The Origins of the Minerva Initiative

The Minerva Initiative, which then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced in April 2008, was the first major effort by the Defense Department to engage systematically with the social science community since the Vietnam War.¹  Note: Patricia Cohen, “Pentagon to Consult Academics on Security,” The New York Times, June 18, 2008, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/arts/18minerva.html.    The essay begins by discussing the deficit in intellectual capital that the Department of Defense faced during the first decade of the twenty-first century. It goes on to describe the process of conceptualizing the initiative before outlining the Minerva Initiative as announced by Gates in his April 2008 speech to the American Association of Universities.

The World of Ideas and the World of Action

 Since World War II, the relationship between government and the academy has witnessed three distinct phases.²  Note: See Thomas G. Mahnken, “Bridging the Gap Between the Worlds of Ideas and Actions,” Orbis (Winter 2010).    The first phase began during World War II and continued into the early decades of the Cold War. During World War II, a wide swath of American society, including scholars and educators, applied their skills to the war effort. This experience of public service shaped a generation of engaged scholars who devoted themselves to policy relevant research during the early decades of the Cold War. In response to new challenges, such as international communism and nuclear weapons, universities became incubators for novel ideas, with funding often provided by the government. The barriers between the academy and government service were relatively low. In addition, the first generation of federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) such as the RAND Corporation, as well as university-affiliated research centers (UARCs) such as the Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Laboratory, served as a sort of halfway house between the worlds of ideas and action. Cooperation between the government and academia gave birth to new fields of study such as game theory and Kremlinology. Academics played a prominent role in U.S. strategy formulation during the early Cold War. Yale’s Bernard Brodie and Chicago’s Albert Wohlstetter (both of whom also spent significant parts of their careers at RAND) made seminal contributions to nuclear deterrence theory, and William Kaufmann played a key part in developing systems analysis, both at Princeton and RAND.

Accelerating this interaction was the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which greatly increased the federal government’s role in funding education at every level. Federally funded loans and fellowships opened up graduate school to a generation of scholars and practitioners and greatly bolstered the study of foreign languages and cultures.

The early Cold War was not, however, altogether a golden age. The study of nuclear weapons, for example, was controversial on university campuses from the start. Brodie, for example, moved from Dartmouth to Yale before eventually finding a more welcoming intellectual home at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA.

The tension between the government and academia devolved into open conflict in the late 1960s, bringing on the second, stormy phase of the relationship. Although the proximate cause of the breakup was widespread disapproval of the Vietnam War among professors and their students, trends on both sides contributed to and ultimately solidified the split once it occurred. The divorce thus persisted far beyond the end of the war. The academy, for its part, over time increasingly gravitated toward methods, and explored questions, that were more theoretical than practical, and over time the incentive structure and professional ethos of the academy became detached from the need for public service. As a result, we live in a world where scholars too often teach theory and methods that are relevant to their peers but not to the majority of their students, who will work outside of academia.³  Note: Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Scholars on the Sidelines,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2009, A15.  

As scholars began to drift away from policy-relevant research, policy makers sought expertise elsewhere. The web of advisors in and around the capitol thickened, ranging from FFRDCs such as the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), to think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Brookings Institution, to the legions of defense contractors encamped in the suburbs of Washington, D.C. As time went on, it became less frequent for presidents to turn to Harvard to find a Henry Kissinger or Columbia for a Zbigniew Brzezinski; now they could tap a think tank or defense industry to fill the ranks of their administration.

In a fundamental sense, scholars and policy makers have increasingly inhabited two different worlds – the world of ideas and the world of action. These worlds operate according to their own rules, and over time have attracted different types of inhabitants. Whereas the scholar seeks recognition through publication and citation of his work, the policy maker takes quiet satisfaction in seeing his ideas turned into action. Whereas the scholar aims for elegance and parsimony in explaining patterns of facts, the policy maker seeks efficacy in affecting events. Whereas the scholar emphasizes research, the policy maker prizes experience. Whereas much of the scholar’s work is retrospective, drawing on documents, data, and interviews to explain the past and perhaps predict the future, the policy maker must operate with limited facts and under intense time pressure to deal with and hopefully affect an uncertain future.

