Conventional wisdom can change quickly. Whereas many opinion-makers once believed that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats were no more than a bluff, after Russian forces invaded Ukraine (again), conventional wisdom settled on a new position: that he planned to invade Ukraine all along, and that Moscow’s diplomatic efforts in advance of the assault were mere window-dressing meant to distract and divide the West. However, it is worth considering that the opposite might be true: that Moscow thought it might obtain some of its aims via coercive diplomacy and brinksmanship, and that the final decision to invade was only taken after these efforts failed. This could, in part, explain why the initial Russian military operation was so “bizarre” and haphazard — defined by “underweighted” and “piecemeal” attacks, obvious logistical problems, and a lack of basic combined arms tactics — and why most Russian soldiers were not told they would be invading Ukraine until the last moment (or, in some cases, not at all). How can we reconcile all the time and effort supposedly spent preparing for this invasion with the Russian army’s apparent lack of readiness for it?

Rather than interpreting the invasion as proof of Putin’s revanchist ambitions, or of secret plans to conquer the former-Soviet “near-abroad” by force, policymakers, analysts, and other observers should consider an alternate hypothesis: that Putin intended, and indeed expected, to achieve his political aims merely by presenting a highly credible threat. As Charles Michel, the president of the European Council aptly put it, Putin was attempting to commit “geopolitical terrorism,” holding Ukraine hostage in order to coerce its leaders, the United States, and NATO to meet his political demands. The invasion may have been the cruel consequence of Putin’s failed coercive diplomacy, and evidence of an inept strategist at the helm of the Russian state.

Read the full article in War on the Rocks.