The current agreement between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by Türkiye, suggest something like a Convention could well be within reach. All parties involved, most obviously Russia, must have seen a net benefit in it. Russia’s brief “suspension” of its participation (29 October – 2 November) drew sweeping condemnation and highly public actions by Türkiye and the U.N. to see the suspension reversed. It also revealed the severe limitations under which Russia’s blockade operates.
It is politically impossible for Russia to shoot at or sink a grain-laden merchantman in international waters on a humanitarian voyage to feed starving people in developing countries. Its veiled threats to do so are not credible. Russia’s freedom of action is bound by this enduring constraint.
The situation suggests that agreement for a Convention could be quite possible. It should not be simply a component of a narrow bi-national agreement. It should be a broader, multinational treaty reflecting a global perspective. Major non-Black Sea states, including the United States would, under U.N. aegis, be signatories. It would be comparable to the Montreux Convention that has long governed passage through the Turkish Straits and helped stabilize the balance of naval forces in the Black Sea. Negotiations to end the heinous war in Ukraine would offer an opportunity to frame the Black Sea’s security architecture and address food security. A grain Convention need not await a peace treaty, however, but could be raised today either as a stand-alone agreement or as a desirable component of the peace agreement.
Under a grain Convention, all Black Sea states would agree not to interfere with the seaborne export of the region’s grain, foodstuffs, and fertilizers. The United States and its allies would strongly support the concept, as would the U.N. It’s hard to imagine any state that wouldn’t.
Both warring parties would benefit. Russia’s blockade would be removed as a source of leverage in war settlement negotiations. The Convention would not impinge on Ukraine’s war aims in Crimea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s own agricultural exports would be protected in the future.
A grain export Convention would contribute an element of a genuinely “magnanimous” character to the war’s settlement. As Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis points out (https://hdiplo.org/to/E417), magnanimous settlements have produced enduring results — nearly a century in the case of the settlement that ended the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and nearly fifty years for the treaties that ended the Second World War. On the other hand, what might be called “punitive” settlements, like the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the “settlement” following the fall of the Soviet Union, which effectively excluded Russia and saw NATO’s expansion to that nation’s borders, had much shorter lives (on the order of twenty years).
War settlement in the 2020s must be informed by magnanimous-punitive alternatives. A grain Convention would seem to fall in the range of the doable middle. It punishes no one, rewards all parties, and requires them to do nothing except engage in peaceful commerce.
When in force, the Convention would discourage military action at or from the sea. Not blockading grain-carrying ships in the Black Sea would make it difficult to selectively blockade ships carrying other kinds of cargo. Similarly, mounting amphibious operations of any scale while avoiding blockading the adversary’s grain ships would be problematic, if not impossible.
A grain Convention would carry powerful incentives for self-enforcement. Nonetheless, it might break down. If Russia tried to reimpose a blockade on Ukraine, NATO could defeat the attempt through military actions solely at sea, by establishing and defending a protected corridor in territorial waters running from Odesa (at a minimum) to the Bosporus. Continuing grain flow would serve Türkiye’s interests, as well as Ukraine’s and other states.’
These conditions mean that if the war moves toward settlement and warships of non-Black Sea NATO navies reenter the Black Sea (none has been there for the last nine months), relatively few, smaller ships would be needed. Initial NATO deployments would express in the language of action confidence in the importance of the Convention. Unless unforeseen events dictate, this confidence, backed by NATO’s latent threat of enforcement, should provide ample stability and security.
Putting the Convention idea forward would cost and risk nothing. It would provide political support for Ukraine and push Russia onto its back foot. It would be welcomed by the international community, especially in the developing world. A boost to the West there alone would justify the effort. But a Convention is also a serious policy initiative to help settle the war, help produce an enduring peace, and solve an ongoing humanitarian problem.
At the highest levels of government, the United States should immediately propose a “Black Sea International Grain Export Convention,” putting America and its allies, including Ukraine, in a position of unassailable moral and political authority and allow the President to give concrete expression to America’s conception of a peaceful and rules-based world order. Uniquely, it would make food security the centerpiece of new international law.
Bradford Dismukes, a retired naval reserve officer, is a strategist and expert on maritime security issues.
Barry M. Blechman is co-founder of the Stimson Center. Both worked previously at the Center for Naval Analyses.
