Under Hamas, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has transformed from being generally, a territorial dispute, as seen by earlier nationalist and resistance movements, into a profound religious and existential struggle. Jihad shapes Hamas’ view of territory, as only under Islam and Sharia law, can true peace be achieved in Palestine. This demands acceptance of Islam as the supreme religion and law by others, notably Jews and Christians.
Hamas’ strategic approach focuses on an enduring struggle rather than immediate victory. Meir Litvak’s research notes that Hamas has cited certain jurists who argue that Quranic passages on jihad remain unrevoked and their directives valid until the Day of Judgement. This interpretation of defensive jihad mandates a prolonged struggle to reclaim dar-al-Islam territories occupied by non-Muslims, continuing indefinitely as Muslim generations grow in strength.
For Hamas, Palestine represents more than a physical space; it embodies a religious, cultural, and historical identity. Central to Hamas’ narrative is the concept of muqawama, or resistance, entertwined with sumud, symbolizing the resilient steadfastness of the Palestinian people and their enduring connection to the land. For the Palestinians, the figure of the fellah, or peasant, has emerged as a powerful symbol. More than just an individual, the fellah has represented the traditions, sacrifices, and the roots of the resistance.
Initially, the fellah was embodied by the fedayeen, early fighters of the conflict. However, under Hamas, the fellah has adopted a narrative of jihad against Israel, a significant shift from the secular identity of the fedayeen to a more religiously and culturally defined role of a shahid or martyr. This transformation shifts the conflict to a larger context within the Umma, the global Islamic community.
In Islamic tradition, combat is sometimes justified, particularly for defending or propagating Islamic teachings. Historically, martyrs—regarded as having sacrificed their lives for a noble cause—are revered, often symbolizing unity and resilience within the Muslim community against formidable challenges. This contrasts with Islam’s general condemnation of suicide, as martyrdom is viewed not as an act of self-destruction but as a selfless act for the protection of the community and religious principles.
However, the concept of shahid typically associated with those who die upholding Islamic monotheism, or tawhid, Islamic law, or in efforts to defend or expand the Muslim community, has been misinterpreted and exploited by terrorist groups. These groups often use a distorted version of this concept to justify acts of violence, diverging significantly from mainstream Islamic teachings on martyrdom and jihad (struggle in the path of God).
Hamas’s practice of blending civilian and military roles, evident since the start of the Second Infatada, is rooted in its ideology viewing every Palestinian as part of the martyrdom in the path to jihad against Israel. This aligns with the concept of muqawama (resistance) and has led to dual roles in Gaza’s civilian infrastructure and bodies. Hamas has been able to cultivate this culture by overseeing these mosques, schools, and healthcare facilities. By providing essential services, particularly in hard-to-reach areas, Hamas has not only addressed immediate needs but also integrated its ideology into everyday life.
Originally resistant to participation in democracy due to its secular nature, Hamas saw an opportunity to portray its vision as a viable alternative to other Palestinian political groups. This led to its victory in the 2006 elections, which dramatically altered the landscape of Palestinian politics.
The aftermath of this victory brought tensions to the surface. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, refused to relinquish control, resulting in escalating violence and chaos, particularly in Gaza. In response, Hamas established the Tanfidhya or Executive Force under Said Seyam, demonstrating its ability to govern despite facing isolation. Its conflict with Fatah, culminated with Hamas gaining control over the Gaza Strip, and demonstrated Hamas superiority.
In reaction, Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the unity government and appointed Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister, further entrenching the divide between the Palestinian territories. This resulted in separate administrations in the West Bank and Gaza, with the Fatah-led Ramallah government, moving away from armed resistance, while Hamas continued to strengthen its efforts on the principle of muqawama.
Hamas’ ideological rigidity, significantly different from the PLO’s trajectory, suggests a lower likelihood of engaging in negotiation processes akin to those conducted by the PLO with Israel. The organization has consistently viewed agreements like the Oslo Accords as a betrayal to the Palestinian cause, a perspective likely to influence its conflict strategy.
