25 Years of Security Cooperation Beneath the Nuclear Shadow
Shifting U.S. Arms Transfers to India and Pakistan
25 years after Washington briefly ended security cooperation with India and Pakistan over their tit-for-tat nuclear testing, a look at the U.S. arms relationship with both countries
A quarter century ago, India and Pakistan broke the non-proliferation taboo and, in a show of mutual saber rattling, tested a series of nuclear weapons. Among the most notable, albeit overlooked, consequence of the tests was the prohibition of U.S. arms transfers to the two countries, shuttering Islamabad and New Delhi off from the world’s most prolific defense exporter. But in the two and a half decades since, changing geopolitical dynamics have reshaped the security cooperation partnerships between Washington and the two nuclear armed rivals. On the 25th anniversary of India and Pakistan’s era-defining nuclear tests, examining the historic arms relationship the United States has shared with India and Pakistan helps illustrate the evolution of the issues, risks, and politics that have defined Washington’s approach to the region.
Unsurprisingly, Cold War imperatives dominated U.S. security cooperation considerations in South Asia throughout the latter half of the 20th century. During this time, India’s lead role in the non-aligned movement and eventual defense ties to Russia led the United States to overwhelmingly favor Pakistan in its regional defense engagement. But while the United States was looking for a bulwark against communist encroachment in South Asia, Pakistan was squarely focused on developing the capacity to compete with neighboring India, a misalignment of interest that would repeatedly hinder U.S-Pakistan defense ties.
Nonetheless, U.S. arms transfers and military assistance to Pakistan between 1950 and 1991 were significant, especially compared to India. Early agreements for U.S. access to Pakistani military bases catalyzed a steady stream of arms transfers that eventually led the United States to command more than 53% of Pakistan’s arms imports between 1950 and 1965.
But frequent disagreements hampered the defense partnership and created dramatic ebbs and flows in U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan. While moments of interest alignment, including collaboration in supporting the Mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan, rapidly accelerated security cooperation between the two countries, frequent India-Pakistan conflicts and the discovery of Pakistan’s nuclear program resulted in repeated suspensions of U.S. transfers. That irregularity led Pakistan to diversify its supply of arms.
Beginning in the 1960s, Islamabad leaned increasingly on China for materiel, and by the end of the Cold War, Beijing commanded the lion’s share of Pakistan’s defense imports. Still, both Washington and Islamabad sought to preserve elements of their defense relationship. For Pakistan, the transfer and sustainment of U.S. F-16 combat aircraft, first made available during the Reagan administration, continued to hold deep symbolic significance that extended beyond their practical battlefield utility.
Near the end of the 20th century, U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan far outpaced those to India. According to the Department of Defense, between FY1950 and FY1992, the United States entered into $3.65 billion in foreign military sales agreements with Pakistan compared to $85.89 million with India. New Delhi, for its part, would eventually import 65% of its arms from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1991.
Post Cold War and the 1998 Tests
As the end of the Cold War shifted U.S. foreign policy imperatives, India and Pakistan’s competing nuclear programs became a defining issue in Washington’s bilateral relationship with both countries and constrained U.S. security cooperation with them both. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the George H. W. Bush administration declined to certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear device, triggering sanctions under the Pressler Amendment that cut off government-to-government military sales. Between FY1993 and FY1996, the United States had foreign military sales agreements with Pakistan worth just $78,000 and $4,000 with India. Foreign Military Sales deliveries in that time amounted to $143 million for Pakistan and $4.5 million for India.
Events came to a head on May 11 and 13, 1998, when India tested a series of nuclear devices. Pakistan responded with its own underground nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. That same month, President Bill Clinton imposed sweeping sanctions on all forms of aid and military assistance to both countries. Between FY1999 and FY2001, the United States made no foreign military sales deliveries to either India or Pakistan.
The Global War on Terror
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 entirely re-framed U.S. foreign policy priorities in South Asia. In exchange for Pakistan’s support and cooperation in the War on Terror and wide-ranging military, intelligence, and logistical support for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the United States looked past areas of disagreement and waived all remaining sanctions on Pakistan, resuming arms transfers and military aid to the country.
