Russia’s recent embrace of a joint statement with Arab countries challenging Iran’s decades-old control of three islands in the Persian Gulf sparked a variety of reactions from Iranian political factions.
Tehran summoned Russia’s ambassador in response to the July 10, 2023, statement. However, conservatives who dominate the Iranian government initially refrained from a harsh response, in contrast to reformists and some social network activists who saw an opportune moment to attack Russia and criticize Iran’s growing ties to the Kremlin.
The reactions can be better understood when viewed through the prism of Iran’s supreme leader and the way in which he directs foreign policy. Over his 34 years in power, the 84-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has developed his own diplomatic apparatus at the heart of the Islamic Republic. This apparatus relies on a group of trusted veteran advisors accumulated over the past three decades to advance “shadow diplomacy.” Among them are Ali Akbar Velayati, who served as foreign minister during the presidency of Khamenei and his successor, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; Kamal Kharrazi, foreign minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami; and Mohsen Rezaei, a long-time former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Under the Iranian system, the supreme leader has the final word on all key foreign and domestic policies. He typically must approve the choice of foreign minister and he keeps a particularly close watch on such sensitive issues as nuclear talks, Israel, relations with the U.S., and the “Look to the East” strategy of closer ties with Russia and China.
In the aftermath of Russia siding with Arab states regarding the three islands, Velayati urged Russian leaders not to be “naive” while still describing them as “friends” of the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, did not even mention Russia in his seemingly soft response. This led Tehran-based journalist Sara Masoumi to question Abdollahian’s judgment.
Hamid Abutalebi, a political advisor to former president Hassan Rouhani, was much more critical. He noted in a tweet said that Russia has a more than 100-year record of “unforgivable betrayal” against the people of Iran. Thus, Moscow’s latest stance was hardly surprising.
Still, not all those close to the supreme leader were restrained.
Rezaie tweeted that “Russia, China, America, and England should know that Iran will not return to the Qajar and Pahlavi era [of weakness]. The Islamic Republic defends its land, rights, and nation with all its might. Russia should correct its position.”
Kharrazi, who heads an advisory body on foreign relations, the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, suggested during a meeting with the Japanese ambassador in Tehran that Russia and Japan negotiate a similarly long-standing dispute over several islands in the Pacific. Abdollahian, meanwhile, toughened his stance during a joint press conference with his Omani counterpart and asserted Tehran’s intolerance for any interference by Moscow or any other party in matters related to Iran’s sovereignty.
The mixed messages reflect Khamenei’s dual-track approach to foreign policy and his penchant for playing multiple cards.
At the leader’s direction, a Strategic Council of Foreign Relations was created in 2005 after the Khatami administration was replaced by that of a conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Notably, the council includes figures such as Saeed Jalili, a hardliner former nuclear negotiator, and Abbas Araghchi, who serves as the secretary of the council.
Araghchi was deputy to well-known former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and a key figure in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with the U.S. and other world powers.
Kharrazi and Araghchi together visited Damascus in March 2023, shortly after Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize relations in a deal largely negotiated Ali Shamkhani, until recently the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the top body for foreign and defense matters.
Back-channel diplomacy has also occurred in Oman as the U.S. and Iran seek to de-escalate tensions over Iran’s nuclear advances and imprisonment of dual nationals. The talks are meant to offset the perception of inaction by the current government of President Ebrahim Raisi. Oman has long been a conduit for U.S.-Iran talks and hosted secret meetings in 2013 — when Ahmadinejad was still president — that led to the nuclear agreement.
The latest unhappiness with Russia has reminded many Iranians not only of centuries-old grievances over the loss of what was once Iranian territory but also of Russia’s often siding with the West regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Both Russia and China in 2008 backed UN Security Council Resolution 1803, which condemned Iran’s nuclear advances and led to multilateral economic sanctions.
Iranians understand that they cannot always count on support from so-called “friendly states.” However, the failure to revive the nuclear deal and nearly 45 years of hostility with the United States have significantly restricted Iran’s options.
In the face of complex geopolitics, the Iranian leadership must carefully navigate its relationships and try harder to adopt a more pragmatic and balanced approach to foreign affairs. After all, Iran embraced a policy of “Neither East nor West” after the 1979 revolution to try to guarantee its political independence.
Iran’s leader should push the Raisi government to more forcefully defend Iran’s rights in talks with both Russia and China, which embraced a similar pro-Arab statement regarding the three islands when Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in December 2022. Khamenei can also use the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations to deliver tough messages discretely.
At the same time, Iran’s supreme leader needs to put more pressure on Raisi’s hardliner government to reach an understanding de-escalating tensions with the U.S. The success of such talks would have the added benefit of showing Russia that Iran is not as dependent as Moscow may have thought.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political science expert who served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency and as a journalist at the Tehran Times.
