On May 31, 2023, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced that it had withdrawn two months ago from the operations of the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Established in 2001, the CMF is a Bahrain-headquartered naval force tasked with enhancing security, counterterrorism, and counter-piracy in the bodies of water around the Arabian Peninsula.
The UAE remains one of 38 nations in this maritime partnership, according to the CMF’s website. Abu Dhabi’s announcement sent a strong message to Washington about UAE frustration with U.S. foreign policy and perceived downgrading of the importance of the Middle East. In fact, a spokesman for the U.S. Fifth Fleet said Washington had not been informed in advance of the Emirati decision.
Abu Dhabi did not provide a reason for the decision, nor did the UAE indicate if or when it would resume participation in CMF operations. However, the announcement came one day after the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that the UAE was upset over the lack of an American response to Iran’s seizure of two oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz on April 27 and May 3. Citing U.S. and Arab officials, the piece reported that “the UAE was particularly incensed by the seizure of the second vessel leaving Dubai because it could have given the impression its waters were unsafe to navigate.”
The UAE responded to the report by calling it a “mischaracterization” of discussions between Abu Dhabi and Washington and announcing that the Persian Gulf country had stopped taking part in CMF operations.
Abu Dhabi’s decision is a blow to Washington’s policy agenda in the Persian Gulf, especially given the UAE’s important role in CMF operations in the past. Nine days before the announcement, the multinational maritime partnership had just launched a new task force to train navies to better address maritime security challenges in the region.
The development underlines tensions between the UAE and the U.S. that have been building since Barack Obama’s presidency. The Emiratis were furious that Washington “abandoned” President Hosni Mubarak during Egypt’s 2011 uprising, failed to enforce “red lines” after the Assad regime’s chemical attack in Ghouta, Syria, and signed the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran which omitted regional issues. Then in 2019, after the Trump administration unilaterally quit the Iran nuclear deal, the U.S. failed to respond to Iran-backed acts of sabotage targeting vessels off the UAE’s east coast as well as a brazen strike on Saudi oil facilities. In January 2022, under the Joe Biden administration, Yemeni Houthis hit Abu Dhabi airport with missile and drone strikes and again the U.S. did not respond. As the Emiratis see it, three U.S. administrations have failed to sufficiently protect U.S. allies and partners in the Persian Gulf from external threats.
Last year, the Biden administration made efforts to mend fences with the Emiratis. In March 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a meeting with then-Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) in Morocco. Seven weeks later, Vice President Kamala Harris travelled to the UAE to offer MbZ in-person condolences after the death of President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan. President Biden then traveled to Jeddah in July for a summit with regional leaders. He met with MbZ and invited the UAE’s president to Washington. But bilateral relations remain seriously strained despite the White House’s attempts to repair the partnership.
The Emiratis are voicing their anger with the U.S. for what they believe to be Washington’s failure to maintain its end of the bargain in the bilateral security partnership. On the U.S. side, there is concern that the UAE has become too close to China and Russia, providing a haven for Russian oligarchs and sanctions-evaders after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and allowing China to resume work on a potential military base.
The UAE has further diversified its international relationships by normalizing relations with Israel, building on a rapprochement with Turkey, and expanding the scope of its ties to heavyweights in the Global South such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. Although none of these countries has demonstrated an ability or willingness to replace the U.S. as the UAE’s security guarantor, Abu Dhabi would like to have options. For the UAE, further diversification from the U.S. enhances Abu Dhabi’s leverage on the international stage, giving the country greater means to advance what the UAE sees as its national interests.
The growing friction between Abu Dhabi and Washington is good news for Iran. Viewing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf as threatening, Tehran would like to see American forces leave Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region. For years, the Iranians have tried to convince their Arab neighbors that the U.S. plays a destabilizing role in the region and that they should abandon faith in Washington as a security guarantor. Given that the CMF’s operations usually go after Iranian maritime activities, the Islamic Republic is pleased to see the UAE withdraw from the US-led force’s operations.
However, it remains to be seen whether the announcement indicates a true scaling back of Abu Dhabi’s partnership with Washington or a negotiating tactic. Looking ahead, the UAE will probably try to leverage this move to convince the U.S. to provide Abu Dhabi with a formal security guarantee. Yet, the terms of such a potential agreement are unclear and would likely be a tough sell for the U.S. Congress, where frustration is mounting with Emirati and other Arab efforts to play both sides of the Ukraine crisis, as well as fatigue with Middle Eastern military entanglements that has been growing for years. Therefore, if Abu Dhabi is seeking a defense commitment from Washington similar to what the U.S. extends to NATO allies, the Emiratis are likely to be disappointed.
