Jordan has led the march to bring Syria back into the Arab League and foster Syria’s reacceptance in the international community. As early as 2018, the Kingdom began pursuing a number of channels to push for a breakthrough in bilateral ties to alleviate the many negative impacts the Syrian war has had on Jordan’s economy and security. However, each effort has been met with disappointment. Jordan’s hope that normalization would engender more cooperation with Syria has turned out to be shortsighted and threatens to put millions of lives at risk.
In 2017, Jordan pursued diplomatic solutions to de-escalate the conflict in Southwest Syria on its northern border. Through talkswith Russia, the U.S., and Israel, Amman hoped that Russia’s de-escalation strategy would open up opportunities for the return of stability and security. However, the freezing of the conflict simply postponed a regime offensive for one year so Syrian forces could focus on recapturing other parts of Syria more directly threatening Damascus.
In 2018, Syria’s military again turned its attention to the Southwest. Jordanian officials fearing a humanitarian catastrophe spilling over into Jordan coordinated with Syrian forces to prevent an influx of even more Syrian refugees on top of the estimated 1.2 million that have fled to Jordan since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Coordination came with a bitter quid pro quo: Jordan had to cut ties with Syrian opposition elements and find a new equilibrium with Syrian security, in coordination with Russian monitors who deployed after the offensive.
By the end of 2018, Jordanian officials hoped the return of Syrian security to the border might stabilize bilateral trade and reinvigorate export opportunities for Jordan. Both sides agreed to reopen the border and mutual efforts were made to jumpstart trade. Yet, they made no major progress. Rather, conditions worsened as Southwest Syria shifted from an opposition stronghold to a wild west of former opposition brigades, expanding Shi’ite militias, and a loose state security footprint. For Jordan, the most significant concern was the widespread production and trafficking of narcotics across its territory.
Since 2021, Jordan has looked for ways to balance its desire to expand trade and coordination with Syria while also maintaining a red line on the narcotics trade. For their part, Jordanian officials, even King Abdullah, saw direct engagement with Syrian counterparts as critical to addressing bilateral security challenges. This, however, provoked U.S. lawmakers over the perceived normalization of ties.
In 2022, Jordan’s diplomatic efforts to resolve Syria’s narcotics smuggling turned sharply violent after Syrian smugglers fatally shot a Jordanian soldier in an exchange of fire on the border. In response, Jordanian military forces killed and captured tens of Syrian smugglers, some of whom had links with the Syrian military. Yet Syria’s involvement in narcotics trafficking did not deter Jordan’s diplomatic efforts to rebuild ties, which expanded in the latter part of 2022.
Looking back, it seems that Jordan has gained little from its diplomatic outreach to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Trade remains stagnant. Southwest Syria remains deeply unstable. The Syrian government, bogged down by a worsening economic crisis and restrained by sanctions, has failed to rebuild key infrastructure in Dara’a and the surrounding countryside. Captagon still floods Jordan, weaving deep tentacles of smuggling networks in and through the country. Despite efforts to coordinate on security issues, elements of Syrian forces are still actively involved in the smuggling.
The cumulative failures have compounded and created a deeply insecure environment in Southwest Syria, a resilient and emboldened regime in Damascus and an unstable environment which will continue to deter Syrian refugees from willingly returning in the near to midterm.
Jordan stands at the crux of two pathways: normalization and national security. On one hand, it wants to end hostilities in Syria, stem the flow of narcotics into its territory and carve a pathway for the rehabilitation of the nation’s infrastructure so that Syrian refugees might eventually go home. The conflict is largely over, but residual insecurity means that a resurgence is always a possibility. Meanwhile, a reported Jordanian airstrike on a drug lord in Southwest Syria on May 8, 2023, a first for the Kingdom,seems to infer a greater level of cooperation between Syria and Jordan, given its proximity to Syria’s return to the Arab League.
Turning off a multibillion-dollar global narcotics operation is not an easy process. Jordan will have to continue to combat cross-border smuggling for the near future, an effort which requires continued robust U.S. security assistance. It also is yet to be seen if the Syrian regime or its many allied militias will cooperate in relinquishing the profitable industry while U.S. sanctions remain in effect.
On the other hand, the Jordanian Government wants to prevent the spillover of insecurity from Syria. While normalization is one way to seek this, Jordan’s primary strategic defense has been its ongoing security cooperation and partnership with U.S. forces, including those deployed at the At Tanf Garrison inside Syria on Jordan’s northeast border. Jordan’s insistence on a continuous U.S. presence aims to ward off a concentration of Shi’ite militias on its border, but, with normalization, Assad will push Arab nations, including Jordan, to oppose the presence of foreign actors. For Jordan, such a position is advantageous when it applies to Iranian forces in Syria but presents a challenge to its support for U.S. forces.