Convention to Safeguard Grain Flow and Secure Stable Peace in the Black Sea
By Barry Blechman
International & Regional Organizations
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded the international community of an indisputable fact: The world depends on grain and other crops grown in Ukraine and Russia, and on the ability of those nations to export them through the Black Sea. Blocking these exports leads directly to shortages that threaten millions with starvation. Negotiations to settle the Ukraine-Russia war will take place eventually. Regardless of where negotiators draw lines on the ground, they must address this humanitarian threat on the sea. One result should be a “Black Sea International Grain Export Convention.” It would enshrine food security in international law on an equal footing with political and military considerations.
The current agreement between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by Türkiye, suggest something like a Convention could well be within reach. All parties involved, most obviously Russia, must have seen a net benefit in it. Russia’s brief “suspension” of its participation (29 October – 2 November) drew sweeping condemnation and highly public actions by Türkiye and the U.N. to see the suspension reversed. It also revealed the severe limitations under which Russia’s blockade operates.
It is politically impossible for Russia to shoot at or sink a grain-laden merchantman in international waters on a humanitarian voyage to feed starving people in developing countries. Its veiled threats to do so are not credible. Russia’s freedom of action is bound by this enduring constraint.
The situation suggests that agreement for a Convention could be quite possible. It should not be simply a component of a narrow bi-national agreement. It should be a broader, multinational treaty reflecting a global perspective. Major non-Black Sea states, including the United States would, under U.N. aegis, be signatories. It would be comparable to the Montreux Convention that has long governed passage through the Turkish Straits and helped stabilize the balance of naval forces in the Black Sea. Negotiations to end the heinous war in Ukraine would offer an opportunity to frame the Black Sea’s security architecture and address food security. A grain Convention need not await a peace treaty, however, but could be raised today either as a stand-alone agreement or as a desirable component of the peace agreement.
Under a grain Convention, all Black Sea states would agree not to interfere with the seaborne export of the region’s grain, foodstuffs, and fertilizers. The United States and its allies would strongly support the concept, as would the U.N. It’s hard to imagine any state that wouldn’t.
Both warring parties would benefit. Russia’s blockade would be removed as a source of leverage in war settlement negotiations. The Convention would not impinge on Ukraine’s war aims in Crimea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s own agricultural exports would be protected in the future.
A grain export Convention would contribute an element of a genuinely “magnanimous” character to the war’s settlement. As Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis points out (https://hdiplo.org/to/E417), magnanimous settlements have produced enduring results — nearly a century in the case of the settlement that ended the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and nearly fifty years for the treaties that ended the Second World War. On the other hand, what might be called “punitive” settlements, like the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the “settlement” following the fall of the Soviet Union, which effectively excluded Russia and saw NATO’s expansion to that nation’s borders, had much shorter lives (on the order of twenty years).
War settlement in the 2020s must be informed by magnanimous-punitive alternatives. A grain Convention would seem to fall in the range of the doable middle. It punishes no one, rewards all parties, and requires them to do nothing except engage in peaceful commerce.
When in force, the Convention would discourage military action at or from the sea. Not blockading grain-carrying ships in the Black Sea would make it difficult to selectively blockade ships carrying other kinds of cargo. Similarly, mounting amphibious operations of any scale while avoiding blockading the adversary’s grain ships would be problematic, if not impossible.
A grain Convention would carry powerful incentives for self-enforcement. Nonetheless, it might break down. If Russia tried to reimpose a blockade on Ukraine, NATO could defeat the attempt through military actions solely at sea, by establishing and defending a protected corridor in territorial waters running from Odesa (at a minimum) to the Bosporus. Continuing grain flow would serve Türkiye’s interests, as well as Ukraine’s and other states.’
These conditions mean that if the war moves toward settlement and warships of non-Black Sea NATO navies reenter the Black Sea (none has been there for the last nine months), relatively few, smaller ships would be needed. Initial NATO deployments would express in the language of action confidence in the importance of the Convention. Unless unforeseen events dictate, this confidence, backed by NATO’s latent threat of enforcement, should provide ample stability and security.
Putting the Convention idea forward would cost and risk nothing. It would provide political support for Ukraine and push Russia onto its back foot. It would be welcomed by the international community, especially in the developing world. A boost to the West there alone would justify the effort. But a Convention is also a serious policy initiative to help settle the war, help produce an enduring peace, and solve an ongoing humanitarian problem.
At the highest levels of government, the United States should immediately propose a “Black Sea International Grain Export Convention,” putting America and its allies, including Ukraine, in a position of unassailable moral and political authority and allow the President to give concrete expression to America’s conception of a peaceful and rules-based world order. Uniquely, it would make food security the centerpiece of new international law.
Bradford Dismukes, a retired naval reserve officer, is a strategist and expert on maritime security issues.
Barry M. Blechman is co-founder of the Stimson Center. Both worked previously at the Center for Naval Analyses.
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