On December 23, 2022 President Biden signed the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—which included a revised version of the Burma Act—bringing new hope to the people of Myanmar. The Myanmar public, who previously called for a U.S.-led military intervention in the early coup period, perceived the Burma Act as an alternative channel of potential U.S. involvement to support an end to the military dictatorship in Myanmar. However, as the NDAA’s Burma Act approaches its one-year anniversary, Burmese interlocuters have expressed disappointment with the lack of U.S. initiative to implement the act. If the United States fails to deliver the proposals outlined in the NDAA, mandated or not, it risks losing the confidence of the Myanmar people, dampening resistance morale, and hindering efforts to rebuild Myanmar’s democracy in the future.
Congress’s decision to incorporate the newest version of the Burma Act into the NDAA came after the 59-page Burma Act of 2021 failed to pass the Senate after almost a year of deliberation. Overall, Senate Republicans could not accept three issues: the severity of sanctions against Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), preference to the Rohingyas, and the overall budget. Finally, to compromise, Congress agreed to include the Burma Act in the NDAA, simplifying the three issues above, to gain bipartisan support. Congress also removed the new position of Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy, who would have been responsible for developing a comprehensive strategy for the implementation of the Act.
Congress stipulates in the Act that it will continue to deliver humanitarian aid as well as provide technical and non-lethal assistance for Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the opposition government National Unity Government (NUG)’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and pro-democracy movement organizations. Additionally, Congress states that U.S. policy will support the efforts of the NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the Burmese Civil Disobedience Movement, and other entities in and outside of Burma to oppose the Burmese military and bring about an end to the military junta’s rule.
Congress outlines that from FY 2023 to FY 2027 the U.S. will continue to authorize funds for programs that strengthen federalism, establish inclusive democracy, provide technical and non-lethal assistance, and assist civil society organizations on multiple platforms, without quantifying the budget. The NDAA is passed annually, so the Appropriations Committee may change Myanmar’s allocations based on the strategic priorities of the United States. With that said, Myanmar is not guaranteed to receive additional aid compared to previous years. The executive branch is also not required to implement the Burma Act until Congress appropriates the funds to transform agenda items from recommendations to obligations. There are concerns from Burmese interlocutors that the U.S. government may not follow through with the Burma Act proposals, since the U.S. has not taken steps to utilize different measures and USAID and State Department spending remains heavily skewed toward humanitarian relief.
For greater understanding of U.S. focus on humanitarian relief, funding for Myanmar in 2023, and the prospect of 2024, please read “The Burma Act of 2022: Promises and Pitfalls”.
The False Hope of Non-Lethal Assistance
Out of the provisions in the 2023 NDAA, Myanmar’s democratic actors and resistance members were most enticed by the permission for the U.S. to provide “non-lethal assistance” to the region and the authorization of U.S. government support for the PDFs and EAOs. The possibility of these measures was used by resistance groups and their supporters to bring fresh hope to their supporters and as a psychological warfare tactic against the military.
But the U.S. seems to maintain a broad definition of non-lethal assistance so Congress can use its discretion in providing support dictated by U.S. security priorities. The U.S. is taking a more conservative approach in Myanmar compared to the provision of non-lethal assistance elsewhere, such as Ukraine, which received items ranging from radar equipment to armored military vehicles, none of which have been provided to Myanmar. This raises questions about the actual scope of U.S. support. In July 2023, the Myanmar resistance groups asked Congress to appropriate $525 million for Myanmar in the next fiscal year, four times the $136 million budget approved for 2023, including $200 million allocated for nonlethal aid like body armor, drones, vehicles, radar hardware, satellite data, military medical supplies, and construction equipment. As a result, the United States has failed to provide any non-lethal assistance to the region since the NDAA was passed in 2022 and is unlikely to meet NUG’s recent demands in the upcoming year.