In 2004, the declaration of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally opened up the potential for significant military sales. Between FY2002 and FY2006, the U.S. provided more than $969 million in Foreign Military Financing to Pakistan and entered into $4.134 billion in Foreign Military Sales agreements. Most notably, in 2005 the United States elected to resume sales of Pakistan’s prized F-16s for the first time since 1989.
India also saw a deepening of its security sector relationship with the United States following the September 11 attacks, though not to the degree Pakistan enjoyed. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush waived all sanctions on India and announced the resumption of defense sales, citing a desire to collaborate on counterterrorism particularly amid concerns that international terrorism could emanate from Kashmir. As a result, U.S. arms sales to India during the next five years doubled compared to the preceding five years, albeit from a lower starting point.
Terrorism Fades and Strategic Competition Intensifies
As the 2000s progressed, geopolitical interests shifted, and the primacy of counterterrorism began to give ground to a growing focus on near-peer adversaries, including Russia and China. In this context, India’s relative geo-strategic importance as a democratic, emerging great power grew.
Shared concerns between Washington and New Delhi about a revanchist China helped pave the way for closer security relations. Building on earlier agreements, including a landmark 2005 deal that facilitated full civil nuclear cooperation, the United States and India signed a 10-year defense framework agreement in 2005, which included an expansion of bilateral defense trade.
Between FY2008 and FY2012, Foreign Military Sales agreements between the United States and India totaled $5.8 billion, a twenty-five-fold increase from the preceding five fiscal years. By 2020, India was the among the significant global importers of U.S. arms over the preceding decade.
Relations between the United States and Pakistan, on the other hand, grew more tense. Once again, the lack of a true convergence of interests undermined the sustainability of the latest iteration of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation. Despite military aid and other forms of assistance, U.S. policymakers grew frustrated with Pakistan’s unwillingness to cut ties with the Taliban and root out militants in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Those frustrations dovetailed with the diminishing centrality of counterterrorism and Afghanistan in U.S. foreign policy, as well as a growing focus on near-peer adversaries.
Tensions culminated in the 2018 suspension of $1.3 billion in U.S. military assistance, which endured until September 2022 when the United States resumed military sales by approving a $450 million package to coordinate sustainment of Pakistan’s existing supply of F-16s.
Accordingly, China’s share of Pakistan’s arms imports has grown over the last decade reflecting Washington’s reduced willingness to facilitate arms sales and Beijing’s effort to build up strategic partners around the Indo-Pacific. Pakistan’s fighter aircraft, tanks, air defenses, are all mostly supplied by China, as well as a diverse range of its incoming naval platforms.
U.S. defense cooperation with India, on the other hand, has continued to grow, but not without difficulties. The inauguration of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative in 2012 was planned to facilitate co-development and co-production of military technology as part of India’s defense indigenization strategy, but nothing notable has come of it.
In 2016, the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner, a status just below ally that has only been applied to India. That, combined with the completion of the so-called foundational agreements that provide a legal framework for information sharing and defense industrial cooperation, has enabled ties to continue expanding. Major foreign military sales have included Seahawk and Apache helicopters as well as patrol and transport aircraft.
While arms transfers from the United States to India have increased, New Delhi’s reliance on Moscow remains due to path dependence from their Cold War partnership. Approximately, 85% of India’s major weapons are of Russian origin, including critical technologies such as the co-produced BrahMos missiles, SSBNs, Su-30 aircraft, and S-400 missile systems. The U.S. government still has not decided whether to waive congressionally mandated sanctions for purchasing Russian military equipment.
Outlook
Looking ahead, arms transfers to both India and Pakistan will remain challenging, albeit for different reasons. In India, the defense relationship seems poised to continue growing, but existing challenges stemming from India’s constrained defense budget, desire for high-end technology transfers, and enduring ties to Russia may continue to limit potential. Nevertheless, the United States sees India as an increasingly important regional partner and is actively seeking to deepen strategic ties through defense. This includes in leveraging Russia’s post-Ukraine military constraints to encourage Indian arms diversification – to include not just U.S. systems but also those of partners like France and Israel as well as enhanced indigenous defense production.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, despite a security partnership spanning three quarters of a century, divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests are reflected in their declining defense cooperation. Despite occasional arms sales intended to maintain capacity on counterterrorism and other shared objectives, both sides’ misaligned perspectives on regional geopolitical competition involving India and China will continue to hamper ties. For significant security cooperation to continue, both will need to find a new value proposition for a renewed partnership.
