Iran experts tend to focus either on the Islamic regime’s foreign policy or its domestic challenges. Studies that analyze the intertwining of the two often emphasize the impact of competition among factions within the ruling regime (pragmatists versus hardliners) and ignore the more complex interaction between the ruling regime and its opponents and international affairs.
Nowhere is this interaction deficit more visible than in analysis of Iran-China relations, which has become highly politicized in recent years. The mutual attraction between the two authoritarian governments is undeniable. Iran and China signed a long-term comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement in March 2021 and China has been Iran’s largest trading partner for more than a decade. The two governments have become even closer in face of the growing hostility of the United States toward China in recent years and China in March even brokered an agreement normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yet Iran-China relations are vulnerable to several risk factors that arise from the recent mass civil unrest and political uncertainties inside Iran.
Similarly, the evolution of the recent mass protests against the Islamic regime that began with the death of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in police custody in September 2022 has been and will be influenced by the government’s foreign policy entanglements, particularly Iran-China relations. The evolution of these protests, which many Iranian political activists label the Mahsa Revolution, can best be understood if they are analyzed in the shadow of Iran-China relations.
The Mahsa Revolution has exposed the depth of social and cultural resistance to the Islamic regime among large segments of Iran’s population. It began as a mass protest against the imposition of the hijab and harsh punishment of women for violating hijab rules. However, it evolved into a broader protest against the entire regime with slogans that called for an end to the political system of control by Shi’ite Muslim clerics. As the protests spread, they provoked a violent response from the government, which gradually suppressed the demonstrations but has not ended women’s resistance to enforced veiling. Sporadic protests still take place.
The ”Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, as the campaign is also known, delivered a significant political shock to the regime and exposed its lack of legitimacy among large segments of society. There is an awareness among both supporters and opponents of the regime that the underlying anger against clerical rule can lead to similar eruptions in the future. This anger is not only rooted in the lack of cultural and political freedom in Iran but in the high rates of poverty, inequality, and corruption.
With this background in mind, the Mahsa Revolution affects Iran-China relations in several ways.
First, sentiment toward China is very negative among the Iranians who oppose the government. Regime opponents perceive China and Russia as the main supporters of the regime and key contributors to its survival. As a result, they view growing Iran-China relations as detrimental to the interests of ordinary people. If domestic tensions continue, we might witness sabotage or other violent attacks against Chinese interests. If China takes this risk into account, it might affect the size and the nature of its future economic engagement with Iran.
Second, the fear of repeating waves of the Mahsa Revolution might force the Iranian regime into a binary choice — an extreme move to the East and even closer relations with China or a sharp compromise with the West. The severity and intensity of the Mahsa Revolution has already caused a divide within the ruling elite on foreign policy. While one faction has become more resolute in developing closer ties with China and Russia, another faction believes that Iran must show more compromise in negotiations with the West in order to end U.S. and European economic sanctions and reduce the danger of another mass protest over economic grievances. If at some point this faction becomes more influential — either by convincing aging Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to change course or by establishing close ties with his successor — Iran might scale back relations with China. Awareness of such divisions and policy reversal risks can also influence Chinese policies toward Iran.
Third, if the Mahsa Revolution succeeds at some point and Iran experiences a regime change, the new government will likely reflect the anti-Chinese sentiments of the public and adopt a “Look West” policy. This reversal would put Chinese investments and Iran’s transit role in the Belt and Road Initiative at risk. Both China and Russia support an active role for Iran in the Belt and Road network. In the event of a regime change, it is likely that Iran would be more cooperative with the United States in determining how these transit routes would be used.
Similarly, Iran-China relations are likely to influence the Mahsa Revolution through three channels.
First, the Islamic regime has relied heavily on Chinese digital technology and surveillance software to identify and arrest protestors. Face recognition software in particular was very effective in helping the government apprehend large numbers of people. The same technology has been used to identify women who defy the hijab rules. The government has inflicted severe economic and social punishment on these women, such as lack of access to government services and heavy fines. It also uses these technologies to identify businesses and government offices that offer services to women that violate the hijab rules. Street cameras have been used to identify stores and restaurants that have served poorly covered or unveiled women. In addition, China is the main supplier of riot control and urban warfare weapons to the government of Iran.
Second, while the United States and European Union nations have imposed more sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran in response to the government crackdown on protests and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia to use in Ukraine, China continued its diplomatic and economic support for Iran, which increased the government’s resilience against the protestors. It also boosted the morale of government supporters who were at some points severely worried about the possibility of the regime’s downfall.
Third, as Iran becomes a more valuable strategic partner for China and Russia, the United States and some European countries will have an added incentive to support opposition groups and protests in Iran. They are aware that public opinion among government opponents is in favor of a “Look West” or at least a “neutral” foreign policy, which would weaken the strategic cooperation of Iran with Russia and China after a regime change or a significant regime concession to the opponents. In light of the escalating tensions between the U.S. and China, these considerations might motivate the West to offer more moral and material support to Iranian opposition groups and protestors in hope of bringing about a significant political change in Iran.
Nader Habibi is an Iranian-American economist and Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in the Economics of the Middle East at Brandeis University.