Burmese scholars hope the United States will define “non-lethal” moving forward. One researcher emphasized that the U.S. should diversify its contributions to Myanmar, including support for various democratic actors through scholarships, training, exchanges, and other activities that are defined as non-lethal assistance. Leaders of Myanmar resistance groups claim that receiving only 1% of the amount of USG aid to Ukraine could result in a favorable condition for pro-democracy groups. Separately, another scholar confirmed the U.S. should prioritize initiatives to restore democratic culture and promote civil society within Myanmar to counterbalance Chinese influence. They recommended providing more medical support for tangible non-lethal assistance for displaced people.
Unintended Consequences of the Burma Act of 2022
An Exaggeration of U.S. Involvement
The Burma Act reached two audiences in Myanmar: Burmese involved in politics, movements, and EROs who understand and observe the political situation in Myanmar, and those who have a more limited understanding of the international context of Myanmar’s crisis. Myanmar interlocutors critique the NDAA Burma Act for misleading people on the ground and feel the Act has hindered the resistance from developing their own strategies. Burmese critics also recognize that the NUG leadership over-sold the significance of the Act, seeing it as an opportunity to consolidate collaboration among pro-democracy groups, especially powerful ethnic armed groups based in northeast and western Myanmar.
Unfortunately, the people of Myanmar are disappointed with the outcomes, or lack thereof, of the Burma Act. As one Burmese scholar emphasized, the U.S. government should be direct in its foreign policy and realistically define what it can do to address the Myanmar crisis to manage the public’s expectations. In conversations with Chin National Front (CNF), Chinland Defense Force (CDF) and other PDFs, the general expectation under the Burma Act was to receive military-related equipment. Under the impression they would have greater resources, economically and politically, the resistance is starting to evaluate its next approach for countering the junta, under the assumption the U.S. will mostly provide support in the form of humanitarian assistance.
Rise in the Perception of Great Power Competition
The U.S. did not consider how including the Burma Act into the NDAA would impact great power competition and influence regional competitors to re-engage the region. China already perceives the NDAA as anti-China and sees the Burma Act as a security threat in its immediate vicinity. Beijing is also concerned about a potential U.S. presence in Myanmar, which serves as China’s entryway to the Bay of Bengal via the Strait of Malacca. As one Chinese expert explained, all Chinese foreign policy is looked at through great power competition; Myanmar is no exception. Note: Private Workshop
Therefore, China has increased its diplomatic engagement in Myanmar since December 2022. Chinese Special Envoy for Asian Affairs Deng Xijun has visited Myanmar three times in a four-month window compared to Sun Guoxiang, who only visited Myanmar twice after the 2021 coup. One week after the NDAA was signed, Special Envoy Deng Xijun also met with seven EAOs, hoping to fracture EAO support for the Washington-leaning NUG and pushing them to meet with the military regime separately for ceasefire talks. A spokesperson for the Arakan Army emphasized it would not meet with the junta without China. the temporary cessation of violence has enabled the regime to deploy more soldiers to conflict-intensive regions, such as Chin and Kachin , where the regime struggles to control territory. Beijing has regularly utilized its political leverage over EAOs to facilitate dialogue with Myanmar’s successive regimes, but reaching a genuine ceasefire agreement is beyond Beijing’s capacity which still requires a certain level of trust between the two opposition parties.
Conclusion
The NDAA Burma Act has been in effect for almost eight months, and the U.S. has not taken significant strides to implement new programs for Myanmar. Regarding assistance, the U.S. primarily provides humanitarian aid, a tool that has been used consistently since the 2021 coup. Unfortunately, with the lack of effort from the U.S., the Myanmar resistance has adjusted its expectations to believe that U.S. policy towards the region will not change in the near-term future, if at all. While the U.S. has five years to see the Act through, its slow pace is not promising for the people of Myanmar. If the U.S. does not uphold the proposals outlined in the NDAA Burma Act to Myanmar, it opens the door for regional competitors, like China, to gain greater regional influence. Furthermore, the U.S. risks eroding the confidence of the Burmese people and the resistance movement in the U.S. government as a champion of global democracy.