Short of a defense commitment, however, the UAE may seek to convince Washington to increase weapons sales to Abu Dhabi. Emirati officials will also argue that a stronger U.S. commitment to their security will decrease their incentive to pivot toward Moscow and Beijing.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
Emirati Announcement Highlights Growing Tensions with the US
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
On May 31, 2023, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced that it had withdrawn two months ago from the operations of the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Established in 2001, the CMF is a Bahrain-headquartered naval force tasked with enhancing security, counterterrorism, and counter-piracy in the bodies of water around the Arabian Peninsula.
The UAE remains one of 38 nations in this maritime partnership, according to the CMF’s website. Abu Dhabi’s announcement sent a strong message to Washington about UAE frustration with U.S. foreign policy and perceived downgrading of the importance of the Middle East. In fact, a spokesman for the U.S. Fifth Fleet said Washington had not been informed in advance of the Emirati decision.
Abu Dhabi did not provide a reason for the decision, nor did the UAE indicate if or when it would resume participation in CMF operations. However, the announcement came one day after the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that the UAE was upset over the lack of an American response to Iran’s seizure of two oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz on April 27 and May 3. Citing U.S. and Arab officials, the piece reported that “the UAE was particularly incensed by the seizure of the second vessel leaving Dubai because it could have given the impression its waters were unsafe to navigate.”
The UAE responded to the report by calling it a “mischaracterization” of discussions between Abu Dhabi and Washington and announcing that the Persian Gulf country had stopped taking part in CMF operations.
Abu Dhabi’s decision is a blow to Washington’s policy agenda in the Persian Gulf, especially given the UAE’s important role in CMF operations in the past. Nine days before the announcement, the multinational maritime partnership had just launched a new task force to train navies to better address maritime security challenges in the region.
The development underlines tensions between the UAE and the U.S. that have been building since Barack Obama’s presidency. The Emiratis were furious that Washington “abandoned” President Hosni Mubarak during Egypt’s 2011 uprising, failed to enforce “red lines” after the Assad regime’s chemical attack in Ghouta, Syria, and signed the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran which omitted regional issues. Then in 2019, after the Trump administration unilaterally quit the Iran nuclear deal, the U.S. failed to respond to Iran-backed acts of sabotage targeting vessels off the UAE’s east coast as well as a brazen strike on Saudi oil facilities. In January 2022, under the Joe Biden administration, Yemeni Houthis hit Abu Dhabi airport with missile and drone strikes and again the U.S. did not respond. As the Emiratis see it, three U.S. administrations have failed to sufficiently protect U.S. allies and partners in the Persian Gulf from external threats.
Last year, the Biden administration made efforts to mend fences with the Emiratis. In March 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a meeting with then-Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) in Morocco. Seven weeks later, Vice President Kamala Harris travelled to the UAE to offer MbZ in-person condolences after the death of President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan. President Biden then traveled to Jeddah in July for a summit with regional leaders. He met with MbZ and invited the UAE’s president to Washington. But bilateral relations remain seriously strained despite the White House’s attempts to repair the partnership.
The Emiratis are voicing their anger with the U.S. for what they believe to be Washington’s failure to maintain its end of the bargain in the bilateral security partnership. On the U.S. side, there is concern that the UAE has become too close to China and Russia, providing a haven for Russian oligarchs and sanctions-evaders after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and allowing China to resume work on a potential military base.
The UAE has further diversified its international relationships by normalizing relations with Israel, building on a rapprochement with Turkey, and expanding the scope of its ties to heavyweights in the Global South such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. Although none of these countries has demonstrated an ability or willingness to replace the U.S. as the UAE’s security guarantor, Abu Dhabi would like to have options. For the UAE, further diversification from the U.S. enhances Abu Dhabi’s leverage on the international stage, giving the country greater means to advance what the UAE sees as its national interests.
The growing friction between Abu Dhabi and Washington is good news for Iran. Viewing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf as threatening, Tehran would like to see American forces leave Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region. For years, the Iranians have tried to convince their Arab neighbors that the U.S. plays a destabilizing role in the region and that they should abandon faith in Washington as a security guarantor. Given that the CMF’s operations usually go after Iranian maritime activities, the Islamic Republic is pleased to see the UAE withdraw from the US-led force’s operations.
However, it remains to be seen whether the announcement indicates a true scaling back of Abu Dhabi’s partnership with Washington or a negotiating tactic. Looking ahead, the UAE will probably try to leverage this move to convince the U.S. to provide Abu Dhabi with a formal security guarantee. Yet, the terms of such a potential agreement are unclear and would likely be a tough sell for the U.S. Congress, where frustration is mounting with Emirati and other Arab efforts to play both sides of the Ukraine crisis, as well as fatigue with Middle Eastern military entanglements that has been growing for years. Therefore, if Abu Dhabi is seeking a defense commitment from Washington similar to what the U.S. extends to NATO allies, the Emiratis are likely to be disappointed.
Short of a defense commitment, however, the UAE may seek to convince Washington to increase weapons sales to Abu Dhabi. Emirati officials will also argue that a stronger U.S. commitment to their security will decrease their incentive to pivot toward Moscow and Beijing.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
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