The Post-Cold War Landscape

In the post-Cold War world, it became increasingly apparent that the gap between the government and the academy was undesirable. First, the distance between the academy and the government denied the government, and ultimately the American people, expertise that could help reach better decisions. This was particularly apparent when it comes to the need to comprehend foreign cultures and societies. The disciplines that possess greatest insight in these areas, sociology and anthropology, were particularly hostile to cooperation with government. Second, the gap abetted the turn within the academy toward abstract theory detached from practicality and relevance. Finally, the divorce of theory from policy hurt students who, as citizens, have a vital role to play in the practice of American democracy.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it became painfully apparent that the United States faced a host of new security challenges.⁴  Note: On the gap between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 perceptions of security challenges, see Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, “Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes toward Transformation,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003).    At the same time, it was equally clear to a number of senior policy makers that the United States faced a deficit in intellectual capital – both within the U.S. government and in academia – on these emerging challenges. This deficit was particularly apparent when it came to the “wars of today” – the wars that the United States was fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against Al Qaeda globally, as well as potential “wars of tomorrow” – first and foremost the competition (and the growing prospect of conflict) with China.

A related deficit, less apparent at the time, ironically had to do with Russia: whereas the U.S. government expended considerable effort over the course of the Cold War to build intellectual capital on the Soviet Union and the Red Army, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union it allowed that capital to dwindle and did not replenish it. The lack of understanding of Russia became telling with the rise of Vladimir Putin and Russia’s growing military activism, beginning with the 2008 Georgia War.

The Origins of Minerva

Initial thinking about how best to increase the Defense Department’s intellectual capital on twenty-first century challenges began in the George W. Bush administration and was spurred by several senior Defense Department leaders, including Ambassador Eric Edelman, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Dr. Abram Shulsky, a Special Assistant to Edelman; and Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment. Initial proposals coalesced around the idea of establishing a new FFRDC to focus on the challenges posed by Islam and China as well as disciplines such as anthropology, demography, and others that were important to national defense but were not being effectively used by the Defense Department.⁵  Note: See Michael C. Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 233.    Much as the RAND Corporation had served as the catalyst for thinking about the nuclear age, this new organization would help equip the government and the nation for the very different challenges of the 21^st century⁶.  Note: For a similar proposal, see Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Thinking Outside the Tank,” The National Interest (Winter 2004/05): 90-98.    Of note, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld had previously served as Chairman of the Board of the RAND Corporation between 1981 and 1986 and again between 1995 and 1996.⁷  Note: Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 155, 178; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 274.    

The idea of building intellectual capital to meet the needs of American national security took hold during Robert M. Gates’ tenure as Secretary of Defense, largely because it resonated with his background and his interests. Gates was himself the beneficiary of a NDEA grant as a graduate student in Indiana University’s Russian and East European Institute in the mid-1960s. Moreover, prior to returning to government service as Secretary of Defense, Gates had served as President of Texas A&M University, an experience that he had enjoyed.⁸  Note: Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 1.    Those around him also believed that although his tenure as Secretary of Defense would largely be defined by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda, an initiative to build intellectual capital gave him a unique opportunity to position the Department to meet future challenges better.

Gates embraced the goal of building intellectual capital within the Defense Department but did not favor the establishment of a new FFRDC, which he saw as too expensive and unlikely to garner Congressional support.⁹  Note: See Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant, 234.    The effort was instead transformed into a Department of Defense-sponsored, university-based social science research initiative that was to focus on areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. Its goals were to foster and improve the Department’s social science intellectual capital and ability to address future challenges as well as to improve the Department’s relationship with the social sciences community. Responsibility for crafting and implementing the initiative fell primarily to Shulsky and the author, who assumed the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning in August 2006 and served for the remainder of the George W. Bush administration.

To sound out the academic community, in October 2007 Gates contacted Robert M. Berdahl, the President of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and former Chancellor of the University of California and President of the University of Texas at Austin. Gates raised the possibility of launching what came to be known as the Minerva Initiative and seeking AAU’s help in shaping it. Gates and Berdahl knew each other from Gates’ time at Texas A&M and his tenure on AAU’s Board.¹⁰  Note: Cohen, “Pentagon to Consult Academics on Security.”     

A series of discussions between the Defense Department and AAU ensued. In January 2008, a small group of Defense Department officials, including the author and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories, Will Rees, met with AAU leaders, including Berdahl and Graham Spanier, head of the AAU’s Executive Committee and its National Security Higher Education Advisory Board. These discussions reinforced the importance of proceeding along two tracks: one involving a series of Department of Defense research grants, and another involving funding from the National Science Foundation.¹¹  Note: Cohen, “Pentagon to Consult Academics on Security.”     First, the Defense Department would use its existing infrastructure for Multidisciplinary University Research Initiatives (MURIs) to incorporate the topics selected by the Secretary of Defense. Second, the Defense Department and NSF would conclude a Memorandum of Understanding allowing the Department to harness NSF’s extensive experience in funding social science projects. The NSF track was critical to the success of the overall Minerva program as it provided the Department access to those sectors of the social science community that were wary about direct engagement with the Department.