Lian Bawi Thang is a Ph.D. student in political science at University of Hawai’i Mānoa and an East-West Center degree fellow. He previously worked as a political analyst and activist in Myanmar for ten years. Follow @Lianbawithang.
Is Myanmar Still Hopeful about the NDAA Burma Act?
By Sydney Tucker • Lian Bawi Thang
Asia & Indo-Pacific
On December 23, 2022 President Biden signed the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—which included a revised version of the Burma Act—bringing new hope to the people of Myanmar. The Myanmar public, who previously called for a U.S.-led military intervention in the early coup period, perceived the Burma Act as an alternative channel of potential U.S. involvement to support an end to the military dictatorship in Myanmar. However, as the NDAA’s Burma Act approaches its one-year anniversary, Burmese interlocuters have expressed disappointment with the lack of U.S. initiative to implement the act. If the United States fails to deliver the proposals outlined in the NDAA, mandated or not, it risks losing the confidence of the Myanmar people, dampening resistance morale, and hindering efforts to rebuild Myanmar’s democracy in the future.
Congress’s decision to incorporate the newest version of the Burma Act into the NDAA came after the 59-page Burma Act of 2021 failed to pass the Senate after almost a year of deliberation.1 Note: Aye Thandar and Michael Haack, “NDAA amendment is no substitute for BURMA Act in US-Myanmar Policy,” Myanmar Now, December 29, 2021, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/opinion-ndaa-amendment-is-no-substitute-for-burma-act-in-us-myanmar-policy/ Overall, Senate Republicans could not accept three issues: the severity of sanctions against Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), preference to the Rohingyas, and the overall budget. Finally, to compromise, Congress agreed to include the Burma Act in the NDAA, simplifying the three issues above, to gain bipartisan support. Congress also removed the new position of Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy, who would have been responsible for developing a comprehensive strategy for the implementation of the Act.
Congress stipulates in the Act that it will continue to deliver humanitarian aid as well as provide technical and non-lethal assistance for Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the opposition government National Unity Government (NUG)’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and pro-democracy movement organizations. Additionally, Congress states that U.S. policy will support the efforts of the NUG,2 Note: Mike Haack, “How the BURMA Act Passed Congress,” Frontier Myanmar, January 13, 2023, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/how-the-burma-act-passed-congress/ the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the Burmese Civil Disobedience Movement, and other entities in and outside of Burma to oppose the Burmese military and bring about an end to the military junta’s rule.3 Note: H.R. 7776: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ263/PLAW-117publ263.pdf
Congress outlines that from FY 2023 to FY 2027 the U.S. will continue to authorize funds for programs that strengthen federalism, establish inclusive democracy, provide technical and non-lethal assistance, and assist civil society organizations on multiple platforms, without quantifying the budget. The NDAA is passed annually, so the Appropriations Committee may change Myanmar’s allocations based on the strategic priorities of the United States. With that said, Myanmar is not guaranteed to receive additional aid compared to previous years. The executive branch is also not required to implement the Burma Act until Congress appropriates the funds to transform agenda items from recommendations to obligations. There are concerns from Burmese interlocutors that the U.S. government may not follow through with the Burma Act proposals, since the U.S. has not taken steps to utilize different measures and USAID and State Department spending remains heavily skewed toward humanitarian relief.
For greater understanding of U.S. focus on humanitarian relief, funding for Myanmar in 2023, and the prospect of 2024, please read “The Burma Act of 2022: Promises and Pitfalls”.
The False Hope of Non-Lethal Assistance
Out of the provisions in the 2023 NDAA, Myanmar’s democratic actors and resistance members were most enticed by the permission for the U.S. to provide “non-lethal assistance” to the region and the authorization of U.S. government support for the PDFs and EAOs. The possibility of these measures was used by resistance groups and their supporters to bring fresh hope to their supporters and as a psychological warfare tactic against the military.4 Note: [1] Tun Myint, “စစ်မကြေညာရုံကလွဲလို့ အဆင်သင့်ဖြစ်တဲ့ အနေအထားလား” [Is this a signal for preparing to declare war?] DVB Interview. December 14, 2022, စစ်မကြေညာရုံကလွဲလို့ အဆင်သင့်ဖြစ်တဲ့ အနေအထားလား.
