goods or people (e.g., causing food or energy insecurity). Despite facing criticisms in certain quarters, the idea is both timely and necessary, designed to harness existing resources and institutional machinery for improved crisis management, both from within and beyond the United Nations system.

A March 2023 follow-on UN policy brief on the Emergency Platform idea further elaborates:

The Emergency Platform would not be a standing body or entity but a set of protocols that could be activated when needed. … [it would] bring together all relevant actors that can contribute to the response – including but not limited to networks of willing Member States, the United Nations system, international financial institutions, regional bodies and relevant private sector, civil society, academic and non-governmental actors – while recognizing the primary role of intergovernmental organs in decision-making; …The Emergency Platform should provide high-level political support and advocacy for the day-to-day operational and coordination activities carried out by mandated entities.

In a recent critique of the proposal, The Heritage Foundation’s Brett Schaefer expresses concern that it will undermine U.S. sovereignty, arguing that: i) the Emergency Platform represents a “stunning attempted power grab” by the Secretary-General by granting more authority to international bureaucrats and establishing new supranational rules; ii) its structure will diminish the authority of national governments and pressure them into cooperation through the platform’s “decrees”; and iii) the overarching goal of next year’s Summit of the Future is to enhance the UN and Secretary-General’s power, through the adoption of the Emergency Platform and other proposals, at the expense of Member States.

This depiction, however, mischaracterizes the purpose, role, and mechanics of the Emergency Platform. Before speaking to the claim of a “power grab” that undercuts national governments, it is necessary to recognize that this initiative emerges out of a cascading array of disasters that spotlight major gaps in global governance.

The Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009), the COVID-19 pandemic and its knock-on effects, and the more recent global food security and cost-of-living crises demonstrate that current piecemeal approaches are inadequate to prevent emergencies within a country or region from metastasizing into worldwide catastrophes. A vehicle is needed for realizing predictable and rapid responses through greater cooperation not only among states, but also intergovernmental organizations, civil society, and the private sector to more efficiently and effectively allocate resources to save lives. (For a fuller discussion of the Emergency Platform’s potential, see section five of the Global Governance Innovation Report 2023.)

Mr. Schaefer’s critiques raise important concerns about the authority of national governments, but a closer reading of the proposal and associated policy brief shows that his alarm is overblown. First, the Secretary-General’s recommendations explicitly state, “the work of an Emergency Platform must fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States…” Participation in the Emergency Platform is entirely voluntary, and the decisions that drive it are not legally binding. Second, governments would provide regular input into the work of the Emergency Platform, as the protocols state that among those the Secretary-General would consult in deciding to convene this new coordination mechanism are “relevant national authorities.”

One aspect identified by Mr. Shaefer that does warrant further deliberation involves the protocols by which an Emergency Platform stands down. Sunsetting too soon could create a shortfall that extends a crisis. At the same time, continuing a platform that potentially drains resources from other disaster response mechanisms is not optimal, so there is an incentive to establish it on only temporary bases. Again, while the Secretary-General plays a part in galvanizing support for an ad hoc platform, it is major stakeholders and other contributors who will ultimately determine a specific platform’s duration.

In short, rather than a wholesale restructuring of international relations that undermines states, the Emergency Platform is a timely reform that coheres existing state and non-state capacities. Article 99 of the Charter gives the Secretary-General convening authority on matters of peace and security, but no one would rightly claim that this role has undermined the power of governments. Similarly, the Emergency Platform would allow the Secretary-General to spearhead the effective coordination of responses to complex global shocks.

Furthermore, as the proposal refrains from calling for a new standing body or resources, it is by no means a usurpation of authority or subtle subversion. On the contrary, the initiative will better harness capabilities and cement commitments to achieve greater proficiency and positive, life saving results—rather than a “power grab”, the Emergency Platform is much more a “force multiplier.”

Brett Schaefer’s third point—that the UN and Secretary-General are seeking through the Summit of the Future, in September 2024, to augment their authorities in some kind of zero-sum battle pitted against the U.S. and other Member States—runs counter to why the United States led the founding of the United Nations in 1945 in San Francisco and how the world body is actually structured. With the ultimate goal of “sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” all nineteen chapters of the UN Charter clearly delineate how equally sovereign Member States, first and foremost, lead the United Nations and manage its Secretariat. Next year’s summit will not alter this fundamental relationship.

Moreover, the Summit of the Future find its origins in the UN75 Political Declaration agreed to, in September 2020, by the Trump administration and the representatives of the UN’s other 192 Member States. Its preparatory roadmap was endorsed, in September 2022, by the Biden Administration, which can draw important lessons over the next fourteen months from the Bush administration’s support for a similar, consensus-based UN World Summit nearly two decades ago. Its primary outcome document, adopted in September 2005, led to important innovations, such as creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, as well as the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect principle to halt mass atrocities.

Next year’s summit presents a rare, generational opportunity for the United Nations to keep pace with changing global threats and challenges. Just as past U.S. administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have found it in America’s interests and consistent with its values to occasionally back UN reform initiatives, preparations now underway for the Summit of the Future should be viewed in a similar light.

Besides ensuring greater accountability and value-for-money to current U.S. tax-payers, doing so renews America’s commitment to the ideals espoused by leaders of our country’s World War II generation. They sought to avoid repeating past mistakes, including the isolationism and exclusive nationalism that contributed to the demise of the League of Nations and condemned humanity to yet another world war. In a historical moment when debates on the character of governance (at nearly all levels) are haunted by frustrations over poor performance and mistrust, the U.S. finds itself not only defending democracy proactively but a rules-based international order. The surge in humanitarian needs—by the end of 2022, 339 million people (or 1 of every 23 people) required assistance, a staggering jump from 274 million at the start of year—reveals both the extent to which global governance is needed and yet needs reform too.

The Emergency Platform is neither a wolf in sheep’s clothing, nor is it a panacea for all crises. However, it is a necessary and vital investment in a world where states remain indispensable to the political infrastructure of inclusive and impactful responses to mounting and complex global shocks.

Peter J. Hoffman is an Associate Professor of International Affairs at the New School.

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