Supreme Leader Uses ‘Shadow Diplomacy’ to Advance Iranian Foreign Policy
By Mohammad Mazhari
Middle East & North Africa
Russia’s recent embrace of a joint statement with Arab countries challenging Iran’s decades-old control of three islands in the Persian Gulf sparked a variety of reactions from Iranian political factions.
Tehran summoned Russia’s ambassador in response to the July 10, 2023, statement. However, conservatives who dominate the Iranian government initially refrained from a harsh response, in contrast to reformists and some social network activists who saw an opportune moment to attack Russia and criticize Iran’s growing ties to the Kremlin.
The reactions can be better understood when viewed through the prism of Iran’s supreme leader and the way in which he directs foreign policy. Over his 34 years in power, the 84-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has developed his own diplomatic apparatus at the heart of the Islamic Republic. This apparatus relies on a group of trusted veteran advisors accumulated over the past three decades to advance “shadow diplomacy.” Among them are Ali Akbar Velayati, who served as foreign minister during the presidency of Khamenei and his successor, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; Kamal Kharrazi, foreign minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami; and Mohsen Rezaei, a long-time former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Under the Iranian system, the supreme leader has the final word on all key foreign and domestic policies. He typically must approve the choice of foreign minister and he keeps a particularly close watch on such sensitive issues as nuclear talks, Israel, relations with the U.S., and the “Look to the East” strategy of closer ties with Russia and China.
In the aftermath of Russia siding with Arab states regarding the three islands, Velayati urged Russian leaders not to be “naive” while still describing them as “friends” of the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, did not even mention Russia in his seemingly soft response. This led Tehran-based journalist Sara Masoumi to question Abdollahian’s judgment.
Hamid Abutalebi, a political advisor to former president Hassan Rouhani, was much more critical. He noted in a tweet said that Russia has a more than 100-year record of “unforgivable betrayal” against the people of Iran. Thus, Moscow’s latest stance was hardly surprising.
Still, not all those close to the supreme leader were restrained.
Rezaie tweeted that “Russia, China, America, and England should know that Iran will not return to the Qajar and Pahlavi era [of weakness]. The Islamic Republic defends its land, rights, and nation with all its might. Russia should correct its position.”
Kharrazi, who heads an advisory body on foreign relations, the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, suggested during a meeting with the Japanese ambassador in Tehran that Russia and Japan negotiate a similarly long-standing dispute over several islands in the Pacific. Abdollahian, meanwhile, toughened his stance during a joint press conference with his Omani counterpart and asserted Tehran’s intolerance for any interference by Moscow or any other party in matters related to Iran’s sovereignty.
The mixed messages reflect Khamenei’s dual-track approach to foreign policy and his penchant for playing multiple cards.
At the leader’s direction, a Strategic Council of Foreign Relations was created in 2005 after the Khatami administration was replaced by that of a conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Notably, the council includes figures such as Saeed Jalili, a hardliner former nuclear negotiator, and Abbas Araghchi, who serves as the secretary of the council.
Araghchi was deputy to well-known former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and a key figure in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with the U.S. and other world powers.
Kharrazi and Araghchi together visited Damascus in March 2023, shortly after Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize relations in a deal largely negotiated Ali Shamkhani, until recently the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the top body for foreign and defense matters.
Back-channel diplomacy has also occurred in Oman as the U.S. and Iran seek to de-escalate tensions over Iran’s nuclear advances and imprisonment of dual nationals. The talks are meant to offset the perception of inaction by the current government of President Ebrahim Raisi. Oman has long been a conduit for U.S.-Iran talks and hosted secret meetings in 2013 — when Ahmadinejad was still president — that led to the nuclear agreement.
The latest unhappiness with Russia has reminded many Iranians not only of centuries-old grievances over the loss of what was once Iranian territory but also of Russia’s often siding with the West regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Both Russia and China in 2008 backed UN Security Council Resolution 1803, which condemned Iran’s nuclear advances and led to multilateral economic sanctions.
Iranians understand that they cannot always count on support from so-called “friendly states.” However, the failure to revive the nuclear deal and nearly 45 years of hostility with the United States have significantly restricted Iran’s options.
In the face of complex geopolitics, the Iranian leadership must carefully navigate its relationships and try harder to adopt a more pragmatic and balanced approach to foreign affairs. After all, Iran embraced a policy of “Neither East nor West” after the 1979 revolution to try to guarantee its political independence.
Iran’s leader should push the Raisi government to more forcefully defend Iran’s rights in talks with both Russia and China, which embraced a similar pro-Arab statement regarding the three islands when Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in December 2022. Khamenei can also use the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations to deliver tough messages discretely.
At the same time, Iran’s supreme leader needs to put more pressure on Raisi’s hardliner government to reach an understanding de-escalating tensions with the U.S. The success of such talks would have the added benefit of showing Russia that Iran is not as dependent as Moscow may have thought.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political science expert who served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency and as a journalist at the Tehran Times.
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