Jordan will not part from its relationship with the U.S., but it will be put into an increasingly tenuous position as it builds ties with Syria. Normalization comes with renewed challenges to national security, especially under conditions of uncertainty around Assad’s long-term cooperation. And, the more Jordan walks this path, the larger the wedge it will drive between it and Washington.
The Human Impact
The human consequences of Jordan’s normalization decision could be stark. Recent plans by Arab states to find ways to send back Syrian refugees are generating concerns that a cycle of forced and premature returns may be on the horizon. In the past two months, Syrian refugees have again emerged as scapegoats for political actors across the region, notably in Turkiye and Lebanon. While Jordanian officials have been more restrained in their political discourse, they often attribute the country’s economic woes to hosting more than a million Syrian refugees.
This cycle for Jordan is not new. It begins with the state attempting to capitalize on a political window in Syria to generate public discussions around the return of refugees. This discourse, during previous cycles, heightened concerns from humanitarian agencies that Jordan would send people back prematurely. These concerns are then further fueled by reports of detention and premature return of Syrians by Jordanian authorities. Jordan must do everything to prevent this spiral and refrain from pushing Syrians to return.
Jordan cannot guarantee the Syrian regime’s adherence to the Arab League’s call for Assad to improve conditions in areas of return, including the restoration of public services and amnesty programs. The future of such programs is linked to the ability of Arab states to corral international donor funding, in addition to Arab funding likely already in the works. Jordan, which already receives an estimated $1.65 billion in U.S. foreign aid annually, is unlikely to convince Washington to shell out more, especially if it is meant for investments in government-controlled areas of Syria.
Conclusion
To put it succinctly, conditions in Syria are not present for a safe, voluntary, sustainable, and dignified return of refugees and Jordan should refrain from any policies that force Syrians to return.
For Jordan, normalization will be a long road fraught with frustration and uncertainty. History has shown Assad to be an unreliable partner, but Jordan seems to have either forgotten its previous diplomatic failures or to see the future state of unreliability as more desirable than the status quo. In either case, the pathway has raised (and will raise many more) questions about its strategic calculus, particularly within Washington’s policy circles that have extended significant support to Jordan over the decades.
Jesse Marks is Nonresident Fellow at the Stimson Center. He previously served as a Fulbright fellow at the Jordan Center for Strategic Studies and a Scoville Fellow with Stimson’s Protecting Civilians in Conflict program focusing on civilian protection in Syria.
Jordan’s Normalization with Syria Will Not Solve its Problems
By Jesse Marks
Middle East & North Africa
Jordan has led the march to bring Syria back into the Arab League and foster Syria’s reacceptance in the international community. As early as 2018, the Kingdom began pursuing a number of channels to push for a breakthrough in bilateral ties to alleviate the many negative impacts the Syrian war has had on Jordan’s economy and security. However, each effort has been met with disappointment. Jordan’s hope that normalization would engender more cooperation with Syria has turned out to be shortsighted and threatens to put millions of lives at risk.
In 2017, Jordan pursued diplomatic solutions to de-escalate the conflict in Southwest Syria on its northern border. Through talkswith Russia, the U.S., and Israel, Amman hoped that Russia’s de-escalation strategy would open up opportunities for the return of stability and security. However, the freezing of the conflict simply postponed a regime offensive for one year so Syrian forces could focus on recapturing other parts of Syria more directly threatening Damascus.
In 2018, Syria’s military again turned its attention to the Southwest. Jordanian officials fearing a humanitarian catastrophe spilling over into Jordan coordinated with Syrian forces to prevent an influx of even more Syrian refugees on top of the estimated 1.2 million that have fled to Jordan since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Coordination came with a bitter quid pro quo: Jordan had to cut ties with Syrian opposition elements and find a new equilibrium with Syrian security, in coordination with Russian monitors who deployed after the offensive.
By the end of 2018, Jordanian officials hoped the return of Syrian security to the border might stabilize bilateral trade and reinvigorate export opportunities for Jordan. Both sides agreed to reopen the border and mutual efforts were made to jumpstart trade. Yet, they made no major progress. Rather, conditions worsened as Southwest Syria shifted from an opposition stronghold to a wild west of former opposition brigades, expanding Shi’ite militias, and a loose state security footprint. For Jordan, the most significant concern was the widespread production and trafficking of narcotics across its territory.
Since 2021, Jordan has looked for ways to balance its desire to expand trade and coordination with Syria while also maintaining a red line on the narcotics trade. For their part, Jordanian officials, even King Abdullah, saw direct engagement with Syrian counterparts as critical to addressing bilateral security challenges. This, however, provoked U.S. lawmakers over the perceived normalization of ties.