Hamas’s leadership has been divided among different branches, in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, at the Israeli prisons, in Qatar, and previously in Damascus. Each branch played a significant role in the decision-making process. Khaled Mashal, based in Damascus, had considerable international influence, while Ismail Haniyeh’s leadership in Gaza was more powerful internally. The dynamic between these two leaderships shifted in 2012 due to the Syrian civil war, which forced Mashal to leave Syria and seek refuge in Qatar. This change led to a reorganization within Hamas, with the Gaza leadership, gaining almost complete control over the organization’s decisions and direction.
Despite efforts at coordination and consultation between the branches in Gaza and Qatar, significant frictions persisted over key issues. Meshaal’s situation, similar to the PLO’s in Hammam Chott, Tunis, involved a lack of direct control over physical forces or territories. This disconnect from the daily realities in Gaza, where the conflict with Israel was most intense since 2007, led to an increased prominence of the al-Qassam Brigades. Mohammad Deif and Ahmad Jaabari, who were directly involved in this conflict, gained more influence due to their active roles in the hostilities against Israel. Then, Ismail Haniyeh’s move to Qatar in 2020, led to the emergence of Yahya Sinwar as a key figure in Gaza, known for his hardline approach and close association with the al-Qassam Brigades.
In considering Israel’s strategy following its conflict with Hamas, it is crucial to recognize the presence of Salafist groups in Palestine, particularly in Gaza. These groups, which align ideologically with global jihadism have become more prominent in the region, especially after Hamas’ political and military victory following 2006.
These Salafist groups have a complex impact on Hamas. Ideologically, they have presented a challenge to Hamas, both externally in the broader political landscape and internally within Hamas’s own ranks, particularly attracting elements of the al-Qassam Brigades. This has exerted pressure on Hamas to adopt a more militant stance and to enforce stricter interpretations of Islamic law.
Israel, in formulating its post-conflict strategy, needs to consider the potential vacuum that might be created if Hamas is defeated. The rise of these Salafist groups, with their more extreme ideology poses a different kind of threat. Their growing influence could lead to an escalation of militancy and further instability in the region, potentially complicating the path to any long-term peace and security solutions.
Carlo J.V. Caro has an advanced degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles in the US and Israel on foreign affairs and security.
Martyrdom and Power in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
By Carlo J.V. Caro
Grand Strategy
Under Hamas, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has transformed from being generally, a territorial dispute, as seen by earlier nationalist and resistance movements, into a profound religious and existential struggle. Jihad shapes Hamas’ view of territory, as only under Islam and Sharia law, can true peace be achieved in Palestine. This demands acceptance of Islam as the supreme religion and law by others, notably Jews and Christians.
Hamas’ strategic approach focuses on an enduring struggle rather than immediate victory. Meir Litvak’s research notes that Hamas has cited certain jurists who argue that Quranic passages on jihad remain unrevoked and their directives valid until the Day of Judgement. This interpretation of defensive jihad mandates a prolonged struggle to reclaim dar-al-Islam territories occupied by non-Muslims, continuing indefinitely as Muslim generations grow in strength.
For Hamas, Palestine represents more than a physical space; it embodies a religious, cultural, and historical identity. Central to Hamas’ narrative is the concept of muqawama, or resistance, entertwined with sumud, symbolizing the resilient steadfastness of the Palestinian people and their enduring connection to the land. For the Palestinians, the figure of the fellah, or peasant, has emerged as a powerful symbol. More than just an individual, the fellah has represented the traditions, sacrifices, and the roots of the resistance.
Initially, the fellah was embodied by the fedayeen, early fighters of the conflict. However, under Hamas, the fellah has adopted a narrative of jihad against Israel, a significant shift from the secular identity of the fedayeen to a more religiously and culturally defined role of a shahid or martyr. This transformation shifts the conflict to a larger context within the Umma, the global Islamic community.
In Islamic tradition, combat is sometimes justified, particularly for defending or propagating Islamic teachings. Historically, martyrs—regarded as having sacrificed their lives for a noble cause—are revered, often symbolizing unity and resilience within the Muslim community against formidable challenges. This contrasts with Islam’s general condemnation of suicide, as martyrdom is viewed not as an act of self-destruction but as a selfless act for the protection of the community and religious principles.
