Air denial: The dangerous illusion of decisive air superiority
A strategy of air denial might be the smarter and more economical choice when trying to preserve the status quo on NATO’s eastern flank or across the Taiwan Strait.
As part of the Airpower after Ukraine series, this essay argues the air war in Ukraine is a harbinger of air wars to come, when US adversaries will increasingly employ defense in vertical depth, layering the effects of cyber disruptions, electromagnetic jamming, air defenses, drones, and missiles in increasing degrees of strength, from higher to lower altitudes. Even if high-end fighters and bombers manage to gain air superiority in the “blue skies,” the airspace below them remains contested. The “air littoral”—that is, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers—then poses the more challenging and important contest for air control.
Air denial: The dangerous illusion of decisive air superiority
By Col. Maximillian K. Bremer • Kelly A. Grieco
Defense Policy & Posture
Originally published by the Atlantic Council.
As part of the Airpower after Ukraine series, this essay argues the air war in Ukraine is a harbinger of air wars to come, when US adversaries will increasingly employ defense in vertical depth, layering the effects of cyber disruptions, electromagnetic jamming, air defenses, drones, and missiles in increasing degrees of strength, from higher to lower altitudes. Even if high-end fighters and bombers manage to gain air superiority in the “blue skies,” the airspace below them remains contested. The “air littoral”—that is, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers—then poses the more challenging and important contest for air control.
Read the article on the Atlantic Council.
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