But the U.S. seems to maintain a broad definition of non-lethal assistance so Congress can use its discretion in providing support dictated by U.S. security priorities. The U.S. is taking a more conservative approach in Myanmar compared to the provision of non-lethal assistance elsewhere, such as Ukraine, which received items ranging from radar equipment to armored military vehicles, none of which have been provided to Myanmar.5 Note: Michael Martin, “What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn’t Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar,” CSIS, February 6, 2023, What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn’t Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar (csis.org). This raises questions about the actual scope of U.S. support. In July 2023, the Myanmar resistance groups asked Congress to appropriate $525 million for Myanmar in the next fiscal year, four times the $136 million budget approved for 2023, including $200 million allocated for nonlethal aid like body armor, drones, vehicles, radar hardware, satellite data, military medical supplies, and construction equipment.6 Note: “Myanmar Resistance asks U.S. for US$500 million in non-lethal aid,” Thai PBS World, July 17, 2023. https://www.thaipbsworld.com/myanmar-resistance-asks-us-for-us500-million-in-non-lethal-aid/#:~:text=The%20act%20authorizes%20the%20US,%24200%20million%20for%20nonlethal%20aid However the Appropriations Committee views any dual-use equipment, like telecommunications, as lethal in nature in Myanmar. Note: U.S. Government Associate at Private Workshop As a result, the United States has failed to provide any non-lethal assistance to the region since the NDAA was passed in 2022 and is unlikely to meet NUG’s recent demands in the upcoming year.
Burmese scholars hope the United States will define “non-lethal” moving forward. One researcher emphasized that the U.S. should diversify its contributions to Myanmar, including support for various democratic actors through scholarships, training, exchanges, and other activities that are defined as non-lethal assistance.7 Note: Private interview Leaders of Myanmar resistance groups claim that receiving only 1% of the amount of USG aid to Ukraine could result in a favorable condition for pro-democracy groups.8 Note: Like Ukraine, Myanmar Deserves International Aid | United States Institute of Peace (usip.org) Separately, another scholar confirmed the U.S. should prioritize initiatives to restore democratic culture and promote civil society within Myanmar to counterbalance Chinese influence.9 Note: Gun Maw, Yee Mon, and Min Ko Naing, “Like Ukraine, Myanmar Deserves International Aid,” Unite States Institute of Peace, July 13, 2023, What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn’t Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar (csis.org) They recommended providing more medical support for tangible non-lethal assistance for displaced people.
Unintended Consequences of the Burma Act of 2022
An Exaggeration of U.S. Involvement
The Burma Act reached two audiences in Myanmar: Burmese involved in politics, movements, and EROs who understand and observe the political situation in Myanmar, and those who have a more limited understanding of the international context of Myanmar’s crisis.10 Note: Quote from Private Interview Myanmar interlocutors critique the NDAA Burma Act for misleading people on the ground and feel the Act has hindered the resistance from developing their own strategies. Burmese critics also recognize that the NUG leadership over-sold the significance of the Act, seeing it as an opportunity to consolidate collaboration among pro-democracy groups, especially powerful ethnic armed groups based in northeast and western Myanmar.
Unfortunately, the people of Myanmar are disappointed with the outcomes, or lack thereof, of the Burma Act. As one Burmese scholar emphasized, the U.S. government should be direct in its foreign policy and realistically define what it can do to address the Myanmar crisis to manage the public’s expectations.11 Note: Private Roundtable In conversations with Chin National Front (CNF), Chinland Defense Force (CDF) and other PDFs, the general expectation under the Burma Act was to receive military-related equipment. Under the impression they would have greater resources, economically and politically, the resistance is starting to evaluate its next approach for countering the junta, under the assumption the U.S. will mostly provide support in the form of humanitarian assistance.