The Birth of Minerva

These efforts culminated in the public-roll out of the Minerva Initiative in an April 14, 2008 speech to the AAU, held on the 50^th anniversary of the National Defense Education Act, which had helped fund social science research and played a major role in establishing area studies programs that had formed a major bridge between academia and government. In announcing the Minerva Initiative, Gates drew a comparison to the conditions that yielded the NDEA – the need “to come to terms with new threats to national security” – as well as a contrast with the Cold War:

Rather than one, single entity – the Soviet Union – and one, single animating ideology – communism – we are instead facing challenges from multiple sources: a new, more malignant form of terrorism inspired by jihadist extremism, ethnic strife, disease, poverty, climate change, failed and failing states, resurgent powers, and so on. The contours of the international arena are much more complex than at any time during the Cold War. This stark reality – driven home in the years since September 11th – has led to a renewed focus on the overall structure and readiness of our government to deal with the threats of the 21st century.¹²  Note: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities, Washington, D.C., on April 14, 2008.  

Gates emphasized the important role of academic research in national security. As he put it:

Our universities remain our most vital and vibrant source for new thinking and research on issues large and small. Just as we have done in the past, we must today find new ways for this pillar of American society to serve our citizens, our nation, and the world.¹³  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.

At the same time, he acknowledged the difficulties in the relationship:

Despite successes in the past and present, it is an unfortunate reality that many people believe there is this sharp divide between academia and the military – that each continues to look on the other with a jaundiced eye. These feelings are rooted in history – academics who felt used and disenchanted after Vietnam, and troops who felt abandoned and unfairly criticized by academia during the same time…These feelings – regardless of whether they are based in reality – are not good for our men and women in uniform, for our universities, or for our country.¹⁴  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  

The speech offered the broad outlines of the Minerva Initiative:

[W]e envision consortia of universities that will promote research in specific areas. These consortia could also be repositories of open-source documentary archives. The Department of Defense, perhaps in conjunction with other government agencies, could provide the funding for these projects.¹⁵  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  

He went on to outline four areas of particular interest. The first was “Chinese Military and Technology Studies,” where Gates noted the need to disseminate and study the vast amount of open-source information that the Chinese government publishes on military and technological developments. By pooling resources and promoting scholarly interaction on Chinese military and technological developments, Gates argued that an academic consortium “would make a very real contribution to our understanding of the intentions of an important world power and military power– an understanding that would have real impact on public policy.”¹⁶  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.    

A second focus area, “The Iraqi and Terrorist Perspectives Projects,” grew out of the fact that the United States seized the archives of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in the 2003 Iraq War. These archives, which number millions of pages of written records and thousands of hours of recordings, represent the largest collection of primary sources on any Arab regime, past or present. The collection had already revised our understanding of the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, but scholars had only just begun to mine the archive.¹⁷  Note: Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, The Iraqi Perspectives Project (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, eds., The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Williamson Murray and Kevin Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Strategic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).    As Gates noted, “further research could yield unprecedented insight into the workings of dictatorial third-world regimes,” but “we cannot realize the full value of these resources unless we find some way of making them widely available.”¹⁸  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.   

In the speech, Secretary Gates announced the establishment of a Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University to give scholars access to the Ba’ath archive.¹⁹  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.    Much as the Smolensk archive²⁰ Note: The Smolensk archive of Soviet documents was captured by the Germans during the invasion of the Soviet Union and subsequently fell into American hands at the end of the war.    informed many of the major early works of Sovietology,²¹  Note: Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958); Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).    access to the records of the Saddam Hussein regime promised to spark new scholarship on authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and to reshape fundamentally the field of Middle East studies.

Third, under the heading of “Religious and Ideological Studies,” Gates emphasized the need to understand the ideological climate within the Islamic world. As he noted, “understanding how this climate is likely to evolve over time, and what actions – including U.S. actions – will affect it [is] one of the most significant intellectual challenges that we face.”²²  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.    Finally, in announcing the “New Disciplines Project,” Gates noted the need to engage a broad range of disciplines, including history, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology. As he put it, “We are interested in furthering our knowledge of these issues and in soliciting diverse points of view – regardless of whether those views are critical of the Department’s efforts.”²³  Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  

To jumpstart the Minerva Initiative, the Defense Department piloted two complementary tracks of funding: a Broad Area Announcement (BAA) and a separate solicitation from the National Science Foundation. The response from academia to these separate solicitations was overwhelming: the two efforts yielded nearly 450 proposals for research.²⁴  Note: Thomas G. Mahnken, “Building Bridges and Communities,” at http://essays.ssrc.org/minerva/2008/12/30/mahnken/    In January 2009, the Defense Department announced the award of seven grants involving at least 16 American and foreign academic institutions worth a total of up to $50 million. These grants funded research on the diffusion and influence of counter-radical Muslim discourse; emotion in intergroup relations; the evolving relationship between technology and national security in China; and climate change, state stability, and political risk in Africa, among other topics.²⁵  Note: See the Minerva web page at http://minerva.dtic.mil.   