25 Years of Security Cooperation Beneath the Nuclear Shadow
Shifting U.S. Arms Transfers to India and Pakistan
By Betzalel Newman • Elias Yousif
South Asia
A quarter century ago, India and Pakistan broke the non-proliferation taboo and, in a show of mutual saber rattling, tested a series of nuclear weapons. Among the most notable, albeit overlooked, consequence of the tests was the prohibition of U.S. arms transfers to the two countries, shuttering Islamabad and New Delhi off from the world’s most prolific defense exporter. But in the two and a half decades since, changing geopolitical dynamics have reshaped the security cooperation partnerships between Washington and the two nuclear armed rivals. On the 25th anniversary of India and Pakistan’s era-defining nuclear tests, examining the historic arms relationship the United States has shared with India and Pakistan helps illustrate the evolution of the issues, risks, and politics that have defined Washington’s approach to the region.
Cold War Sanctions and Transfers
Unsurprisingly, Cold War imperatives dominated U.S. security cooperation considerations in South Asia throughout the latter half of the 20th century. During this time, India’s lead role in the non-aligned movement and eventual defense ties to Russia led the United States to overwhelmingly favor Pakistan in its regional defense engagement. But while the United States was looking for a bulwark against communist encroachment in South Asia, Pakistan was squarely focused on developing the capacity to compete with neighboring India, a misalignment of interest that would repeatedly hinder U.S-Pakistan defense ties.
Nonetheless, U.S. arms transfers and military assistance to Pakistan between 1950 and 1991 were significant, especially compared to India. Early agreements for U.S. access to Pakistani military bases catalyzed a steady stream of arms transfers that eventually led the United States to command more than 53% of Pakistan’s arms imports between 1950 and 1965.
But frequent disagreements hampered the defense partnership and created dramatic ebbs and flows in U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan. While moments of interest alignment, including collaboration in supporting the Mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan, rapidly accelerated security cooperation between the two countries, frequent India-Pakistan conflicts and the discovery of Pakistan’s nuclear program resulted in repeated suspensions of U.S. transfers. That irregularity led Pakistan to diversify its supply of arms.
Beginning in the 1960s, Islamabad leaned increasingly on China for materiel, and by the end of the Cold War, Beijing commanded the lion’s share of Pakistan’s defense imports. Still, both Washington and Islamabad sought to preserve elements of their defense relationship. For Pakistan, the transfer and sustainment of U.S. F-16 combat aircraft, first made available during the Reagan administration, continued to hold deep symbolic significance that extended beyond their practical battlefield utility.
Near the end of the 20th century, U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan far outpaced those to India. According to the Department of Defense, between FY1950 and FY1992, the United States entered into $3.65 billion in foreign military sales agreements with Pakistan compared to $85.89 million with India. New Delhi, for its part, would eventually import 65% of its arms from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1991.
Post Cold War and the 1998 Tests
As the end of the Cold War shifted U.S. foreign policy imperatives, India and Pakistan’s competing nuclear programs became a defining issue in Washington’s bilateral relationship with both countries and constrained U.S. security cooperation with them both. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the George H. W. Bush administration declined to certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear device, triggering sanctions under the Pressler Amendment that cut off government-to-government military sales. Between FY1993 and FY1996, the United States had foreign military sales agreements with Pakistan worth just $78,000 and $4,000 with India. Foreign Military Sales deliveries in that time amounted to $143 million for Pakistan and $4.5 million for India.
Events came to a head on May 11 and 13, 1998, when India tested a series of nuclear devices. Pakistan responded with its own underground nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. That same month, President Bill Clinton imposed sweeping sanctions on all forms of aid and military assistance to both countries. Between FY1999 and FY2001, the United States made no foreign military sales deliveries to either India or Pakistan.
The Global War on Terror
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 entirely re-framed U.S. foreign policy priorities in South Asia. In exchange for Pakistan’s support and cooperation in the War on Terror and wide-ranging military, intelligence, and logistical support for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the United States looked past areas of disagreement and waived all remaining sanctions on Pakistan, resuming arms transfers and military aid to the country.
In 2004, the declaration of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally opened up the potential for significant military sales. Between FY2002 and FY2006, the U.S. provided more than $969 million in Foreign Military Financing to Pakistan and entered into $4.134 billion in Foreign Military Sales agreements. Most notably, in 2005 the United States elected to resume sales of Pakistan’s prized F-16s for the first time since 1989.