However, the concept of shahid typically associated with those who die upholding Islamic monotheism, or tawhid, Islamic law, or in efforts to defend or expand the Muslim community, has been misinterpreted and exploited by terrorist groups. These groups often use a distorted version of this concept to justify acts of violence, diverging significantly from mainstream Islamic teachings on martyrdom and jihad (struggle in the path of God).
Hamas’s practice of blending civilian and military roles, evident since the start of the Second Infatada, is rooted in its ideology viewing every Palestinian as part of the martyrdom in the path to jihad against Israel. This aligns with the concept of muqawama (resistance) and has led to dual roles in Gaza’s civilian infrastructure and bodies. Hamas has been able to cultivate this culture by overseeing these mosques, schools, and healthcare facilities. By providing essential services, particularly in hard-to-reach areas, Hamas has not only addressed immediate needs but also integrated its ideology into everyday life.
Originally resistant to participation in democracy due to its secular nature, Hamas saw an opportunity to portray its vision as a viable alternative to other Palestinian political groups. This led to its victory in the 2006 elections, which dramatically altered the landscape of Palestinian politics.
The aftermath of this victory brought tensions to the surface. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, refused to relinquish control, resulting in escalating violence and chaos, particularly in Gaza. In response, Hamas established the Tanfidhya or Executive Force under Said Seyam, demonstrating its ability to govern despite facing isolation. Its conflict with Fatah, culminated with Hamas gaining control over the Gaza Strip, and demonstrated Hamas superiority.
In reaction, Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the unity government and appointed Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister, further entrenching the divide between the Palestinian territories. This resulted in separate administrations in the West Bank and Gaza, with the Fatah-led Ramallah government, moving away from armed resistance, while Hamas continued to strengthen its efforts on the principle of muqawama.
Hamas’ ideological rigidity, significantly different from the PLO’s trajectory, suggests a lower likelihood of engaging in negotiation processes akin to those conducted by the PLO with Israel. The organization has consistently viewed agreements like the Oslo Accords as a betrayal to the Palestinian cause, a perspective likely to influence its conflict strategy.
Hamas’s leadership has been divided among different branches, in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, at the Israeli prisons, in Qatar, and previously in Damascus. Each branch played a significant role in the decision-making process. Khaled Mashal, based in Damascus, had considerable international influence, while Ismail Haniyeh’s leadership in Gaza was more powerful internally. The dynamic between these two leaderships shifted in 2012 due to the Syrian civil war, which forced Mashal to leave Syria and seek refuge in Qatar. This change led to a reorganization within Hamas, with the Gaza leadership, gaining almost complete control over the organization’s decisions and direction.
Despite efforts at coordination and consultation between the branches in Gaza and Qatar, significant frictions persisted over key issues. Meshaal’s situation, similar to the PLO’s in Hammam Chott, Tunis, involved a lack of direct control over physical forces or territories. This disconnect from the daily realities in Gaza, where the conflict with Israel was most intense since 2007, led to an increased prominence of the al-Qassam Brigades. Mohammad Deif and Ahmad Jaabari, who were directly involved in this conflict, gained more influence due to their active roles in the hostilities against Israel. Then, Ismail Haniyeh’s move to Qatar in 2020, led to the emergence of Yahya Sinwar as a key figure in Gaza, known for his hardline approach and close association with the al-Qassam Brigades.
In considering Israel’s strategy following its conflict with Hamas, it is crucial to recognize the presence of Salafist groups in Palestine, particularly in Gaza. These groups, which align ideologically with global jihadism have become more prominent in the region, especially after Hamas’ political and military victory following 2006.
These Salafist groups have a complex impact on Hamas. Ideologically, they have presented a challenge to Hamas, both externally in the broader political landscape and internally within Hamas’s own ranks, particularly attracting elements of the al-Qassam Brigades. This has exerted pressure on Hamas to adopt a more militant stance and to enforce stricter interpretations of Islamic law.
Israel, in formulating its post-conflict strategy, needs to consider the potential vacuum that might be created if Hamas is defeated. The rise of these Salafist groups, with their more extreme ideology poses a different kind of threat. Their growing influence could lead to an escalation of militancy and further instability in the region, potentially complicating the path to any long-term peace and security solutions.
Carlo J.V. Caro has an advanced degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles in the US and Israel on foreign affairs and security.
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