Challenges to Iran-China Relations in the Shadow of the ‘Mahsa Revolution’
By Nader Habibi
Middle East & North Africa
Iran experts tend to focus either on the Islamic regime’s foreign policy or its domestic challenges. Studies that analyze the intertwining of the two often emphasize the impact of competition among factions within the ruling regime (pragmatists versus hardliners) and ignore the more complex interaction between the ruling regime and its opponents and international affairs.
Nowhere is this interaction deficit more visible than in analysis of Iran-China relations, which has become highly politicized in recent years. The mutual attraction between the two authoritarian governments is undeniable. Iran and China signed a long-term comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement in March 2021 and China has been Iran’s largest trading partner for more than a decade. The two governments have become even closer in face of the growing hostility of the United States toward China in recent years and China in March even brokered an agreement normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yet Iran-China relations are vulnerable to several risk factors that arise from the recent mass civil unrest and political uncertainties inside Iran.
Similarly, the evolution of the recent mass protests against the Islamic regime that began with the death of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in police custody in September 2022 has been and will be influenced by the government’s foreign policy entanglements, particularly Iran-China relations. The evolution of these protests, which many Iranian political activists label the Mahsa Revolution, can best be understood if they are analyzed in the shadow of Iran-China relations.
The Mahsa Revolution has exposed the depth of social and cultural resistance to the Islamic regime among large segments of Iran’s population. It began as a mass protest against the imposition of the hijab and harsh punishment of women for violating hijab rules. However, it evolved into a broader protest against the entire regime with slogans that called for an end to the political system of control by Shi’ite Muslim clerics. As the protests spread, they provoked a violent response from the government, which gradually suppressed the demonstrations but has not ended women’s resistance to enforced veiling. Sporadic protests still take place.
The ”Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, as the campaign is also known, delivered a significant political shock to the regime and exposed its lack of legitimacy among large segments of society. There is an awareness among both supporters and opponents of the regime that the underlying anger against clerical rule can lead to similar eruptions in the future. This anger is not only rooted in the lack of cultural and political freedom in Iran but in the high rates of poverty, inequality, and corruption.
With this background in mind, the Mahsa Revolution affects Iran-China relations in several ways.
First, sentiment toward China is very negative among the Iranians who oppose the government. Regime opponents perceive China and Russia as the main supporters of the regime and key contributors to its survival. As a result, they view growing Iran-China relations as detrimental to the interests of ordinary people. If domestic tensions continue, we might witness sabotage or other violent attacks against Chinese interests. If China takes this risk into account, it might affect the size and the nature of its future economic engagement with Iran.
Second, the fear of repeating waves of the Mahsa Revolution might force the Iranian regime into a binary choice — an extreme move to the East and even closer relations with China or a sharp compromise with the West. The severity and intensity of the Mahsa Revolution has already caused a divide within the ruling elite on foreign policy. While one faction has become more resolute in developing closer ties with China and Russia, another faction believes that Iran must show more compromise in negotiations with the West in order to end U.S. and European economic sanctions and reduce the danger of another mass protest over economic grievances. If at some point this faction becomes more influential — either by convincing aging Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to change course or by establishing close ties with his successor — Iran might scale back relations with China. Awareness of such divisions and policy reversal risks can also influence Chinese policies toward Iran.
Third, if the Mahsa Revolution succeeds at some point and Iran experiences a regime change, the new government will likely reflect the anti-Chinese sentiments of the public and adopt a “Look West” policy. This reversal would put Chinese investments and Iran’s transit role in the Belt and Road Initiative at risk. Both China and Russia support an active role for Iran in the Belt and Road network. In the event of a regime change, it is likely that Iran would be more cooperative with the United States in determining how these transit routes would be used.
Similarly, Iran-China relations are likely to influence the Mahsa Revolution through three channels.
First, the Islamic regime has relied heavily on Chinese digital technology and surveillance software to identify and arrest protestors. Face recognition software in particular was very effective in helping the government apprehend large numbers of people. The same technology has been used to identify women who defy the hijab rules. The government has inflicted severe economic and social punishment on these women, such as lack of access to government services and heavy fines. It also uses these technologies to identify businesses and government offices that offer services to women that violate the hijab rules. Street cameras have been used to identify stores and restaurants that have served poorly covered or unveiled women. In addition, China is the main supplier of riot control and urban warfare weapons to the government of Iran.
Second, while the United States and European Union nations have imposed more sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran in response to the government crackdown on protests and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia to use in Ukraine, China continued its diplomatic and economic support for Iran, which increased the government’s resilience against the protestors. It also boosted the morale of government supporters who were at some points severely worried about the possibility of the regime’s downfall.
Third, as Iran becomes a more valuable strategic partner for China and Russia, the United States and some European countries will have an added incentive to support opposition groups and protests in Iran. They are aware that public opinion among government opponents is in favor of a “Look West” or at least a “neutral” foreign policy, which would weaken the strategic cooperation of Iran with Russia and China after a regime change or a significant regime concession to the opponents. In light of the escalating tensions between the U.S. and China, these considerations might motivate the West to offer more moral and material support to Iranian opposition groups and protestors in hope of bringing about a significant political change in Iran.
Nader Habibi is an Iranian-American economist and Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in the Economics of the Middle East at Brandeis University.
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