India also saw a deepening of its security sector relationship with the United States following the September 11 attacks, though not to the degree Pakistan enjoyed. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush waived all sanctions on India and announced the resumption of defense sales, citing a desire to collaborate on counterterrorism particularly amid concerns that international terrorism could emanate from Kashmir. As a result, U.S. arms sales to India during the next five years doubled compared to the preceding five years, albeit from a lower starting point.
Terrorism Fades and Strategic Competition Intensifies
As the 2000s progressed, geopolitical interests shifted, and the primacy of counterterrorism began to give ground to a growing focus on near-peer adversaries, including Russia and China. In this context, India’s relative geo-strategic importance as a democratic, emerging great power grew.
Shared concerns between Washington and New Delhi about a revanchist China helped pave the way for closer security relations. Building on earlier agreements, including a landmark 2005 deal that facilitated full civil nuclear cooperation, the United States and India signed a 10-year defense framework agreement in 2005, which included an expansion of bilateral defense trade.
Between FY2008 and FY2012, Foreign Military Sales agreements between the United States and India totaled $5.8 billion, a twenty-five-fold increase from the preceding five fiscal years. By 2020, India was the among the significant global importers of U.S. arms over the preceding decade.
Relations between the United States and Pakistan, on the other hand, grew more tense. Once again, the lack of a true convergence of interests undermined the sustainability of the latest iteration of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation. Despite military aid and other forms of assistance, U.S. policymakers grew frustrated with Pakistan’s unwillingness to cut ties with the Taliban and root out militants in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Those frustrations dovetailed with the diminishing centrality of counterterrorism and Afghanistan in U.S. foreign policy, as well as a growing focus on near-peer adversaries.
Tensions culminated in the 2018 suspension of $1.3 billion in U.S. military assistance, which endured until September 2022 when the United States resumed military sales by approving a $450 million package to coordinate sustainment of Pakistan’s existing supply of F-16s.
Accordingly, China’s share of Pakistan’s arms imports has grown over the last decade reflecting Washington’s reduced willingness to facilitate arms sales and Beijing’s effort to build up strategic partners around the Indo-Pacific. Pakistan’s fighter aircraft, tanks, air defenses, are all mostly supplied by China, as well as a diverse range of its incoming naval platforms.
U.S. defense cooperation with India, on the other hand, has continued to grow, but not without difficulties. The inauguration of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative in 2012 was planned to facilitate co-development and co-production of military technology as part of India’s defense indigenization strategy, but nothing notable has come of it.
In 2016, the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner, a status just below ally that has only been applied to India. That, combined with the completion of the so-called foundational agreements that provide a legal framework for information sharing and defense industrial cooperation, has enabled ties to continue expanding. Major foreign military sales have included Seahawk and Apache helicopters as well as patrol and transport aircraft.
While arms transfers from the United States to India have increased, New Delhi’s reliance on Moscow remains due to path dependence from their Cold War partnership. Approximately, 85% of India’s major weapons are of Russian origin, including critical technologies such as the co-produced BrahMos missiles, SSBNs, Su-30 aircraft, and S-400 missile systems. The U.S. government still has not decided whether to waive congressionally mandated sanctions for purchasing Russian military equipment.
Outlook
Looking ahead, arms transfers to both India and Pakistan will remain challenging, albeit for different reasons. In India, the defense relationship seems poised to continue growing, but existing challenges stemming from India’s constrained defense budget, desire for high-end technology transfers, and enduring ties to Russia may continue to limit potential. Nevertheless, the United States sees India as an increasingly important regional partner and is actively seeking to deepen strategic ties through defense. This includes in leveraging Russia’s post-Ukraine military constraints to encourage Indian arms diversification – to include not just U.S. systems but also those of partners like France and Israel as well as enhanced indigenous defense production.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, despite a security partnership spanning three quarters of a century, divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests are reflected in their declining defense cooperation. Despite occasional arms sales intended to maintain capacity on counterterrorism and other shared objectives, both sides’ misaligned perspectives on regional geopolitical competition involving India and China will continue to hamper ties. For significant security cooperation to continue, both will need to find a new value proposition for a renewed partnership.
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