In 2022, Jordan’s diplomatic efforts to resolve Syria’s narcotics smuggling turned sharply violent after Syrian smugglers fatally shot a Jordanian soldier in an exchange of fire on the border. In response, Jordanian military forces killed and captured tens of Syrian smugglers, some of whom had links with the Syrian military. Yet Syria’s involvement in narcotics trafficking did not deter Jordan’s diplomatic efforts to rebuild ties, which expanded in the latter part of 2022.
Looking back, it seems that Jordan has gained little from its diplomatic outreach to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Trade remains stagnant. Southwest Syria remains deeply unstable. The Syrian government, bogged down by a worsening economic crisis and restrained by sanctions, has failed to rebuild key infrastructure in Dara’a and the surrounding countryside. Captagon still floods Jordan, weaving deep tentacles of smuggling networks in and through the country. Despite efforts to coordinate on security issues, elements of Syrian forces are still actively involved in the smuggling.
The cumulative failures have compounded and created a deeply insecure environment in Southwest Syria, a resilient and emboldened regime in Damascus and an unstable environment which will continue to deter Syrian refugees from willingly returning in the near to midterm.
Jordan stands at the crux of two pathways: normalization and national security. On one hand, it wants to end hostilities in Syria, stem the flow of narcotics into its territory and carve a pathway for the rehabilitation of the nation’s infrastructure so that Syrian refugees might eventually go home. The conflict is largely over, but residual insecurity means that a resurgence is always a possibility. Meanwhile, a reported Jordanian airstrike on a drug lord in Southwest Syria on May 8, 2023, a first for the Kingdom,seems to infer a greater level of cooperation between Syria and Jordan, given its proximity to Syria’s return to the Arab League.
Turning off a multibillion-dollar global narcotics operation is not an easy process. Jordan will have to continue to combat cross-border smuggling for the near future, an effort which requires continued robust U.S. security assistance. It also is yet to be seen if the Syrian regime or its many allied militias will cooperate in relinquishing the profitable industry while U.S. sanctions remain in effect.
On the other hand, the Jordanian Government wants to prevent the spillover of insecurity from Syria. While normalization is one way to seek this, Jordan’s primary strategic defense has been its ongoing security cooperation and partnership with U.S. forces, including those deployed at the At Tanf Garrison inside Syria on Jordan’s northeast border. Jordan’s insistence on a continuous U.S. presence aims to ward off a concentration of Shi’ite militias on its border, but, with normalization, Assad will push Arab nations, including Jordan, to oppose the presence of foreign actors. For Jordan, such a position is advantageous when it applies to Iranian forces in Syria but presents a challenge to its support for U.S. forces.
Jordan will not part from its relationship with the U.S., but it will be put into an increasingly tenuous position as it builds ties with Syria. Normalization comes with renewed challenges to national security, especially under conditions of uncertainty around Assad’s long-term cooperation. And, the more Jordan walks this path, the larger the wedge it will drive between it and Washington.
The Human Impact
The human consequences of Jordan’s normalization decision could be stark. Recent plans by Arab states to find ways to send back Syrian refugees are generating concerns that a cycle of forced and premature returns may be on the horizon. In the past two months, Syrian refugees have again emerged as scapegoats for political actors across the region, notably in Turkiye and Lebanon. While Jordanian officials have been more restrained in their political discourse, they often attribute the country’s economic woes to hosting more than a million Syrian refugees.
This cycle for Jordan is not new. It begins with the state attempting to capitalize on a political window in Syria to generate public discussions around the return of refugees. This discourse, during previous cycles, heightened concerns from humanitarian agencies that Jordan would send people back prematurely. These concerns are then further fueled by reports of detention and premature return of Syrians by Jordanian authorities. Jordan must do everything to prevent this spiral and refrain from pushing Syrians to return.
Jordan cannot guarantee the Syrian regime’s adherence to the Arab League’s call for Assad to improve conditions in areas of return, including the restoration of public services and amnesty programs. The future of such programs is linked to the ability of Arab states to corral international donor funding, in addition to Arab funding likely already in the works. Jordan, which already receives an estimated $1.65 billion in U.S. foreign aid annually, is unlikely to convince Washington to shell out more, especially if it is meant for investments in government-controlled areas of Syria.
Conclusion
To put it succinctly, conditions in Syria are not present for a safe, voluntary, sustainable, and dignified return of refugees and Jordan should refrain from any policies that force Syrians to return.
For Jordan, normalization will be a long road fraught with frustration and uncertainty. History has shown Assad to be an unreliable partner, but Jordan seems to have either forgotten its previous diplomatic failures or to see the future state of unreliability as more desirable than the status quo. In either case, the pathway has raised (and will raise many more) questions about its strategic calculus, particularly within Washington’s policy circles that have extended significant support to Jordan over the decades.
Jesse Marks is Nonresident Fellow at the Stimson Center. He previously served as a Fulbright fellow at the Jordan Center for Strategic Studies and a Scoville Fellow with Stimson’s Protecting Civilians in Conflict program focusing on civilian protection in Syria.
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