Minerva Then and Now

The Minerva Initiative represented a successful effort to build intellectual capital to meet the needs of U.S. national security. Minerva helped to fund research, educate scholars, and train government employees. To take but one example, it produced at low cost a considerable body of work on Chinese defense innovation that has played an important role in preparing the United States for long-term competition with China.²⁶  Note: See, for example, Tai Ming Cheung, ed., Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Tai Ming Cheung and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging US-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2018); Tai Ming Cheung, ed., China’s Emergence as a Defense Technological Power (Oxford: Routledge, 2012).    

Minerva was, however, a modest success. It did not, but also could not, fully meet the need for skills and expertise, nor could it single-handedly alter the course of academic disciplines. As with any effort to build intellectual capital, additional resources would have yielded greater results. Similarly, greater focus and leadership involvement over time would have magnified its impact.

The decline of Soviet/Russia expertise in the U.S. government offers a cautionary tale of the dominance of short-term thinking in official circles, just as the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates the need to not just build, but also stockpile strategic expertise. Russia expertise is today at a premium not only because of Putin’s aggression in Europe, but also because of thickening ties between Moscow and Beijing.²⁷  Note: See, for example, Angela Stent, Russia, China, and the West after Crimea, 2015-16 Paper Series No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Transatlantic Academy, 2016). Given the reality of long-term competition with China and Russia and the growing possibility of great-power war, the need for thoughtful engagement between the academic and national security communities is both greater and more urgent now than it was when Minerva was launched. To succeed in this environment, leaders will need a broader and more diverse set of intellectual tools than most currently have and will rest upon a firm foundation of broad, multidisciplinary basic research. Government and the academy will need to work together broadly if the United States is to be prepared for the challenges it faces today and will face in the future.

Thomas G. Mahnken is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Senior Research Professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Among his most recent books is Learning the Lessons of Modern War (Stanford University Press, 2020).

Notes

• 1
    Note: Patricia Cohen, “Pentagon to Consult Academics on Security,” The New York Times, June 18, 2008, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/arts/18minerva.html.  
• 2
    Note: See Thomas G. Mahnken, “Bridging the Gap Between the Worlds of Ideas and Actions,” Orbis (Winter 2010).  
• 3
    Note: Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Scholars on the Sidelines,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2009, A15.  
• 4
    Note: On the gap between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 perceptions of security challenges, see Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, “Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes toward Transformation,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003).  
• 5
    Note: See Michael C. Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 233.  
• 6
  .  Note: For a similar proposal, see Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Thinking Outside the Tank,” The National Interest (Winter 2004/05): 90-98.  
• 7
    Note: Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 155, 178; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 274.    
• 8
    Note: Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 1.  
• 9
    Note: See Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant, 234.  
• 10
    Note: Cohen, “Pentagon to Consult Academics on Security.”     
• 11
    Note: Cohen, “Pentagon to Consult Academics on Security.”   
• 12
    Note: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities, Washington, D.C., on April 14, 2008.  
• 13
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.
• 14
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  
• 15
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  
• 16
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.    
• 17
    Note: Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, The Iraqi Perspectives Project (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, eds., The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Williamson Murray and Kevin Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Strategic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
• 18
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.   
• 19
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  
• 20
  Note: The Smolensk archive of Soviet documents was captured by the Germans during the invasion of the Soviet Union and subsequently fell into American hands at the end of the war.  
• 21
    Note: Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958); Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).  
• 22
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  
• 23
    Note: Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities.  
• 24
    Note: Thomas G. Mahnken, “Building Bridges and Communities,” at http://essays.ssrc.org/minerva/2008/12/30/mahnken/  
• 25
    Note: See the Minerva web page at http://minerva.dtic.mil.   
• 26
    Note: See, for example, Tai Ming Cheung, ed., Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Tai Ming Cheung and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging US-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2018); Tai Ming Cheung, ed., China’s Emergence as a Defense Technological Power (Oxford: Routledge, 2012).    
• 27
    Note: See, for example, Angela Stent, Russia, China, and the West after Crimea, 2015-16 Paper Series No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Transatlantic Academy, 2016).