Rise in the Perception of Great Power Competition
The U.S. did not consider how including the Burma Act into the NDAA would impact great power competition and influence regional competitors to re-engage the region. China already perceives the NDAA as anti-China and sees the Burma Act as a security threat in its immediate vicinity.12 Note: Amara Thiha, “Unraveling Chinas Strategic Re-Engagement in Myanmar,” Stimson Center, July 6, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/unraveling-chinas-strategic-re-engagement-in-myanmar/. Beijing is also concerned about a potential U.S. presence in Myanmar, which serves as China’s entryway to the Bay of Bengal via the Strait of Malacca. As one Chinese expert explained, all Chinese foreign policy is looked at through great power competition; Myanmar is no exception. Note: Private Workshop
Therefore, China has increased its diplomatic engagement in Myanmar since December 2022. Chinese Special Envoy for Asian Affairs Deng Xijun has visited Myanmar three times in a four-month window compared to Sun Guoxiang, who only visited Myanmar twice after the 2021 coup. One week after the NDAA was signed, Special Envoy Deng Xijun also met with seven EAOs, hoping to fracture EAO support for the Washington-leaning NUG and pushing them to meet with the military regime separately for ceasefire talks.13 Note: “中国新任亚洲事务特使邓锡军会见七支缅甸少数民族武装组织代表,” 搜狐, December 30, 2022, 中国新任亚洲事务特使邓锡军会见七支缅甸少数民族武装组织代表_掸邦_民族民主 (sohu.com) A spokesperson for the Arakan Army emphasized it would not meet with the junta without China.14 Note: Ingyin Naing, “Peace Talks in Myanmar Highlight China’s Increasing Influence,” VOA, June 4, 2023, Peace Talks in Myanmar Highlight China’s Increasing Influence (voanews.com). the temporary cessation of violence has enabled the regime to deploy more soldiers to conflict-intensive regions, such as Chin15 Note: Thet Htar Maung, “Myanmar Regime Reinforcements Sent to Resistance Strongholds After China Talks,” The Irrawaddy, March 21, 2023, Myanmar Regime Reinforcements Sent to Resistance Strongholds After China Talks (irrawaddy.com) and Kachin16 Note: “Junta’s Offensive Aims to Secure Strategic Posturing in Namsan Yang,” Kachin News Group, July 17, 2023, Junta’s Offensive Aims to Secure Strategic Position in Namsan Yang – Kachin News Group (KNG) , where the regime struggles to control territory. Beijing has regularly utilized its political leverage over EAOs to facilitate dialogue with Myanmar’s successive regimes, but reaching a genuine ceasefire agreement is beyond Beijing’s capacity which still requires a certain level of trust between the two opposition parties.
Conclusion
The NDAA Burma Act has been in effect for almost eight months, and the U.S. has not taken significant strides to implement new programs for Myanmar. Regarding assistance, the U.S. primarily provides humanitarian aid, a tool that has been used consistently since the 2021 coup. Unfortunately, with the lack of effort from the U.S., the Myanmar resistance has adjusted its expectations to believe that U.S. policy towards the region will not change in the near-term future, if at all. While the U.S. has five years to see the Act through, its slow pace is not promising for the people of Myanmar. If the U.S. does not uphold the proposals outlined in the NDAA Burma Act to Myanmar, it opens the door for regional competitors, like China, to gain greater regional influence. Furthermore, the U.S. risks eroding the confidence of the Burmese people and the resistance movement in the U.S. government as a champion of global democracy.
Lian Bawi Thang is a Ph.D. student in political science at University of Hawai’i Mānoa and an East-West Center degree fellow. He previously worked as a political analyst and activist in Myanmar for ten years. Follow @Lianbawithang.
Notes
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