After Saudi Arabia reached a reconciliation deal with Iran and then made moves to restore relations with Syria, there were predictions that the rest of the Arab world would shortly follow suit, perhaps at a summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after the end of the holy month of Ramadan.

But as the Eid al-Fitr approaches, Qatar and several other Arab states are not yet ready to readmit the regime of Bashar al-Assad into the Arab fold.

Qatar established itself as one of the main state sponsors of Sunni Islamist forces fighting Assad after the Arab Spring uprisings spread to Syria in 2011. Although Qatar and Syria had ostensibly warm relations prior to the Syrian civil war, Doha’s commitment to revolutionary actors throughout the region pitted it against Damascus. Ten months into the bloody conflict, Qatar’s Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani went so far as declaring that “some [Arab] troops should go [to Syria] to stop the killing.”

Bucking the trend to rehabilitate Assad, Qatar has maintained that restoring diplomatic relations would require political concessions to the Syrian opposition — something Assad has shown no willingness to do. Qatar’s anti-Assad position is reportedly shared by Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen, preventing the Arab League from reaching the consensus necessary to readmit Syria.

Doha defends its stance as principled. The Qatari view is that the Syrian government’s egregious human rights violations have deprived Assad and his regime of any legitimacy. This position, which is popular among Qataris, also buys Doha goodwill in Washington and other Western capitals. Yet, it risks leaving Qatar isolated among Arab states, most of which favor accepting the reality that Assad is not going anywhere, and that continued ostracism may only be hurting the Syrian people by preventing the country’s reconstruction.

Qatar’s stance is in line with other moves to distinguish itself from Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia, which have lately been hedging their once-close ties to the United States by moving closer to Russia and China.

Qatar itself was the victim of a regional boycott led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which in 2017 sought to convince the Trump administration that Doha’s alleged support of Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups — designated by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as terrorist entities — justified a siege. Qatar asserted that it was being targeted because of its support for grassroots movements fighting dictatorships in the Arab world, as well as its sponsorship of Al-Jazeera and other media outlets that extensively covered the Arab Spring revolts and gave platforms to dissidents and activists from across the region.

Despite Donald Trump’s initial rhetoric in favor of the blockade, his administration reaffirmed its commitment to Qatar, which hosts U.S. forces at al-Udeid air base. Saudi and Emirati efforts to persuade the Trump White House to view Qatar as the GCC’s problem child failed and Washington-Doha ties actually strengthened, as Qatar hosted Afghan peace talks under Trump and provided crucial support during the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. That the Biden administration designated Qatar a “Major non-NATO Ally” in early 2022 further underscored the deepening of bilateral ties.

Since the blockade ended in January 2021, Qatar has taken other steps to show that it is more aligned with the West than Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Doha’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was less accommodating of Moscow’s aggression, for example. At the same time, Qatar has made efforts to build on rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and, most recently, Bahrain. Qatar believes that good relations with fellow GCC states will serve its interests and wants to avoid another blockade down the road. Therefore, Doha is not interested in finding itself isolated on regional issues too often.

If Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian pressure to normalize with Syria increases, Qatari officials will consider the risks of continued defiance. Qatar may also face pressure from Iran, which improved its ties to Qatar during the Emirati- and Saudi-led blockade by opening new transit routes, to convince Doha to abandon its hardline anti-Assad stance.

Of all countries in the neighborhood, Turkey likely has the most potential to convince Qatar that the time has come to accept Assad’s political survival. In earlier stages of the Syrian conflict, Ankara and Doha were in extremely close alignment and coordinated their policies in support of regime change.

Throughout the 2017-21 blockade, Turkey also played an important role in supporting Doha and convincing the Qatari leadership that Ankara would stand by the gas-rich emirate as pressure from Arab neighbors and Egypt intensified. Turkey is now gradually moving toward reconciliation with Damascus, which may make it less politically unpalatable for Qatar to follow suit.

Economic Interests Versus Ideals

Arab countries in favor of rehabilitating Assad, such as the UAE, foresee major economic opportunities in Syria. Although U.S. sanctions have, at least thus far, prevented America’s allies and partners in the region from making major investments in or signing large trade deals with Syria, Abu Dhabi and other Arab capitals have a long-term vision for Syrian reconstruction once sanctions are lifted or eased.

Qatar could also reap such benefits. Given current financial problems in Russia and Iran, these countries alone cannot bankroll the rebuilding of Syria. Qatar, as an extremely wealthy Persian Gulf nation, can finance the large-scale projects that Syria needs.

In the final analysis, Qatari officials will weigh multiple factors before making a decision. They will balance ideals with economic interests and pragmatism as Assad is gradually rehabilitated in the wider Arab-Islamic world.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project. Pictured: Hundreds of Syrians and other Doha residents turn out to protest against Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in 2012. Photo by Omar Chatriwala.